{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 12021034CAO","title":"BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2021-03-19","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12021034cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12021034cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12021034cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12021034CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2021-03-19 and is reported as closed as of 2023-07-13. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n12021034CAO_Amended Corrective Action Order_05042021_(21-207810).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_05042021_(21-207810).pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Amended Corrective Action Order_05042021_(21-207810)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_05042021_(21-207810)_text.pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Closure Letter_07132023_(21-207810).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Closure%20Letter_07132023_(21-207810).pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Closure Letter_07132023_(21-207810)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Closure%20Letter_07132023_(21-207810)_text.pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Corrective Action Order_03192021_(21-207810).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_03192021_(21-207810).pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Corrective Action Order_03192021_(21-207810)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_03192021_(21-207810)_text.pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Op Req for Hearing and Req Time Extension_03292021_(21-207810).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Op%20Req%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Req%20Time%20Extension_03292021_(21-207810).pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Operator Hearing Request Withdrawn_04062021_(21-207810).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12021034CAO/12021034CAO_Operator%20Hearing%20Request%20Withdrawn_04062021_(21-207810).pdf\n\n12021034CAO_Closure Letter_07132023_(21-207810)_text.pdf\n\nOVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY\nJuly 13, 2023\nMr. Todd Russo\nChief Executive Officer\nBuckeye Partners, LP\n4200 Westheimer Road\nSuite 975\nHouston, Texas 77027\nCPF 1-2021-034-CAO\nDear Mr. Russo:\nOn March 19, 2021, and on May 4, 2021, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) and an Amended Corrective\nAction Order (ACAO), respectively, to Buckeye Partners, LP (Buckeye), with regard to the March\n16, 2021 rupture of its 12-inch hazardous liquid pipeline located in Linden, New Jersey. The\nACAO included a list of various required Corrective Actions.\nWe have received the CAO Documentation Report (CDR), dated February 2, 2023, from Ms.\nClaudia Pankowski, Director of Regulatory Compliance. We have also received quarterly reports,\nmonthly reports, and other information.\nBased on our review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined that you have\ncomplied with the terms of this Order. Accordingly, this CAO is now closed. Thank you for your\ncooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n\n\nCc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS,\nPHMSA <linda.daugherty@dot.gov>\nMs. Claudia Pankowski, Director of Regulatory Compliance, Buckeye Partners, LP\n<cpankowski@buckeye.com>\nMr. Evan Hofmann, General Counsel, Buckeye Partners, LP <ehofmann@buckeye.com>\n\n12021034CAO_Amended Corrective Action Order_05042021_(21-207810)_text.pdf\n\nMay 4, 2021\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: csmith@buckeye.com\nMr. Clark C. Smith\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nBuckeye Partners, LP\nOne Greenway Plaza, Suite 600\nHouston, Texas 77046\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nDear Mr. Smith:\nEnclosed please find an Amended Corrective Action Order issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety, in the above-referenced case. It\nrequires Buckeye Partners, LP to take certain corrective actions with respect to the March 16,\n2021 failure of Line 602, a 12-inch transmission line, in Linden, New Jersey.\nService of the Amended Corrective Action Order by e-mail is deemed complete upon\ntransmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Amended Corrective Action Order\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMr. William Hollis, Senior Vice President, Buckeye Partners, LP, whollis@buckeye.com\nMs. Claudia Pankowski, Director of Regulatory Compliance, Buckeye Partners, LP,\ncpankowski@buckeye.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBuckeye Partners, LP,\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent.\n____________________________________)\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Amended Order) is being issued by the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to require Buckeye Partners, LP (Buckeye or\nRespondent) to take the necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from potential hazards associated with the March 16, 2021 rupture of its 12-inch\nhazardous liquid pipeline located in Linden, New Jersey: the “Accident.”\nAt approximately 5:26 AM ET, on March 16, 2021, Buckeye’s 12-inch hazardous liquid\npipeline, Line 602, ruptured and released approximately 353 barrels of unleaded gasoline in\nLinden, New Jersey. The accident was discovered when Buckeye’s supervisory control and data\nacquisition (SCADA) control center in Breinigsville, Pennsylvania indicated that the flow rate\nwas continuing to rise while the pressure plateaued. Buckeye’s system automatically shut down\nthe pipeline due to a low inlet pump pressure safety switch. Buckeye controllers followed-up by\nhaving field personnel close remote block valves, and dispatched personnel to locate the failure.\nBuckeye personnel discovered gasoline in a low-lying swamp between mile post (MP) 99+98\nand MP 109+89, near the Arthur Kill River.\nBuckeye deployed an oil spill response team to the site to run a containment and absorbent boom\nto keep the release from reaching a tributary of the Arthur Kill River. The two remote block\nvalves Buckeye closed were at the west bank of the Arthur Kill River, north of the release site,\nand at the south side of the site. There were no reports of fires, injuries, fatalities or evacuations.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Accident, and on March\n19, 2021, issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO). However, as a result of PHMSA’s continued\ninvestigation and additional information provided by Buckeye, PHMSA is issuing this ACAO to\nmodify a definition, modify corrective actions based upon a technical review of data submitted\nby Buckeye, and grant extensions of time for completion of some of the corrective actions. The\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 2\nACAO does not make any substantive changes to the corrective actions prescribed in the CAO.\nThe amended preliminary findings of the agency’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\nAmended Preliminary Findings\n At approximately 5:26 AM ET, on March 16, 2021, Buckeye’s 12-inch hazardous\nliquid pipeline, Line 602, ruptured and the line was automatically shut down by a low\ninlet pump pressure safety switch. Buckeye’s SCADA control center in Breinigsville,\nPennsylvania, later identified that the flow rate on Line 602 was rising but the\npressure had plateaued. Buckeye’s control center requested that Linden station\npersonnel keep Line 602 shutdown; closed block valves located at Valve Site 1L-\nLinden Station, stationing (Sta.) 3+72, and Valve Site 2L-West Side Arthur Kill, Sta.\n130+30; and dispatched personnel to determine the cause for the plateau. Buckeye\npersonnel discovered gasoline bubbling up in a low-lying swamp between mile post\n(MP) 99+98 and MP 109+89, near the Arthur Kill River.\n Buckeye reported the Accident to the National Response Center (NRC) at 8:40 AM\nET on March 16, 2021, (NRC Report No. 1300418), indicating it released an\nestimated 55 barrels of unleaded gasoline into swampland near the Arthur Kill River.\nLater in the afternoon, at 3:35 PM ET, Buckeye revised its release estimate to\napproximately 353 barrels of unleaded gasoline.\n There were no fires, injuries, fatalities, or evacuations associated with the Accident.\n Prior to the rupture, the operating pressure on Line 602 was 1145 pounds per square\nin gauge (psig). The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the line is 1222 psig.\n Line 602 is a 12-inch nominal diameter, 0.25-inch wall thickness, API 5L, X-60\ngrade, seamless pipe that was constructed in 1965. It has a coal tar coating and an\nimpressed current cathodic protection system. Line 602 is one of five parallel\npipelines in the right-of-way (ROW). There are two Buckeye pipelines (Line 601 and\nLine 602) and three Colonial pipelines in the ROW at the failure location. Both Lines\n601 and 602 run from the Linden, New Jersey terminal to New Lots Junction in New\nYork. Line 601 then travels to John F. Kennedy and LaGuardia airports. Line 602\ntravels to Long Island City, New York and Inwood, New York. Another Buckeye\npipeline, Line 607, runs from the Linden, New Jersey terminal and supplies jet fuel to\nNewark Liberty airport.\n The Respondent performed an in-line inspection (ILI) on Line 602, utilizing both a\ngeometry and magnetic flux leakage (MFL) tool in July 2019. Multiple general metal\nloss and pitting anomalies were identified, but Buckeye reports the anomalies were\nnot of a degree that were actionable. Respondent’s two pipelines (601 and 602) are\nboth located in similar, marshy environments.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 3\n Buckeye shut in Line 601 during the post-failure excavation activities on Line 602.\nThe closest Colonial pipeline in the ROW is idle and was previously purged with\nnitrogen. The remaining two Colonial pipelines contain hazardous liquids but are\ncurrently idle due to lack of demand.\n Respondent’s Lines 602 and 601 are pipeline facilities subject to the pipeline safety\nlaws in 49 U.S.C. chapter 601 and 49 C.F.R. part 195.\n The Buckeye pipeline system in the Linden Area of New Jersey consists of: 20-inch\nand 16-inch pipelines from Linden, New Jersey to Pennsylvania (49.1 miles); a 12-\ninch pipeline from Sewaren, New Jersey to Linden Station (5.2 miles); a 6-inch\npipeline from Linden, New Jersey (1 mile) that turns into an 8-inch pipeline to\nNewark airport (6.1 miles)(Line 607); two 12-inch pipelines from Linden, New\nJersey to Long Island, New York (2.8 miles)(Lines 601 and 602); 49 breakout tanks\nlocated at the Linden facility; one breakout tank located at Newark airport; and one\npump station at the Linden facility. The Linden Area system includes several river\ncrossings.\n The failure occurred in a high-consequence area, near a commercially navigable\nwaterway – the Arthur Kill River - approximately 2.5 miles east of Linden, New\nJersey. Line 602 traverses several high consequence areas.\n Preliminary indications suggest the Accident occurred due to thinning of pipe wall\nbecause of generalized corrosion at the 3 o’clock position along the longitudinal axis.\n The Isolated Segment (defined below) was cut out and replaced with pretested pipe\non March 21, 2021, pursuant to the terms of the CAO.\n Pursuant to the terms of the CAO, Buckeye submitted a written Restart Plan to the\nDirector on March 21, 2021. The Restart Plan was approved by the Director on\nMarch 24, 2021.\n The Isolated Segment was restarted at 60% of MOP on March 25, 2021, pursuant to\nthe terms of the Restart Plan.\nOn March 30, 2021, Buckeye submitted technical data on Line 607, which included material\nspecifications, date of installation, and inspection reports. Based upon a review of this data, Line\n607 differs significantly from Lines 601 and 602 in material, installation, and operating\nconditions. For this reason, we are removing Line 607 from the scope of the ACAO.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 4\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the hazardous liquid pipeline facility is located to environmentally\nsensitive areas; (5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in\nwhich the pipeline facility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation\nSafety Board made under another law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as\nappropriate.\nAfter evaluating the amended preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the age of the\npipeline, the hazardous nature of the materials transported, the July 2019 ILI on Line 602 that\nfailed to detect corrosion preliminarily observed at the failure site, the location of the spill in a\nlow-lying marsh near a navigable body of water, and the likelihood that similar conditions\nconducive to corrosion exist on Buckeye's other pipelines in the Linden Area pipeline system, I\nfind that continued operation of the Affected Pipelines, as defined below, without corrective\nmeasures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue\nthis Amended Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Amended Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Amended\nOrder are effective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Amended Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held\nas soon as practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing,\nwith a copy to the Director, Eastern Region, PHMSA. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, a further amended order will be issued. To the\nextent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nDefinitions:\nAffected Pipelines – The “Affected Pipelines” means Buckeye’s 12-inch Line 602 and\nBuckeye’s 12-inch Line 601, both located in Linden, New Jersey.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 5\nIsolated Segment – The \"Isolated Segment\" means Buckeye’s Line 602 between the valve at\nValve Site 1L - Linden Station (Sta 3+72) and the valve at Valve Site 2L – West Side Arthur\nKill (Sta 130+30).\nDirector – The Director, Eastern Region, PHMSA, OPS, 840 Bear Tavern Rd., Ste. 300,\nWest. Trenton, New Jersey 08628.\nDay – Calendar day.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order Respondent to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions:\n1. Shutdown of the Isolated Segment. The Isolated Segment was out of service from March\n16, 2021 through March 24, 2021. The Isolated Segment remained shut-in and was not\noperated until authorized to restart by the Director on March 24, 2021, in accordance with\nthe terms of the CAO.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. Buckeye must maintain a forty percent (40%) pressure\nreduction in the maximum operating pressure (MOP) along the entire length of the Isolated\nSegment, and must maintain a twenty percent (20%) pressure reduction along the remaining\nlength of the Affected Pipelines, such that the operating pressure will not exceed eighty\npercent (80%) of the MOP.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return a pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\n3. b. On March 19, 2021, Respondent provided the Director the actual operating pressures of\neach pump station on the Affected Pipelines at the time of failure and the reduced\npressure restriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, Respondent must take into\naccount any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected Pipelines to provide for\ncontinued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\ne. Respondent must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating\npressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected\nPipelines. Respondent must immediately reduce the operating pressure further to\nmaintain the safe operations of the Affected Pipelines, if warranted by the monthly\nreview. Respondent must submit the results of the monthly review to the Director\nincluding, at a minimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional\npressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points. Submittals\nmust be made quarterly, in accordance with Item 17 below.\nRestart Plan. Pursuant to the terms of the CAO, Buckeye developed and submitted a\nwritten Restart Plan to the Director on March 21, 2021. The Director approved the Restart\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 6\nPlan on March 24, 2021. The Restart Plan is incorporated by reference in to this Amended\n4. 5. 6. 7. Order.\nReturn to Service. Pursuant to the terms of the CAO and the approved Restart Plan,\nRespondent returned the Isolated Segment to service on March 25, 2021. The operating\npressure must not exceed the pressure restrictions in accordance with Item 2 above.\nRemoval or Modification of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a\nwritten request from Respondent demonstrating that modifying or restoring the\nAffected Pipelines to their pre-failure operating pressures is justified based on a\nreliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all\nknown defects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\nb. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestrictions upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that temporary\nmitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The Director's\ndetermination will be based on the failure cause and provision of evidence that\npreventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe\noperation of the Affected Pipelines during the temporary removal or modification of\nthe pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this regard will\nbe decided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\nMechanical and Metallurgical Testing. By May 18, 2021, Respondent must complete\nmechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including an\nanalysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Mechanical and metallurgical testing\nmust be conducted by an independent third-party acceptable to the Director, and must\ndocument the decision-making process and all factors contributing to the failure.\nRespondent must complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Buckeye provided chain-of-custody documentation for the handling and transporting\nof the failed pipe section and evidence from the failure site on March 30, 2021.\nb. Pursuant to the CAO, the Respondent developed and submitted the testing protocol\nand the proposed testing laboratory to the Director for approval on March 19, 2021.\nThe Director approved the testing protocol on March 19, 2021.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS\nrepresentative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to Respondent.\nRoot Cause Failure Analysis. By July 17, 2021, Respondent must complete a root cause\nfailure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the Director. The RCFA\nmust be supplemented or facilitated by an independent third-party acceptable to the\nDirector and must document the decision-making process and all factors contributing to the\nfailure. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 7\nfindings and lessons learned are applicable to other locations within Respondent’s pipeline\nsystem.\n8. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. b. c. d. e. Within 30 days following the completion of the RCFA, see Item 7 above, Respondent\nmust submit a Remedial Work Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nThe Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nOnce approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nAmended Order.\nThe RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures Respondent will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Pipelines. It must\naddress all known or suspected factors and causes of the Accident. Respondent must\nconsider the risks and consequences of another failure to develop a prioritized\nschedule for RWP-related work along the Affected Pipelines.\nThe RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Pipelines with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Accident.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Pipelines and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and\nfailures.\niii. iv. v. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis, and\nother corrective actions required by this Amended Order with all relevant pre-\nexisting operational and assessment data for the Affected Pipelines. Pre-existing\noperational data includes, but is not limited to, design, construction, operations,\nmaintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and any third-party\nconsultation information. Pre-existing assessment data includes, but is not limited\nto, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close interval\nsurveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\nDetermine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Accident are likely to\nexist elsewhere on the Affected Pipelines.\nConduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the\nAccident and other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any other\nintegrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Pipelines. At a minimum,\nthis process must consider all failure causes and use:\n1) ILI tools with ultrasonic thickness (UT) measurement technology, and\nACVG/DCVG surveys to detect holidays under disbonded coating; and one or\nmore of the following, if necessary:\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing;\n3) Close-interval surveys;\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 8\n9. 4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in coordination\nwith other utilities (e.g. underground utilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in\nthe area;\n5) Coating surveys;\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys;\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the\nfailure causes.\nNote: The results of tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations conducted prior\nto issuance of this CAO may be used only if they included UT measurement\ntechnology.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria Respondent will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\nvii. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Pipelines, describe the\nmethods Respondent will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective measures\nto remediate the conditions associated with the Accident and to address other\nknown integrity threats along the Affected Pipelines. The repair, replacement, or\nother corrective measures must meet the criteria specified in (e)(vi) above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Pipelines\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to the Amended Order.\nf. g. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nRespondent must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Amended Order, and to incorporate modifications\nrequired by the Director.\nh. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\ni. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\nii. All revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by reference\ninto this Amended Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO\nDocumentation Report, see below.\ni. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the\nplan.\nPatrolling. Within 30 days of receipt of this Amended Order, Respondent must perform an\naerial or ground right-of-way patrol of the Affected Pipelines. Respondent must investigate\nall leak indications and remedy all leaks discovered. Respondent must submit\ndocumentation of this survey to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Amended\nOrder.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 9\n10. Records Verification. As outlined in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, Respondent\nmust verify the records for the Affected Pipelines to confirm the MOP. Respondent must\nsubmit documentation of this this record verification to the Director within 45 days of\nreceipt of this Amended Order.\n11. Review of Prior Inline Inspection (ILI) Results. By May 7, 2021, Respondent must\nconduct a review of any previous ILI results of the Affected Pipelines. In its review,\nRespondent must re-evaluate all ILI results from the past 10 calendar years, including a\nreview of the ILI vendor’s raw data and analysis. Respondent must determine whether any\nfeatures were present in the failed pipe joints from the Accident and any other pipe\nremoved. Respondent must also determine if any features with similar characteristics are\npresent elsewhere on the Affected Pipelines. Respondent must submit documentation of\nthis ILI review to the Director within 30 days of receipt of this Amended Order as follows:\na. b. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs.\nList, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures present in the failed joint and other pipe removed.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected Pipelines.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the reevaluation.\n12. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Respondent must review and assess the\neffectiveness of its emergency response plan with regards to the failure. Include in the\nreview and assessment the on-scene response and support, coordination, and\ncommunication with emergency responders and public officials. Also, include a review\nand assessment of the effectiveness of its emergency training program. Respondent must\namend its emergency response plan and emergency training, if necessary, to reflect the\nresults of this review. Further, Respondent must review controller response to all alarms\nprior to, and following, confirmation of the rupture. Respondent must also review the\ncontrollers’ coordination and communications with internal and external stakeholders prior\nto and throughout this accident response. The documentation of this Emergency Response\nPlan and Training Review must be available for inspection by OPS or provided to the\nDirector, if requested.\n13. Public Awareness Program Review. Respondent must review and assess the effectiveness\nof its Public Awareness Program with regards to the failure. Respondent must amend its\nPublic Awareness Program, if necessary, to reflect the results of this review. The\ndocumentation of this Public Awareness Program Review must be available for inspection\nby OPS or provided to the Director, if requested.\n14. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). Respondent must create and revise, as necessary, a\nCAO Documentation Report (CDR). When Respondent has concluded all the items in this\nAmended Order it will submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow\nthe Director to complete a thorough review of all actions taken by Respondent with regards\nto this Amended Order prior to approving its closure. The intent is for the CDR to\nsummarize all activities and documentation associated with this Amended Order in one\ndocument.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 10\na. b. c. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.\nOnce approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nAmended Order.\nThe CDR must include, but is not necessarily limited to, the following:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. iii. Summary of the Accident and the response activities;\nSummary of pipe data, material properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Pipeline;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required\nby the Amended Order;\nv. Summary of the mechanical and metallurgical testing as required by the Amended\nOrder;\nvi. vii. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Amended Order;\nDocumentation of all actions taken by Respondent to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Amended Order and\nwhenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure\ninvestigation and remedial activities;\nix. x. Lessons learned while completing this Amended Order;\nA path forward describing specific actions Respondent will take on its entire\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Amended\nOrder; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n15. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Amended Order that requires\nthe approval of the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the\nsubmission; (b) approve the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission\nto cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that\nRespondent modify the submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of\napproval, approval upon conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall\nproceed to take all action required by the submission as approved or modified by the\nDirector. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must\ncorrect all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director, and resubmit it for\napproval.\n16. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Amended Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 11\n17. Reporting. Respondent must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Amended Order;\nand (2) describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken.\nThe first quarterly report is due on June 18, 2021. The Director may change the interval for\nthe submission of these reports.\n18. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this ACAO. Include in each\nmonthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and\nrevision of procedures, studies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure, including repairs, replacements, and other modifications; and (3)\nenvironmental remediation, if applicable.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The\nactions required by this Amended Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements\nthat apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any\nother order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other\nprovision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal in writing any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Amended Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in\nreferral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Amended Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nMay 4, 2021\n_________________________________ ________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n12021034CAO_Corrective Action Order_03192021_(21-207810)_text.pdf\n\nMarch 19, 2021\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: csmith@buckeye.com\nMr. Clark C. Smith\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nBuckeye Partners, LP\nOne Greenway Plaza, Suite 600\nHouston, Texas 77046\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nDear Mr. Smith:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety, in the above-referenced\ncase. It requires Buckeye Partners, LP (Buckeye or Respondent) to take certain corrective\nactions with respect to the March 16, 2021 failure of Line 602, a 12-inch transmission line, in\nLinden, New Jersey.\nService of the CAO by e-mail is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of\nreceipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this\nOrder are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nAlan Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMr. William Hollis, Senior Vice President, Buckeye Partners, LP, whollis@buckeye.com\nMs. Claudia Pankowski, Director of Regulatory Compliance, Buckeye Partners, LP,\ncpankowski@buckeye.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBuckeye Partners, LP,\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent.\n____________________________________)\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) is being issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), under the authority\nof 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to require Buckeye Partners, LP (Buckeye or Respondent) to take the\nnecessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential\nhazards associated with the March 16, 2021 rupture of its 12-inch hazardous liquid pipeline\nlocated in Linden, New Jersey (Accident).\nAt approximately 5:26 AM ET, on March 16, 2021, Buckeye’s 12-inch hazardous liquid\npipeline, Line 602, ruptured and released approximately 353 barrels of unleaded gasoline in\nLinden, New Jersey. The accident was discovered when Buckeye’s supervisory control and data\nacquisition (SCADA) control center in Breinigsville, Pennsylvania indicated that the flow rate\nwas continuing rise while the pressure plateaued. Buckeye shut down the pipeline, closed\nremote block valves, and dispatched personnel to the site. Buckeye personnel discovered\ngasoline bubbling up in a low-lying swamp between mile post (MP) 99+98 and MP 109+89, near\nthe Arthur Kill River.\nBuckeye deployed an oil spill response team to the site to run a containment and absorbent boom\nto keep the release from reaching the tributary or the Arthur Kill River. The two remote block\nvalves Buckeye closed were at the west bank of the Arthur Kill River, north of the release site,\nand at the south side of the site. There were no reports of fires, injuries, fatalities or evacuations.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Accident. The\npreliminary findings of the agency’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\nPreliminary Findings\n At approximately 5:26 AM ET, on March 16, 2021, Buckeye’s 12-inch hazardous\nliquid pipeline, Line 602, ruptured. Buckeye’s SCADA control center in\n\n\n\nCPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO\nPage 2\nBreinigsville, Pennsylvania, detected that the flow rate on Line 602 was rising but the\npressure had plateaued. Buckeye’s control center remotely shut down Line 602;\nclosed block valves located at Valve Site 1L-Linden Station, stationing (Sta.) 3+72,\nand Valve Site 2L-West Side Arthur Kill, Sta. 130+30; and dispatched personnel to\ndetermine the cause for the plateau. Buck","truncated":true,"body_characters":68285}