{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 12024055CAO","title":"BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2024-09-13","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12024055cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12024055cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12024055cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12024055CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving BUCKEYE PARTNERS, LP. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2024-09-13 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n12024055CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_11082024_(24-319516).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(Amended)_11082024_(24-319516).pdf\n\n12024055CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_11082024_(24-319516)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(Amended)_11082024_(24-319516)_text.pdf\n\n12024055CAO_Corrective Action Order_09132024_(24-319516).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_09132024_(24-319516).pdf\n\n12024055CAO_Corrective Action Order_09132024_(24-319516)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_09132024_(24-319516)_text.pdf\n\n12024055CAO_Operator Request for Hearing and Request for Informal Meeting_09232024_(24-319516).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_Operator%20Request%20for%20Hearing%20and%20Request%20for%20Informal%20Meeting_09232024_(24-319516).pdf\n\n12024055CAO_Operator Withdrawal of Hearing Request_11132024_(24-319516).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_Operator%20Withdrawal%20of%20Hearing%20Request_11132024_(24-319516).pdf\n\n12024055CAO_PHC Hearing Scheduled_10092024_(24-319516).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_10092024_(24-319516).pdf\n\n12024055CAO_PHC Hearing Scheduled_10092024_(24-319516)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12024055CAO/12024055CAO_PHC%20Hearing%20Scheduled_10092024_(24-319516)_text.pdf\n\n12024055CAO_Corrective Action Order (Amended)_11082024_(24-319516)_text.pdf\n\nNovember 8, 2024\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: trusso@buckeye.com\nTodd Russo\nChief Executive Officer\nBuckeye Partners, LP\n4200 Westheimer Road, Suite 975\nHouston, Texas 77027\nCPF No. 1-2024-055-CAO\nDear Mr. Russo:\nEnclosed please find the Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Order) issued by the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety, in the above-\nreferenced case. It requires Buckeye Partners, LP to take certain corrective actions with respect\nto the September 5, 2024, leak of gasoline from its hazardous liquid pipeline facilities in Linden,\nNew Jersey.\nService of the ACAO by e-mail is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of\nreceipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this\nOrder are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: ACAO\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMr. Craig Brown, Vice President, Environmental & DOT Compliance\nBuckeye Partners, LP, cbrown@buckeye.com\n\n\n\nMr. Robert Osika, Director, DOT Compliance, Buckeye Partners, LP,\nrosika@buckeye.com\nMr. Mark Copeland, Manager, Pipeline Safety & DOT Compliance, Buckeye Partners,\nLP, mcopeland@buckeye.com\nMs. Catherine Little, Esq., Counsel for Buckeye Partners, LP, Bracewell, LLP,\ncatherine.little@bracewell.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBuckeye Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2024-055-CAO\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Amended Corrective Action Order (ACAO or Order) is being issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), under the\nauthority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, to require Buckeye Partners, LP\n(Buckeye or Respondent) to take the necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property,\nand the environment from potential hazards associated with the September 5, 2024, release from\nits hazardous liquid pipeline facilities located near Linden, New Jersey (Accident).\nRespondent operates a hazardous liquid pipeline system that includes over 5,000 miles of\npipeline across several locations in the United States, including in the Linden, New Jersey area.\nBuckeye’s hazardous liquid facilities in the Linden area include numerous pipelines traversing\nthe states of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, including breakout tanks, a pump station,\nand two 12-inch hazardous liquid pipelines (Lines 601 and 602) running between Linden, New\nJersey and Long Island, New York (approximately 2.8 miles in length). Line 602 is a hazardous\nliquid pipeline facility subject to the pipeline safety laws in 49 U.S.C. chapter 601 and 49 C.F.R.\npart 195.\nAt approximately 6:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT)1, on September 5, 2024, Respondent\nwas notified by personnel of another local pipeline operator of an odor in the area of Buckeye’s\n12-inch hazardous liquid pipeline, Line 602, in Linden, New Jersey. Respondent’s subsequent\ninvestigation discovered that a leak of unleaded gasoline was occurring from Line 602, resulting\nin the release of approximately ten gallons of hazardous liquid.\nIn response, Buckeye closed remote block valves, shut down Line 602, and dispatched personnel\nto the site. There were no reports of fires, injuries, fatalities or evacuations.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA’s OPS initiated an investigation of the Accident and, on\n1 All times specified in this order reflect EDT.\n\n\n\nSeptember 13, 2024, issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO). Buckeye responded to the CAO\non September 23, 2024, and reserved its right to a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.233. The\nhearing in this matter is currently scheduled to occur on January 9, 2025. This ACAO includes\nminor revision to three preliminary findings, amends the corrective actions prescribed in the\nCAO, and incorporates an updated version of the restart plan that was attached to the CAO. The\npreliminary findings of the agency’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\nAmended Preliminary Findings\n• At approximately 6:00 P.M. on September 5, 2024, Respondent was notified by the\npersonnel of another local pipeline operator of an odor in the area of Buckeye’s 12-\ninch hazardous liquid pipeline, Line 602, in Linden, New Jersey. Respondent’s\nsubsequent investigation discovered that a leak of unleaded gasoline was occurring\nfrom Line 602, resulting in the release of approximately ten gallons of hazardous\nliquid.\n• Buckeye’s control center remotely shut down Line 602; closed block valves located at\nValve Site 1L-Linden Station, stationing (Sta.) 3+72, and Valve Site 2L-West Side\nArthur Kill, Sta. 130+30; and, dispatched personnel to determine the cause.\n• Buckeye reported the Accident to the National Response Center (NRC) at 6:31 P.M.\non September 5, 2024 (NRC Report No. 1410029), indicating the Accident resulted in\nthe release an estimated ten gallons of unleaded gasoline. Buckeye’s investigation\nnoted a sheen on standing water in proximity to adjacent Piles Creek.\n• The failure occurred in a high-consequence area, near a commercially navigable\nwaterway – the Arthur Kill River – approximately one mile from Linden Station.\nLine 602 traverses several high consequence areas.\n• Prior to the failure, the operating pressure on Line 602 was 1,141 pounds per square\ninch gauge (psig). The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the line is 1,222 psig.\n• Line 602 is a 12-inch nominal diameter, 0.250-inch wall thickness, API 5L, X-60\ngrade, seamless pipe that was constructed in 1965. It has a coal tar coating and an\nimpressed current cathodic protection system.\n• Line 602 runs from the Linden, New Jersey terminal to New Lots Junction in New\nYork. Line 602 then travels north to Long Island City Terminal, New York and east\nto the JFK Airport and Inwood Terminals, also in New York.\n• Line 602, including the September 5, 2024, aboveground failure location, was the\nsubject of a previous PHMSA CAO, CPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO associated with a\nMarch 2021 failure located below grade.2\n2 See https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12021034CAO.\n\n\n\n• On September 4, 2024, the day before the Accident, Respondent performed an in-line\ninspection (ILI) tool run on Line 602, utilizing both a geometry and magnetic flux\nleakage (MFL). The results of the ILI run are not yet available for review.\n• On September 7, 2024, the Director, Eastern Region, OPS, approved Respondent’s\nwritten restart plan (602 Repair and Restart Plan 9-6-24 V4; attached) for Line 602,\nwith a 20 percent reduced operating pressure after the section of pipe where the\nrelease occurred was cut out and replaced.\n• PHMSA’s on-site investigation and observations of the pipe where the failure\noccurred noted apparent external metal loss due to corrosion.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nOn October 11, 2024, Buckeye submitted a request for amendments to the CAO for PHMSA’s\nconsideration. The requested changes included amendments to applicable deadlines specified in\nCorrective Actions 1(e), 3, 7, and 11. The requested changes also addressed Corrective Action 2\nto reflect that Line 602 is a hazardous liquid pipeline equipped with a computational pipeline\nmonitoring (CPM) leak detection system.\nPursuant to Buckeye’s request, PHMSA is amending Corrective Action 1(e) to reflect that the\npressure review report must be submitted to the Director on a quarterly basis, via the quarterly\nreport required under Corrective Action 11. This amendment reflects that the factors listed under\nCorrective Action 1(e) and pressure changes are not expected to change monthly. The pressure\nrestriction and setpoint limitations required under Corrective Action 1 remain in effect until the\nrestriction is removed by the Director (per Corrective Action 6). Buckeye also asserts it will\ncontinue to respond to and report safety-related conditions as is required under Part 195.\nCorrective Action 1 is also amended to reflect that the Respondent’s written restart plan was\napproved by the Director on September 7, 2024. Corrective Action 2 is amended below to\nreflect that Line 602 is equipped with computational pipeline monitoring (CPM) leak detection\nsystem, and also that Buckeye will provide the Director with documentation of its right of way\npatrol activities upon request. Corrective Action 2 specifies Buckeye will report any\ninterruptions or malfunctions affecting Line 602’s CPM to the Director within 24 hours.\nCorrective Actions 3 and 7 are amended below to provide 60 days from issuance of the CAO for\nthe submission of the review of prior inline ILI results and the mechanical and metallurgical\ntesting and failure analysis of the failed pipe (by November 12, 2024). Corrective Action 11 is\namended to reflect that the first quarterly report due under this ACAO must be submitted by\nDecember 13, 2024, or three months (one quarter) after issuance of the CAO. Finally, the\ncorrective actions in this ACAO have been amended to reflect that the specified submission\ndeadlines run from the original September 13, 2024, issuance date of the CAO. PHMSA\nacknowledges that some of the specified deadlines are now retrospective and have already been\nfulfilled.\nSection 60112 authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous\nto life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood of serious harm, to expeditiously\norder to the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective action, including suspended or\n\n\n\nrestricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other appropriate\naction. An order issued expeditiously must provide an opportunity for a hearing as soon as\npracticable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material are transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the pipeline facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas;\n(5) the population density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made\nunder another law; and (7) other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact and having considered the age of the\npipeline; the hazardous nature of the materials transported; the unknown cause of the September\n5, 2024, release of gasoline; the March 2021 failure on Line 602 that resulted in PHMSA’s\nissuance of a previous CAO in CPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO; the presently unknown results from\nthe September 4, 2024, inline inspection run conducted on Line 602; the location of the failure\nand release occurring in a high-consequence area and Line 602’s path through several high\nconsequence areas; the area of the failure in a low-lying marshy area near a navigable body of\nwater and near Linden, New Jersey; and the likelihood as based on past failures that similar\nconditions conducive to corrosion exist could exist on Line 602, I find that continued operation\nof the Affected Segment, as defined below, without corrective measures is or would be\nhazardous to life, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order expeditiously\nwould result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, under 49 C.F.R. § 190.233(b), this Order mandating immediate corrective action is\nissued expeditiously without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions\nof this Order are effective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this ACAO, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon\nas practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a\ncopy to the Director, OPS Eastern Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will\nbe held in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider amending this Order. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\n\n\n\nRequired Corrective Actions\nDefinitions:\nAffected Segment – The \"Affected Segment\" means Buckeye’s Line 602 between the valve at\nValve Site 1L - Linden Station (Sta 3+72) and the valve at Valve Site 2L – West Side Arthur\nKill (Sta 130+30).\nDirector – The Director, Eastern Region, PHMSA, OPS, 840 Bear Tavern Rd., Ste. 300,\nWest. Trenton, New Jersey 08628.\nDay – Calendar day.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order Respondent to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions:\n1. Operating Pressure Restriction. As specified in Buckeye’s written restart plan approved\nby the Director on September 7, 2024, Buckeye must reduce and maintain a twenty percent\n(20%) pressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the\nAffected Segment, such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not\nexceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to\nthe Accident on September 5, 2024.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return a pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. c. d. e. Within 15 days of receipt of the CAO, Respondent must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each pump station on the Affected Segment at the time of failure\nand the reduced pressure restriction set-points at these same locations.\nThis pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nWhen determining the pressure restriction set-points, Respondent must take into\naccount any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected Segment to provide for\ncontinued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\nRespondent must review the pressure restriction quarterly by analyzing the operating\npressure data, taking into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegment. Respondent must immediately reduce the operating pressure further to\nmaintain the safe operations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by the quarterly\nreview. Respondent must submit the results of the quarterly review to the Director\nincluding, at a minimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional\npressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points. Submittals\nmust be made quarterly, in accordance with Item 11 of this Order below. Respondent\nwill also respond to, and report, safety-related conditions as required by § 195.55.\n\n\n\n2. 3. 4. Leak Detection Activities. Buckeye must provide documentation of its right of way patrol\nactivities to the Director upon request. Buckeye must also report within 24-hours any\ninterruptions or malfunctions affecting Line 602’s computational pipeline monitoring\n(CPM) leak detection system to the Director during the effective period of this Order.\nMechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 60 days of receipt of the CAO,\nRespondent must complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the\nfailed pipe, including an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Mechanical\nand metallurgical testing must be conducted by an independent third-party acceptable to the\nDirector, and must document the decision-making process and all factors contributing to\nthe failure. Respondent must complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of the CAO, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS\nrepresentative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to Respondent.\nRoot Cause Failure Analysis. Within 120 days of receipt of the CAO, Respondent must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to\nthe Director. The RCFA must be supplemented or facilitated by an independent third-party\n(which is without relationship to third parties used in complying with the RCFA\nrequirement in CPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO) acceptable to the Director and must document\nthe decision-making process and all factors contributing to the failure. The final report\nmust include findings and any lessons learned and whether the findings and lessons learned\nare applicable to other locations within Respondent’s pipeline system. The RCFA must also\naddress how a potential corrosion condition, if found to be applicable to the cause of this\nAccident, was not identified and remediated under the past CAO, CPF No. 1-2021-034-\nCAO.\n5. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 30 days following submission of the RCFA, Respondent must submit to the\nDirector for approval a remedial work plan (RWP) that addresses the conditions\ndescribed in the RCFA that contributed to the Accident.\nb. c. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nOnce approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures Respondent will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It must\naddress all known or suspected contributing factors to the Accident. Respondent\nmust consider the risks and consequences of another failure to develop a prioritized\n\n\n\ne. schedule for RWP-related work along the Affected Segment.\nThe RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Accident.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and\nfailures.\niii. iv. v. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis, and\nother corrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing\noperational and assessment data for the Affected Segment, including pertinent\ninformation associated with the RWP created under CPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO.\nPre-existing operational data includes, but is not limited to, design, construction,\noperations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and any\nthird-party consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data includes, but is\nnot limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct assessments, close\ninterval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\nDetermine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Accident are likely to\nexist elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nConduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the\nAccident and other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any other\nintegrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum,\nthis process must consider all failure causes and use:\n1) ILI tools with ultrasonic thickness (UT) measurement technology, or one or\nmore of the following, if necessary:\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing;\n3) Close-interval surveys;\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in coordination\nwith other utilities (e.g., underground utilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in\nthe area;\n5) Coating surveys, such as DCVG/ACVG;\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys;\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the\nfailure causes.\nNote: The results of tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations conducted prior\nto issuance of this CAO may be used only if they included UT measurement\ntechnology.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria Respondent will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\n\n\n\nf. g. integrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\nvii. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment, describe the\nmethods Respondent will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective measures\nto remediate the conditions associated with the Accident and to address other\nknown integrity threats along the Affected Segment. The repair, replacement, or\nother corrective measures must meet the criteria specified in (e)(vi) above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to the Order.\nInclude a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nRespondent must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate modifications required by\nthe Director.\nh. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\ni. ii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\nAll revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by reference\ninto this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO\nDocumentation Report, see below.\ni. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the\nplan.\n6. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\n7. a. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a\nwritten request from Respondent demonstrating that modifying or restoring the\nAffected Segment to its pre-failure operating pressures is justified based on a reliable\nengineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known\ndefects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\nb. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestrictions upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that temporary\nmitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The Director's\ndetermination will be based on the failure cause and provision of evidence that\npreventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe\noperation of the Affected Segment during the temporary removal or modification of\nthe pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this regard will\nbe decided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\nReview of Prior Inline Inspection (ILI) Results. Within 60 days of receipt of the CAO,\nRespondent must conduct a review of the September 4, 2024, ILI results of the Affected\nSegment. In its review, Respondent must also re-evaluate all ILI results from the past 10\n\n\n\n8. calendar years, including a review of the ILI vendor’s raw data and analysis. Respondent\nmust determine whether any features were present in the failed pipe joints from the\nAccident and any other pipe removed. Respondent must also determine if any features\nwith similar characteristics are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. Respondent\nmust submit documentation of this ILI review to the Director no later than when the RCFA\nis required to be submitted (120 days after issuance of the CAO) under Item 5 above as\nfollows:\na. b. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs.\nList, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures present in the failed joint and other pipe removed.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the reevaluation.\nCAO Documentation Report (CDR). Respondent must create and revise, as necessary, a\nCAO Documentation Report (CDR). When Respondent has concluded all the items in this\nOrder it will submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the\nDirector to complete a thorough review of all actions taken by Respondent with regards to\nthis Order prior to approving the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to\nsummarize all activities and documentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. b. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.\nOnce approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include, but is not necessarily limited to, the following:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. iii. Summary of the Accident and the response activities;\nSummary of pipe data, material properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Segment;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required\nby the Order;\nv. vi. vii. Summary of the mechanical and metallurgical testing as required by the Order;\nSummary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nDocumentation of all actions taken by Respondent to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever\nnecessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure investigation\nand remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\n\n\n\nx. A path forward describing specific actions Respondent will take on its entire\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n9. Approvals. With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve\nthe submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;\n(d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director, and resubmit it for approval.\n10. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\n11. Reporting. Respondent must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2)\ndescribe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first\nquarterly report is due on December 13, 2024. The Director may change the interval for\nthe submission of these reports.\n12. Documentation of Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each\nmonthly report submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and\nrevision of procedures, studies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure, including repairs, replacements, and other modifications; and (3)\nenvironmental remediation, if applicable.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 1-2024-055-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The\nactions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order\nissued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of\nfederal or state law.\n\n\n\nRespondent may appeal in writing any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nNovember 8, 2024\n_________________________________ ________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nAttachment\n\n12024055CAO_Corrective Action Order_09132024_(24-319516)_text.pdf\n\nSeptember 13, 2024\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: trusso@buckeye.com\nTodd Russo\nChief Executive Officer\nBuckeye Partners, LP\n4200 Westheimer Road, Suite 975\nHouston, Texas 77027\nCPF No. 1-2024-055-CAO\nDear Mr. Russo:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety, in the above-referenced\ncase. It requires Buckeye Partners, LP to take certain corrective actions with respect to the\nSeptember 5, 2024, leak of gasoline from its hazardous liquid pipeline facilities in Linden, New\nJersey.\nService of the CAO by e-mail is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of\nreceipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this\nOrder are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, OPS\nMr. Craig Brown, Vice President, Environmental & DOT Compliance\nBuckeye Partners, LP, cbrown@buckeye.com\n\n\n\nMr. Robert Osika, Director, DOT Compliance, Buckeye Partners, LP,\nrosika@buckeye.com@buckeye.com\nMr. Mark Copeland, Manager, Pipeline Safety & DOT Compliance, Buckeye Partners,\nLP, mcopeland@buckeye.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nBuckeye Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 1-2024-055-CAO\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) is being issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), under the authority of 49\nU.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, to require Buckeye Partners, LP (Buckeye or\nRespondent) to take the necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from potential hazards associated with the September 5, 2024, release from its\nhazardous liquid pipeline facilities located near Linden, New Jersey (Accident).\nRespondent operates a hazardous liquid pipeline system that includes over 5,000 miles of\npipeline across several locations in the United States, including in the Linden, New Jersey area.\nBuckeye’s hazardous liquid facilities in the Linden area include numerous pipelines traversing\nthe states of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, including breakout tanks, a pump station,\nand two 12-inch hazardous liquid pipelines (Lines 601 and 602) running between Linden, New\nJersey and Long Island, New York (approximately 2.8 miles in length). Line 602 is a hazardous\nliquid pipeline facility subject to the pipeline safety laws in 49 U.S.C. chapter 601 and 49 C.F.R.\npart 195.\nAt approximately 6:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT)1, on September 5, 2024, Respondent\nwas notified by personnel of another local pipeline operator of an odor in the area of Buckeye’s\n12-inch hazardous liquid pipeline, Line 602, in Linden, New Jersey. Respondent’s subsequent\ninvestigation discovered that a leak of unleaded gasoline was occurring from Line 602, resulting\nin the release of approximately ten gallons of hazardous liquid.\nIn response, Buckeye closed remote block valves, shut down Line 602, and dispatched personnel\nto the site. There were no reports of fires, injuries, fatalities, or evacuations.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA’s OPS initiated an investigation of the Accident. The\n1 All times specified in this order reflect EDT.\n\n\n\npreliminary findings of OPS’ ongoing investigation are as follows:\nPreliminary Findings\n• At approximately 6:00 P.M. on September 5, 2024, Respondent was notified by the\npersonnel of another local pipeline operator of an odor in the area of Buckeye’s 12-\ninch hazardous liquid pipeline, Line 602, in Linden, New Jersey. Respondent’s\nsubsequent investigation discovered that a leak of unleaded gasoline was occurring\nfrom Line 602, resulting in the release of approximately ten gallons of hazardous\nliquid.\n• Buckeye’s control center remotely shut down Line 602; closed block valves located at\nValve Site 1L-Linden Station, stationing (Sta.) 3+72, and Valve Site 2L-West Side\nArthur Kill, Sta. 130+30; and dispatched personnel to determine the cause.\n• Buckeye reported the Accident to the National Response Center (NRC) at 6:31 P.M.\non September 5, 2024 (NRC Report No. 1410029), indicating the Accident resulted in\nthe release an estimated ten gallons of unleaded gasoline. Buckeye’s investigation\nnoted a sheen on standing water in proximity to adjacent Piles Creek.\n• The failure occurred in a high consequence area, near a commercially navigable\nwaterway – the Arthur Kill River – approximately one mile from Linden Station.\nLine 602 traverses several high consequence areas.\n• Prior to the failure, the operating pressure on Line 602 was 1,141 pounds per square\ninch gauge (psig). The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the line is 1,222 psig.\n• Line 602 is a 12-inch nominal diameter, 0.250-inch wall thickness, API 5L, X-60\ngrade, seamless pipe that was constructed in 1965. It has a coal tar coating and an\nimpressed current cathodic protection system.\n• Line 602 runs from the Linden, New Jersey terminal to New Lots Junction in New\nYork. Line 602 then travels to Long Island City, New York, and then to LaGuardia\nAirport.\n• Line 602, including the September 5, 2024 failure location, was the subject of a\nprevious PHMSA CAO, CPF No. 1-2021-034-CAO.2\n• On September 4, 2024, the day before the Accident, Respondent performed an in-line\ninspection (ILI) tool run on Line 602, utilizing both a geometry and magnetic flux\nleakage (MFL). The results of the ILI run are not yet available for review.\n2 See https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12021034CAO.\n\n\n\n• On September 8, 2024, the Director, Eastern Region, OPS, approved Respondent’s\nwritten restart plan (attached) for Line 602, with a 20 percent reduced operating\npressure after the section of pipe where the release occurred was cut out and replaced.\n• PHMSA’s on-site investigation and observations of the pipe where the failure\noccurred noted apparent external metal loss due to corrosion.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous\nto life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood of serious harm, to expeditiously\norder to the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective action, including suspended or\nrestricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other appropri","truncated":true,"body_characters":62815}