{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 12026006NOPV","title":"COLLINS PIPELINE CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2026-01-27","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.444(b), 195.452(b)(5), 195.452(h)(4)(i)(A).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026006nopv.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026006nopv.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026006nopv","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12026006NOPV","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving COLLINS PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.444(b),  195.452(b)(5),  195.452(h)(4)(i)(A). The case was opened on 2026-01-27 and is reported as closed as of 2026-03-20. Proposed civil penalty: $195,700. Assessed civil penalty: $195,700. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n12026006NOPV_Final Order_03202026_(21-232095).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026006NOPV/12026006NOPV_Final%20Order_03202026_(21-232095).pdf\n\n12026006NOPV_Final Order_03202026_(21-232095)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026006NOPV/12026006NOPV_Final%20Order_03202026_(21-232095)_text.pdf\n\n12026006NOPV_Operator Response to Notice_02262026_(21-232095).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026006NOPV/12026006NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_02262026_(21-232095).pdf\n\n12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026006NOPV/12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095).pdf\n\n12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026006NOPV/12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095)_text.pdf\n\n12026006NOPV_Final Order_03202026_(21-232095)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nMarch 20, 2026\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: matthew.lucey@pbfenergy.com\nMr. Matthew Lucey\nChief Executive Officer, President\nCollins Pipeline Company\nOne Sylvan Way, 2nd Floor\nParsippany, New Jersey 07054\nRe: CPF No. 1-2026-006-NOPV\nDear Mr. Lucey:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and finds that the civil penalty amount of $195,700 has been paid in full. This case is\nnow closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of transmission and\nacknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures (Final Order and NOPV)\ncc: Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nThomas J. McLane, Director, PBF Logistics Regulatory Compliance, PBF Energy, Inc.,\nThomas.McLane@pdfenergy.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\n2\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nCollins Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 1-2026-006-NOPV\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn January 27, 2026, pursuant to 49 CFR § 190.207, the Director, Eastern Region, Office of\nPipeline Safety (OPS), issued a Notice of Probable Violation (Notice) to Collins Pipeline\nCompany (Respondent). The Notice proposed finding that Respondent had violated the pipeline\nsafety regulations in 49 CFR Part 195 and proposed a civil penalty of $ 195,700. Respondent,\nwithout admission, did not contest the allegations of violation and paid the proposed civil penalty\non February 26, 2026. In accordance with section 190.208(a)(1), such payment authorizes the\nentry of this final order.\nHaving failed to contest the allegations, pursuant to section 190.213, I find Respondent violated\nthe pipeline safety regulations listed below, as more fully described in the enclosed Notice,\nwhich is incorporated by reference:\n49 CFR § 195.402(a) (Item 1) ─ Respondent failed to follow its manual of\nwritten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities\nby failing to shut down the pipeline after a leak was suspected in a high\nconsequence area as required by its procedures.\n49 CFR § 195.444(b) (Item 2) ─ Respondent failed to have an effective system\nfor detecting leaks and failed to evaluate the capability of its leak detection\nsystem (LDS). Specifically, the LDS failed to detect a leak in an unusually\nsensitive area, in part, due to incorrect threshold detection settings in two LDS\nmodules.\n49 CFR § 195.452(b)(5) (Item 3) ─ Respondent failed to follow its written\nintegrity management program. Specifically, Respondent failed to consider tool\ntolerance when calculating remaining strength of corroded pipe as required by its\nintegrity management plan.\n\n\n\n3\n49 CFR § 195.452(h)(1) (Item 4) ─ Respondent failed to take prompt action to\naddress all anomalous conditions in its pipeline discovered through an integrity\nassessment. Specifically, Respondent failed to immediately remediate an\nimmediate repair condition.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent. In accordance with 49 CFR § 190.223, Respondent is assessed\nthe proposed civil penalty amount of $195,700, which Respondent has already paid in full.\nThe terms and conditions of this order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\n___________________________________ _________________________\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n840 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 300\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628\n609.771.7800\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nand\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: matthew.lucey@pbfenergy.com\nJanuary 27, 2026\nMr. Matthew Lucey\nChief Executive Officer, President\nCollins Pipeline Company\nOne Sylvan Way, 2nd Floor\nParsippany, New Jersey 07054\nCPF 1-2026-006-NOPV\nDear Mr. Lucey:\nFrom December 29 through 31, 2021, and January 4 through February 1, 2022 of the on-site\ninvestigation, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\n(U.S.C.) investigated Collins Pipeline Company’s1 (Collins Pipeline) rupture in Chalmette,\nLouisiana.\nOn December 27, 2021, Collins Pipeline experienced a reportable accident on its 16-inch refined\nproducts pipeline near the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet levee in St. Bernard Parish, LA, a high\nconsequence area (HCA), that released 8,325 barrels of ultra-low sulfur diesel.\nAs a result of the investigation, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items investigated\nand the probable violations are:\n1. § 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each\npipeline system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\n1 Collins Pipeline Company is a subsidiary of PBF Energy, Inc.\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-006-NOPV\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal\noperations and emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals\nnot exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, and\nappropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a\npipeline system commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at\nlocations where operations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nCollins Pipeline failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities in accordance with section 195.402(a). Specifically, Collins Pipeline\nfailed to shut down the pipeline after a leak was suspected in an HCA, as required by Collins\nPipeline PCC Operating Instructions, V-2, section 11.2.1 (11/20/2019) (CRM Procedure) and\ninstead attempted to restart the pipeline six times.\nOn December 27, 2021, Collins Pipeline experienced a reportable accident on its 16-inch refined\nproducts pipeline near the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet levee in Chalmette, LA, an HCA, that\nreleased 8,325 barrels of ultra-low sulfur diesel. The Collins Pipeline Control Center (PCC) failed\nto immediately shut down the pipeline after receiving several leak alarms, as required by section\n11.2.1. Instead, the PCC attempted to restart the pipeline six times over a five-hour period. The\nPCC also failed to notify the refinery to stop the booster pumps, as required by section 11.2.1.\nStarting at 9:29 AM, the PCC began receiving priority level 1 and 2 alarms. Between 9:28 AM\nand 2:28 PM, the PCC received 25 alarms in total including: four lockout alarms, four extended\nreal-time transient model (E-RTTM) alarms, two low discharge pressure alarms, four imbalance\nnotifications, ten low meter pressure alarms, and one low case pressure alarm. The CRM\nProcedure, section 10.5 stated that the PCC must be readily able to recognize the existence of or\nthe potential of an abnormal situation and able to take action necessary to mitigate potential danger\nand section 9.1.2 outlined leak detection alarms and how to respond to each. Because these specific\nalarms indicated a suspected leak, the PCC was required to shut down and isolate the pipeline in\naccordance with section 11.2.1. However, between 9:28 AM and 2:29 PM, the PCC attempted to\nrestart the pipeline six times (9:44 AM, 10:32 AM, 11:22 AM, 12:16 PM, 1:22 PM and 2:22 PM).\nThe PCC did not shut down the pipeline until 2:38 PM, over five hours after the first leak\nindications, contrary to section 11.2.1.\nAn independent third-party prepared a root cause analysis focused on the control room actions,\nPost Failure Delayed Response Root Cause Analysis, V-1.1 (04/29/2022) (RCA). In section 6.1.2,\nthe RCA concluded that Collins Pipeline failed to recognize various alarms as leak indications.\nThe RCA concluded that there were low meter and low discharge pressure alarms that went\nunrecognized or missed. There was a failure of communication between the PCC staff regarding\nan E-RTTM alarm. In addition, three hourly and one daily over/short alarms were recognized but\nnot identified as leak indicators.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline failed to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities in accordance with section 195.402(a).\n12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095) Page 2 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-006-NOPV\n2. § 195.444 Leak detection.\n(a) ….\n(b) General. A pipeline must have an effective system for detecting\nleaks in accordance with §§195.134 or 195.452, as appropriate. An\noperator must evaluate the capability of its leak detection system to\nprotect the public, property, and the environment and modify it as\nnecessary to do so. At a minimum, an operator’s evaluation must\nconsider the following factors - length and size of the pipeline, type of\nproduct carried, the swiftness of leak detection, location of nearest\nresponse personnel, and leak history.\nCollins Pipeline failed to have an effective system for detecting leaks and failed to evaluate the\ncapability of its leak detection system (LDS) in accordance with section 195.444(b). Specifically,\nthe LDS failed to detect a leak on December 27, 2021 in an unusually sensitive area, in part, due\nto incorrect threshold leak detection settings in two LDS modules.\nDuring the failure investigation, Collins Pipeline commissioned an independent third-party RCA\nfocused on its LDS. The RCA concluded that the Collins Pipeline LDS was ineffective for several\nreasons. The LDS used three modules, and each had pre-determined thresholds that were\nconfigured individually with sensitivity settings that vary as a function of flow characteristics of\nthe pipeline. All three modules were expected to generate an alarm if a leak occurs. However,\nRCA, section 6.1.1 concluded that Collins Pipeline used incorrect threshold settings in two of the\nthree modules on the LDS. The module settings were not sensitive enough to detect the leak, and\nthey therefore did not alarm during the December 27, 2021 leak. Because only one module alarmed\nand not all three, the LDS failed to effectively detect the December 27, 2021 leak.\nIn addition, the RCA determined that Collins Pipeline’s failure to test the LDS using a simulated\nrupture event and failure to regularly evaluate the LDS operating parameters and performance\nwere factors that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the LDS.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline failed to have an effective system for detecting leaks and failed to\nevaluate its leak detection system in accordance with section 195.444(b).\n3. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) ….\n(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage\npipeline integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section\nmust:\n(1) ….\n(5) Implement and follow the program.\nCollins Pipeline failed to follow its written integrity management program in accordance with\nsection 195.452(b)(5). Specifically, Collins Pipeline failed to consider tool tolerance when\ncalculating remaining strength of corroded pipe as required by its integrity management plan, PBF\nEnergy Inc., Pipeline Integrity Management Plan Hazardous Liquids Pipelines Chalmette,\nTorrance and DPC, sections 5 and 6.8.4 (6/30/20) (IMP).\n12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095) Page 3 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-006-NOPV\nCollins Pipeline, IMP, sections 5 and 6.8.4 required tool tolerance to be considered when\nevaluating assessment results of an in-line inspection.\nAccording to the Safety Related Condition Report (11/11/2020) (SRC Report), in October 2020,\nan ultra-high resolution MFL tool run was completed on the Collins – Meraux Station to State Line\npipeline. Preliminary assessment of the data received in November 2020 indicated there was a\n75% (or 85% with the 10% tool tolerance) metal loss anomaly near the Mississippi River Gulf\nOutlet (MRGO) levee at mile post 3.79. This anomaly was later reclassified to 66% (or 76% with\nthe 10% tool tolerance). The SRC Report indicated that the maximum allowable operating pressure\n(MAOP) had been reduced from 1,440 psig to 1,402 psig. Since the pressure reduction exceeded\n365 days, Integrity Assurance Notification (11/11/2021) was submitted to PHMSA, which\nincluded indication that the MAOP had been further lowered to 1,398 psig on 11/11/2021.\nAlthough the pressure reduction was calculated using the Safe Effective Area Method\n(RSTRENG) and the pit depth of 66%, the tool tolerance was not used in the calculation. If tool\ntolerance had been accounted for in the calculation, the pressure would have been reduced to 1,225\npsig, not 1,398 psig, see Entegra ILI Report 2020 (01/13/2023). As per Operating Pressure at\nTime of Failure (01/14/2022) the operating pressure at time of the reportable accident was 1,329\npsig.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline failed to follow its written integrity management program in\naccordance with section 195.452(b)(5).\n4. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) ….\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues? —\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take prompt action to\naddress all anomalous conditions in the pipeline that the operator\ndiscovers through the integrity assessment or information analysis. In\naddressing all conditions, an operator must evaluate all anomalous\nconditions and remediate those that could reduce a pipeline’s integrity,\nas required by this part. An operator must be able to demonstrate that\nthe remediation of the condition will ensure that the condition is\nunlikely to pose a threat to the long-term integrity of the pipeline. An\noperator must comply with all other applicable requirements in this\npart in remediating a condition. Each operator must, in repairing its\npipeline systems, ensure that the repairs are made in a safe and timely\nmanner and are made so as to prevent damage to persons, property, or\nthe environment. The calculation method(s) used for anomaly\nevaluation must be applicable for the range of relevant threats.\n(4) Special requirements for scheduling remediation\n(i) Immediate repair conditions. An operator’s evaluation and\nremediation schedule must provide for immediate repair conditions. To\nmaintain safety, an operator must temporarily reduce the operating\npressure or shut down the pipeline until the operator completes the\nrepair of these conditions. An operator must calculate the temporary\nreduction in operating pressure using the formulas referenced in\n12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095) Page 4 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-006-NOPV\nparagraph (h)(4)(i)(B) of this section. If no suitable remaining strength\ncalculation method can be identified, an operator must implement a\nminimum 20 percent or greater operating pressure reduction, based on\nactual operating pressure for two months prior to the date of\ninspection, until the anomaly is repaired. An operator must treat the\nfollowing conditions as immediate repair conditions:\n(A) Metal loss greater than 80% of nominal wall regardless of\ndimensions.\nCollins Pipeline failed to take prompt action to address all anomalous conditions in its pipeline\ndiscovered through an integrity assessment in accordance with section 195.452(h)(1). Specifically,\nCollins Pipeline discovered an immediate repair condition, metal loss greater than 80%, at mile\npost (MP) 3.79 on its 16-inch interstate refined fuels pipeline on October 12, 2020, but failed to\nimmediately remediate the condition as required by section 195.452(h)(4)(i)(A).\nOn November 12, 2020, Collins Pipeline filed an SRC Report with PHMSA indicating it\ndiscovered two immediate repair conditions on its 16-inch interstate refined fuels pipeline, at MP\n3.79 (corrosion anomaly) and MP 52.17 (manufacturing anomaly) with a metal wall loss of 85%\nand 86%, respectively. In the SRC Report Collins Pipeline stated it would repair both anomalies\nand reduce the operating pressure until all repairs are completed. However, instead of immediately\nrepairing the corrosion anomaly at MP 3.79, Collins Pipeline downgraded the condition one year\nlater to a 76% wall loss defect, in October 2021. Two months later, on December 27, 2021, the\nCollins Pipeline failed at MP 3.79—the exact location of the immediate repair condition\ndiscovered in October 2020. An independent third-party RCA (Section 8.2.1) determined external\ncorrosion was the direct cause of the December 2021 reportable accident.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline failed to take prompt action to address all anomalous conditions in its\npipeline discovered through an integrity assessment in accordance with section 195.452(h)(1).\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$272,926 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,729,245 for a related\nseries of violations. For violation occurring on or after December 28, 2023 and before December\n30, 2024, the maximum penalty may not exceed $266,015 per violation per day the violation\npersists, up to a maximum of $2,660,135 for a related series of violations. For violation occurring\non or after January 6, 2023 and before December 28, 2023, the maximum penalty may not exceed\n$257,664 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,576,627 for a related\nseries of violations. For violation occurring on or after March 21, 2022 and before January 6, 2023,\nthe maximum penalty may not exceed $239,142 per violation per day the violation persists, up to\na maximum of $2,391,412 for a related series of violations. For violation occurring on or after\nMay 3, 2021 and before March 21, 2022, the maximum penalty may not exceed $225,134 per\nviolation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,251,334 for a related series of\nviolations. For violation occurring on or after January 11, 2021 and before May 3, 2021, the\nmaximum penalty may not exceed $222,504 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a\nmaximum of $2,225,034 for a related series of violations. For violation occurring on or after July\n31, 2019 and before January 11, 2021, the maximum penalty may not exceed $218,647 per\n12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095) Page 5 of 6\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-006-NOPV\nviolation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a related series of\nviolations.\nWe have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved for the above\nprobable violations and recommend that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $195,700\nas follows:\nItem number PENALTY\n1 $46,600\n2 $55,900\n3 $46,600\n4 $46,600\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nEnforcement Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. All\nmaterial you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly available. If you\nbelieve that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5\nU.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of\nthe document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an\nexplanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under\n5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nFollowing your receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to respond as described in the enclosed\nResponse Options. If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes\na waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to\nyou and to issue a Final Order. If you are responding to this Notice, we propose that you submit\nyour correspondence to my office within 30 days from receipt of this Notice. The Region Director\nmay extend the period for responding upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 1-2026-006-NOPV and, for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement\nProceedings\n12026006NOPV_PCP_01272026_(21-232095) Page 6 of 6","truncated":false,"body_characters":22332}