{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 12026007NOA","title":"COLLINS PIPELINE CO — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2026-03-16","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.446(b)(4), 195.446(e)(4), 195.446(e)(5), 195.446(e)(6), 195.446(g)(1), 195.446(g)(2).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026007noa.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026007noa.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026007noa","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12026007NOA","body":"Notice of Amendment involving COLLINS PIPELINE CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.446(b)(4),  195.446(e)(4),  195.446(e)(5),  195.446(e)(6),  195.446(g)(1),  195.446(g)(2). The case was opened on 2026-03-16 and is reported as closed as of 2026-07-24. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n12026007NOA_Closure Letter_07242026_(23-263951).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026007NOA/12026007NOA_Closure%20Letter_07242026_(23-263951).pdf\n\n12026007NOA_Closure Letter_07242026_(23-263951)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026007NOA/12026007NOA_Closure%20Letter_07242026_(23-263951)_text.pdf\n\n12026007NOA_Notice of Amendment_03162026_(23-263951).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026007NOA/12026007NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_03162026_(23-263951).pdf\n\n12026007NOA_Notice of Amendment_03162026_(23-263951)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026007NOA/12026007NOA_Notice%20of%20Amendment_03162026_(23-263951)_text.pdf\n\n12026007NOA_Operator Response to Notice_05152026_(23-263951).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026007NOA/12026007NOA_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_05152026_(23-263951).pdf\n\n12026007NOA_Notice of Amendment_03162026_(23-263951)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n840 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 300\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628\n609.771.7800\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: matthew.lucey@pbfenergy.com\nMarch 16, 2026\nMr. Matthew Lucey\nChief Executive Officer and President\nPBF Energy Inc.\n1 Sylvan Way, 2nd Floor\nParsippany, New Jersey 07054\nCPF 1-2026-007-NOA\nDear Mr. Lucey:\nFrom December 4, 2023 to March 15, 2024 of the on-site inspection, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49\nUnited States Code (U.S.C.) inspected Collins Pipeline Company’s (Collins Pipeline)1 control\nroom procedures in Woodlands, Texas.\nAs a result of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies found within\nCollins Pipeline’s plans or procedures. The items inspected and the alleged inadequacies and\nproposed revisions are described below:\n1. § 195.446 Control room management\n(a) …\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles\nand responsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and\nemergency operating conditions. To provide for a controller’s prompt\nand appropriate response to operating conditions, an operator must\ndefine each of the following:\n(1) …\n(4) A method of recording controller shift-changes and any\nhand-over of responsibility between controllers;\n1 Collins Pipeline Company is a subsidiary of PBF Energy, Inc.\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-007-NOA\nCollins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Collins Pipeline’s CRM Plan2 failed to include an\nadequate shift handover process when the outgoing controller is unable to complete their scheduled\nshift in accordance with section 195.446(b)(4).\nThe CRM Plan, section F8, stated that “[i]n the event a Controller is unable to complete their\nscheduled shift; it is the responsibility of the Controller to notify the Control Room Supervisor or\ndesignee.” In addition, the CRM Plan stated that “[t]he outgoing controller will record ‘Mid’ in\nthe ‘Shift’ field on the Controller Shift Change Checklist on the green sheet.” However, the CRM\nPlan failed to identify how the console is managed (shutdown or monitored) while a replacement\nis found, and how to proceed if the outgoing controller is unable to fulfill the outgoing\nresponsibilities in section F3.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to\nensure safe operation of a pipeline facility in accordance with section 195.446(b)(4). PHMSA\nproposes that Collins Pipeline revise its written control room management procedures to include a\nshift handover process that addresses how the console is managed (shutdown or monitored) while\na replacement is found, and how to proceed if the outgoing controller is unable to fulfill the\noutgoing responsibilities in section F3.\n2. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must\nhave a written alarm management plan to provide for effective\ncontroller response to alarms. An operator’s plan must include\nprovisions to:\n(1) …\n(4) Review the alarm management plan required by this\nparagraph at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not\nexceeding 15 months, to determine the effectiveness of the plan;\nCollins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Collins Pipeline’s CRM Plan failed to include an\nadequate process to review the alarm management plan to determine the effectiveness of the plan\nat least once a calendar year but at intervals not exceeding 15 months in accordance with section\n195.446(e)(4).\nCollins Pipeline’s CRM Plan, sections A7 and M2.15 required an annual review of the alarm\nmanagement plan. However, the CRM Plan failed to include adequate details regarding the annual\nreview process. The CRM Plan failed to detail data sources, key performance indicators,\neffectiveness evaluation methods, decision criteria, documentation requirements, and corrective\naction procedures.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to\nassure safe operation of a pipeline facility in accordance with section 195.446(e)(4). PHMSA\n2 PBF Logistics Pipeline Control Center: Control Room Management Plan, Rev-8 (08/25/23) (CRM Plan).\nPage 2 of 7\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-007-NOA\nproposes that Collins Pipeline revise its written control room management procedures to establish\na detailed process for reviewing the effectiveness of the alarm management plan. This includes\ndefining data sources, key performance indicators, evaluation methods, decision criteria,\ndocumentation standards, and corrective action procedures.\n3. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must\nhave a written alarm management plan to provide for effective\ncontroller response to alarms. An operator’s plan must include\nprovisions to:\n(1) …\n(5) Monitor the content and volume of general activity being\ndirected to and required of each controller at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not exceeding 15 months, that will\nassure controllers have sufficient time to analyze and react to\nincoming alarms; and\nCollins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Collins Pipeline’s CRM Plan failed to provide a\nprocess for effective monitoring of the content and volume of general activity being directed to\nand required of each controller at least once a calendar year but at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths in accordance with section 195.446(e)(5).\nCollins Pipeline’s CRM Plan, sections A6.8 and M2.15 required an annual review of the content\nand volume of general activity being directed to and required of each controller. However, the\nCRM Plan failed to include adequate details regarding this annual review process. The CRM Plan\nstated that the review will be monitored with a special application without describing it or how it\nfunctioned in the workload study analysis. Section A6.8 stated that Collins Pipeline “will strive\nfor Controller availability percentage greater than 60%,” but failed to specify what this percentage\nmeasured, how it was calculated, what activities were included in the measurement, or how the\nresults will be evaluated or acted upon if thresholds are not met. The CRM Plan also failed to\ninclude documentation requirements for this annual review or specify how the results would be\nused to reduce controller workload.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to\nensure safe operation of a pipeline facility in accordance with section 195.446(e)(5). PHMSA\nproposes that Collins Pipeline revise its written control room procedures to establish a data-driven\nprocess for analyzing controller workload and its impact on alarm response times. This includes\ndefining metrics, specifying how data is collected and analyzed, outlining corrective actions when\ndeficiencies are found, and documenting findings.\n4. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) …\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must\nhave a written alarm management plan to provide for effective\nPage 3 of 7\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-007-NOA\ncontroller response to alarms. An operator’s plan must include\nprovisions to:\n(1) …\n(6) Address deficiencies identified through the implementation\nof paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(5) of this section.\nCollins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to ensure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Collins Pipeline’s CRM Plan failed to include\nadequate procedures to address deficiencies identified through the implementation of subsections\n195.446(e)(1) through (e)(5) in accordance with section 195.446(e)(6).\nCollins Pipeline’s CRM Plan, section A6.9 stated that any deficiencies discovered through\nimplementation of the CRM Plan procedures will be addressed and documented by the Control\nRoom Supervisor or Designee. However, the CRM Plan failed to specify how deficiencies are to\nbe evaluated, what constitutes an actionable deficiency, how corrective measures will be\ndetermined or prioritized, or how follow-up and verification of effectiveness will occur.\nFurthermore, the CRM Plan also failed to require that this process be documented or incorporated\ninto future reviews and plan updates.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to\nensure safe operation of a pipeline facility in accordance with section 195.446(e)(6). PHMSA\nproposes that Collins Pipeline revise its written control room management procedures to include\ndefine a process for identifying, analyzing, documenting, correcting, and verifying the resolution\nof deficiencies for each of the elements found under subsections 195.446(e)(1) through (e)(5).\nThese procedures must include documentation requirements, timelines for action, criteria for\nevaluation, and a feedback loop to ensure continuous improvement.\n5. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) …\n(g) Operating experience. Each operator must assure that lessons\nlearned from its operating experience are incorporated, as appropriate,\ninto its control room management procedures by performing each of\nthe following:\n(1) Review accidents that must be reported pursuant to § 195.50\nand 195.52 to determine if control room actions contributed to the\nevent and, if so, correct, where necessary, deficiencies related to:\n(i) Controller fatigue;\n(ii) Field equipment;\n(iii) The operation of any relief device;\n(iv) Procedures;\n(v) SCADA system configuration; and\n(vi) SCADA system performance.\nCollins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to ensure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Collins Pipeline’s CRM Plan failed to provide a\nprocess for reportable accident reviews to determine if control room actions contributed to the\nPage 4 of 7\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-007-NOA\nevent and, if so, correct, where necessary, deficiencies related controller fatigue, field equipment,\nthe operation of any relief device, procedures, and SCADA system configuration and performance\nin accordance with section 195.446(g)(1)(i)-(vi).\nCollins Pipeline’s CRM Plan included multiple sections related to learning from experience but\nfailed to include a process for reviewing reportable accidents and correcting related control room\ndeficiencies:\n• Section H2.2 mentioned continuous improvement and lessons learned but did not correlate\nthose efforts to the systematic review of reportable accidents or required corrective actions\nbased on such reviews.\n• Section H4 included review metrics such as the number of lessons learned and drills but\ndid not require evaluation of control room actions after reportable incidents to determine if\nthey contributed to the event.\n• Section S1 outlined general goals for collecting lessons learned from abnormal operating\nconditions, near misses, and DOT reports but did not include an adequate process for\nreviewing reportable accidents under sections 195.50 and 195.52.\n• Section D7 included some investigation requirements following leaks or test failures, but\nit did not require an investigation of control room actions after reportable accidents. While\nit acknowledged the need to review procedures and consider controller fatigue, it did not\nestablish a requirement to evaluate whether control room actions contributed to reportable\naccidents. Furthermore, it lacked a defined process to analyze and correct system-level\ndeficiencies such as SCADA system configuration, procedural inadequacies, or controller\nresponse.\nCollins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility in accordance with section 195.446(g)(1). PHMSA proposes that\nCollins Pipeline revise its written control room management procedures to define a process for\nreviewing reportable accidents to determine if control room actions contributed to the accident\nconsidering the criteria in section 195.446(g)(1)(i)-(vi).\n6. § 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) …\n(g) Operating experience. Each operator must assure that lessons\nlearned from its operating experience are incorporated, as appropriate,\ninto its control room management procedures by performing each of\nthe following:\n(1) …\n(2) Include lessons learned from the operator’s experience in the\ntraining program required by this section.\nCollins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate to assure safe\noperation of a pipeline facility. Specifically, Collins Pipeline’s CRM Plan failed to include a\nprocess that ensures lessons learned from the operator’s experience are incorporated in the training\nprogram as required by section 195.446(g)(2).\nPage 5 of 7\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-007-NOA\nCollins Pipeline’s CRM Plan contained several sections that mention lessons learned and operating\nexperience. These sections, however, did not establish a consistent, documented process for\nintegrating lessons learned into controller training. For instance, Collins Pipeline failed to\nincorporate lessons learned from a 2021 reportable accident into its training program. Under the\nterms of the Corrective Action Order (CAO), Collins Pipeline was required to evaluate controller\nresponses to all alarms occurring both immediately before and after the confirmation of that\naccident.3\nSection E5 Continuous Improvement notes that opportunities for improvement will be integrated\ninto procedures and training, but the process for how lessons are selected, reviewed, and\nincorporated into training is not defined. Section H2.2 assigns responsibility to the Control Room\nSupervisor or Designee for communicating lessons learned and improving processes. However,\nthis section did not describe how those lessons are translated into training materials or instructional\nformats. Section H4 outlined performance metrics such as the number or lessons learned but did\nnot describe how those lessons informed training design or execution.\nSections S1 and S2 referred to an Operating Experience Program and indicated sources of lessons\nlearned, including AOCs, near misses and DOT reports. These sections identified that lessons were\nto be reviewed and disseminated. However, the process for incorporating those lessons into\ntraining were not detailed. For example:\n• Section S2.1.4 stated that the Control Room Supervisor shall review reports and include\nlessons in training but did not specify how the training is updated, delivered, or\ndocumented.\n• Section S2.1.5 stated that lessons learned “should be used” in various forums, but use of\ndiscretionary language and lack of documentation requirements did not provide assurance\nof consistent implementation.\n• Section S1.3 assigned responsibilities for reporting lessons learned but did not define\nhow or when this information is delivered to training personnel or integrated into course\ncontent.\n• Section S3 addressed retention of lessons learned but did not ensure traceability between\nthose lessons and updates made to the training program.\nWhile the CRM Plan referenced multiple responsibilities and general expectations it did not\ninclude an actionable process for evaluating, selecting, integrating, and documenting lessons\nlearned within the controller training program.\nTherefore, Collins Pipeline’s written control room management procedures were inadequate\npursuant to section 195.446(g)(2). PHMSA proposes that Collins Pipeline revise its written control\nroom management procedures to establish a defined and documented process for incorporating\nlessons learned into controller training, as required by section 195.446(g)(2).\nResponse to this Notice\nPlease refer to this document and note the response options. Be advised that all material you submit\nin response to this enforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe\n3 See Corrective Action Order, CPF No. 1-2021-077-CAO, Required Corrective Action 7 (Dec. 30, 2021).\nPage 6 of 7\n\n\n\nCPF 1-2026-007-NOA\nthat any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. §\n552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the\ndocument with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an\nexplanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under\n5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under 49 CFR § 190.211. If you do not respond within 30\ndays of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in\nthis Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged\nin this Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 CFR § 190.206). If you are not contesting\nthis Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good cause. Once the\ninadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended procedures, this enforcement\naction will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that Collins Pipeline Company maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of\nplans, procedures) and submit the total to Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter, please refer\nto CPF 1-2026-007-NOA and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic\nformat whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Thomas McLane, Director Logistics Regulatory Compliance,\nthomas.mclane@pbfenergy.com\nJeff Hersperger, Sr. Operations Director, jeffrey.hersperger@pbfenergy.com\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\nPage 7 of 7\n\n12026007NOA_Closure Letter_07242026_(23-263951)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n840 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 300\nWest Trenton, NJ 08628\n609.771.7800\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: matthew.lucey@pbfenergy.com\nJuly 24, 2026\nMr. Matthew Lucey\nChief Executive Officer and President\nPBF Energy Inc.\n1 Sylvan Way, 2nd Floor\nParsippany, New Jersey 07054\nRE: CPF 1-2026-007-NOA\nDear Mr. Lucey:\nFrom December 4, 2023 to March 15, 2024, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\n(U.S.C.) conducted an inspection of Collins Pipeline Company’s (Collins Pipeline) control room\nprocedures in Woodlands, Texas. On March 16, 2026, pursuant to 49 CFR § 190.206, PHMSA\nissued a Notice of Amendment which proposed amendment of Collins Pipeline’s procedures.\nCollins Pipeline submitted its amended procedures on May 15, 2026. PHMSA has reviewed the\namended procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in the Notice of Amendment\nhave been corrected.\nThis letter is to inform you that no further action is necessary, and this case is now closed. Thank\nyou for your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nRobert Burrough\nDirector, Eastern Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Thomas McLane, Director Logistics Regulatory Compliance, thomas.mclane@pbfenergy.com\nJeff Hersperger, Sr., Operations Director, jeffrey.hersperger@pbfenergy.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":21380}