{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 12026031CAO","title":"ANR PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-01-31","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026031cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026031cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-12026031cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12026031CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving ANR PIPELINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-01-31 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n12026031CAO_Corrective Action Order_01312026_(26-363280).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026031CAO/12026031CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01312026_(26-363280).pdf\n\n12026031CAO_Corrective Action Order_01312026_(26-363280)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026031CAO/12026031CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01312026_(26-363280)_text.pdf\n\n12026031CAO_Corrective Action Order_01312026_(26-363280)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nJanuary 31, 2026\nVIA EMAIL TO: david_brast@tcenergy.com\nDavid Brast\nPresident, US Natural Gas Pipelines\nTC Energy\n700 Louisiana Street\nHouston, Texas 77002\nCPF 1-2026-031-CAO\nDear Mr. Brast:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO\nrequires ANR Pipeline Co. (ANR or Respondent) to take certain corrective actions with respect to\nthe pipeline failure that occurred on January 27, 2026, on the Loop Line 1-501 near Columbus,\nIndiana.\nService of the CAO by electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and\nacknowledgment of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and\nconditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nLinda Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nAmy Willis, Director, Pipeline Safety Compliance, US Natural Gas, TC Energy,\namy_willis@tcenergy.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nANR Pipeline Co., a subsidiary ) CPF No. 1-2026-031-CAO\nof TC Energy, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority provided\nin 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires ANR Pipeline Co. (ANR or Respondent), a subsidiary\nof TC Energy,\n1 to take certain necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from the potential hazards associated with the continued operation of Loop Line 1-\n501. Part of the ANR Pipeline System, the Loop Line 1-501 is a 30-inch diameter interstate natural\ngas transmission pipeline that begins near Eunice, Louisiana, and ends near Ann Arbor, Michigan.\nThe ANR Pipeline System consists of approximately 9,250 miles of natural gas transmission\npipelines that transports natural gas from Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana to Wisconsin, Michigan,\nIllinois and Ohio, with two segments converging near Chicago.2\nOn January 27, 2026, at approximately 6:29 PM CST, the Loop Line 1-501 pipeline ruptured at\nmilepost (MP) 715.36 near Columbus, Indiana (the Failure) likely due to stress corrosion cracking.\nThe Failure resulted in the release of more than 3,000 MCF of natural gas and the evacuation of\n10 residential homes. There were no reported injuries or fatalities, there was no ignition of the\nescaping gas.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 TC Energy operates 58,222 miles of natural gas pipelines and has more than 653 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural\ngas storage in Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. TC Energy, About, https://www.tcenergy.com/about/ (last visited Jan.\n31, 2026).\n2 TC, Energy, ANR Pipeline, https://www.tcenergy.com/operations/natural-gas/anr-pipeline/#facts (last visited Jan.\n31, 2026).\n\n\n\nPreliminary Findings\n• ANR owns and operates Loop Line 1-501, an interstate gas transmission pipeline that\nbegins near Eunice, Louisiana, and ends near Ann Arbor, Michigan and is part of the\nANR Pipeline System.\n• Loop Line 1-501 was constructed in 1965 by U.S. Steel and consists of X-60 grade steel\nand has 0.298-inch wall thickness with a maximum allowable operating pressure\n(MAOP) of 858 pounds per square inch (psi).\n• Loop Line 1-501 runs parallel to Mainline 501, a 30-inch interstate gas transmission\npipeline.\n• On January 27, 2026, at 6:29 PM CST, the Loop Line 1-501 pipeline ruptured at milepost\n(MP) 715.36 near Columbus, Indiana while operating at 782 psi.\n• ANR’s control center did not observe a noticeable pressure drop throughout the Failure.\n• The Failure occurred in a Class 2 location.\n• At least 10 homes were evacuated by the fire department within a half-mile radius of the\nFailure. There were no reported injuries or fatalities, and there was no ignition of the\nescaping gas.\n• ANR notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the failure on January 27, 2026,\nat approximately 7:51 PM CST (NRC Incident Report #1453552).\n• PHMSA launched an investigation, with investigators arriving on January 28, 2026.\n• On January 30, 2026, PHMSA preliminarily determined that the source of the Failure\nwas a circumferential crack oriented from the 5 to 8 o’clock position. The crack is\napproximately 3 feet long and ¾ inches wide and located about 2 inches from a girth\nweld.\n• The crack characteristics are consistent with circumferential stress corrosion cracking.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\n\n\n\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another\nlaw; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipelines; the nature of the failure; the hazardous nature of the material\ntransported; the existing and potential additional impacts to life, property, or the environment; and\nthe likelihood that stress corrosion cracking may be present elsewhere on the pipelines, it is hereby\ndetermined that continued operation of the Affected Segments of the Loop Line 1-501 and Mainline\n501 pipelines, as defined below, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life,\nproperty, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result in the\nlikelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Eastern Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions\nDefinitions:\nAffected Segments – The “Affected Segments” means Loop Line 1-501 and\nMainline 501 from the Shelbyville compressor station (approximately MP 738) to\nthe Celestine compressor station (approximately MP 648).\nThe Failure – The “Failure” means the January 27, 2026 rupture near MP 715.36\non Loop Line 1-501.\n\n\n\nIsolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the 18.8-mile segment of Loop\nLine 1-501 line from main line valve (MLV) 501-55-1 to MLV 501-56-1.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, Eastern Region, OPS, PHMSA. The\nDirector’s address is 840 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 300 West Trenton, NJ 08628.\n1. Operating Pressure Restriction. ANR must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%)\npressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected\nSegments, such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segments will not exceed\neighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure\non January 27, 2026.\na. This pressure restriction must remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. Within 10 days of issuance of the Order, ANR must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each compressor station and each main line pressure regulating\nstation on the Affected Segments at the time of failure and the reduced pressure\nrestriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, ANR must take into account any\nin-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segments to\nprovide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\ne. ANR must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating pressure\ndata. ANR must take into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegments and immediately reduce the operating pressure to maintain the safe operations\nof the Affected Segments, if warranted by the monthly review. ANR must submit the\nresults of the monthly review to the Director. The results must include, at a minimum,\nthe current discharge set-points (including any additional pressure reductions), and any\npressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\nf. ANR may request approval from the Director to increase the operating pressure on\nindividual segments on the Affected Pipeline based on an engineering analysis or other\njustification that the segment does not pose a safety risk.\n2. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, ANR must develop and\nsubmit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Restart Plan must include a Repair Plan for the Director’s approval.\nb. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally, including the Repair Plan,\nwithout approving the entire plan.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\n\n\n\nd. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling and sufficient surveillance of the\nIsolated Segment during the restart process to ensure that no leaks are present when\noperation of the line resumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications\nwith local emergency response officials.\n3. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, ANR may return the Isolated\nSegment to service according to the terms of the Restart Plan, but the operating pressure must\nnot exceed the limit in accordance with Item 1 above.\n4. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a\nwritten request from ANR demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure\noperating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the\npressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating\nparameters of the pipeline.\nb. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestrictions upon a written request from ANR demonstrating that temporary mitigative\nand preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the temporary removal or\nmodification of the pressure restriction. The Director's determination will be based on\navailable information, including the failure cause and provision of evidence that\npreventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe operation\nof the Affected Segments during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestriction. Appeals of determinations of the Director in this regard will be decided by\nthe Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n5. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, ANR must\ncomplete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and\nanalysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\nand other evidence from the failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and the\nproposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative\nto witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports (whether draft or final) in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to ANR.\n6. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, ANR must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the\nDirector. The RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party\nacceptable to the Director and must document the decision-making process and all factors\ncontributing to the failure. The final report must include findings, and any lessons learned\nand whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within\n\n\n\nANR’s pipeline system. The independent third-party must distribute all RCFA reports\n(whether draft or final) in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made\navailable to ANR.\n7. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, ANR must submit a Remedial Work\nPlan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures ANR will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segments. It must address\nall known or suspected factors and causes of the January 27, 2026 failure. ANR must\nconsider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segments.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segments with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the January 27, 2026 failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Segments and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, RCFA, and other corrective actions\nrequired by this Order with all relevant pre-existing operational and assessment data\nfor the Affected Segments. Pre-existing operational data includes, but is not limited\nto, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical\nanalyses, and any third-party consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data\nincludes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct\nassessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on January 27,\n2026, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segments.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the failure on\nJanuary 27, 2026, and other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or\nany other integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segments. At a\nminimum, this process must consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or\nmore of the following:\n1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline system\nbased on the cause of failure on January 27, 2026, and that can reliably detect and\nidentify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Close-interval surveys,\n\n\n\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in coordination\nwith other utilities (e.g., underground utilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in the\narea,\n5) Coating surveys,\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and,\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the\nfailure causes.\nNote: ANR may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments, and\nevaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests,\ninspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the factors\nknown or suspected to have caused the January 27, 2026 failure.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria ANR will use to prioritize, excavate,\nevaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified integrity threats.\nInclude a description of how any defects will be graded and a schedule for repairs or\nreplacement.\nvii. Describe the methods ANR will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective\nmeasures to remediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on January\n27, 2026, and to address other known integrity threats along the Affected Segments.\nThe repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the criteria specified\nin 7(e)(vi) above.\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures\nto ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segments considering the results\nof the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures undertaken pursuant\nto the Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. ANR must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained during\nthe failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of actions\nundertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate modifications required by the\nDirector.\ni. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\niii. Any and all revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO\nDocumentation Report.\nh. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the\nplan.\n8. CAO Documentation Report. ANR must create and revise, as necessary, a CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR). When ANR has concluded all the items in this Order it will\nsubmit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to complete\n\n\n\na thorough review of all actions taken by ANR with regards to this Order prior to approving\nthe closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities and\ndocumentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. Summary of the pipeline failure of January 27, 2026, and the response activities;\niii. Summary of pipe data/properties and all prior assessments of the Affected\nSegments;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required\nby the Order;\nv. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the Order;\nvi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by ANR to implement the RWP, the results of\nthose actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever\nnecessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure investigation\nand remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nx. A path forward describing specific actions ANR will take on its entire pipeline\nsystem as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n9. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve\nthe submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;\n(d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n\n\n\n10. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause\nfor an extension.\n11. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and\nresults of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of\nthe repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due on\nApril 30, 2026, covering the period through March 31, 2026. The Director may change the\ninterval for the submission of these reports.\n12. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of the\ncosts associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each quarterly report\nsubmitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,\nstudies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,\nreplacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 1-2026-031-CAO and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal\nor state law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §\n60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\n__________________________ _______________________\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":26059}