# ANR PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 12026031CAO
- **title:** ANR PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** current
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2026-01-31
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** OPEN corrective action order.
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/12026031CAO
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving ANR PIPELINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-01-31 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

12026031CAO_Corrective Action Order_01312026_(26-363280).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026031CAO/12026031CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01312026_(26-363280).pdf

12026031CAO_Corrective Action Order_01312026_(26-363280)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/12026031CAO/12026031CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_01312026_(26-363280)_text.pdf

12026031CAO_Corrective Action Order_01312026_(26-363280)_text.pdf

U.S. Department
of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety
Administration
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
January 31, 2026
VIA EMAIL TO: david_brast@tcenergy.com
David Brast
President, US Natural Gas Pipelines
TC Energy
700 Louisiana Street
Houston, Texas 77002
CPF 1-2026-031-CAO
Dear Mr. Brast:
Enclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) issued by the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO
requires ANR Pipeline Co. (ANR or Respondent) to take certain corrective actions with respect to
the pipeline failure that occurred on January 27, 2026, on the Loop Line 1-501 near Columbus,
Indiana.
Service of the CAO by electronic transmission is deemed complete upon transmission and
acknowledgment of receipt, or as otherwise provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and
conditions of this Order are effective upon completion of service.
Sincerely,
Linda Daugherty
Acting Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure: CAO
cc: Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
Amy Willis, Director, Pipeline Safety Compliance, US Natural Gas, TC Energy,
amy_willis@tcenergy.com
CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
ANR Pipeline Co., a subsidiary ) CPF No. 1-2026-031-CAO
of TC Energy, )
)
)
)
Respondent )
____________________________________)
CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Background and Purpose
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority provided
in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires ANR Pipeline Co. (ANR or Respondent), a subsidiary
of TC Energy,
1 to take certain necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the
environment from the potential hazards associated with the continued operation of Loop Line 1-
501. Part of the ANR Pipeline System, the Loop Line 1-501 is a 30-inch diameter interstate natural
gas transmission pipeline that begins near Eunice, Louisiana, and ends near Ann Arbor, Michigan.
The ANR Pipeline System consists of approximately 9,250 miles of natural gas transmission
pipelines that transports natural gas from Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana to Wisconsin, Michigan,
Illinois and Ohio, with two segments converging near Chicago.2
On January 27, 2026, at approximately 6:29 PM CST, the Loop Line 1-501 pipeline ruptured at
milepost (MP) 715.36 near Columbus, Indiana (the Failure) likely due to stress corrosion cracking.
The Failure resulted in the release of more than 3,000 MCF of natural gas and the evacuation of
10 residential homes. There were no reported injuries or fatalities, there was no ignition of the
escaping gas.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The
preliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:
1 TC Energy operates 58,222 miles of natural gas pipelines and has more than 653 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural
gas storage in Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. TC Energy, About, https://www.tcenergy.com/about/ (last visited Jan.
31, 2026).
2 TC, Energy, ANR Pipeline, https://www.tcenergy.com/operations/natural-gas/anr-pipeline/#facts (last visited Jan.
31, 2026).



Preliminary Findings
• ANR owns and operates Loop Line 1-501, an interstate gas transmission pipeline that
begins near Eunice, Louisiana, and ends near Ann Arbor, Michigan and is part of the
ANR Pipeline System.
• Loop Line 1-501 was constructed in 1965 by U.S. Steel and consists of X-60 grade steel
and has 0.298-inch wall thickness with a maximum allowable operating pressure
(MAOP) of 858 pounds per square inch (psi).
• Loop Line 1-501 runs parallel to Mainline 501, a 30-inch interstate gas transmission
pipeline.
• On January 27, 2026, at 6:29 PM CST, the Loop Line 1-501 pipeline ruptured at milepost
(MP) 715.36 near Columbus, Indiana while operating at 782 psi.
• ANR’s control center did not observe a noticeable pressure drop throughout the Failure.
• The Failure occurred in a Class 2 location.
• At least 10 homes were evacuated by the fire department within a half-mile radius of the
Failure. There were no reported injuries or fatalities, and there was no ignition of the
escaping gas.
• ANR notified the National Response Center (NRC) of the failure on January 27, 2026,
at approximately 7:51 PM CST (NRC Incident Report #1453552).
• PHMSA launched an investigation, with investigators arriving on January 28, 2026.
• On January 30, 2026, PHMSA preliminarily determined that the source of the Failure
was a circumferential crack oriented from the 5 to 8 o’clock position. The crack is
approximately 3 feet long and ¾ inches wide and located about 2 inches from a girth
weld.
• The crack characteristics are consistent with circumferential stress corrosion cracking.
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing
Section 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline
facility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood
of serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective
action, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,
replacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an
opportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.



In deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the
characteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,
manufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the
equipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and
deteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the
pressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline
facility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the
proximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the
population density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is
located; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another
law; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the
characteristics of the pipelines; the nature of the failure; the hazardous nature of the material
transported; the existing and potential additional impacts to life, property, or the environment; and
the likelihood that stress corrosion cracking may be present elsewhere on the pipelines, it is hereby
determined that continued operation of the Affected Segments of the Loop Line 1-501 and Mainline
501 pipelines, as defined below, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life,
property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result in the
likelihood of serious harm.
Accordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without
prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective
upon completion of service.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as
practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy
to the Director, PHMSA, OPS Eastern Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in
accordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may
identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any
additional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.
To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a
hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Required Corrective Actions
Definitions:
Affected Segments – The “Affected Segments” means Loop Line 1-501 and
Mainline 501 from the Shelbyville compressor station (approximately MP 738) to
the Celestine compressor station (approximately MP 648).
The Failure – The “Failure” means the January 27, 2026 rupture near MP 715.36
on Loop Line 1-501.



Isolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the 18.8-mile segment of Loop
Line 1-501 line from main line valve (MLV) 501-55-1 to MLV 501-56-1.
Director – The “Director” means the Director, Eastern Region, OPS, PHMSA. The
Director’s address is 840 Bear Tavern Road, Suite 300 West Trenton, NJ 08628.
1. Operating Pressure Restriction. ANR must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%)
pressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected
Segments, such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segments will not exceed
eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure
on January 27, 2026.
a. This pressure restriction must remain in effect until written approval to increase the
pressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the
Director.
b. Within 10 days of issuance of the Order, ANR must provide the Director the actual
operating pressures of each compressor station and each main line pressure regulating
station on the Affected Segments at the time of failure and the reduced pressure
restriction set-points at these same locations.
c. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software
programming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be
adjusted accordingly.
d. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, ANR must take into account any
in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segments to
provide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.
e. ANR must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating pressure
data. ANR must take into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected
Segments and immediately reduce the operating pressure to maintain the safe operations
of the Affected Segments, if warranted by the monthly review. ANR must submit the
results of the monthly review to the Director. The results must include, at a minimum,
the current discharge set-points (including any additional pressure reductions), and any
pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.
f. ANR may request approval from the Director to increase the operating pressure on
individual segments on the Affected Pipeline based on an engineering analysis or other
justification that the segment does not pose a safety risk.
2. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, ANR must develop and
submit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.
a. The Restart Plan must include a Repair Plan for the Director’s approval.
b. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally, including the Repair Plan,
without approving the entire plan.
c. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into
this Order.



d. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling and sufficient surveillance of the
Isolated Segment during the restart process to ensure that no leaks are present when
operation of the line resumes.
e. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications
with local emergency response officials.
3. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, ANR may return the Isolated
Segment to service according to the terms of the Restart Plan, but the operating pressure must
not exceed the limit in accordance with Item 1 above.
4. Removal of Pressure Restriction.
a. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a
written request from ANR demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure
operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the
pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating
parameters of the pipeline.
b. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure
restrictions upon a written request from ANR demonstrating that temporary mitigative
and preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the temporary removal or
modification of the pressure restriction. The Director's determination will be based on
available information, including the failure cause and provision of evidence that
preventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe operation
of the Affected Segments during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure
restriction. Appeals of determinations of the Director in this regard will be decided by
the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
5. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, ANR must
complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,
including an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. Complete the testing and
analysis as follows:
a. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section
and other evidence from the failure site.
b. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and the
proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.
c. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with
the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative
to witness the testing.
d. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports (whether draft or final) in their
entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to ANR.
6. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, ANR must
complete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the
Director. The RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party
acceptable to the Director and must document the decision-making process and all factors
contributing to the failure. The final report must include findings, and any lessons learned
and whether the findings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within



ANR’s pipeline system. The independent third-party must distribute all RCFA reports
(whether draft or final) in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made
available to ANR.
7. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).
a. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, ANR must submit a Remedial Work
Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.
b. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.
c. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this
Order.
d. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial
measures ANR will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segments. It must address
all known or suspected factors and causes of the January 27, 2026 failure. ANR must
consider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to
develop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segments.
e. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:
i. Identify pipe in the Affected Segments with characteristics similar to the
contributing factors identified for the January 27, 2026 failure.
ii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test
failures) of the Affected Segments and to prepare a written report containing all the
available information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.
iii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, RCFA, and other corrective actions
required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing operational and assessment data
for the Affected Segments. Pre-existing operational data includes, but is not limited
to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical
analyses, and any third-party consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data
includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct
assessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.
iv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on January 27,
2026, are likely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segments.
v. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to
determine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the failure on
January 27, 2026, and other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or
any other integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segments. At a
minimum, this process must consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or
more of the following:
1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline system
based on the cause of failure on January 27, 2026, and that can reliably detect and
identify anomalies,
2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,
3) Close-interval surveys,



4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in coordination
with other utilities (e.g., underground utilities, overhead power lines, etc.) in the
area,
5) Coating surveys,
6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,
7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and,
8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate for the
failure causes.
Note: ANR may use the results of previous tests, inspections, assessments, and
evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the results of the tests,
inspections, assessments, and evaluations are analyzed with regard to the factors
known or suspected to have caused the January 27, 2026 failure.
vi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria ANR will use to prioritize, excavate,
evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified integrity threats.
Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a schedule for repairs or
replacement.
vii. Describe the methods ANR will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective
measures to remediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on January
27, 2026, and to address other known integrity threats along the Affected Segments.
The repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the criteria specified
in 7(e)(vi) above.
viii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures
to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segments considering the results
of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures undertaken pursuant
to the Order.
f. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.
g. ANR must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained during
the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of actions
undertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate modifications required by the
Director.
i. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.
ii. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.
iii. Any and all revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by
reference into this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO
Documentation Report.
h. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the
plan.
8. CAO Documentation Report. ANR must create and revise, as necessary, a CAO
Documentation Report (CDR). When ANR has concluded all the items in this Order it will
submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to complete



a thorough review of all actions taken by ANR with regards to this Order prior to approving
the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities and
documentation associated with this Order in one document.
a. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire CDR.
b. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this
Order.
c. The CDR must include but not be limited to:
i. Table of Contents;
ii. Summary of the pipeline failure of January 27, 2026, and the response activities;
iii. Summary of pipe data/properties and all prior assessments of the Affected
Segments;
iv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis required
by the Order;
v. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the Order;
vi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;
vii. Documentation of all actions taken by ANR to implement the RWP, the results of
those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;
viii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to
incorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever
necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure investigation
and remedial activities;
ix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;
x. A path forward describing specific actions ANR will take on its entire pipeline
system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order; and
xi. Appendices (if required).
Other Requirements:
9. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of
the Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve
the submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;
(d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the
submission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon
conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action
required by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director
disapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies
within the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.



10. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any
of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause
for an extension.
11. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and
results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of
the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due on
April 30, 2026, covering the period through March 31, 2026. The Director may change the
interval for the submission of these reports.
12. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of the
costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each quarterly report
submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,
studies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,
replacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.
Be advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential
treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 1-2026-031-CAO and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions
required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to
Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued
to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal
or state law.
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to
the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §
60120.
The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR
§ 190.5.
__________________________ _______________________
Linda Daugherty Date Issued
Acting Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
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