{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220063003","title":"CHATTANOOGA GAS CO — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2006-04-20","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 193.2503, 193.2603, 199.105(b), 199.225(a)(1).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220063003.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220063003.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220063003","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220063003","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving CHATTANOOGA GAS CO. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 193.2503,  193.2603,  199.105(b),  199.225(a)(1). The case was opened on 2006-04-20 and is reported as closed as of 2009-07-22. Proposed civil penalty: $303,000. Assessed civil penalty: $303,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220063003_FinalOrder_07072009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220063003/220063003_FinalOrder_07072009.pdf\n\n220063003_FinalOrder_07072009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220063003/220063003_FinalOrder_07072009_text.pdf\n\n220063003_FinalOrder_07072009_text.pdf\n\nJUL 07 2009\nMr. John W. Somerhalder, II\nPresident\nAGL Resources, Inc.\nTen Peachtree Place, NE\nAtlanta, GA 30309\nRe: CPF No. 2-2006-3003\nDear Mr. Somerhalder:\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation\nand assesses a civil penalty of $303,000. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final\nOrder. This enforcement action closes automatically upon payment. Your receipt of the Final\nOrder constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: David E. Slovensky, Esq.,\nAGL Resources Inc., Ten Peachtree Place NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30309\nPaul Biancardi, Esq., 5818 Beaver Falls Drive, Kingwood, Texas 77345\nLinda Daugherty, Director, Southern Region, PHMSA\nRichard Lonn, Director, Regulatory Compliance, Chattanooga Gas Company\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005-1160 0001 0046 9716]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n______________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nAGL Resources, Inc. , ) CPF No. 2-2006-3003\n)\nRespondent. )\n______________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted a post-incident\ninvestigation of a natural gas fire at a liquefied natural gas facility (LNG Plant) owned by AGL\nResources, Inc. (AGL or Respondent), and operated by its subsidiary, Chattanooga Gas\nCompany, in Chattanooga, Tennessee. AGL Resources, Inc., is a diversified energy services\ncompany that distributes natural gas in Florida, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, Tennessee, and\nVirginia.\nThe incident occurred on May 13, 2005, when a fire at the LNG Plant severely burned one of\nChattanooga’s employees, Mr. Terry Poss, and resulted in his hospitalization (Incident). At the\ntime of the Incident, Mr. Poss was attempting to unclog an F-101 filter that was used to clean the\nnatural gas of certain impurities. When the built-up pressure dislodged the blockage in the filter,\ngas rushed out in Mr. Poss’ direction, ignited, and caused him to sustain second- and third-degree\nburns.1 Respondent promptly initiated an emergency shutdown of the LNG Plant.2\nAs a result of the post-incident investigation, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director),\nissued to Respondent, by letter dated April 20, 2006, a Notice of Probable Violation and\nProposed Civil Penalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed\nfinding that Respondent had violated 49 C.F.R. §§ 193.2503, 193.2503(f)(4), 193.2603(a),\n193.2603(b), 199.105(b), and 199.225(a)(1) and assessing a civil penalty of $303,000 for the\nalleged violations.\nAfter an authorized extension of time, AGL responded to the Notice by letter dated July 20, 2006\n(Response). AGL did not dispute the allegations of violation but contested the amount of the\nproposed civil penalty and offered a compromise amount of $173,000. OPS declined the offer\n1 Investigation Report, Natural Gas Fire, May 13, 2005, Chattanooga LNG Plant, Chattanooga Gas Company, U.S.\nDepartment of Transportation, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (December 30, 2005), at 5.\n2 Id.\n\n\n\n2\nand the matter was scheduled for hearing, which was subsequently held on May 11, 2007, in\nAtlanta, Georgia. An attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, served as presiding\nofficial pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.211(c). After the hearing, Respondent provided a Post-\nHearing Closing Argument (Closing), which was further supplemented by letter dated July 18,\n3\n2008.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nAGL did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R. Parts 193 and 199, as\nfollows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2503, which states:\n§ 193.2503 Operating procedures.\nEach operator shall follow one or more manuals of written\nprocedures to provide safety in normal operation and in responding to an\nabnormal operation that would affect safety….\nThe Notice alleged that on the date of the Incident, Respondent violated § 193.2503 by failing to\nfollow its own written procedures to provide safety in both normal and abnormal operating\nsituations. At the time of the Incident, AGL’s written procedures required that all employees\nwear personal protective equipment (PPE), including flame-retardant coveralls and hood,\nwhenever “a hazardous or potentially hazardous atmospheric condition exist[ed] on a job\nsite….\n”4 Mr. Poss, however, was not wearing flame-retardant clothing when he attempted to\nclear the clogged filter and, as a result, suffered serious injury.\nfailed to ensure that Poss followed these company procedures.\n5 The Notice alleged that AGL\nIn its Response, AGL did not contest this allegation. Accordingly, upon consideration of all of\nthe evidence, I find that AGL violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2503 by failing to follow its own written\nprocedures to provide safety in normal operation and in responding to an abnormal operation that\nwould affect safety.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2503(f)(4), which states:\n§ 193.2503 Operating procedures.\nEach operator shall follow one or more manuals of written\nprocedures to provide safety in normal operation and in responding to an\nabnormal operation that would affect safety. The procedures must include\nprovisions for:\n3 AGL confirmed in its Closing that it did not wish to contest the allegation of violation in the Notice. See Closing,\n1.\n4 Chattanooga Gas Company Safety Manual, Paragraph 5.3 (1993).\n5 Investigation Report, supra, at 2.\n\n\n\n3\n(a) ….\n(f) In the case of liquefaction, maintaining temperatures, pressures,\npressure differentials and flow rates, as applicable, within their design\nlimits for:\n(1) ….\n(4) Purification and regeneration equipment;….\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 193.2503 by failing to follow its own manual of\nwritten liquefaction procedures for maintaining pressure differentials and flow rates for\npurification and regeneration equipment, within their design limits. Specifically, the Notice\nalleged that AGL failed to follow the instructions in the manufacturer’s manual for maintaining\nEquipment Corporation) warned in its operating instructions that the pressure drop across the\npressure differentials across the F-101 filter within its design limits.6 The manufacturer (Perry\nfilter should never exceed 35 psi or else the filter elements might collapse.\nAGL admitted in its Response that the company was aware of this restriction and expected its\nallowed the pressure drop across the filter to reach 54 psi before they shut down the liquefaction\nprocess. As a consequence, the filter collapsed, causing molecular sieve and dust particles to\nignite. In its Response, AGL did not contest this allegation. Accordingly, upon consideration of\nall the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §193.2503(f)(4) by failing to follow\nits own written procedures for maintaining pressure differentials for the F-101 filter within the\ndesign limits set by the manufacturer.\nemployees to adhere to it.7 However, its employees failed to comply with this restriction and\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2603, which states:\n§ 193.2603 General.\n(a) Each component in service, including its support system, must\nbe maintained in a condition that is compatible with its operational or\nsafety purpose by repair, replacement, or other means.\n(b) An operator may not place, return, or continue in service any\ncomponent which is not maintained in accordance with this subpart.\nThe Notice alleged that AGL violated § 193.2603 by failing to maintain various components of\nthe LNG Plant equipment in a condition that was compatible with their operational or safety\npurpose by repair, replacement, or other means. Specifically, it alleged that AGL failed to\nproperly maintain the three dehydrator towers. The Notice further noted that Respondent had\ncontinued to keep the dehydrators in service despite known problems dating back to 2003.\nDuring the LNG liquefaction pre-treatment process, water, carbon dioxide, and other compounds\n6 The pressure differential for the filter is calculated by subtracting the outlet pressure from the inlet pressure. The\ninlet pressure is a reading taken from a gauge installed upstream from the dehydrator. The outlet pressure is a\nreading taken from a gauge installed at the outlet of the cold box.\n7 Closing, at 7.\n\n\n\n4\nare removed by using a dehydrator and molecular sieve towers.8 As revealed by the AGL\ninternal investigation, the caulking that sealed the gap between the mesh and the inside wall of\nall three towers failed, allowing sieve under pressure to be forced out of the dehydrator and\ncausing the F-101 filter to clog.\n9 As explained in the Investigation Report, the F-101 filter had\nroutinely clogged prior to the Incident, becoming blocked by molecular sieve and dust that\noriginated in the dehydrator.\ndid not repair or replace the dehydrator, the source of the problem. As recently as six days prior\nto the Incident, the filter clogged and required cleaning. Respondent chose to install an\nadditional strainer to catch the sieve rather than to properly repair the dehydrator but both\nstrainers failed prior to the Incident.\n10 Although AGL cleaned and replaced the filter numerous times, it\nProper maintenance and repair of these various components could have prevented the May 13,\n2005 fire. AGL did not contest this allegation. Accordingly, upon consideration of all of the\nevidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 193.2603 by failing to maintain the\ndehydrator and other related components in a condition that was compatible with their\noperational or safety purpose by repair, replacement, or other means.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b), which states:\n§ 199.105 Drug tests required.\nEach operator shall conduct the following drug tests for the\npresence of a prohibited drug:\n(a) …\n(b) Post-accident testing. As soon as possible but no later than 32\nhours after an accident, an operator shall drug test each employee whose\nperformance either contributed to the accident or cannot be completely\ndiscounted as a contributing factor to the accident. An operator may\ndecide not to test under this paragraph but such a decision must be based\non the best information available immediately after the accident that the\nemployee's performance could not have contributed to the accident or that,\nbecause of the time between that performance and the accident, it is not\nlikely that a drug test would reveal whether the performance was affected\nby drug use….\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 199.105(b) by failing, within 32 hours after an\naccident, to drug test an employee whose performance either contributed to the accident or could\nnot be completely discounted as a contributing factor. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nRespondent failed to drug test within 32 hours the employee who was involved and injured in the\nIncident. AGL failed either to provide a reasonable explanation for its failure to test or to\n8 Investigation Report, supra, at 7.\n9 Id. at 9.\n10 Id.\n\n\n\n5\ndemonstrate that the employee’s performance could be completely discounted as a contributing\nfactor to the accident. AGL did not contest this allegation. Accordingly, upon consideration of\nall of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.105(b) by failing to drug test,\nwithin 32 hours, the employee involved and injured in the Incident.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 199.225 (a)(1), which states:\n§ 199.225 Alcohol tests required.\nEach operator shall conduct the following types of alcohol tests for\nthe presence of alcohol:\n(a) Post-accident. (1) As soon as practicable following an\naccident, each operator shall test each surviving covered employee for\nalcohol if that employee’s performance of a covered function either\ncontributed to the accident or cannot be completely discounted as a\ncontributing factor to the accident. The decision not to administer a test\nunder this section shall be based on the operator’s determination, using the\nbest available information at the time of the determination, that the\ncovered employee’s performance could not have contributed to the\naccident.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 199.225(a)(1) by failing to test, as soon as\npracticable following an accident, each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that\nemployee’s performance of a covered function either contributed or could not be completely\ndiscounted as a contributing factor to the accident. Specifically, the Notice alleged that AGL\nfailed to test, as soon as practicable, the employee involved and injured in the Incident.\nRespondent failed either to provide a reasonable explanation for its failure to test or to\ndemonstrate that the employee’s performance could not be completely discounted as a\ncontributing factor to the accident. In its Response, AGL did not contest this allegation.\nAccordingly, upon consideration of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 199.225(a)(1) by failing to test for alcohol use, as soon as practicable, the employee involved\nand injured in the Incident.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.\n49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 require that, in determining the amount of a civil\npenalty, I consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s ability to pay the penalty and any effect that\n\n\n\n6\nthe penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent\nin attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the\neconomic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of subsequent\ndamages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil\npenalty of $303,000 for violations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 193.2503, 193.2503(f)(4), 193.2603,\n199.105(b), and 199.225(a)(1).\nAGL did not contest any of the findings of violation but presented five distinct arguments why\nthe total penalty should be reduced. The first involved the gravity and circumstances of each\nviolation and is therefore discussed separately under each Item below. The other four, which can\nbe discussed collectively, are as follows: (1) that the Incident and injuries were the direct result\nof employee misconduct rather than the culpability of the company; (2) that AGL had made a\nsubstantial good-faith investment after the Incident in certain company-wide safety\nenhancements; (3) that the company had no history of prior offenses; and (4) that 10 other Final\nOrders issued by OPS in the past provided for mitigation of a proposed penalty based upon the\noperator’s conduct subsequent to issuance of the Notice.\nI find these last four arguments unpersuasive. First, it is well settled that pipeline operators are\nultimately responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees, contractors, and agents in\ncomplying with federal pipeline safety regulations. Furthermore, such a policy conforms to the\ntraditional doctrine of respondeat superior under which AGL is legally responsible for the\nactions of its employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment. Even if AGL\nhad appropriate safety procedures in place at the time of the Incident, the company still failed to\ntake effective action to ensure that the procedures were actually followed by individuals\nperforming work at the LNG Plant.\nIn fact, it is troubling that Respondent attempts to shift responsibility and culpability for its own\nregulatory violations to two front-line employees.\nculture is one that imposes multiple safety “barriers” to reduce the risks and consequences of\naccidents. Under Respondent’s argument, no pipeline operator that had adopted adequate safety\nprocedures but then failed to monitor or supervise its personnel in carrying them out would ever\nbe held liable for its own regulatory violations. Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear\nthat AGL failed on multiple levels to take the measures necessary to prevent the Incident and to\nensure that its employees actually followed company procedures.\n11 An organization with an effective safety\nSecond, AGL argued that its actions after the Incident reflected a sincere, good-faith effort to\nimprove safety conditions at the company and that such efforts should serve to mitigate the\nproposed penalty. The company stated that it had made “substantial investments in time and\nmoney which had yielded demonstrable improvements in the safety of the Company’s overall\noperations.”12\nThese improvements, it argued, were not limited to ones directly related to the\n11 For example, AGL states in its Closing: “The Company did not condone or ratify the misconduct of Poss or\n[Plant Superintendent] Young in failing to follow applicable policies and manufacturer’s instructions, and the\nCompany notes that neither individual is presently employed by the Company.” Closing at 1.\n12 Closing, at 2.\n\n\n\n7\nIncident but encompassed a broad range of measures designed to foster “a renewed safety focus\nacross all operations.” This included a commitment, made prior to issuance of the Notice, to\ninvest more than $1.77 million on actions that went “above and beyond the requirements of 49\nCFR Part 193.”13\nWhile such measures may reflect a sincere and effective effort to improve safety, they do not\nconstitute a basis for mitigating a penalty imposed for multiple, significant safety violations that\noccurred prior to a serious accident. PHMSA has indeed recognized a “good faith” defense for\nactions voluntarily taken by an operator before a violation to achieve regulatory compliance; it\nhas not generally recognized this defense for corrective actions taken in response to an accident\nor enforcement proceeding. In this case, I find that the actions taken by AGL after the Incident\nwere largely ones that any reasonable and prudent operator would have taken to protect its\nfacilities and operating personnel and do not constitute a basis for reducing a penalty.\nThird, AGL argued that it had not previously been cited by PHMSA for the specific violations\nlisted in the Notice. While this may be correct, an operator’s history of prior violations is one of\nseveral considerations listed in 49 C.F.R. § 190.225 and by which a proposed civil penalty is\ninitially calculated. In this case, AGL’s prior enforcement history was considered by PHMSA in\ncalculating the proposed penalty; otherwise, the proposed penalties might have been substantially\nhigher.\nFinally, Respondent’s counsel referred to 10 other OPS Final Orders in which a civil penalty was\nreduced. As discussed at the hearing and as referenced above, all of the penalty assessment\nconsiderations enumerated in 49 U.S.C. § 60122 are evaluated in calculating a proposed penalty.\nIn fairness, this necessarily entails an independent assessment of the totality of the facts and\ncircumstances of each case. This case involved an accident that resulted in one employee being\nseriously injured and that could have easily resulted in a major catastrophe. Therefore, it is\ndifficult to draw meaningful parallels between this case and the ones cited by Respondent.\nIn addition to these general arguments, AGL raised the following specific arguments for\nmitigation of the penalties proposed for Items 1-5:\nItem 1. The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $41,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 193.2503, for failing to follow its own written procedures requiring the use of PPE. In its post-\nhearing submissions, Respondent acknowledged the seriousness of the employee’s injuries but\nasserted that they were the result of his own “poor choices,\n” not those of the company.\n14\nAGL\nargued that Mr. Poss elected to violate standard AGL procedures by failing to wear the PPE and\nchose to stand in the flow of gas when cleaning the filter, thus increasing the risk and extent of\nhis injuries. The company also argued that the penalty should reflect the fact that the company\nhad provided Poss with proper training on the company’s safety procedures and the usage of PPE\nprior to the Incident.\n13 Id.\n14 Id. at 4.\n\n\n\n8\nI disagree. First, the gravity of this violation cannot be overstated. Not only was Mr. Poss\nseverely injured and hospitalized with second- and third-degree burns, but the consequences of\nthe Incident could easily have been far worse. AGL is fortunate that only one employee was\ninjured and that the fire was quickly contained. Regardless of any mistakes that the employees\nmay have made, the fact remains that Mr. Poss would not have suffered significant injuries if\nAGL had taken adequate measures to ensure that its personnel properly followed the company’s\nprocedures on PPEs. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment\ncriteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $41,000 for Item 1.\nItem 2. The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $91,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 193.2503(f)(4), for failing to follow the manufacturer’s written instructions for maintaining\npressure differentials and flow rates for purification and regeneration equipment within their\ndesign limits. As stated above, Respondent admitted that it allowed the pressure drop across the\nfilter to exceed the manufacturer’s stated allowance. AGL argued nevertheless that a reduced\npenalty was appropriate because: (1) AGL was not required by the pipeline safety regulations to\nmaintain equipment to measure the pressure differential across the filter; (2) the violation was a\nresult of employee misconduct; and (3) the fire was quickly controlled and did not present a risk\nto the public.\nI find these arguments unconvincing. First, it is true that Respondent was not required to\nmaintain specific equipment to measure the pressure differential across the filter, but it was\nrequired to adopt and follow procedures for “maintaining temperatures, pressures, pressure\ndifferentials and flow rates, as applicable, within [the purification and regeneration equipment’s]\ndesign limits.\nlimits for the filter and attempted to observe the pressure drop by periodically observing the\nflow, it had a clear responsibility to maintain the proper pressure levels by whatever means\nnecessary. The company failed to do this. Respondent stated that it has since installed a\nmeasuring device to detect the pressure drop. However, as explained above, this post-accident\naction is not persuasive of an operator’s good faith in attempting to comply with the pipeline\nsafety regulations prior to an incident.\n”15 Although AGL acknowledged that it was aware of the manufacturer’s design\nAs noted above, the alleged misconduct of AGL employees does not absolve the company of its\nown obligation to properly maintain its equipment so that it does not pose a safety risk.\nLikewise, the fact that the fire was contained and did not result in greater injury does not reduce\nthe culpability of the operator. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the\nassessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $91,000 for Item 2.\nItem 3. The Notice proposed a civil penalty amount of $131,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 193.2603, for failing to maintain the three dehydrator towers. As stated above, I\nfound that the fire and the resulting injuries to Mr. Poss would not have occurred if the\nliquefaction equipment had been properly maintained. In addition to the general arguments\ndiscussed earlier, AGL argued that a reduced penalty was appropriate for this Item because the\ncompany had made a good-faith effort, prior to the Incident, to correct the problem with the F-\n101 filter by installing an additional strainer and replacing the filter.\n15 49 C.F.R. § 193.2503.\n\n\n\n9\nEven though such measures may have been taken prior to the Incident, I still do not believe they\nrise to the level of a valid “good faith” defense. Under § 193.2603, operators have an affirmative\nobligation to maintain their equipment “in a condition that is compatible with its operational or\nsafety purpose by repair, replacement, or other means.” AGL had experienced repeated\nproblems with molecular sieve at the LNG plant dating back to 2003 and occurring as recently as\nsix days prior to the Incident. The company clearly knew or should have known that its previous\nrepair efforts had been unsuccessful, that the dehydrator was not operating properly, and that\nmore extensive repairs were necessary in order to comply with the regulation.\nSince Respondent failed to repair the dehydrator towers or to fix the underlying cause of the\nfilter problems, despite having had ample opportunities to do so for several years, I find that the\nproposed penalty of $131,000 is warranted. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and\nconsidered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $131,000 for Notice\nItem 3.\nItems 4 and 5. The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $40,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 199.105(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 199.225(a)(1), for Respondent’s failure to drug and alcohol test\nthe involved employee after the Incident.\nRespondent did not provide an explanation for its failure to conduct the drug and alcohol tests,\nbut noted that the employee’s supervisor, who was an hour-and-a-half away from the LNG Plant\nat the time of the Incident, was more focused on managing the incident response and assisting\nwith the hospitalization of the injured employee than with conducting the alcohol and drug tests.\nWhile this may be understandable, such is the case for most accidents involving injuries. In\naddition, § 199.105(b) allows for drug testing to occur within a 32-hour window and § 199.225\n(a)(1) requires that alcohol testing occur “as soon as practicable” following an accident.\nhad ample opportunity to meet both requirements. Furthermore, the injured employee was taken\nto a hospital, where the tests could have readily been performed.\n16 AGL\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $20,000 for Item 4 and $20,000 for Item 5.\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for all the Items\ndiscussed above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $303,000.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require this payment be made by wire transfer, through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, OK 73125; (405) 954-8893.\n16 §§ 199.105(b) and 199.225(a)(1).\n\n\n\n10\nFailure to pay the $303,000 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual\nrate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a United\nStates District Court.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be received within 20 days of Respondent’s receipt of this\nFinal Order and must contain a brief statement of the issue(s). The filing of the petition\nautomatically stays the payment of any civil penalty assessed. However if Respondent submits\npayment for the civil penalty, the Final Order becomes the final administrative decision and the\nright to petition for reconsideration is waived. The terms and conditions of this Final Order shall\nbe effective upon receipt.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":29627}