{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220071010","title":"SOUTH CAROLINA PIPELINE CORP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2007-05-22","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.905(a), 192.911(m), 192.925(b), 192.935(a), 192.935(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220071010.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220071010.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220071010","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220071010","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving SOUTH CAROLINA PIPELINE CORP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.905(a),  192.911(m),  192.925(b),  192.935(a),  192.935(b). The case was opened on 2007-05-22 and is reported as closed as of 2010-07-15. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220071010_ Final Order_07152010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071010/220071010_%20Final%20Order_07152010.pdf\n\n220071010_ Final Order_07152010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071010/220071010_%20Final%20Order_07152010_text.pdf\n\n220071010_notice letter_05222007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071010/220071010_notice%20letter_05222007.pdf\n\n220071010_notice letter_05222007_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071010/220071010_notice%20letter_05222007_text.pdf\n\n220071010_Oper Resp to notice and req for exten_06182007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071010/220071010_Oper%20Resp%20to%20notice%20and%20req%20for%20exten_06182007.pdf\n\n220071010_operator response and Request to cancel their previous hearing request _09212007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071010/220071010_operator%20response%20and%20Request%20to%20cancel%20their%20previous%20hearing%20request%20_09212007.pdf\n\n220071010_ Final Order_07152010_text.pdf\n\nJUL 15 2010\nMr. Samuel L. Dozier\nVice President, Commercial & Operations\nCarolina Gas Transmission Corporation\n105 New Way Road\nColumbia, SC 29224-2407\nRE: CPF No. 2-2007-1010\nDear Mr. Dozier:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and concludes that Carolina Gas Transmission Corporation has completed the actions\nspecified in the Notice to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. Therefore, this case is\nnow closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of\nmailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Wayne Lemoi, Director, Southern Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0039 0744]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nCarolina Gas Transmission Corporation, ) CPF No. 2-2007-1010\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n_________________________________________ )\nFINAL ORDER\nOn October 2-5 and October 23-26, 2006, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of Carolina Gas Transmission\nCorporation’s (CGT or Respondent) gas integrity management program (IMP) at the company’s\noffices in Columbia, South Carolina. CGT is an interstate natural gas company that delivers\nnatural gas throughout the Southeast.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated May 22, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed\nCompliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed\nfinding that Respondent had committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed\nordering Respondent to take measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed\nfinding that Respondent had committed certain other probable violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192\nand warning Respondent to take appropriate corrective action to address them or be subject to\nfuture enforcement action.\nBy letter dated June 18, 2007, Respondent requested an extension of time to respond to the\nNotice. Respondent was granted an extension until December 31, 2007, and responded to the\nNotice by letter dated September 21, 2007 (Response). CGT did not contest the allegations of\nviolation and expressed its intent to comply with the proposed corrective actions upon receipt of\na final order. Respondent did not request a hearing and has therefore waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, CGT did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R. Part\n192, as follows:\nItem 2A: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b), which states:\n\n\n\n2\n§ 192.925 What are the requirements for using External Corrosion Direct\nAssessment (ECDA)?\n(a) ….\n(b) General requirements. An operator that uses direct assessment to\nassess the threat of external corrosion must follow the requirements in this\nsection, in [American Society of Mechanical Engineers]/[American National\nStandards Institute] B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7), section\n6.4, and in NACE RP 0502-2002 (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7). An\noperator must develop and implement a direct assessment plan that has\nprocedures addressing preassessment, indirect examination, direct\nexamination, and post-assessment. If the ECDA detects pipeline coating\ndamage, the operator must also integrate the data from the ECDA with other\ninformation from the data integration (§ 192.917(b)) to evaluate the covered\nsegment for the threat of third party damage, and to address the threat as\nrequired by § 192.917(e)(1).\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b) by failing to develop and\nimplement a direct assessment plan that adequately addressed indirect assessment, direct\nexamination, and post-assessment procedures. Specifically, it alleged that Respondent’s\nprocedures did not provide for integrating ECDA indirect inspection pipeline coating indication\ndata with encroachment and foreign line crossing data to evaluate covered segments for the\nthreat of third-party damage and did not address such threats, as required by § 192.917(e)(1).\nThe Notice also alleged that CGT had failed to develop and implement a process for requiring\nindirect surveys of its lines that had been crossed during third-part excavation activities but\nwhere CGT personnel had not been present to witness such activities. The Notice alleged, for\nexample, that third-party damage had occurred on Respondent’s pipeline because of the\nplacement of a power pole by CGT’s sister company.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, after considering all of the\nevidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.925(b) by failing to develop and\nimplement a direct assessment plan that adequately addressed indirect assessment, direct\nexamination, and post-assessment procedures.\nItem 3A: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935(b), which states, in\nrelevant part:\n§ 192.935 What additional preventive and mitigative measures must\nan operator take?\n(a) ….\n(b) Third party damage and outside force damage—\n(1) Third party damage. An operator must enhance its damage\nprevention program, as required under § 192.614 of this part, with respect to a\ncovered segment to prevent and minimize the consequences of a release due to\nthird party damage. Enhanced measures to an existing damage prevention\nprogram include, at a minimum—\n. . ..\n(ii) Collecting in a central database information that is location specific\n\n\n\n3\non excavation damage that occurs in covered and non covered segments in the\ntransmission system and the root cause analysis to support identification of\ntargeted additional preventative and mitigative measures in the high\nconsequence areas. This information must include recognized damage that is\nnot required to be reported as an incident under part 191. . . .\n1\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935(b) by failing to include\nenhanced measures in its damage prevention program for collecting, in a central database,\nlocation-specific information on excavation damage that had occurred in covered and non-\ncovered pipeline segments. Additionally, it alleged that CGT did not have a root cause analysis\nto support the identification of targeted additional preventive and mitigative (P&M) measures in\nHigh Consequence Areas (HCAs). Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.935(b) by failing to include enhanced measures in its damage prevention program for\ncollecting information on excavation damage that had occurred along its pipeline.\nItem 3B: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935(a), which states:\n§ 192.935 What additional preventive and mitigative measures must an\noperator take?\n(a) General requirements. An operator must take additional measures\nbeyond those already required by Part 192 to prevent a pipeline failure and to\nmitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure in a high consequence area. An\noperator must base the additional measures on the threats the operator has\nidentified to each pipeline segment. (See § 192.917). An operator must\nconduct, in accordance with one of the risk assessment approaches in\nASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7), section 5, a\nrisk analysis of its pipeline to identify additional measures to protect the high\nconsequence area and enhance public safety. Such additional measures\ninclude, but are not limited to, installing Automatic Shut-off Valves or\nRemote Control Valves, installing computerized monitoring and leak\ndetection systems, replacing pipe segments with pipe of heavier wall\nthickness, providing additional training to personnel on response procedures,\nconducting drills with local emergency responders and implementing\nadditional inspection and maintenance programs.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935(a) by failing to take additional\nmeasures, beyond those already required by Part 192, to prevent pipeline failures and to mitigate\ntheir consequences in HCAs. Specifically, it alleged that CGT’s IMP did not include an\nevaluation of threats, a spectrum of P&M alternatives, and the potential impact of identified\nrisks, as outlined in § 192.917. The Notice also alleged that the determination of P&M measures\ndid not include appropriate factors of likelihood and consequence. Respondent did not contest\nthis allegation of violation. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.935(a) by failing to take the additional P&M measures\ndiscussed above to prevent pipeline failures and mitigate their consequences in HCAs.\n1 Item 3A of the Notice correctly quoted § 192.935(b)(1)(ii) but then incorrectly referred to subparagraph (b)(2) as\nthe alleged violation.\n\n\n\n4\nItem 4A: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(m), which states:\n§ 192.911 What are the elements of an integrity management program?\nAn operator's initial integrity management program begins with a\nframework (see § 192.907) and evolves into a more detailed and\ncomprehensive integrity management program, as information is gained and\nincorporated into the program. An operator must make continual\nimprovements to its program. The initial program framework and subsequent\nprogram must, at minimum, contain the following elements. (When indicated,\nrefer to ASME/ANSI B31.8S (incorporated by reference, see § 192.7) for\nmore detailed information on the listed element.) . . .\n(m) A communication plan that includes the elements of ASME/ANSI\nB31.8S, section 10, and that includes procedures for addressing safety\nconcerns raised by—\n(1) OPS; and\n(2) A State or local pipeline safety authority when a covered segment is\nlocated in a State where OPS has an interstate agent agreement.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(m) by failing to develop and\nimplement an IMP that included a communications plan with procedures on how safety concerns\nthat had been raised by OPS or State authorities were to be documented, tracked, and addressed.\nCGT did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, after considering all of the\nevidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.911(m) by failing to have a\ncommunications plan with procedures for addressing safety concerns raised by OPS or State\nauthorities.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a Compliance Order with regards to Items 2(A), 3(A), 3(B), and 4(A) in the\nNotice for violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns\nor operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under chapter 601. The Director has indicated that Respondent has taken the\nfollowing actions specified in the proposed compliance order:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.925(b) (Item 2A), CGT has developed a process\nand procedures for integrating ECDA indirect inspection indications with encroachment\nand foreign line crossing data to evaluate the covered segments for the threat of third-\nparty damage. These process and procedures require the following:\na) Actions to ensure the integrity of CGT’s pipelines when operator personnel are\nnot present during third-party excavation and construction activities that cross CGT\npipelines;\n\n\n\n5\nb) Indirect surveys of CGT pipelines crossed, to ensure safety and that\nconstruction activity has not damaged its pipeline; and\nc) Documenting these actions and incorporating them into CGT’s IMP, including\nactions to ensure that CGT’s sister companies are aware of these requirements and to\nprevent inadvertent damage to the pipelines when power poles are installed.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 192.935(b) (Item 3A), CGT has developed\nprocedures for collecting, in a central database, location-specific information on\nexcavation damage that has occurred in covered and non-covered segments.\n3. With respect to the violation of § 192.935(a) (Item 3B), CGT has fully developed a\nthreat evaluation process and a spectrum of preventative and mitigative alternatives with\nappropriate risk factors, including the likelihood of failure and consequences.\n4. With respect to the violation of § 192.911(m) (Item 4A), CGT has developed\nprocedures on how safety concerns raised by PHMSA or State authorities are to be\ndocumented, tracked, and addressed.\nAccordingly, since compliance has been achieved with respect to these violations, the\ncompliance terms are not included in this Order.\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Item 1A, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 192 but did not propose\na civil penalty or compliance order for the item. Therefore, this is considered to be a warning\nitem. The warning was for:\n49 C.F.R. § 192.905(a) (Item 1A) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to identify the\nHCAs along its pipeline, in accordance with method (1) or (2) from the definition\nof HCA in Part 192.\nCGT presented information in its Response showing that it had taken certain actions to address\nthe cited item. Accordingly, having considered such information, I find, pursuant to 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.205, that a probable violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.905 (Notice Item 1A) has occurred and\nRespondent is hereby advised to correct such condition. In the event that OPS finds a violation of\nthis provision in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement\naction.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon receipt.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n220071010_Oper Resp to notice and req for exten_06182007.pdf\n\nFROM\n(MON) JUN 18 2007 14\n/ST. 14:58/No. 6802438935 P\n2\nSormol L Dozier\nCommerciol & Field Operations\nVice President\nTRANSMISSION +*\nCAROLINA GAS\nsdozier@scana.com\nA SCANA COMPANY\nJune 18, 2007\nVIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY\nAND FACSIMILE\nDirector, Southern Region\nMs. Linda Daugherty\nPipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration\n233 Peachtree Street, Suite 600\nU.S. Department of Transportation\nAtlanta, GA 30303\nRe:\nCarolina Gas Transmission Corporation, CPF 2-2007-1010\nRequest For Hearing and Statement of Issues\nDear Ms. Daugherty:\nrobable Violation and Proposed Compliance Order ('Notice\") dated May 22, 2007, issued |\nn May 22, 2007, Carolina Gas Transmission Corporation (\"CGT\") received a Notice\nMaterials Safety Administration (\"PHMSA\"). In the Notice, based on its review of CGT'\nhe Southern Region of the Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline and Hazardou\nIntegrity Management Program (\"IMP\") conducted in Columbia, South Carolina, during the\nweeks of October 2-5 and 23-26, 2006, PHMSA states that it appears that CGT has committed\nprobable violations of the IMP provisions of the pipeline safety regulations.\n4 within 90 days of the final notice. In addition, CGT will track and submit to the Regional\nCGT will comply with the warning iter and Proposed Compliance Order Items 1, 2, and\nadditional Lime to comply with Proposed Compliance Order Item 3, which states that, in regard\nDirector all costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order. However, CGT requests\nalternatives with all appropriate factors included into the evaluation, specially the likelihood\nto Item Number 3B of the Notice, CGT must \"fully develop a threat evaluation and P&M\nprocess.\"\nand consequence factors. The risk process should also be appropriately linked to the P&M\nextension of time to December 31, 2007. This extension is needed so that CT can (1) obtain\nIn order to comply fully with Proposed Compliance Order Itcm 3, CGT requests an\nfrom the vendor a new version of the risk ranking model; (2) populate the risk ranking model\nmanagement procedures to document the nature and operation of the new risk ranking model.\nwith the necessary data, including data regarding P&M measures; and (3) revise CGT's integrity\nOrder Item 3 is derried, CGT hereby requests a hearing pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.211(a) and\nTo the extent this request for an extension of time to respond to Proposed Compliance\nthe Notice's instructions. The purpose of the hearing would be to discuss the scope and nature of\nCarolina Gos Transmisson | P. O. Box 102407 - Columbia, South Corolina - 29224-2407. T (803) 217.6457 - F (803) 933.7460\n\n\n\nFROM\n(MON) JUN 18 2007 14\n/ST. 14:58/No. 6802438935 P\n• Ms. Linda Daugherty\nPage 2\nJune 18, 2007\nProposed Compliance Order Item 3, and to explain the steps CGT believes are necessary to bring\nCOT into compliance with the IMP regulations. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.211 (e), CGT\nequests that the materials in the agency's case files be provided to CGT at least 30 days befor\nny hearing date. During the hearing process, CGT will be represented by counse\nrequcst for a hearing be directed to the following:\nCGT respectfully requests that any correspondence and communications regarding this\nLaura A. Comstock\nSupervisor, Safety and Compliance\n105 New Way Road\nCarolina Gas Transmission Corporation\nColumbia, South Carolina 29224-2407\nSufa\nSamuel L. Dozier\nVice President,\nCommercial and Field Operations\ncc:\nCraig Collin\nWayne Vermulle\n\n220071010_notice letter_05222007_text.pdf\n\nU 5 Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\n233 Peachtree Street Ste 600\nAtlanta, GA 30303\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nAnd\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT RE UESTED\nMay 22, 2007\nMr Samuel L Dozier\nVice President and Commercial Field Operations\nCarohna Gas Transmission (CGT)\n105 New Way Road\nColumbia, South Carohna 29224-2407\nCPF 2-2007-1010\nDear Mr Dozier\nOn October 2-5 aud October 23-26, 2006, representatives of the Pipehne and Hazardous\nMatenals Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\ninspected your Gas integrity Management Program at your office in Columbia, South Carohna\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipelme Safety Regulations, Tttle 49, Code of Federal Regulations The items inspected and the\nprobable violations are\n1. High Consequence Area (HCA) Identification\nI)192. 905 How does an operator identify a high consequence area (HCA)?\n(a) General. To determine whtch segments of an operator's transmission pipehne\nsystem are covered by this subpart, an operator must identify the high\nconsequence areas. An operator must use method (1) or (2) from the definition in\ntt 192. 903 to idenhfy a high consequence area.\n\n\n\n$192. 903 What definitions apply to this subparto\nHigh consequence area means an area estabhshed by one of the methods described\nm paragraphs (I) or (2) as follows.\n(1) An area defined as—\n(i) A Class 3 location under $192. 5; or\n(u) A Class 4 location under (]192. 5, or\n(ni) Any area m a Class I or Class 2 location where the potential impact radius is\ngreater than 660 feet (200 meters), and the area withm a potential impact circle\ncontains 20 or more buddings intended for human occupancy; or\n(iv) Any area m a Class I or Class 2 location where the potenhal impact circle\ncontams an identified site.\n(2) The area within a potenhal impact circle (PIC) containing—\n(i) 20 or more buddings mtended for human occupancy, unless the exception in\nparagraph (4) applies; or\n(n) An identified site\n(3) Where a potential impact circle is calculated under either method (I) or (2) to\nestabhsh a high consequence area, the length of the high consequence area extends\naxially along the length of the pipeline from the outermost edge of the first potential\nimpact circle that contains either an identified site or 20 or more buddmgs intended\nfor human occupancy to the outermost edge of the last contiguous potential impact\ncircle that contains either an identified site or 20 or more buddmgs mtended for\nhuman occupancy. (See Figure E. I. A. in appendix E. )\n(4) If in identifying a high consequence area under paragraph (1)(ni) of this\ndefinition or paragraph (2)(i) of this definition, the radius of the potential impact\ncircle is greater than 660 feet (200 meters), the operator may identify a high\nconsequence area based on a prorated number of buddings intended for human\noccupancy within a distance 660 feet (200 meters) from the centerhne of the pipelme\nuntd December 17, 2006. If an operator chooses this approach, the operator must\nprorate the number of buddings intended for human occupancy based on the ratio\nof an area with a radius of 660 feet (200 meters) to the area of the potential impact\ncircle (i. e.\n,\nthe prorated number of buildings mtended for human occupancy is equal\nto [20 x (660 feet [or 200 meters]/ potential impact radius in feet [or meters])**2])\nIdentified site means each of the following areas.\n(a) An outside area or open structure that is occupied by twenty (20) or more\npersons on at least 50 days in any twelve (12)-month period (The days need not be\n\n\n\nconsecutive. ) Examples include but are not hmited to, beaches, playgrounds,\nrecreational facihties, camping grounds, outdoor theaters, stadiums, recreational\nareas near a body of water, or areas outside a rural budding such as a rehgious\nfacdity; or\n(b) A budding that is occupied by twenty (20) or more persons on at least five (5)\ndays a week for ten (10) weeks in any twelve (12)- month period. (The days and\nweeks need not be consecutive. ) Examples include, but are not limited to, rehgious\nfacilities, office buildmgs, community centers, general stores, 4-H facihties, or roller\nskating rinks; or\n(c) A facdity occupied by persons who are confined, are of impaired mobdity, or\nwould be difficult to evacuate. Examples include but are not hmited to hospitals,\nprisons, schools, day-care facihties, retirement facihties or assisted-living facdities.\n~ Item 1A: t'1 192. 905(a)\nDuring a records review of HCAs, it was determined that the HCA identification process\nhad not appropnately identified a school playgrouncUathletic field as an HCA pipehne\nsegment on Rhame Road in Columbia, South Carohna\n2. Direct Assessment (DA) Plan\n$ 192. 925 What are the requirements for using External Corrosion Direct\nAssessment (ECDA)?\n(b) General reqrrrremenrs. An operator that uses direct assessment to assess the\nthreat of external corrosion must follow the requirements in this section, in\nASME/ANSI B31 SS (ibr, see (1 192. 7), sechon 6. 4, and in NACE RP 0502 — 2002 (ibr,\nsee t'1 192. 7). An operator must develop and implement a direct assessment plan that\nhas procedures addressmg pre-assessment, indirect examination, direct\nexammation, and post-assessment. If the ECDA detects pipeline coatuig damage, the\noperator must also integrate the data from the ECDA with other mformation from\nthe data mtegration (1'1 192. 917(b)) to evaluate the covered segment for the threat of\nthird party damage, and to address the threat as required by t'1 192. 917(e)(1).\n~ Item 2A. g 192. 925(b)\nCGT's ECDA procedures do not provide for integrating ECDA indirect mspection\npipeline coating indkcanon data with encroachment and foreign hne crossing data to\nevaluate the covered segment for the threat of tlurd party damage, and to address this\nthreat as required by (192 917(e)(1) Further, a process is not in place to require an\nindirect survey of CGT's lines crossed when operator personnel are not present dunng\nthird party construction activities As an additional note, it was learned that third party\n\n\n\ndamage occurred on the CGT pipehne as a result of power pole placement by CGT's\nsister company, indicating lack of appropriate controls\n3 Preventive and Mitigative Measures\nt'l 192. 935 What additional preventive and mihgative measures must an operator\ntake\"\n(a) General requirements An operator must take additional measures beyond those\nalready required by Part 192 to prevent a pipehne fadure and to mitigate the\nconsequences of a pipehne failure in a high consequence area. An operator must\nbase the additional measures on the threats the operator has idenhfied to each\npipehne segment. (See g 192. 917) An operator must conduct, in accordance with one\nof the risk assessment approaches m ASME/ANSI B31. 8S (ibr, see g 192. 7), section\n5, a risk analysis of its pipeline to idenhfy additional measures to protect the high\nconsequence area and enhance public safety. Such additional measures include, but\nare not hmited to, instalhng Automatic Shut-off Valves or Remote Control Valves,\nmstalhng computeriaed monitoring and leak detection systems, replacing pipe\nsegments with pipe of heavier wall thickness, providing additional training to\npersonnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local emergency\nresponders and unplementing additional inspechon and maintenance programs.\n(b) Third party damage and outside force damage — (1) Third party damage. An\noperator must enhance its damage prevention program, as required under ('l 192. 614\nof this part, with respect to a covered segment to prevent and mmimue the\nconsequences of a release due to third party damage. Enhanced measures to an\nexishng damage prevention program include, at a mmimum—\n(u) Collecting in a central database information that is location specific on\nexcavation damage that occurs in covered and non covered segments in the\ntransmission system and the root cause analysis to support identification of targeted\nadditional preventative and mihgative measures in the high consequence areas. This\ninformation must include recognued damage that is not required to be reported as\nan mcident under part 191.\n~ Item 3A: t'l 192. 935(b)(2)\nThere are no procedures for collecting, in a cental database, location-specific\ninformation on excavation damage that occurs in covered and non-covered segments and\nthe root cause analysis to support identification of targeted additional preventative and\nmitigative measures in HCAs\n~ Item 3B tl 192. 935(a)\n\n\n\nThe CGT IMP does not include an evaluation of threats, a spectrum of preventive and\nnutigative (PkM) alternatives, and the potential impact on the identified risks for HCA\nsegments Specifically, the determination of appropnate P&M measures does not include\nappropnatc factors of hkchhood and consequence\n4. Communications Plan\ng 192. 911 What are the elements of an integrity management program\"\nAn operator's initial mtegrity management program begms with a framework (see g\n192. 907) and evolves mto a more detailed and comprehensive integrity management\nprogram, as information is gained and incorporated into the program. An operator\nmust make continual improvements to its program The initial program framework\nand subsequent program must, at mmimum, contam the following elements. (When\nindicated, refer to ASME/ANSI B31. 8S (ibr, see tl 192 7) for more detailed\ninformation on the hsted element. )\n(m) A communication plan that mcludes the elements of ASME/ANSI B31. 8S,\nsection 10, and that includes procedures for addressing safety concerns raised by—\n(I) OPS; and (2) A State or local pipehne safety authority when a covered segment is\nlocated in a State where OPS has an interstate agent agreement\n~ Item 4A: I'I 192. 911(m)\nThe CGT IMP includes no procedures on how safety concerns raised by PHMSA or State\nauthonues are to be documented, tracked, and addressed\nPro osed Com bunce Order\nPursuant to 49 Umted States Code $ 60118, the Pipehne and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration proposes to issue a Comphance Order to Carohna Gas Transmission Please\nrefer to the Proposed Complmnce Order that is enclosed and made a part of tlus Notice\nWWW It\nWith respect to item number lA, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents\ninvolved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty\nassessment proceedings at this time We advise you to promptly correct tlus item Be advised\nthat failure to do so may result in Carohna Gas Transmission being sublect to additional\nenforcement action\n\n\n\nRes onse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of tlus Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipelme Operators\nin Compliance Proceedmgs Please refer to this document and note the response options Be\nadvised that all matenal you submit in response to this enforcement action is sublect to bemg\nmade pubhcly available If you believe that any portion of your responsive matenal quahfies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U S C 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you beheve quahfy for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U S C 552(b) If you do not respond within 30 days\nof receipt of this Notice, tlus constitutes a waiver of your nght to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipelme Safety to find facts as alleged in\ntlus Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order\nIn your correspondence on tins matter, please refer to CPF 2-2007-1010 and for each document\nyou submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible\nLinda Daugherty\nDirector, Southern Region\nPipelme and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators m Compfiance Proceedmgs\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code $ 60118, the Pipehne and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Carohna Gas Transmission (CGT) a Compliance\nOrder incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Carohna Gas\nTransnussion with the pipeline safety regulations\nIn regard to Item Number 2A of the Notice pertaining to CGT's ECDA procedures not\nproviding for integrating ECDA indirect inspection pipelme coating indication data with\nencroachment and foreign line crossing data to evaluate the covered segment for the\nthreat of third party damage A process and procedures must be developed for integrating\nECDA indirect inspection indications with encroachment and foreign lme crossing data to\nevaluate the covered segments for the threat of third party damage Additionally, CGT\nmust require action to ensure the integrity of CGT pipehnes when operator personnel are not\npresent dunng third party construction activities that cross CGT pipelmes An indirect\nsurvey of the CGT pipeline crossed could be performed to ensure safety and that the\nconstruction activity dtd not damage the CGT pipehne CGT has taken steps to ensure that\nthe sister companies are aware of these reqmrements to prevent inadvertent damage to the\npipehnes when power poles are installed in the future CGT must document these\nactions and incorporate into the CGT integnty management program\nIn regard to Item Number 3A of the Notice pertaining to CGT IMP having no procedures for\ncollecting, m a central database, location-specific information on excavation damage that\noccurs in covered and non-covered segments and the root cause analysis to support\nidentification of targeted additional preventative and mitigative (P&M) measures in\nHCAs CGT must develop procedures for collecting location — specific information on\nexcavation damage that occurs in covered and non-covered segments Root cause analysis\nrequirements should be developed and mtegrated into CGT procedures\nIn regard to Item Number 3B of the Notice pertaiiung to CGT IMP not including an\nevaluation of threats, a spectrum of preventive and mitigative (PkM) alternatives, and the\npotential impact on the identified nsks for HCA segments CGT must fully develop a\nthreat evaluation and PkM alternatives with all appropnate factors included mto the\nevaluation, especially likelihood and consequence factors The nsk process should also be\nappropnately hnked to the PkM process\nIn regard to Item Number 4A of the Notice pertauung to CGT IMP having no procedures on\nhow safety concerns raised by PHMSA or State authorities are to be documented, hacked,\nand addressed CGT must develop procedures on how all safety concerns are to be\ndocumented, tracked and addressed\nCarohna Gas Transmission has 90 days after the receipt of the Final Order to complete the\nabove items\nCarohna Gas Transmission shall maintain documentation of the safety unprovement costs\nassociated with fulfilhng this Comphance Order and submit the total to Linda Daugherty,\nDirector, Southern Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Matenals Safety Administration Costs\nshall be reported in two categones 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans,\nprocedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and\nother changes to pipehne infrastructure","truncated":false,"body_characters":34822}