{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220071011","title":"TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2007-06-06","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.467(c), 192.605(b)(3).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220071011.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220071011.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220071011","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220071011","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.467(c),  192.605(b)(3). The case was opened on 2007-06-06 and is reported as closed as of 2010-07-30. Proposed civil penalty: $50,000. Assessed civil penalty: $50,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220071011_Final Order_ 07092010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071011/220071011_Final%20Order_%2007092010.pdf\n\n220071011_Final Order_07092010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071011/220071011_Final%20Order_07092010_text.pdf\n\n220071011_NOPV letter_06062007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071011/220071011_NOPV%20letter_06062007.pdf\n\n220071011_nopv letter_06062007_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071011/220071011_nopv%20letter_06062007_text.pdf\n\n220071011_operator response _09242007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071011/220071011_operator%20response%20_09242007.pdf\n\n220071011_operator response _10232007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071011/220071011_operator%20response%20_10232007.pdf\n\n220071011_Operator Response_07102007.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220071011/220071011_Operator%20Response_07102007.pdf\n\n220071011_Final Order_07092010_text.pdf\n\nMr. Bill Cope July 9, 2010\nVice President Eastern Operations\nTennessee Gas Pipeline Company\n2 Brentwood Commons, Suite 190\nBrentwood, TN 37027\nRe: CPF No. 2-2007-1011\nDear Mr. Cope:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a civil penalty of $50,000. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the\nFinal Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon payment. Service of the Final\nOrder by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Wayne Lemoi, Director, Southern Region, PHMSA\nMr. Patrick F. Carey, P.E., Director, D.O.T. Compliance Services\nCERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0039 0553]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n______________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nTennessee Gas ) CPF No. 2-2007-1011\nPipeline Company, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n______________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn September 5-22, 2006, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Tennessee Gas\nPipeline Company’s (TGP or Respondent) facilities in Mississippi and Alabama and reviewed\noperations and maintenance records at its offices in Columbus, MS, and Heidelberg, MS. TGP, a\nsubsidiary of El Paso Corporation, operates approximately 14,200 miles of natural gas pipelines\nrunning from the Mexican border to Canada.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated June 6, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil\nPenalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nRespondent had committed two violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192, proposed assessing a civil\npenalty of $50,000 for one of the alleged violations, and warned Respondent to take corrective\naction regarding the other alleged violation.\nTGP responded to the Notice by letter dated July 10, 2007 (Response). TGP contested the\nallegations and requested a hearing. A hearing was subsequently held on October 4, 2007, in\nAtlanta, Georgia, with Larry White, an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA,\npresiding. At the hearing, Respondent was represented by counsel. Respondent subsequently\nprovided additional material for the record by letter dated October 23, 2007.\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\n\n\n\n2\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.467(c), which states:\n§ 192.467 External corrosion control: Electrical isolation.\n(a) . . .\n(c) Except for unprotected copper inserted in ferrous pipe, each\npipeline must be electrically isolated from metallic casings that are a\npart of the underground system. However, if isolation is not achieved\nbecause it is impractical, other measures must be taken to minimize\ncorrosion of the pipeline inside the casing.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that TGP had made no attempt since 1974 to eliminate metallic\ncontact and achieve electrical isolation of a casing at the Highway 49 crossing and had failed to\ntake measures necessary to minimize corrosion of the pipe inside the shorted casing.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, TGP acknowledged that it had failed to achieve electrical\nisolation of the pipe but contended that it had taken alternative measures to minimize corrosion\nof the pipe inside the casing (i.e., the carrier pipe). TGP stated that these measures consisted of\nmaintaining cathodic protection on the pipeline, periodically taking pipe-to-soil readings at the\nends of the casing, and performing leak tests in 1980, 1989-1992, and 2007. TGP also\nquestioned whether there was any correlation between shorted casings and corrosion.\nThe use of casings for pipe crossings under highways and railroads has been a common practice\nin the gas pipeline industry for decades. When metallic casings are used to protect carrier pipes,\noperators are required to electrically isolate the pipe from the casing. The reason why an\nelectrical isolation requirement was made part of the federal pipeline safety regulations was that\nto cathodically protect a pipeline, it is necessary to protect it from corrosion in its entirety.\n1\nWhen a casing is not electrically isolated from the carrier pipe, it can adversely affect the\nintegrity of the latter by shielding cathodic protection current from the carrier pipe and reducing\nthe effectiveness of the cathodic protection in the vicinity of the casing. Casings can come into\nelectrical contact with the carrier pipe or become “shorted” in several ways, including the\nmovement of the carrier pipe inside the casing, the failure of spacing materials, inadequate\nsupport, and shorted test leads. Once a short has been identified, an operator can often “clear”\nthe shorted casing and eliminate the metallic contact by realigning the carrier pipe and providing\nsupport such as sandbags to maintain the realignment, or, in some cases, by removing a portion\nof the casing.\nUnder circumstances where it is impractical to achieve isolation, operators are required to take\nother measures to minimize corrosion of the pipe inside the casing. These measures can range\nfrom removing electrolyte between the casing and the carrier pipe and replacing the end seals, to\nreplacing or recoating the carrier pipe. However, the measure appropriate for correcting most\n1 The term “cathodic protection” refers to a method of corrosion prevention in which a pipeline is allowed or made\nto act as the cathode in an electrochemical corrosion cell. A sacrificial anode having a lower electrolytic potential\nthan the pipe is provided to complete the cell. Applying impressed current to the pipe is another method of cathodic\nprotection. See generally, PHMSA Stakeholder Communications Glossary,\nhttp://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/glossary/index.htm?nocache=3413#CathodicProtection.\n\n\n\n3\nshorted casings is to fill the casing annulus with dielectric material (i.e., material that will not\nelectrolyte from coming into contact with the carrier pipe by encapsulating any coating voids\ndegree of confidence that the risk of corrosion inside the shorted casing has been minimized.\nconduct current) and to conduct ongoing monitoring.2 A properly filled casing annulus prevents\nalong the carrier pipe. This approach is a very cost-effective measure that gives a relatively high\nIn circumstances where eliminating the metallic contact or filling the casing with dielectric\nmaterial is impracticable, still other measures can potentially satisfy the requirement to minimize\ncorrosion. For example, an operator may analyze a given shorted casing or casings and\ndetermine that a targeted program of regular internal inspections and frequent monitoring would\nbe sufficient to protect against corrosion.\n3\nIn this case, TGP did not clear the short or eliminate the metallic contact. It did not fill the\ncasing annulus with dielectric material, nor did the company provide any explanation for its\nfailure to do so.4 TGP noted that a hydrostatic test had been conducted in 1981 and leak tests\nhad been conducted from 1980 to 1992. TGP, however, had no explanation for the 14-year gap\nthis period. In short, TGP was unable to demonstrate that it had conducted a targeted program of\nregular inspections and monitoring to minimize corrosion inside this shorted casing during the\nrelevant period.\nin testing between 1993 and 2007.5 Moreover, no internal inspections were conducted during\nFinally, TGP argued that its normal cathodic protection maintenance activities should satisfy the\nrequirement that it take measures to minimize corrosion inside the shorted casing. TGP noted\nthat its cathodic protection and close-interval survey readings taken at the ends of the casing\nshowed that protective criteria had continuously been satisfied and cited a January 2005 report,\nprepared by Corrpro Companies, Inc., for the Gas Research Institute (GRI Report), in support of\nthe proposition that maintaining cathodic protection levels on pipe immediately outside of\ncasings minimizes corrosion inside them.\nTGP’s argument, however, is unpersuasive. Cathodic protection is a basic requirement of\nmaintaining a pipeline and meeting these criteria only shows compliance with minimum cathodic\nprotection requirements.6\nTGP did not present evidence that it had made a determination at the\n2 National Association of Corrosion Engineers, Standard Recommended Practice RP0200-2000, Appendix A.\n3 Such an analysis would have to be conducted at the time the decision not to take other measures was made and\nwould have to be well documented and technically sound.\n4 TGP argued that to the extent OPS expected it to fill the casing with dielectric material, OPS was enforcing\nunpublished guidance. However, OPS did not assert that filling the casing was required or that it was the only\nmeasure that could have satisfied the requirement to minimize corrosion. OPS merely stated that had the casing\nbeen filled, doing so would have satisfied the requirement.\n5 TGP also pointed out that the records associated with the 1974 attempt to clear the casing indicated that the\ncoating on the carrier pipe appeared to be in good condition. Although coatings are an important part of protecting\nagainst corrosion, they are applied during initial construction of the pipeline and are not relevant to any efforts to\nnegate the adverse effects of shorted casings and to minimize the resulting corrosion.\n6 49 C.F.R. § 192.457.\n\n\n\n4\ntime the short was identified that providing supplemental cathodic protection to this shorted\ncasing would minimize corrosion inside the casing (nor did it actually provide such supplemental\nonly states that maintaining cathodic protection above the minimum requirements on pipe\noutside of casings should increase the probability that the pipe inside the casings will be\nprotected from corrosion. This is not the same as saying that maintaining cathodic protection is\nMaintaining cathodic protection levels does not satisfy the purpose of the cited regulation, which\nis to ensure that the necessary measures are taken to minimize corrosion when a specific adverse\ncathodic protection as a result of identifying the shorted casing).7 sufficient to minimize corrosion inside a shorted casing, as required by the cited regulation.\ncondition, such as a shorted casing, has been identified.\nIn addition, the GRI report\nOverall, the record reflects the absence of taking measures to minimize corrosion inside the\nshorted casing between 1993 and 2007, not the presence of such measures. Accordingly, after\nconsidering all of the evidence and the legal issues presented, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 192.467(c) by making no attempt since 1974 to eliminate metallic contact and achieve\nelectrical isolation of a casing at the Highway 49 crossing and failing to take measures necessary\nto minimize corrosion of the pipe inside the shorted casing.\nThis finding of violation will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent enforcement action\ntaken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122\nand 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and\ngravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of\nRespondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s ability to\npay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business;\nand the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations.\nIn addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction\nbecause of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $50,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.467(c), for failing either to make any attempt since 1974 to eliminate metallic contact and\nachieve electrical isolation of a casing at the Highway 49 crossing or to take measures necessary\nto minimize corrosion of the pipe inside the shorted casing.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, TGP correctly pointed out that OPS had concluded in a 1995\nrulemaking document that the need to clear shorted casings in order to maintain safety was not\napparent. Of course, in this case, OPS did not attempt to require that the short be cleared (i.e.,\nmetallic contact eliminated), but, instead, accepted TGP’s assertion that doing so was impractical\n7 OPS noted that TGP did not perform any “on/off” surveys between 1991 and 2007.\n\n\n\n5\nand focused on the measures that needed to be taken in order to minimize corrosion given that it\nwas shorted.\nTGP also pointed out that in a 2002 rulemaking, OPS discussed measures for minimizing\ncorrosion inside shorted casings, including filling the casing, conducting internal inspections, and\nmonitoring, but that OPS did not actually amend the regulations to require these particular\nmeasures. We acknowledge that a more prescriptive regulation may have provided additional\ncertainty to TGP with regard to the measures that were needed to minimize corrosion. On the\nother hand, a pipeline operator is expected to have the necessary expertise and knowledge about\nits own system to make technically sound decisions affecting safety. Moreover, OPS provided\nmore clarity on the requirements of the regulation in its discussion in the 2002 proceeding, not\nless.\nAt the hearing, TGP officials stated that they took safety very seriously. We have no reason to\ndoubt this, but it does not change the nature of the violation. TGP failed to clear the shorted\ncasing, failed to fill the casing with dielectric material, failed to conduct a targeted program of\ninspections and monitoring or to take other measures that would have ensured corrosion was\nminimized inside the shorted casing. Railroad and highway crossings are a particular concern if\na gas pipeline leak occurs because a passing train or vehicle can potentially ignite a gas cloud if\none forms. Respondent has not presented any information that would warrant a reduction in the\ncivil penalty amount proposed in the Notice for this violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the\nrecord and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $50,000 for\nthis violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.467(c).\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require this payment be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, OK 73125; The Financial\nOperations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8893.\nFailure to pay the $50,000 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate\nin accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nWARNING ITEM\nWith respect to Item 2, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 192 but did not propose a\ncivil penalty or compliance order for this item. Therefore, this is considered to be a warning\nitem. The warning was for:\n\n\n\n6\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(3) (Item 2) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to ensure that\ncurrent and accurate schematics of all lines in the Columbus Operating Area were\nmade available to appropriate operating personnel.\nRespondent presented information in its Response showing that it had taken action to address the\ncited item. Having considered such information, I find, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, that a\nprobable violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(3) (Notice Item 2) has occurred and Respondent is\nhereby advised to correct such conditions. In the event that OPS finds a violation of this\nprovision in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has the right to submit a petition for reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. Should Respondent elect to do so, the petition must be sent to: Associate\nAdministrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building,\n2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at\nthe same address. PHMSA will accept petitions received no later than 20 days after service of\nthis Final Order upon the Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and\nmeet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The filing of a petition automatically stays\nthe payment of any civil penalty assessed but does not stay any other provisions of the Final\nOrder, including any required corrective actions. If Respondent submits payment of the civil\npenalty, the Final Order becomes the final administrative decision and the right to petition for\nreconsideration is waived.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n220071011_Final Order_ 07092010.pdf\n\nU.S. Department of Transportation\n1200 New Jersey Ave, S.E.\nSafety Administration\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials\nWashington, D.C. 20590\nJUL 9\n2010\nMr. Bill Cope\nVice President Eastern Operations\nTennessee Gas Pipeline Company\n2 Brentwood Commons, Suite 190\nBrentwood, TN 37027\nRe: CPF No. 2-2007-1011\nDear Mr. Cope:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a civil penalty of $50,000. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the\nFinal Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon payment. Service of the Final\nOrder by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nMack. Mages\nfor: Jeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc:\nMr. Wayne Lemoi, Director, Southern Region, PHMSA\nMr. Patrick F. Carey, P.E., Director, D.O.T. Compliance Services\nCERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0039 0553]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\nIn the Matter of\nTennessee Gas\nCPF No. 2-2007-1011\nPipeline Company,\nRespondent.\n)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn September 5-22, 2006, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Tennessee Gas\nPipeline Company's (TGP or Respondent) facilities in Mississippi and Alabama and reviewed\noperations and maintenance records at its offices in Columbus, MS, and Heidelberg, MS. TGP, a\nsubsidiary of El Paso Corporation, operates approximately 14,200 miles of natural gas pipelines\nrunning from the Mexican border to Canada.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated June 6, 2007, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil\nPenalty (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that\nRespondent had committed two violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192, proposed assessing a civil\npenalty of $50,000 for one of the alleged violations, and warned Respondent to take corrective\naction regarding the other alleged violation.\nTGP responded to the Notice by letter dated July 10, 2007 (Response). TGP contested the\nAtlanta, Georgia, with Larry White, an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA,\npresiding. At the hearing, Respondent was represented by counsel. Respondent subsequently\nprovided additional material for the record by letter dated October 23, 2007.\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\n\n\n\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.467(c), which states:\n§ 192.467 External corrosion control: Electrical isolation.\n(c) Except for unprotected copper inserted in ferrous pipe, each\nart of the underground system. However.\nbecause it is impractical, other measures must be taken to minimize\ncorrosion of the pipeline inside the casing.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that TGP had made no attempt since 1974 to eliminate metallic\ncoke menues ieve say tie inie of casing ate pi i hside 9 shossing and had failed to\nIn its Response and at the hearing, TGP acknowledged that it had failed to achieve electrical\nisolation of the pipe but contended that it had taken alternative measures to minimize corrosion\nof the pipe inside the casing (i.e., the carrier pipe). TGP stated that these measures consisted of\nmaintaining cathodic protection on the pipeline, periodically taking pipe-to-soil readings at the\nends of the casing, and performing leak tests in 1980, 1989-1992, and 2007. TGP also\nquestioned whether there was any correlation between shorted casings and corrosion.\nThe use of casings for pipe crossings under highways and railroads has been a common practice\nin the gas pipeline industry for decades. When metallic casings are used to protect carrier pipes,\noperators are required to electrically isolate the pipe from the casing. The reason why an\nelectrical isolation requirement was made part of the federal pipeline safety regulations was that\nto cathodically protect a pipeline, it is necessary to protect it from corrosion in its entirety.'\nWhen a casing is not electrically isolated from the carrier pipe, it can adversely affect the\nintegrity of the latter by shielding cathodic protection current from the carrier pipe and reducing\nthe effectiveness of the cathodic protection in the vicinity of the casing. Casings can come into\nelectrical contact with the carrier pipe or become \"shorted\" in several ways, including the\nmovement of the carrier pipe inside the casing, the failure of spacing materials, inadequate\nsupport, and shorted test leads. Once a short has been identified, an operator can often \"clear\"\nthe shorted casing and eliminate the metallic contact by realigning the carrier pipe and providing\nsupport such as sandbags to maintain the realignment, or, in some cases, by removing a portion\nof the casing.\nUnder circumstances where it is impractical to achieve isolation, operators are required to take\nother measures to minimize corrosion of the pipe inside the casing. These measures can range\nfrom removing electrolyte between the casing and the carrier pipe and replacing the end seals, to\nreplacing or recoating the carrier pipe. However, the measure appropriate for correcting most\n' The term \"cathodic protection\" refers to a method of corrosion prevention in which a pipeline is allowed or made\nto act as the cathode in an electrochemical corrosion cell. A sacrificial anode having a lower electrolytic potential\nthan the pipe is provided to complete the cell. Applying impressed current to the pipe is another method of cathodic\nprotection. See generally, PHMSA Stakeholder Communications Glossary,\nhttp://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/glossary/index.htm?nocache=3413#CathodicProtection.\n\n\n\n3\nshorted casings is to fill the casing annulus with dielectric material (i.e., material that will not\nconduct current) and to conduct ongoing monitoring. A properly filled casing annulus prevents\nelectrolyte from coming into contact with the carrier pipe by encapsulating any coating voids\nalong the carrier pipe. This approach is a very cost-effective measure that gives a relatively high\ndegree of confidence that the risk of corrosion inside the shorted casing has been minimized.\nIn circumstances where eliminating the metallic contact or filling the casing with dielectric\nmaterial is impracticable, still other measures can potentially satisfy the requirement to minimize\ncorrosion. For example, an operator may analyze a given shorted casing or casings and\ndetermine that a targeted program of regular internal inspections and frequent monitoring would\nbe sufficient to protect against corrosion.?\nIn this case, TGP did not clear the short or eliminate the metallic contact. It did not fill the\ncasing annulus with dielectric material, nor did the company provide any explanation for its\nfailure to do so.* TGP noted that a hydrostatic test had been conducted in 1981 and leak tests\nhad been conducted from 1980 to 1992. TGP, however, had no explanation for the 14-year gap\nin testing between 1993 and 2007. Moreover, no internal inspections were conducted during\nthis period. In short, GP was unable to demonstrate that it had conducted a targeted program of\nregular inspections and monitoring to minimize corrosion inside this shorted casing during the\nrelevant period\nFinally, TGP argued that its normal cathodic protection maintenance activities should satisfy the\nrequirement that it take measures to minimize corrosion inside the shorted casing. TGP noted\nthat its cathodic protection and close-interval survey readings taken at the ends of the casing\nshowed that protective criteria had continuously been satisfied and cited a January 2005 report,\nprepared by Corrpro Companies, Inc., for the Gas Research Institute (GRI Report), in support of\nthe proposition that maintaining cathodic protection levels on pipe immediately outside of\ncasings minimizes corrosion inside them.\nTGP's argument, however, is unpersuasive. Cathodic protection is a basic requirement of\nmaintaining a pipeline and meeting these criteria only shows compliance with minimum cathodic\nprotection requirements.\" TGP did not present evidence that it had made a determination at the\n= National Association of Corrosion Engineers, Standard Recommended Practice RP0200-2000, Appendix A.\n3 Such an analysis would have to be conducted at the time the decision not to take other measures was made and\nwould have to be well documented and technically sound.\n* TGP argued that to the extent OPS expected it to fill the casing with dielectric material, OPS was enforcing\nmeasure that could have satisfied the requirement to minimize corrosion. OPS merely stated that had the casing\nunpublished guidance. However, OPS did not assert that filling the casing was required or that it was the only\nbeen filled, doing so would have satisfied the requirement.\n5 TGP also pointed out that the records associated with the 1974 attempt to clear the casing indicated that the\ncoating on the carrier pipe appeared to be in good condition. Although coatings are an important part of protecting\nnegate the adverse effects of shorted casings and to minimize the resulting corrosion.\nagainst corrosion, they are applied during initial construction of the pipeline and are not relevant to any efforts to\n• 49 C.F.R. § 192.457.\n\n\n\n4\ntime the short was identified that providing supplemental cathodic protection to this shorted\ncasing would minimize corrosion inside the casing (nor did it actually provide such supplemental\ncathodic protection as a result of identifying the shorted casing).? In addition, the GRI report\nonly states that maintaining cathodic protection above the minimum requirements on pipe\noutside of casings should increase the probability that the pipe inside the casings will be\nprotected from corrosion. This is not the same as saying that maintaining cathodic protection is\nsufficient to minimize corrosion inside a shorted casing, as required by the cited regulation.\nMaintaining cathodic protection levels does not satisty the purpose of the cited regulation, which\nis to ensure that the necessary measures are taken to minimize corrosion when a specific adverse\ncondition, such as a shorted casing, has been identified.\nOverall, the record reflects the absence of taking measures to minimize corrosion inside the\nshorted casing between 1993 and 2007, not the presence of such measures. Accordingly, after\nconsidering all of the evidence and the legal issues presented, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 192.467(c) by making no attempt since 1974 to eliminate metallic contact and achieve\nelectrical isolation of a casing at the Highway 49 crossing and failing to take measures necessary\nto minimize corrosion of the pipe inside the shorted casing.\nThis finding of violation will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent enforcement action\ntaken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122\nand 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and\ngravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of\nRespondent's culpability; the history of Respondent's prior offenses; the Respondent's ability to\npay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business;\nand the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations.\nIn addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction\nbecause of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $50,000 for Respondent's violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 192.467(c), for failing either to make any attempt since 1974 to eliminate metallic contact and\nachieve electrical isolation of a casing at the Highway 49 crossing or to take measures necessary\nto minimize corrosion of the pipe inside the shorted casing.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, TGP correctly pointed out that OPS had concluded in a 1995\nrulemaking document that the need to clear shorted casings in order to maintain safety was not\napparent. Of course, in this case, OPS did not attempt to require that the short be cleared (i.e.,\nmetallic contact eliminated), but, instead, accepted TP's assertion that doing so was impractical\n> OPS noted that TGP did not perform any \"on/off\" surveys between 1991 and 2007.\n\n\n\n5\nand focused on the measures that needed to be taken in order to minimize corrosion given that it\nwas shorted\nTGP also pointed out that in a 2002 rulemaking, OPS discussed measures for minimizing\ncorrosion inside shorted casings, including filling the casing, conducting internal inspections, and\nmonitoring, but that OPS did not actually amend the regulations to require these particular\nmeasures. We acknowledge that a more prescriptive regulation may have provided additional\ncertainty to GP with regard to the measures that were needed to minimize corrosion. On the\nother hand, a pipeline operator is expected to have the necessary expertise and knowledge about\nits own system to make technically sound decisions affecting safety. Moreover, OPS provided\nmore clarity on the requirements of the regulation in its discussion in the 2002 proceeding, not\nless.\nAt the hearing, TGP officials stated that they took safety very seriously. We have no reason to\ndoubt this, but it does not change the nature of the violation. TGP failed to clear the shorted\ncasing, failed to fill the casing with dielectric material, failed to conduct a targeted program of\ninspections and monitoring or to take other measures that would have ensured corrosion was\nminimized inside the shorted casing. Railroad and highway crossings are a particular concern if\na gas pipeline leak occurs because a passing train or vehicle can potentially ignite a gas cloud if\none forms. Respondent has not presented any information that would warrant a reduction in the\ncivil penalty amount proposed in the Notice for this violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the\nrecord and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $50,000 for\nthis violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.467(c).\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require this payment be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, OK 73125; The Financial\nOperations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8893.\nFailure to pay the $50,000 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate\nin accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nWARNING ITEM\nWith respect to Item 2, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 192 but did not propose a\ncivil penalty or compliance order for this item. Therefore, this is considered to be a warning\nitem. The warning was for:\n\n\n\n6\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(3) (Item 2) - Respondent's alleged failure to ensure that\ncurrent and accurate schematics of all lines in the Columbus Operating Area were\nmade available to appropriate operating personnel.\nRespondent presented information in its Response showing that it had taken action to address the\ncited item. Having considered such information, I find, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. $ 190.205, that a\nprobable violation of 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(3) (Notice Item 2) has occurred and Respondent is\nhereby advised to correct such conditions. In the event that OPS finds a violation of this\nprovision in a subsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has the right to submit a petition for reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. Should Respondent elect to do so, the petition must be sent to: Associate\nAdministrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building,\n2nd Floor, Washington, DC 20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at\nthe same address. PHMSA will accept petitions received no later than 20 days after service of\nthis Final Order upon the Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and\nmeet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The filing of a petition automatically stays\nthe payment of any civil penalty assessed but does not stay any other provisions of the Final\nOrder, including any required corrective actions. If Respondent submits payment of the civil\npenalty, the Final Order becomes the final administrative decision and the right to petition for\nreconsideration is waived.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\n'JUL 9 2010\nWait Wan\nfor: Jeffrey D. Wiese\nDate Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":37822}