{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220086002","title":"TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO. — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2008-05-07","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(12), 195.402(e), 195.402(e)(8), 195.403, 195.404(a)(3), 195.440(a), 195.440(c), 195.505(b), 195.573(a)(1), 195.579(c), 195.583(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220086002.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220086002.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220086002","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220086002","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(12),  195.402(e),  195.402(e)(8),  195.403,  195.404(a)(3),  195.440(a),  195.440(c),  195.505(b),  195.573(a)(1),  195.579(c),  195.583(a). The case was opened on 2008-05-07 and is reported as closed as of 2011-03-04. Proposed civil penalty: $398,000. Assessed civil penalty: $398,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220086002_Closure Letter_03042011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_Closure%20Letter_03042011.pdf\n\n220086002_Closure Letter_03042011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_Closure%20Letter_03042011_text.pdf\n\n220086002_FinalOrder_04262010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_FinalOrder_04262010.pdf\n\n220086002_FinalOrder_04262010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_FinalOrder_04262010_text.pdf\n\n220086002_NOPV PCP PCO_05072008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_05072008.pdf\n\n220086002_nopv pcp pco_05072008_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_nopv%20pcp%20pco_05072008_text.pdf\n\n220086002_operator response to notice_08072008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_operator%20response%20to%20notice_08072008.pdf\n\n220086002_Petition for Reconsideration and Stay_06112010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_Petition%20for%20Reconsideration%20and%20Stay_06112010.pdf\n\n220086002_Closure Letter_03042011_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMarch 4, 2011\nMr. Robert Rose\nPresident\nTampa Pipeline Corporation\nP.O. Box 35236\nSarasota, FL 34242\nCPF 2-2008-6002\nDear Mr. Rose:\nOn April 26, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §60118(b) and 49 CFR §190.213, the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) issued a Final Order to Tampa Pipeline Corporation and its subsidiary Tampa Bay\nPipeline Company (TPC).\nThe Final Order found that TPC had committed violations of the federal pipeline safety\nregulations and included a Compliance Order (CO), which required TPC to take certain\nactions to protect the public and the environment.\nThe PHMSA Southern Region has reviewed your letter of September 13, 2010, and your\nmemorandum of October 21, 2010, in response to the CO. This case is now closed.\nPlease be advised that this letter refers only to CPF 2-2008-6002 and not to any other PHMSA\npending cases. Also be advised that nothing herein states or implies that the TPC pipeline\nsystem meets the requirements of the federal pipeline safety laws or regulations. The pipeline\nsystem remains subject to inspection by PHMSA.\nSincerely,\nWayne T. Lemoi\nDirector, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Southern Region\n\n220086002_FinalOrder_04262010_text.pdf\n\nAPR 26 2010\nMr. Robert Rose\nPresident\nTampa Pipeline Corporation\nP.O. Box 35236\nSarasota, FL 34242\nRe: CPF No. 2-2008-6002\nDear Mr. Rose:\nEnclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation,\nassesses a civil penalty of $398,000, and specifies actions to be taken by Tampa Pipeline\nCorporation to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set\nforth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance\norder completed, as determined by the Director, Southern Region, this enforcement action will\nbe closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of\nmailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty\nDirector, Southern Region, PHMSA\nMr. Henry D. Fellows, Jr.\nFellows LaBriola LLP\nSuite 2300 South Tower\n225 Peachtree Street, N.E.\nAtlanta, Georgia 30303-1731\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7009 1410 0000 2472 2476]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nTampa Pipeline Corporation, ) CPF No. 2-2008-6002\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn July 30 – August 2, 2007, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Tampa Pipeline\nCorporation (TPC), and its subsidiary, Tampa Bay Pipeline Company (TBPC) (collectively, TPC\nor Respondent), in Tampa, Florida. On November 26 – 27, 2007, a representative of OPS\nconducted another inspection of Respondent’s facility and records following a pipeline release\nthat occurred on November 12, 2007. Respondent operates approximately 100 miles of pipeline\ntransporting anhydrous ammonia, a highly volatile liquid (HVL), and approximately 10 miles of\nhazardous liquid pipeline transporting refined petroleum products, all within the State of Florida.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated May 7, 2008, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that Respondent had committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195\nand proposed a civil penalty of $398,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed to\norder that Respondent take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nRespondent responded to the Notice by letter dated June 4, 2008. Respondent offered\ninformation in response to some of the allegations, requested an extension of time to more fully\nrespond, asked to meet with the Director to discuss the Notice, and requested a hearing. The\nDirector granted the extension but denied the request to meet outside of a hearing. Respondent\nsubmitted its complete response to the Notice by letter dated September 2, 2008 (Response).\nThe company again contested several allegations of violation and requested elimination or\nmitigation of the civil penalty and withdrawal of the proposed compliance order.\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a hearing was held on April 21, 2009, in Atlanta,\nGeorgia, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. After the\n\n\n\n2\nhearing, Respondent provided a post-hearing brief by letter dated May 22, 2009 (Brief).\nThroughout this proceeding, Respondent has been represented by counsel.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent committed the following violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195:\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.404(a)(3), which states:\n§ 195.404 Maps and records.\n(a) Each operator shall maintain current maps and records of its\npipeline systems that include at least the following information:\n(1) . . . .\n(3) The maximum operating pressure of each pipeline . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.404(a)(3) by failing to maintain current\nrecords of the maximum operating pressure (MOP) of each pipeline. Specifically, the Notice\nalleged that Respondent could not produce records that established MOP for its pipelines, even\nthough the pipeline system had been designed to operate at stress levels below regulatory limits.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, TPC did not contest this allegation but provided information\nconcerning corrective actions it had taken to amend its operations and maintenance (O&M)\nprocedures. In its Brief, however, Respondent stated, “This concern was unfounded because\n§ 4.9.2 of the 2006 O&M Manual that was in place at the time of the 2007 inspection listed the\nMOP.”1\nAfter reviewing the evidence referenced by Respondent, I find that § 4.9.2 of Respondent’s 2006\nO&M Manual listed only certain device pressure settings but did not list the MOP for each\npipeline.2 Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 195.404(a)(3) by failing to have current records of the MOP of each pipeline.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.440(a), which states:\n§ 195.440 Public awareness.\n(a) Each pipeline operator must develop and implement a written\ncontinuing public education program that follows the guidance provided in\nthe American Petroleum Institute’s (API) Recommended Practice (RP)\n1162 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3) . . . .\n1 Brief at 2.\n2 Response, Exhibit (Tab) 4 at 25.\n\n\n\n3\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.440(a) by failing to implement a written\ncontinuing public education program that followed the guidance provided in API RP 1162.3\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that § 4.7.0 of Respondent’s O&M procedures required the\ncompany to communicate annually to certain emergency officials, but Respondent had not\ncommunicated with such officials annually since January 1, 2006.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, TPC did not contest this allegation but provided information\nconcerning corrective action it had taken to amend its O&M procedures. In its Brief,\nRespondent further acknowledged that it had not communicated a baseline message to all\nemergency responders. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find Respondent\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 195.440(a) by failing to implement a written continuing public education\nprogram that followed the guidance provided in API RP 1162.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.440(c), which states:\n§ 195.440 Public awareness.\n(a) . . . .\n(c) The operator must follow the general program recommendations,\nincluding baseline and supplemental requirements of API RP 1162, unless\nthe operator provides justification in its program or procedural manual as\nto why compliance with all or certain provisions of the recommended\npractice is not practicable and not necessary for safety . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.440(c) by failing to follow the program\nrecommendations of API RP 1162, including baseline and supplemental requirements.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that § 4.7.0 of Respondent’s O&M procedures failed to define a\nminimum communications coverage area distance, and failed to determine specific affected\npublic stakeholder addresses in accordance with API RP 1162.\nIn its Response, TPC did not contest this allegation but provided information concerning\ncorrective action it had taken to amend its O&M procedures to further define the term “Affected\nPublic.” At the hearing, Respondent contended that § 195.440 had been amended by PHMSA,\nand that the previous version permitted operators to use mass media to comply with the\nregulation. In its Brief, Respondent further stated that in 2005 and 2007, the company had\nconducted mass media public awareness by placing over 46,108 inserts in The Tampa Tribune.\nWhile it is true that PHMSA amended § 195.440 in May 2005, this occurred more than two years\nprior to PHMSA’s inspection of Respondent in this case. Therefore, Respondent was required to\nbe in compliance with the current requirements of § 195.440 at the time of the PHMSA\ninspection. After considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.440(c) by failing to define a minimum communications coverage area distance, and by\nfailing to determine specific affected public stakeholder addresses in accordance with the\nrequirements of API RP 1162.\n3 API RP 1162, “Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators,” is incorporated by reference at 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.3(c).\n\n\n\n4\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b), which states:\n§ 195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.\nThe program shall include provisions to:\n(a) Identify covered tasks;\n(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered\ntasks are qualified . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.505(b) by failing to follow a written\nqualification program to ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks\nwere qualified.4 Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent permitted an employee to\nperform two covered tasks without qualifying that individual under the company’s operator\nqualification (OQ) program. Respondent’s records allegedly demonstrated that a person with the\ntitle “Ammonia Operator” had been performing two covered tasks without a valid qualification\nfor at least a year.\n5\nIn its Response, TPC acknowledged that the particular individual “was technically not qualified\non paper,” but reasoned that he was an experienced Ammonia Operator.\nRespondent stated that the individual was eventually evaluated under the company’s OQ\nprogram during the PHMSA inspection and the results of that evaluation demonstrated the\nindividual had the necessary knowledge and skills to meet the appropriate qualification\nrequirements. At the hearing, the PHMSA inspector agreed that the individual in question had\nsatisfied the company’s OQ evaluation during the PHMSA inspection.\n6 Furthermore,\nIn its Brief, Respondent again admitted that it had not conducted a timely performance\nevaluation of the individual, but contended that he had many years of experience operating\npipelines and that the company’s “failure to satisfy a technical requirement was a simple\nmechanisms for preventing this type of oversight in the future.\noversight that had no impact on safety.”7 Respondent also indicated that it had instituted\nQualifications under a valid OQ program are not merely “paper requirements,” but are\nfundamental to safety because they ensure that employees whose duties affect the integrity of a\npipeline have been evaluated and determined to be able to perform those tasks safely. In\naddition, qualification ensure that employees performing such tasks can recognize and react to\n4 A “covered task” is an activity, identified by the operator, that: (1) is performed on a pipeline facility; (2) is an\noperations or maintenance task; (3) is performed as a requirement of 49 C.F.R. Part 195; and (4) affects the\noperation or integrity of the pipeline. 49 C.F.R. § 195.501. “Qualified” means that an individual has been evaluated\nand can: (a) perform assigned covered tasks; and (b) recognize and react to abnormal operating conditions. 49\nC.F.R. § 195.503.\n5 The covered tasks were Task 43.3, “Monitor Pressures, Flows, Communications and Line Integrity and Maintain\nThem Within Allowable Limits,” and Task 43.4, “Manually or Remotely Open or Close Valves or Other\nEquipment.”\n6 Response at 5.\n7 Brief at 3.\n\n\n\n5\nunsafe and abnormal conditions that could arise during their performance. Although the\nindividual in question may have had years of experience in the field and could readily\ndemonstrate his ability to meet qualification requirements when finally evaluated during the\nPHMSA inspection, the evidence demonstrates he had been allowed to perform two covered\ntasks for at least a year without being properly qualified under Respondent’s OQ program.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.505(b) by failing to follow a written OQ program to ensure through evaluation that an\nAmmonia Operator was qualified to perform two covered tasks.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.583(a), which states:\n§ 195.583 What must I do to monitor atmospheric corrosion control?\n(a) You must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is\nexposed to the atmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as\nfollows:\nIf the pipeline is\nlocated:\nOnshore . . . . . . . . . . . . Then the frequency of\ninspection is:\nAt least once every 3 calendar years, but with\nintervals not exceeding 39 months….\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.583(a) by failing to inspect an exposed pipe\nat the south end of Licata Bridge for evidence of atmospheric corrosion at least once every three\ncalendar years, but with intervals not exceeding 39 months. The Notice further alleged that the\ncoating was in poor condition, the pipeline was suffering from severe atmospheric corrosion, and\na corrosion analysis indicated that the pipe wall had lost as much as 56% of its thickness yet\nRespondent’s inspection records failed to identify deteriorated coating and atmospheric corrosion\non the exposed pipe. The Notice also indicated that Respondent’s written procedures required\natmospheric corrosion inspections to be conducted as part of the company’s bi-weekly pipeline\npatrols.\nIn its Response and at the hearing, TPC acknowledged that its inspections of the exposed pipe in\nquestion were not at the intervals specified in the regulation. Respondent contended, however,\nthat it had determined the pipeline was not being operated in an unsafe manner, based on a\ncalculation of the remaining pipe wall strength, which demonstrated that the pipeline could still\nbe safely operated at a pressure above MOP. In its Brief, Respondent again acknowledged that it\nhad not adequately documented external corrosion on the pipeline, but contended that such gap\nwas “mitigated” by the fact that the pipeline had not been operated in an unsafe condition.\nRespondent further indicated it had taken certain measures to prevent this from occurring in the\nfuture.\nThe contention by Respondent that the pipeline was never operated in an unsafe manner may be\nrelevant to the gravity of the violation but does not negate the evidence demonstrating that the\ncompany failed to inspect the exposed pipeline at the intervals specified in the regulation.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.583(a) by failing to inspect the exposed pipe at the south end of Licata Bridge for evidence\n\n\n\n6\nof atmospheric corrosion at least once every three calendar years, with intervals not exceeding 39\nmonths.\nItem 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(12), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies . . . .\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(1) . . . .\n(12) Establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other\nappropriate public officials to learn the responsibility and resources of\neach government organization that may respond to a hazardous liquid or\ncarbon dioxide pipeline emergency and acquaint the officials with the\noperator’s ability in responding to a hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide\npipeline emergency and means of communication . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 194.402(c)(12) by failing to prepare and follow\nwritten procedures for establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other\nappropriate public officials. The regulation requires that operators maintain an ongoing liaison\nprogram with governmental entities, such as local first responders, who might respond to a\npipeline emergency involving that operator’s facilities. Such procedures must ensure that an\noperator learns the responsibilities and resources of each government organization involved and\nthat public officials become acquainted with the operator’s ability to respond to pipeline\nemergencies and its means of communications.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that the events following the November 12, 2007 release\ndemonstrated that TPC lacked such procedures. The Notice and Violation Report8 alleged that\naround 5:40 p.m. on November 12, 2007, an ammonia leak was discovered on the Respondent’s\nline. The leak was the result of a deliberate act of vandalism committed by three teenagers who\ndrilled into the pipeline, thinking, as they later told police, that there was money inside the pipe.9\nOne of the boys suffered chemical burns from exposure to the ammonia vapor that was released\nas a result of their vandalism.\n10\nThe Violation Report further alleged that the leak was discovered shortly after the incident by the\ncrew of a Hillsborough County Fire Rescue (HCFR) engine that happened to be crossing the\nAlafia River near the leak site. The crew reported the event to the Hillsborough County\n8 OPS Pipeline Safety Violation Report (May 7, 2008) (Violation Report).\n9 Response, Exhibit 1 (Incident Report of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office).\n10 Id.\n\n\n\n7\nEmergency Dispatch as a “major release,” thus triggering a robust response by local emergency\npersonnel at the scene. Residents within a one-mile radius of the site were evacuated—later\nreduced to one-half mile—and a local elementary school closed. A significant quantity of\nammonia was discharged into the atmosphere, at which point it immediately vaporized, forming\na highly toxic vapor cloud that settled over the failure site and the Alafia River. Officials later\nestimated that 10,000 - 20,000 pounds of ammonia were released.\n11\nThe Violation Report further alleged that HCFR promptly established a Unified Command on\nsite and remained on the scene for 40 hours, using approximately 6.5 million gallons of potable\nwater to mitigate and control the release. The leak was not contained until around 10:00 a.m. on\nWednesday, November 14, two days after the initial release.\nThe Notice and Violation Report alleged that a number of difficulties arose during the\nemergency response efforts which were attributable to TPC’s failure to develop a compliant\nliaison program with first responders prior to the incident. According to documents provided by\nHCFR, the failure to establish and follow an effective liaison included:\n• A failure to develop an appropriate protocol with HCFR regarding the use of Level A\ntrained in their use. Absent such training and a prior agreement as to who should be\nHazmat Suits in the event of an emergency.12 TPC allegedly had such safety suits\navailable but was unable to produce any records showing that its personnel were properly\nauthorized to use such equipment, HCFR refused to allow TPC personnel access to the\nfailure site until local officials had determined that the area was safe. This lack of access,\nin turn, hampered TPC’s attempts to stop the leak and repair the pipe.\n• A failure to provide HCFR in advance with pipeline drawings showing the location of\nvalves and previous “hot taps” on the pipeline. According to HCFR, the availability of\nsuch drawings might have enabled emergency responders to move more quickly to “flare\noff” the ammonia.13\n• A failure to address HCFR’s need for emergency communications with TPC in the event\nof a pipeline emergency. TPC allegedly failed to maintain personnel at the HCFR\nCommand Center at all times during the incident. A representative of HCFR allegedly\nhad to call TPC’s general manager at his home a few hours into the incident in order to\nget him to come to the command center to provide assistance.14\n11 Violation Report at 10, 11.\n12 Level A Hazmat Suits are total containment suits that protect an individual against all forms of chemicals: solids,\nliquids and gasses/vapors. Level A suits include a full-facepiece self-contained breathing apparatus or supplied-air\nrespirator worn inside the suit.\n13 Violation Report, Exhibit 10 at 2.\n14 Id. at 10, 12.\n\n\n\n8\n• A failure to establish who should be responsible for maintaining a supply of pipeline leak\nclamps and other emergency response equipment that might be needed to respond\nproperly to an anhydrous ammonia leak.\nThe Notice further noted that an “After Action Review Meeting” was convened by HCFR on\nNovember 27, 2007, with various affected parties, including Respondent, participating and\nreviewing the actions taken by everyone in response to the incident. The meeting generated a\nreport that included various recommendations on how the parties could improve their response\nefforts in the event of future accidents.\n15\nIn its Response, TPC denied that it had failed to prepare and follow adequate procedures for\nestablishing and maintaining liaison with HCFR prior to the November 2007 accident. The\ncompany acknowledged that TPC personnel could have repaired the leak much sooner than they\ndid, but contended that the company had been denied access to the site by HCFR and the\nHillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO). Since the company could not gain access to the\nfailure site, TPC argued that it made no difference as to whether the company could have used\nLevel A Hazmat Suits or pipeline repair clamps. As evidence of its liaison program, TPC\nasserted that in June 2006, the company’s General Manager had attended a Florida State Pipeline\nSafety Meeting for the purpose of obtaining additional training and education on liaison efforts\nwith HCFR.\nIn its Brief, Respondent cited additional contacts and communications it had had with various\nfederal, state, and local officials prior to the November 2007 release. For example, Respondent\nasserted that in June 1995, it had provided information to the Tampa Bay Local Emergency\nPlanning Committee for a report on TPC’s ammonia pipeline. Respondent also said that it had\ninteracted with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in connection with a similar but larger\nammonia release in 2003 near the Fish Hawk subdivision (2003 Release). Respondent met with\nthe U.S. Coast Guard on January 21, 2004, during a federal Port Security Assessment, as well as\nwith the National Transportation Safety Board on April 5, 2004, during a government survey of\nits supervisory control and data acquisition system. Respondent also asserted that it had\ninteracted with HCFR and HCSO on September 29, 2006, when local residents reported smelling\nammonia.\nRespondent further contended in its Brief that it had developed liaison specifically with the\nHCSO, as evidenced by the fact that the company had provided maps of its pipeline system to\nthe HCSO in 2003 and 2005, and that TPC had hired various members of the HCSO to provide\noff-duty security services. Respondent credited its efforts responding to the November 2007\nrelease, at least in part, on the fact that several HCFR representatives were involved in\nresponding to the 2003 Release and were aware of Respondent’s response capabilities.\nSection § 195.402(c)(12) requires pipeline operators to prepare and follow procedures for\nestablishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other appropriate public officials.\n15 In its Response, TPC argued it was inaccurate for the Notice to refer to the November 2007release as an\n“accident” because it was caused by deliberate vandalism. The term “accident” in the context of the pipeline safety\nregulations, however, refers to an unintended release of product from the pipeline. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.50. The\nterm does not connote fault on the part of the operator for the release.\n\n\n\n9\nThrough such procedures and ongoing communications, operators are able to gain a clear\nunderstanding of the responsibilities and resources of each government organization that may\nrespond to a pipeline emergency and the local officials, in turn, are able to learn about an\noperator’s abilities to respond to such emergencies and its means of communication.\n“Maintaining liaison with response officials on an ongoing basis is an important [part] of\npipeline safety because it ensures that the responsible officials are kept up-to-date on the\noperational status of pipelines in their area and facilitates emergency response planning and the\nability to rapidly establish communications in the event of an incident.”16\nPHMSA has interpreted this regulation (and the corresponding provision for gas pipelines under\n§ 192.615(c)) as requiring pipeline operators to establish programs that are specifically designed\nto maintain liaison with response officials in all cities and counties where a pipeline is located.17\nThe liaison must cover all possible emergency scenarios to ensure proper coordination with those\nofficials who would respond to potential emergencies.18 Operators are expected to maintain\nliaison through regular meetings held at least once a year.19 Meetings should be conducted face-\nto-face, but if methods other than face-to-face meetings are used, the operator must be able to\nconvincingly demonstrate that such methods are at least as effective as face-to-face meetings.\n20\nOperators are also expected to document their liaison activities by producing appropriate records,\nsuch as copies of invitations sent by the company to response officials, lists of officials who\nprovided to officials at the meetings or sent to those officials who did not attend. 21\nattended liaison meetings, agendas showing topics addressed during the meetings, and materials\nI have reviewed the entire record in this case to determine whether or not Respondent had\nestablished and maintained proper liaison with the appropriate response officials in Hillsborough\n16 In the Matter of the Premcor Refining Group, Inc., Final Order, CPF No. 3-2004-5008, 2006 WL 3825320 (Feb.\n16, 2006). Cases are also available at www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/enforcement.\n17 In the Matter of Ozark Gas Transmission System, Warning Letter, CPF No. 27111-W, 1997 WL 34614812 (Jul.\n24, 1997) (warning that failure to establish liaison in all areas and counties traversed by the pipeline constituted a\nprobable violation); In the Matter of Cook Inlet Pipeline Co., Warning Letter, CPF No. 59506W, 1999 WL\n34788505 (Jul. 7, 1999) (warning that the operator’s interactions with officials outside of its established liaison\nprogram did not satisfy the requirement to maintain ongoing liaison because the interactions did not cover all\npipeline emergency scenarios). Note also that Webster’s New World Dictionary (Second College Edition, 1980)\ndefines “liaison” as “a linking up or connecting of the parts of a whole, as of military units, in order to bring about\nproper coordination of activities.”\n18 Cook Inlet, CPF No. 59506W.\n19 Premcor, CPF No. 3-2004-5008 (finding a violation for failing to hold liaison activities during calendar year\n2002); In the Matter of AmeriGas Propane, L.P., Final Order, CPF No. 3-2006-0004, 2009 WL 1211365 (Apr. 15,\n2009) (finding a violation for failing to conduct liaison activities for the years 2002-2004).\n20 Interpretation for Ms. Mary L. McDaniel, P.E., #PI-93-003 (Feb. 4, 1993) (available at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/interps) (interpreting §§192.615(c) and 195.402(c)(12) to require that\noperators meet face-to-face with public officials and maintain an ongoing face-to-face liaison after the initial\nmeeting); but see In the Matter of Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Final Order, CPF No. 54013, 1997 WL 34614757\n(May 9, 1997) (stating that other forms of maintaining liaison with public officials may be acceptable).\n21 In the Matter of Ozark Gas Transmission, LLC, Warning Letter, CPF No. 29102W, 1999 WL 34788548 (Aug.\n18, 1999) (warning that a violation may be found if the operator could not provide documentation of liaison visits).\n\n\n\n10\nCounty as of the date of the November 2007 release. As discussed above, the appropriate\nofficials included the HCFR and HCSO.\nRespondent has presented examples of the company’s various interactions with HCFR and\nHCSO prior to the November 2007 release. In affidavits submitted with the Brief, two long-time\nTPC officials asserted that they had had “numerous opportunities to interface with state, local,\nlisted several of the examples already discussed, most of which were in response to the 2003\nRelease.\nand federal public officials under both emergency and normal operating scenarios.”22 They\nI reject Respondent’s assertion that such sporadic contacts from 2003 to 2007 constituted an\nadequate liaison program with first responders in Hillsborough County. Such examples, rather\nthan supporting TPC’s claim, actually demonstrate that the company’s interactions with local\nofficials consisted of little more than intermittent meetings, most of which were held in response\nto the 2003 Release. The meetings did not indicate that any sort of regular, pro-active, working\nrelationship had been established or that the parties were prepared to respond in a coordinated\nfashion to all types of pipeline emergencies. Particularly following the 2003 Release, the\ncompany should have recognized the importance of a robust liaison program that would be\ndesigned to provide all affected parties with the data, equipment and tools they needed to\nrespond effectively and quickly to pipeline emergencies.\nRespondent has failed to provide documentation of any regularly scheduled meetings with local\nofficials or to produce any other indicia of an ongoing liaison program specifically designed to\nprovide the parties with necessary information to respond effectively and quickly to pipeline\nemergencies.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402(c)(12) by failing to maintain ongoing liaison with HCFR and HCSO, to learn and stay\nup-to-date on the responsibilities and resources of such government organizations in responding\nto pipeline emergencies, and to keep local officials up-to-date regarding the operator’s ability to\nrespond to pipeline emergencies and its means of communication.\nItem 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(2), (e)(3), and\n(e)(7), which state:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies . . . .\n(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this\nsection must include procedures for the following to provide safety when\nan emergency condition occurs . . .\n22 Brief, Exhibits A, B (affidavits dated May 21, 2009).\n\n\n\n11\n(1) . . . .\n(2) Prompt and effective response to a notice of each type emergency,\nincluding fire or explosion occurring near or directly involving a pipeline\nfacility, accidental release of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide from a\npipeline facility, operational failure causing a hazardous condition, and\nnatural disaster affecting pipeline facilities.\n(3) Having personnel, equipment, instruments, tools, and material\navailable as needed at the scene of an emergency . . . .\n(7) Notifying fire, police, and other appropriate public officials of\nhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline emergencies and coordinating\nwith them preplanned and actual responses during an emergency,\nincluding additional precautions necessary for an emergency involving a\npipeline system transporting a highly volatile liquid . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402(e) by failing to prepare and follow\nwritten procedures to provide safety when an emergency occurs, including procedures for the\nfollowing: prompt and effective response to an accidental release of hazardous liquid from the\npipeline (subsection (e)(2)); having personnel, equipment, instruments, tools, and material\navailable as needed at the scene of an emergency (subsection (e)(3)); and notifying fire, police,\nand other appropriate public officials of a pipeline emergency and coordinating with them\npreplanned and actual responses during an emergency, including additional precautions\nnecessary for an emergency involving a pipeline system transporting a highly volatile liquid\n(subsection (e)(7)).\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that following the November 2007 release, Respondent installed\na stopple and “hot tap” on the pipeline around 6:00 p.m. on November 13 to facilitate flaring,\napproximately 24 hours after the ammonia release was first discovered. The Notice further\nalleged that HCFR had expressed concern about the excessive amount of time it took Respondent\nto bring in personnel to perform this operation and about the reluctance of Respondent’s own\npersonnel to perform the work. In summary, the Notice alleged that TPC’s emergency response\nactions demonstrated that the company failed to provide a “prompt and effective” response to the\nemergency by having the necessary personnel and equipment “available as needed at the scene of\na pipeline emergency,\n” and by coordinating with local first responders “preplanned and actual\nresponses during an emergency, including additional precautions for an emergency involving . . .\na highly volatile liquid” such as anhydrous ammonia.\nIn its Response, TPC denied the allegation by referring to its comments to Item 9. In summary,\nthe company disagreed that the actions it had taken following the November 2007 release\ndemonstrated it had inadequate emergency response procedures. As noted above, Respondent\nexplained that while the company could have repaired the leak much sooner than it did, HCFR\nwould not allow TPC to enter the site until the pipeline had reached zero pressure.23 Respondent\nfurther explained that HCSO had declared the site a crime scene, so TPC was not permitted\naccess to the site until police had completed their investigation.24\nThe “unified command\n23 Response at 7.\n24 Id.\n\n\n\n12\nstructure,” according to Respondent, “directly prevented TBPL from making any attempt to limit\nor minimize the volume of ammonia that would eventually escape from the damaged section of\nnorth side of the bridge to help. The company concluded that its personnel were acting as\npipeline.”25 Respondent pointed out that it had two people on the south side and two on the\npromptly as possible, given the instructions it received from HCFR and HCSO and the congested\ntraffic near the bridge.\nAt the hearing, Respondent again referred to its comments made to Item 9, and in its Brief,\nRespondent combined its comments for Items 9, 10, 11, and 12. The company argued that it\npromptly responded to the release immediately after receiving notice, kept its employees on\nscene for the duration of the event, and worked with HCFR to contain the leak. For example,\nRespondent’s on-duty operator first received a call about the release at 5:40 p.m. and\nimmediately shut down the entire pipeline system and notified two managers of the event. The\npipeline was fully shut down by 5:50 p.m., and TPC employees were directed to the scene of the\nrelease. On their way, the employees closed isolation valves on both the north and south side of\nthe Alafia River bridge where the release occurred. Within approximately one hour of receiving\nnotice of the release, the company had closed the isolation valves on either side of the leak.\nCheck valves on either side further isolated the leak area.\nRespondent indicated that a company manager had remained at TPC headquarters to help\norganize the repair of the pipeline and to consult with HCFR or HCSO, if necessary. Respondent\nalso had contractors on scene to do work as needed. On November 13, 2007, the day following\nthe release, Respondent informed HCFR that it had determined there were 21 tons of product\nbetween the two isolation valves on either side of the leak and 4.9 tons between the two check\nvalves, but the company was unable to determine how long it would take to “blow down” the\npressure in the pipe because its employees were not allowed access to the site to evaluate the size\nand shape of the hole or to determine whether the check valves had, in fact, closed. This\ninformation, Resp","truncated":true,"body_characters":116703}