# TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO. — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 220086002
- **title:** TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO. — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2008-05-07
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(12), 195.402(e), 195.402(e)(8), 195.403, 195.404(a)(3), 195.440(a), 195.440(c), 195.505(b), 195.573(a)(1), 195.579(c), 195.583(a).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220086002
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(12),  195.402(e),  195.402(e)(8),  195.403,  195.404(a)(3),  195.440(a),  195.440(c),  195.505(b),  195.573(a)(1),  195.579(c),  195.583(a). The case was opened on 2008-05-07 and is reported as closed as of 2011-03-04. Proposed civil penalty: $398,000. Assessed civil penalty: $398,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

220086002_Closure Letter_03042011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_Closure%20Letter_03042011.pdf

220086002_Closure Letter_03042011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_Closure%20Letter_03042011_text.pdf

220086002_FinalOrder_04262010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_FinalOrder_04262010.pdf

220086002_FinalOrder_04262010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_FinalOrder_04262010_text.pdf

220086002_NOPV PCP PCO_05072008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_05072008.pdf

220086002_nopv pcp pco_05072008_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_nopv%20pcp%20pco_05072008_text.pdf

220086002_operator response to notice_08072008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_operator%20response%20to%20notice_08072008.pdf

220086002_Petition for Reconsideration and Stay_06112010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220086002/220086002_Petition%20for%20Reconsideration%20and%20Stay_06112010.pdf

220086002_Closure Letter_03042011_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
March 4, 2011
Mr. Robert Rose
President
Tampa Pipeline Corporation
P.O. Box 35236
Sarasota, FL 34242
CPF 2-2008-6002
Dear Mr. Rose:
On April 26, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §60118(b) and 49 CFR §190.213, the Associate
Administrator for Pipeline Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) issued a Final Order to Tampa Pipeline Corporation and its subsidiary Tampa Bay
Pipeline Company (TPC).
The Final Order found that TPC had committed violations of the federal pipeline safety
regulations and included a Compliance Order (CO), which required TPC to take certain
actions to protect the public and the environment.
The PHMSA Southern Region has reviewed your letter of September 13, 2010, and your
memorandum of October 21, 2010, in response to the CO. This case is now closed.
Please be advised that this letter refers only to CPF 2-2008-6002 and not to any other PHMSA
pending cases. Also be advised that nothing herein states or implies that the TPC pipeline
system meets the requirements of the federal pipeline safety laws or regulations. The pipeline
system remains subject to inspection by PHMSA.
Sincerely,
Wayne T. Lemoi
Director, Office of Pipeline Safety
PHMSA Southern Region

220086002_FinalOrder_04262010_text.pdf

APR 26 2010
Mr. Robert Rose
President
Tampa Pipeline Corporation
P.O. Box 35236
Sarasota, FL 34242
Re: CPF No. 2-2008-6002
Dear Mr. Rose:
Enclosed is the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of violation,
assesses a civil penalty of $398,000, and specifies actions to be taken by Tampa Pipeline
Corporation to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set
forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance
order completed, as determined by the Director, Southern Region, this enforcement action will
be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of
mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty
Director, Southern Region, PHMSA
Mr. Henry D. Fellows, Jr.
Fellows LaBriola LLP
Suite 2300 South Tower
225 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1731
CERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7009 1410 0000 2472 2476]



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Tampa Pipeline Corporation, ) CPF No. 2-2008-6002
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
On July 30 – August 2, 2007, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),
conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Tampa Pipeline
Corporation (TPC), and its subsidiary, Tampa Bay Pipeline Company (TBPC) (collectively, TPC
or Respondent), in Tampa, Florida. On November 26 – 27, 2007, a representative of OPS
conducted another inspection of Respondent’s facility and records following a pipeline release
that occurred on November 12, 2007. Respondent operates approximately 100 miles of pipeline
transporting anhydrous ammonia, a highly volatile liquid (HVL), and approximately 10 miles of
hazardous liquid pipeline transporting refined petroleum products, all within the State of Florida.
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director), issued to
Respondent, by letter dated May 7, 2008, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil
Penalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the
Notice proposed finding that Respondent had committed certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195
and proposed a civil penalty of $398,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed to
order that Respondent take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.
Respondent responded to the Notice by letter dated June 4, 2008. Respondent offered
information in response to some of the allegations, requested an extension of time to more fully
respond, asked to meet with the Director to discuss the Notice, and requested a hearing. The
Director granted the extension but denied the request to meet outside of a hearing. Respondent
submitted its complete response to the Notice by letter dated September 2, 2008 (Response).
The company again contested several allegations of violation and requested elimination or
mitigation of the civil penalty and withdrawal of the proposed compliance order.
In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a hearing was held on April 21, 2009, in Atlanta,
Georgia, with an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, presiding. After the



2
hearing, Respondent provided a post-hearing brief by letter dated May 22, 2009 (Brief).
Throughout this proceeding, Respondent has been represented by counsel.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent committed the following violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195:
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.404(a)(3), which states:
§ 195.404 Maps and records.
(a) Each operator shall maintain current maps and records of its
pipeline systems that include at least the following information:
(1) . . . .
(3) The maximum operating pressure of each pipeline . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.404(a)(3) by failing to maintain current
records of the maximum operating pressure (MOP) of each pipeline. Specifically, the Notice
alleged that Respondent could not produce records that established MOP for its pipelines, even
though the pipeline system had been designed to operate at stress levels below regulatory limits.
In its Response and at the hearing, TPC did not contest this allegation but provided information
concerning corrective actions it had taken to amend its operations and maintenance (O&M)
procedures. In its Brief, however, Respondent stated, “This concern was unfounded because
§ 4.9.2 of the 2006 O&M Manual that was in place at the time of the 2007 inspection listed the
MOP.”1
After reviewing the evidence referenced by Respondent, I find that § 4.9.2 of Respondent’s 2006
O&M Manual listed only certain device pressure settings but did not list the MOP for each
pipeline.2 Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49
C.F.R. § 195.404(a)(3) by failing to have current records of the MOP of each pipeline.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.440(a), which states:
§ 195.440 Public awareness.
(a) Each pipeline operator must develop and implement a written
continuing public education program that follows the guidance provided in
the American Petroleum Institute’s (API) Recommended Practice (RP)
1162 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3) . . . .
1 Brief at 2.
2 Response, Exhibit (Tab) 4 at 25.



3
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.440(a) by failing to implement a written
continuing public education program that followed the guidance provided in API RP 1162.3
Specifically, the Notice alleged that § 4.7.0 of Respondent’s O&M procedures required the
company to communicate annually to certain emergency officials, but Respondent had not
communicated with such officials annually since January 1, 2006.
In its Response and at the hearing, TPC did not contest this allegation but provided information
concerning corrective action it had taken to amend its O&M procedures. In its Brief,
Respondent further acknowledged that it had not communicated a baseline message to all
emergency responders. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find Respondent
violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.440(a) by failing to implement a written continuing public education
program that followed the guidance provided in API RP 1162.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.440(c), which states:
§ 195.440 Public awareness.
(a) . . . .
(c) The operator must follow the general program recommendations,
including baseline and supplemental requirements of API RP 1162, unless
the operator provides justification in its program or procedural manual as
to why compliance with all or certain provisions of the recommended
practice is not practicable and not necessary for safety . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.440(c) by failing to follow the program
recommendations of API RP 1162, including baseline and supplemental requirements.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that § 4.7.0 of Respondent’s O&M procedures failed to define a
minimum communications coverage area distance, and failed to determine specific affected
public stakeholder addresses in accordance with API RP 1162.
In its Response, TPC did not contest this allegation but provided information concerning
corrective action it had taken to amend its O&M procedures to further define the term “Affected
Public.” At the hearing, Respondent contended that § 195.440 had been amended by PHMSA,
and that the previous version permitted operators to use mass media to comply with the
regulation. In its Brief, Respondent further stated that in 2005 and 2007, the company had
conducted mass media public awareness by placing over 46,108 inserts in The Tampa Tribune.
While it is true that PHMSA amended § 195.440 in May 2005, this occurred more than two years
prior to PHMSA’s inspection of Respondent in this case. Therefore, Respondent was required to
be in compliance with the current requirements of § 195.440 at the time of the PHMSA
inspection. After considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.440(c) by failing to define a minimum communications coverage area distance, and by
failing to determine specific affected public stakeholder addresses in accordance with the
requirements of API RP 1162.
3 API RP 1162, “Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators,” is incorporated by reference at 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.3(c).



4
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b), which states:
§ 195.505 Qualification program.
Each operator shall have and follow a written qualification program.
The program shall include provisions to:
(a) Identify covered tasks;
(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered
tasks are qualified . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.505(b) by failing to follow a written
qualification program to ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks
were qualified.4 Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent permitted an employee to
perform two covered tasks without qualifying that individual under the company’s operator
qualification (OQ) program. Respondent’s records allegedly demonstrated that a person with the
title “Ammonia Operator” had been performing two covered tasks without a valid qualification
for at least a year.
5
In its Response, TPC acknowledged that the particular individual “was technically not qualified
on paper,” but reasoned that he was an experienced Ammonia Operator.
Respondent stated that the individual was eventually evaluated under the company’s OQ
program during the PHMSA inspection and the results of that evaluation demonstrated the
individual had the necessary knowledge and skills to meet the appropriate qualification
requirements. At the hearing, the PHMSA inspector agreed that the individual in question had
satisfied the company’s OQ evaluation during the PHMSA inspection.
6 Furthermore,
In its Brief, Respondent again admitted that it had not conducted a timely performance
evaluation of the individual, but contended that he had many years of experience operating
pipelines and that the company’s “failure to satisfy a technical requirement was a simple
mechanisms for preventing this type of oversight in the future.
oversight that had no impact on safety.”7 Respondent also indicated that it had instituted
Qualifications under a valid OQ program are not merely “paper requirements,” but are
fundamental to safety because they ensure that employees whose duties affect the integrity of a
pipeline have been evaluated and determined to be able to perform those tasks safely. In
addition, qualification ensure that employees performing such tasks can recognize and react to
4 A “covered task” is an activity, identified by the operator, that: (1) is performed on a pipeline facility; (2) is an
operations or maintenance task; (3) is performed as a requirement of 49 C.F.R. Part 195; and (4) affects the
operation or integrity of the pipeline. 49 C.F.R. § 195.501. “Qualified” means that an individual has been evaluated
and can: (a) perform assigned covered tasks; and (b) recognize and react to abnormal operating conditions. 49
C.F.R. § 195.503.
5 The covered tasks were Task 43.3, “Monitor Pressures, Flows, Communications and Line Integrity and Maintain
Them Within Allowable Limits,” and Task 43.4, “Manually or Remotely Open or Close Valves or Other
Equipment.”
6 Response at 5.
7 Brief at 3.



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unsafe and abnormal conditions that could arise during their performance. Although the
individual in question may have had years of experience in the field and could readily
demonstrate his ability to meet qualification requirements when finally evaluated during the
PHMSA inspection, the evidence demonstrates he had been allowed to perform two covered
tasks for at least a year without being properly qualified under Respondent’s OQ program.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.505(b) by failing to follow a written OQ program to ensure through evaluation that an
Ammonia Operator was qualified to perform two covered tasks.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.583(a), which states:
§ 195.583 What must I do to monitor atmospheric corrosion control?
(a) You must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is
exposed to the atmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as
follows:
If the pipeline is
located:
Onshore . . . . . . . . . . . . Then the frequency of
inspection is:
At least once every 3 calendar years, but with
intervals not exceeding 39 months….
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.583(a) by failing to inspect an exposed pipe
at the south end of Licata Bridge for evidence of atmospheric corrosion at least once every three
calendar years, but with intervals not exceeding 39 months. The Notice further alleged that the
coating was in poor condition, the pipeline was suffering from severe atmospheric corrosion, and
a corrosion analysis indicated that the pipe wall had lost as much as 56% of its thickness yet
Respondent’s inspection records failed to identify deteriorated coating and atmospheric corrosion
on the exposed pipe. The Notice also indicated that Respondent’s written procedures required
atmospheric corrosion inspections to be conducted as part of the company’s bi-weekly pipeline
patrols.
In its Response and at the hearing, TPC acknowledged that its inspections of the exposed pipe in
question were not at the intervals specified in the regulation. Respondent contended, however,
that it had determined the pipeline was not being operated in an unsafe manner, based on a
calculation of the remaining pipe wall strength, which demonstrated that the pipeline could still
be safely operated at a pressure above MOP. In its Brief, Respondent again acknowledged that it
had not adequately documented external corrosion on the pipeline, but contended that such gap
was “mitigated” by the fact that the pipeline had not been operated in an unsafe condition.
Respondent further indicated it had taken certain measures to prevent this from occurring in the
future.
The contention by Respondent that the pipeline was never operated in an unsafe manner may be
relevant to the gravity of the violation but does not negate the evidence demonstrating that the
company failed to inspect the exposed pipeline at the intervals specified in the regulation.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.583(a) by failing to inspect the exposed pipe at the south end of Licata Bridge for evidence



6
of atmospheric corrosion at least once every three calendar years, with intervals not exceeding 39
months.
Item 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(12), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies . . . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) . . . .
(12) Establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other
appropriate public officials to learn the responsibility and resources of
each government organization that may respond to a hazardous liquid or
carbon dioxide pipeline emergency and acquaint the officials with the
operator’s ability in responding to a hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide
pipeline emergency and means of communication . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 194.402(c)(12) by failing to prepare and follow
written procedures for establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other
appropriate public officials. The regulation requires that operators maintain an ongoing liaison
program with governmental entities, such as local first responders, who might respond to a
pipeline emergency involving that operator’s facilities. Such procedures must ensure that an
operator learns the responsibilities and resources of each government organization involved and
that public officials become acquainted with the operator’s ability to respond to pipeline
emergencies and its means of communications.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that the events following the November 12, 2007 release
demonstrated that TPC lacked such procedures. The Notice and Violation Report8 alleged that
around 5:40 p.m. on November 12, 2007, an ammonia leak was discovered on the Respondent’s
line. The leak was the result of a deliberate act of vandalism committed by three teenagers who
drilled into the pipeline, thinking, as they later told police, that there was money inside the pipe.9
One of the boys suffered chemical burns from exposure to the ammonia vapor that was released
as a result of their vandalism.
10
The Violation Report further alleged that the leak was discovered shortly after the incident by the
crew of a Hillsborough County Fire Rescue (HCFR) engine that happened to be crossing the
Alafia River near the leak site. The crew reported the event to the Hillsborough County
8 OPS Pipeline Safety Violation Report (May 7, 2008) (Violation Report).
9 Response, Exhibit 1 (Incident Report of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office).
10 Id.



7
Emergency Dispatch as a “major release,” thus triggering a robust response by local emergency
personnel at the scene. Residents within a one-mile radius of the site were evacuated—later
reduced to one-half mile—and a local elementary school closed. A significant quantity of
ammonia was discharged into the atmosphere, at which point it immediately vaporized, forming
a highly toxic vapor cloud that settled over the failure site and the Alafia River. Officials later
estimated that 10,000 - 20,000 pounds of ammonia were released.
11
The Violation Report further alleged that HCFR promptly established a Unified Command on
site and remained on the scene for 40 hours, using approximately 6.5 million gallons of potable
water to mitigate and control the release. The leak was not contained until around 10:00 a.m. on
Wednesday, November 14, two days after the initial release.
The Notice and Violation Report alleged that a number of difficulties arose during the
emergency response efforts which were attributable to TPC’s failure to develop a compliant
liaison program with first responders prior to the incident. According to documents provided by
HCFR, the failure to establish and follow an effective liaison included:
• A failure to develop an appropriate protocol with HCFR regarding the use of Level A
trained in their use. Absent such training and a prior agreement as to who should be
Hazmat Suits in the event of an emergency.12 TPC allegedly had such safety suits
available but was unable to produce any records showing that its personnel were properly
authorized to use such equipment, HCFR refused to allow TPC personnel access to the
failure site until local officials had determined that the area was safe. This lack of access,
in turn, hampered TPC’s attempts to stop the leak and repair the pipe.
• A failure to provide HCFR in advance with pipeline drawings showing the location of
valves and previous “hot taps” on the pipeline. According to HCFR, the availability of
such drawings might have enabled emergency responders to move more quickly to “flare
off” the ammonia.13
• A failure to address HCFR’s need for emergency communications with TPC in the event
of a pipeline emergency. TPC allegedly failed to maintain personnel at the HCFR
Command Center at all times during the incident. A representative of HCFR allegedly
had to call TPC’s general manager at his home a few hours into the incident in order to
get him to come to the command center to provide assistance.14
11 Violation Report at 10, 11.
12 Level A Hazmat Suits are total containment suits that protect an individual against all forms of chemicals: solids,
liquids and gasses/vapors. Level A suits include a full-facepiece self-contained breathing apparatus or supplied-air
respirator worn inside the suit.
13 Violation Report, Exhibit 10 at 2.
14 Id. at 10, 12.



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• A failure to establish who should be responsible for maintaining a supply of pipeline leak
clamps and other emergency response equipment that might be needed to respond
properly to an anhydrous ammonia leak.
The Notice further noted that an “After Action Review Meeting” was convened by HCFR on
November 27, 2007, with various affected parties, including Respondent, participating and
reviewing the actions taken by everyone in response to the incident. The meeting generated a
report that included various recommendations on how the parties could improve their response
efforts in the event of future accidents.
15
In its Response, TPC denied that it had failed to prepare and follow adequate procedures for
establishing and maintaining liaison with HCFR prior to the November 2007 accident. The
company acknowledged that TPC personnel could have repaired the leak much sooner than they
did, but contended that the company had been denied access to the site by HCFR and the
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO). Since the company could not gain access to the
failure site, TPC argued that it made no difference as to whether the company could have used
Level A Hazmat Suits or pipeline repair clamps. As evidence of its liaison program, TPC
asserted that in June 2006, the company’s General Manager had attended a Florida State Pipeline
Safety Meeting for the purpose of obtaining additional training and education on liaison efforts
with HCFR.
In its Brief, Respondent cited additional contacts and communications it had had with various
federal, state, and local officials prior to the November 2007 release. For example, Respondent
asserted that in June 1995, it had provided information to the Tampa Bay Local Emergency
Planning Committee for a report on TPC’s ammonia pipeline. Respondent also said that it had
interacted with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in connection with a similar but larger
ammonia release in 2003 near the Fish Hawk subdivision (2003 Release). Respondent met with
the U.S. Coast Guard on January 21, 2004, during a federal Port Security Assessment, as well as
with the National Transportation Safety Board on April 5, 2004, during a government survey of
its supervisory control and data acquisition system. Respondent also asserted that it had
interacted with HCFR and HCSO on September 29, 2006, when local residents reported smelling
ammonia.
Respondent further contended in its Brief that it had developed liaison specifically with the
HCSO, as evidenced by the fact that the company had provided maps of its pipeline system to
the HCSO in 2003 and 2005, and that TPC had hired various members of the HCSO to provide
off-duty security services. Respondent credited its efforts responding to the November 2007
release, at least in part, on the fact that several HCFR representatives were involved in
responding to the 2003 Release and were aware of Respondent’s response capabilities.
Section § 195.402(c)(12) requires pipeline operators to prepare and follow procedures for
establishing and maintaining liaison with fire, police, and other appropriate public officials.
15 In its Response, TPC argued it was inaccurate for the Notice to refer to the November 2007release as an
“accident” because it was caused by deliberate vandalism. The term “accident” in the context of the pipeline safety
regulations, however, refers to an unintended release of product from the pipeline. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.50. The
term does not connote fault on the part of the operator for the release.



9
Through such procedures and ongoing communications, operators are able to gain a clear
understanding of the responsibilities and resources of each government organization that may
respond to a pipeline emergency and the local officials, in turn, are able to learn about an
operator’s abilities to respond to such emergencies and its means of communication.
“Maintaining liaison with response officials on an ongoing basis is an important [part] of
pipeline safety because it ensures that the responsible officials are kept up-to-date on the
operational status of pipelines in their area and facilitates emergency response planning and the
ability to rapidly establish communications in the event of an incident.”16
PHMSA has interpreted this regulation (and the corresponding provision for gas pipelines under
§ 192.615(c)) as requiring pipeline operators to establish programs that are specifically designed
to maintain liaison with response officials in all cities and counties where a pipeline is located.17
The liaison must cover all possible emergency scenarios to ensure proper coordination with those
officials who would respond to potential emergencies.18 Operators are expected to maintain
liaison through regular meetings held at least once a year.19 Meetings should be conducted face-
to-face, but if methods other than face-to-face meetings are used, the operator must be able to
convincingly demonstrate that such methods are at least as effective as face-to-face meetings.
20
Operators are also expected to document their liaison activities by producing appropriate records,
such as copies of invitations sent by the company to response officials, lists of officials who
provided to officials at the meetings or sent to those officials who did not attend. 21
attended liaison meetings, agendas showing topics addressed during the meetings, and materials
I have reviewed the entire record in this case to determine whether or not Respondent had
established and maintained proper liaison with the appropriate response officials in Hillsborough
16 In the Matter of the Premcor Refining Group, Inc., Final Order, CPF No. 3-2004-5008, 2006 WL 3825320 (Feb.
16, 2006). Cases are also available at www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/enforcement.
17 In the Matter of Ozark Gas Transmission System, Warning Letter, CPF No. 27111-W, 1997 WL 34614812 (Jul.
24, 1997) (warning that failure to establish liaison in all areas and counties traversed by the pipeline constituted a
probable violation); In the Matter of Cook Inlet Pipeline Co., Warning Letter, CPF No. 59506W, 1999 WL
34788505 (Jul. 7, 1999) (warning that the operator’s interactions with officials outside of its established liaison
program did not satisfy the requirement to maintain ongoing liaison because the interactions did not cover all
pipeline emergency scenarios). Note also that Webster’s New World Dictionary (Second College Edition, 1980)
defines “liaison” as “a linking up or connecting of the parts of a whole, as of military units, in order to bring about
proper coordination of activities.”
18 Cook Inlet, CPF No. 59506W.
19 Premcor, CPF No. 3-2004-5008 (finding a violation for failing to hold liaison activities during calendar year
2002); In the Matter of AmeriGas Propane, L.P., Final Order, CPF No. 3-2006-0004, 2009 WL 1211365 (Apr. 15,
2009) (finding a violation for failing to conduct liaison activities for the years 2002-2004).
20 Interpretation for Ms. Mary L. McDaniel, P.E., #PI-93-003 (Feb. 4, 1993) (available at
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/interps) (interpreting §§192.615(c) and 195.402(c)(12) to require that
operators meet face-to-face with public officials and maintain an ongoing face-to-face liaison after the initial
meeting); but see In the Matter of Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Final Order, CPF No. 54013, 1997 WL 34614757
(May 9, 1997) (stating that other forms of maintaining liaison with public officials may be acceptable).
21 In the Matter of Ozark Gas Transmission, LLC, Warning Letter, CPF No. 29102W, 1999 WL 34788548 (Aug.
18, 1999) (warning that a violation may be found if the operator could not provide documentation of liaison visits).



10
County as of the date of the November 2007 release. As discussed above, the appropriate
officials included the HCFR and HCSO.
Respondent has presented examples of the company’s various interactions with HCFR and
HCSO prior to the November 2007 release. In affidavits submitted with the Brief, two long-time
TPC officials asserted that they had had “numerous opportunities to interface with state, local,
listed several of the examples already discussed, most of which were in response to the 2003
Release.
and federal public officials under both emergency and normal operating scenarios.”22 They
I reject Respondent’s assertion that such sporadic contacts from 2003 to 2007 constituted an
adequate liaison program with first responders in Hillsborough County. Such examples, rather
than supporting TPC’s claim, actually demonstrate that the company’s interactions with local
officials consisted of little more than intermittent meetings, most of which were held in response
to the 2003 Release. The meetings did not indicate that any sort of regular, pro-active, working
relationship had been established or that the parties were prepared to respond in a coordinated
fashion to all types of pipeline emergencies. Particularly following the 2003 Release, the
company should have recognized the importance of a robust liaison program that would be
designed to provide all affected parties with the data, equipment and tools they needed to
respond effectively and quickly to pipeline emergencies.
Respondent has failed to provide documentation of any regularly scheduled meetings with local
officials or to produce any other indicia of an ongoing liaison program specifically designed to
provide the parties with necessary information to respond effectively and quickly to pipeline
emergencies.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.402(c)(12) by failing to maintain ongoing liaison with HCFR and HCSO, to learn and stay
up-to-date on the responsibilities and resources of such government organizations in responding
to pipeline emergencies, and to keep local officials up-to-date regarding the operator’s ability to
respond to pipeline emergencies and its means of communication.
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(e)(2), (e)(3), and
(e)(7), which state:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies . . . .
(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety when
an emergency condition occurs . . .
22 Brief, Exhibits A, B (affidavits dated May 21, 2009).



11
(1) . . . .
(2) Prompt and effective response to a notice of each type emergency,
including fire or explosion occurring near or directly involving a pipeline
facility, accidental release of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide from a
pipeline facility, operational failure causing a hazardous condition, and
natural disaster affecting pipeline facilities.
(3) Having personnel, equipment, instruments, tools, and material
available as needed at the scene of an emergency . . . .
(7) Notifying fire, police, and other appropriate public officials of
hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline emergencies and coordinating
with them preplanned and actual responses during an emergency,
including additional precautions necessary for an emergency involving a
pipeline system transporting a highly volatile liquid . . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated § 195.402(e) by failing to prepare and follow
written procedures to provide safety when an emergency occurs, including procedures for the
following: prompt and effective response to an accidental release of hazardous liquid from the
pipeline (subsection (e)(2)); having personnel, equipment, instruments, tools, and material
available as needed at the scene of an emergency (subsection (e)(3)); and notifying fire, police,
and other appropriate public officials of a pipeline emergency and coordinating with them
preplanned and actual responses during an emergency, including additional precautions
necessary for an emergency involving a pipeline system transporting a highly volatile liquid
(subsection (e)(7)).
Specifically, the Notice alleged that following the November 2007 release, Respondent installed
a stopple and “hot tap” on the pipeline around 6:00 p.m. on November 13 to facilitate flaring,
approximately 24 hours after the ammonia release was first discovered. The Notice further
alleged that HCFR had expressed concern about the excessive amount of time it took Respondent
to bring in personnel to perform this operation and about the reluctance of Respondent’s own
personnel to perform the work. In summary, the Notice alleged that TPC’s emergency response
actions demonstrated that the company failed to provide a “prompt and effective” response to the
emergency by having the necessary personnel and equipment “available as needed at the scene of
a pipeline emergency,
” and by coordinating with local first responders “preplanned and actual
responses during an emergency, including additional precautions for an emergency involving . . .
a highly volatile liquid” such as anhydrous ammonia.
In its Response, TPC denied the allegation by referring to its comments to Item 9. In summary,
the company disagreed that the actions it had taken following the November 2007 release
demonstrated it had inadequate emergency response procedures. As noted above, Respondent
explained that while the company could have repaired the leak much sooner than it did, HCFR
would not allow TPC to enter the site until the pipeline had reached zero pressure.23 Respondent
further explained that HCSO had declared the site a crime scene, so TPC was not permitted
access to the site until police had completed their investigation.24
The “unified command
23 Response at 7.
24 Id.



12
structure,” according to Respondent, “directly prevented TBPL from making any attempt to limit
or minimize the volume of ammonia that would eventually escape from the damaged section of
north side of the bridge to help. The company concluded that its personnel were acting as
pipeline.”25 Respondent pointed out that it had two people on the south side and two on the
promptly as possible, given the instructions it received from HCFR and HCSO and the congested
traffic near the bridge.
At the hearing, Respondent again referred to its comments made to Item 9, and in its Brief,
Respondent combined its comments for Items 9, 10, 11, and 12. The company argued that it
promptly responded to the release immediately after receiving notice, kept its employees on
scene for the duration of the event, and worked with HCFR to contain the leak. For example,
Respondent’s on-duty operator first received a call about the release at 5:40 p.m. and
immediately shut down the entire pipeline system and notified two managers of the event. The
pipeline was fully shut down by 5:50 p.m., and TPC employees were directed to the scene of the
release. On their way, the employees closed isolation valves on both the north and south side of
the Alafia River bridge where the release occurred. Within approximately one hour of receiving
notice of the release, the company had closed the isolation valves on either side of the leak.
Check valves on either side further isolated the leak area.
Respondent indicated that a company manager had remained at TPC headquarters to help
organize the repair of the pipeline and to consult with HCFR or HCSO, if necessary. Respondent
also had contractors on scene to do work as needed. On November 13, 2007, the day following
the release, Respondent informed HCFR that it had determined there were 21 tons of product
between the two isolation valves on either side of the leak and 4.9 tons between the two check
valves, but the company was unable to determine how long it would take to “blow down” the
pressure in the pipe because its employees were not allowed access to the site to evaluate the size
and shape of the hole or to determine whether the check valves had, in fact, closed. This
information, Resp
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