{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220111008","title":"SOUTHEAST SUPPLY HEADER, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-10-04","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 191.15(b), 191.5(a), 192.167(a)(2), 192.243(b)(1), 192.303, 192.305, 192.317(a), 192.709(c), 192.745(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220111008.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220111008.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220111008","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220111008","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving SOUTHEAST SUPPLY HEADER, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 191.15(b),  191.5(a),  192.167(a)(2),  192.243(b)(1),  192.303,  192.305,  192.317(a),  192.709(c),  192.745(a). The case was opened on 2011-10-04 and is reported as closed as of 2012-06-15. Proposed civil penalty: $174,500. Assessed civil penalty: $174,500. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220111008_Final Order_06152012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220111008/220111008_Final%20Order_06152012.pdf\n\n220111008_Final Order_06152012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220111008/220111008_Final%20Order_06152012_text.pdf\n\n220111008_nopv_pcp_pco_10042011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220111008/220111008_nopv_pcp_pco_10042011.pdf\n\n220111008_nopv_pcp_pco_10042011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220111008/220111008_nopv_pcp_pco_10042011_text.pdf\n\n220111008_Operator Response to Notice_11022011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220111008/220111008_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_11022011.pdf\n\n220111008_Final Order_06152012_text.pdf\n\nJUNE 15, 2012\nMr. Pete M. Kirsch\nDivision Senior Vice-President\nPipeline Operations & Engineering\nSoutheast Supply Header, LLC\nP. O. Box 4567\nHouston, TX 77210\nRe: CPF No. 2-2011-1008\nDear Mr. Kirsch:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a civil penalty of $174,500. This is to acknowledge receipt of payment\nof the full penalty amount, by wire transfer, dated November 4, 2011. It further finds that\nSoutheast Supply Header, LLC has completed the actions specified in the Notice to comply\nwith the pipeline safety regulations. Therefore, this case is now closed. Service of the Final\nOrder by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided\nunder 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. David M. McClanahan, President, CenterPoint Energy, Inc., P. O. Box\n4567, Houston, TX 77210\nMr. Wayne T. Lemoi, Director Southern Region, OPS\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nSoutheast Supply Header, LLC, ) CPF No. 2-2011-1008\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn May 3-7, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of Southeast Supply Header, LLC’s (SESH or\nRespondent) records in Shreveport, Louisiana. On August 2-5, 2010, OPS conducted a second\ninspection of the company’s pipeline facilities from Delhi, Louisiana, to Coden, Alabama. The\n274-mile natural gas transmission pipeline system, generally known as “Line 100,” consists of\n36-inch and 42-inch diameter pipe.\n1 Line 100 is a joint venture between subsidiaries of\nCenterPoint Energy, Inc., and Spectra Energy Corporation.\n2\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated October 4, 2011, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included a warning pursuant to\n49 C.F.R. § 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding\nthat SESH had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Parts 191 and 192 and proposed\nassessing a civil penalty of $174,500 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed\nordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The warning\nitems required no further action, but warned the operator to correct the probable violations or\nface possible enforcement action.\nSESH responded to the Notice by letter dated November 2, 2011 (Response). The company\ndid not contest the allegations of violation, but provided an explanation of its actions, and paid\nthe proposed civil penalty of $174,500, as provided in 49 C.F.R. § 190.227. Payment of the\npenalty serves to close the case with prejudice to Respondent.\n1 See http://www.spectraenergy.com and http://www.centerpointenergy.com (last assessed 5/4/2012).\n2 Spectra Energy is responsible for gas control and commercial operations; CenterPoint Energy is responsible for\nfield operations.\n\n\n\n2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, SESH did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated\n49 C.F.R. Parts 191 and 192, as follows:\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 191.15(b), which states:\n§ 191.15 Transmission and gathering systems: Incident report.\n(a) ….\n(b) Where additional related information is obtained after a report is\nsubmitted under paragraph (a) of this section, the operator shall make a\nsupplemental report as soon as practicable with a clear reference by date\nand subject to the original report.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 191.15 by failing to make a\nsupplemental report, as soon as practicable, after obtaining additional information related to an\nincident report submitted on February 19, 2010 for an incident that occurred on January 21,\n2010, near Hazlehurst, MS. Specifically, the Notice alleged that on May 23, 2010, SESH\nobtained additional information related to the pipeline incident and did not submit a\nsupplemental report until January 21, 2011, eight months later.\n3\nAccording to the Notice, SESH received a metallurgical analysis of the failure on May 23,\n2010, that identified the cause of the leaking girth weld as Hydrogen Assisted Cracking.\n4\nHowever, SESH did not submit the supplemental report until January 21, 2011, eight months\nafter SESH obtained the information.5 Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation\nbut explained that no information was intentionally withheld from PHMSA and updating the\nreport was an oversight.\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 191.15 by failing to submit a supplemental report as soon as\npracticable after it had obtained additional information regarding the cause of a reportable\nincident.\n6 Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.167(a)(2), which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 192.167 Compressor stations: Emergency shutdown.\n(a) Except for unattended field compressor stations of 1,000\nhorsepower (746 kilowatts) or less, each compressor station must have\nan emergency shutdown system that meets the following:\n(1) . . .\n3 The Incident Report (IR) number is 20100010-15010 (dated February 19, 2010).\n4 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (September 30, 2011) (Violation Report), Attachment A, Kiefner &\nAssociates, Inc. (Final Report No. 10-031).\n5 IR 20100010-15162 (January 21, 2011).\n6 Response at 3.\n\n\n\n3\n(2) It must discharge gas from the blowdown piping at a location\nwhere the gas will not create a hazard.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.167 by failing to place the\nblowdown piping vents for the SESH Emergency Shutdown Device (ESD) systems at a\nlocation where the discharge gas would not create a hazard. Specifically, the Notice alleged\nthat Respondent’s ESD blowdown piping vents were found near the compressor buildings and\nat other locations where vented natural gas would create a hazard to individuals if the ESD was\nactivated. Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation but explained that the\ncompany is modifying the ESD trip station blowdown piping to direct the vented gas vertically\nto eliminate the hazard.\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.167(a)(2) by failing to have emergency shutdown device\nblowdown piping vents located where the discharge of gas would not create a hazard.\n7 Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.243(b)(1), which states\nin relevant part:\n§ 192.243 Nondestructive testing.\n(a)….\n(b) Nondestructive testing of welds must be performed:\n(1) In accordance with written procedures; and…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.243(b)(1) by failing to\nnondestructively test (NDT) girth welds in accordance with SESH’s written procedures.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to comply with its written procedures\nrequiring that all welds (excluding Engineering Critical Assessment welds), including repairs,\nare evaluated to the workmanship standards of acceptability of API Standard 1104, Section 9.\n8\nAccording to the Notice, although SESH’s construction radiographs of two girth welds showed\na crack in each weld, Respondent did not identify and reject either of the girth welds during\nradiographic reviews, but installed the two girth welds in Line 100,\n9 failing to follow its\nwritten procedures or meet API 1104 workmanship standards of acceptability.\n10\n7 Response at 4.\n8 Violation Report, Attachment A at 34, SESH General Construction- Welding and Tie-Ins Procedures (Spec.\nNumber: CS-GC 8.2), pipe Weld Examination, Section 4D.\n9 Girth weld no. XRA-078 at station #4616+78 was discovered to be leaking on January 21, 2010. The source of\nthe leak was a longitudinal crack. Upon discovery of the leak, SESH and PHMSA used independent NDT\nconsultants to re-review the construction radiographs. Both NDT consultants identified the crack and concluded\nthe crack should have been identified and rejected by the NDT technician at the time of the original construction\nradiographic NDT evaluation.\nGirth weld no. XRA-047 at station #4366+51 was identified as having a transverse crack upon re-examination of\nthe construction radiograph by SESH's NDT consultant and by PHMSA's NDT consultant. The crack was\nconfirmed by examination of the girth weld by SESH's contract metallurgical consultant after the girth weld was\nremoved from the pipeline.\n10 Am. Petroleum Inst., Standard 1104, Section 11, Procedures for Nondestructive testing (19th ed. 1999, errata\nOctober 31, 2001).\n\n\n\n4\nThe Notice further alleged two other instances of Respondent’s failure to follow written NDT\nexamination procedures by not adequately recording NDT inspections and tests, and not\ncorrectly completing SESH Form TS-406 NDE Report of Field Welds (TS-406). Respondent’s\nForm TS-406, dated January 21, 2008 and February 14, 2008, had incorrect radiographic\nprocedure numbers and incorrect dimensions for two girth welds. The January 21, 2008 form\nincorrectly recorded Girth weld no. XRA-047 as a 42” x 0.720” x 0.750” transition weld when\nthe correct dimensions were 42” x 0.600” x 0.750.\n” The February 14, 2008 form incorrectly\nrecorded dimensions for four inspected girth welds as 42” x 0.750” x 0.600” transition welds\nwhen the correct dimensions were 42” x 1.000” x 0.600.” Although the February TS-406 form\nalso indicated that a Radiographic Procedure 42 x 600 x 750 GI was used, Respondent was\nunable to provide to PHMSA any procedure qualification records related to this weld.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation but explained that it has enhanced its\nexisting Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) practices.\nreview of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.243(b)(1) by\nfailing to nondestructively test (NDT) girth welds in accordance with its written procedures.\n11 Accordingly, based upon a\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.303, which states:\n§ 192.303 Compliance with specifications or standards.\nEach transmission line or main must be constructed in accordance\nwith comprehensive written specifications or standards that are\nconsistent with this part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.303 by failing to construct its\nLine 100, a transmission pipeline, in accordance with comprehensive written specifications or\nstandards. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent had two procedures requiring the\nuse of Class I or GI radiographic film for NDT girth of welds, but SESH’s records showed that\ndifferent radiographic procedures were used during the construction of its Line 100.12\nThe Notice further alleged that SESH’s records showed that it approved the contractor’s use of\nthe procedures that allowed Class II (D7 Agfa) radiographic film (not Class I or GI film) in the\ngamma-sourced radiographic inspection of manually produced girth welds on Line 100 where\npenetration and/or wall thicknesses were less than 0.750 inches.\n13 PHMSA asserted that the\n11 The company requires NDE suppliers to have an established QA/QC Procedure and/or Quality Management\nSystem with a continuous improvement process. SESH also explained that it has enhanced its inspector training\nprogram and documentation process. Response at 4.\n12 SESH procedure, Construction Specification, Spec. Number: CS-GC31.2 Radiography (CS-GC31.2), required\nthe use of Class I or GI film with gamma radiation sources for penetration thicknesses (excluding weld build-up)\nless than 0.750 inches (18mm). SESH procedure, Radiographic Inspection Procedure, required Class I film to be\nused on wall thicknesses up to and including 0.750 inches.\n13 Radiographic inspection is a nondestructive testing method of producing images on film through the use of\ngamma rays to inspect materials for hidden flaws or defects.\n\n\n\n5\nClass II film is inferior to Class I film in the ability to detect or capture images of some\nactionable defects and imperfections when inspecting girth welds in pipe with the wall\nthicknesses less than 0.750 inches. Respondent acknowledged that the use of Class II film for\npenetration thickness less than 0.750 inches did not meet SESH Specification CS-GC31.2 and\nexplained that it has enhanced its QA/QC practices.\nThe Notice also alleged that SESH failed to ensure that its pipeline was constructed in\naccordance with its comprehensive written Specification Number: CS-GC 8.2 Item 3G, that\nrequired the internal transition slope on transition welds to be a minimum of 1:4 (14 degree\nangle) and maximum of 1:2.6 (21 degree angle). SESH’s contracted investigation report14\nindicated the two induction bend-end welds on the bend located at construction survey station\nno. 4583+53 (failed weld bend) had maximum transition angles that exceeded 21 degrees. The\nreport indicated maximum transition angles of 37 degrees and 34 degrees for these bend welds.\nRespondent did not contest the allegation of violation but explained that the company has\nenhanced its QA/QC practices. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find\nthat Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.303 by failing to construct Line 100 in accordance\nwith its written specifications and standards.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.305, which states:\n§ 192.305 Inspections: General.\nEach transmission line or main must be inspected to ensure that it is\nconstructed in accordance with this part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.305 by failing to adequately\ninspect Line 100, a transmission pipeline, to ensure that it was constructed in accordance with\ncomprehensive written specifications as required by Part 192. Specifically, the Notice alleged\ntwo instances where the Respondent failed to follow construction inspection Specification\nNumber: CS-GC 8.2, Item 3D, Transition Report and SESH form TS-713 for girth weld XRA-\n078. SESH’s construction inspection specification CS-GC 8.2 required wall thickness readings\nto be taken on the quarter points of the transitioned pipe, that the information be recorded on\nForm TS-713, and then submitted for company approval of the method of measurement. Form\nTS-713 also required the recording of the minimum and maximum transition slopes and\nsignature/date of the Chief Inspector.\nThe first instance alleged was that Form TS-713 for girth weld XRA-078, dated February 18,\n2008, recorded measured transition slope angles of 16 degrees (min) and of 20 degrees (max),\nyet these min/max angles were inconsistent with the angles measured and reported in the\nquarter points were all recorded as nominal size numbers, which showed that the actual wall\nthicknesses were not measured. The form was also not signed by the chief inspector.\ncompany’s failure investigation report.15 Further the wall thickness measurements taken at the\n14 Violation Report, Attachment A, Spectra Energy Final Report No. 10-031, dated May 18, 2010, at 37.\n15 Violation Report, Attachment A, Spectra Energy Final Report No. 10-031, dated May 18, 2010, at 37.\n\n\n\n6\nThe second instance alleged was that on August 3, 2010, PHMSA inspected and photographed\nGirth weld XRA-075 (42” x 1.000” x 0.600” bend/pup transition weld) and found that it did\nnot comply with weld specifications.\nmisalignment was not evenly distributed around the circumference of the pipe; indicating that\nthe weld was either inadequately inspected, or not inspected, for internal pipe misalignment to\nensure that it was constructed in accordance with comprehensive written specifications.\n16 The measurements indicated that the internal pipe\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation but explained that it has enhanced its\nexisting QA/QC practices to prevent a reoccurrence. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.305 by failing to adequately\ninspect the Line 100 transmission pipeline to ensure that it was constructed in accordance with\ncomprehensive written specifications as required by Part 192.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.317, which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 192.317 Protection from hazards.\n(a) The operator must take all practicable steps to protect each\ntransmission line or main from washouts, floods, unstable soil,\nlandslides, or other hazards that may cause the pipeline to move or to\nsustain abnormal loads.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.317(a) by failing to take all\npracticable steps to protect its Line 100 from hazards during construction that caused the\npipeline to sustain abnormal loads. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent\ndiscovered a buckle in the pipe at survey station no. 4389+68 during an unrelated excavation\napproximately 19 months after the pipeline was placed in service. SESH’s investigation report\nstated that the buckle “was caused by excessive bending loads applied to the pipeline during\nsome phase of the construction of the pipeline.”17\nThe report also stated that the “\n... mode of\nbuckling is associated with little or no pressure in the pipeline at the time the buckle formed.\nThis implies that the buckle was probably present when the pipeline was hydrostatically\ntested.” The Notice further alleged that based on these reports an actionable anomaly (5.3%\ndent) existed at the buckle location approximately one month after the construction hydrostatic\ntest; therefore, Respondent failed to take steps during construction of the pipeline to prevent\nthe buckle from occurring. Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49\nC.F.R. § 192.317(a) by failing to take all practicable steps to protect its Line 100 from hazards\nduring construction that caused the pipeline to sustain abnormal loads.\n16 The girth weld had a (scaled) outside diameter (OD) misalignment of approximately 0.40 inches at one position\nand essentially zero misalignment directly opposite (180 degrees circumferentially from) the misalignment, which\nis consistent with the OD misalignment measurements taken by SESH on the weld. Violation Report at 23.\n17 Violation Report, Attachment A, Spectra Energy Final Report No. 10-069R, dated November 5, 2010 at 37.\n\n\n\n7\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to\nexceed $100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000\nfor any related series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under\n49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; the\nRespondent’s ability to pay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability\nto continue doing business; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the\npipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the\nviolation without any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as\njustice may require. The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $174,500 for the violations\ncited above.\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $5,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 191.15(b), for failing to submit a supplemental report regarding the cause of a\nreportable incident as soon as practicable, after it obtained additional related information.\nSESH obtained additional information related to a reportable pipeline incident but did not\nsubmit a supplemental report until eight months later. SESH neither contested the allegation\nnor presented any evidence or argument justifying a reduction in the proposed civil penalty.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $5,000, which has already been paid by Respondent.\nItem 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $35,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.167(a)(2), for failing to have emergency shutdown device blowdown piping\nvents located where the discharge of gas would not create a hazard. SESH neither contested\nthe allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying a reduction in the proposed\ncivil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria,\nI assess Respondent a civil penalty of $35,000, which has already been paid by Respondent.\nItem 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $85,600 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.243(b)(1), for failing to nondestructively test (NDT) girth welds in accordance\nwith its written procedures, which required that all welds (excluding ECA welds) including\nrepairs are evaluated to the workmanship standards of acceptability of API Standard 1104,\nSection 9. SESH neither contested the allegation nor presented any evidence or argument\njustifying a reduction in the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record\nand considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $85,600, which\nhas already been paid by Respondent.\nItem 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $16,500 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.303, for failing to construct its Line 100, a transmission pipeline, in\naccordance with comprehensive written specifications or standards requiring the use of Class I\nor GI radiographic film for NDT of girth welds. SESH neither contested the allegation nor\npresented any evidence or argument justifying a reduction in the proposed civil penalty.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $16,500, which has already been paid by Respondent.\n\n\n\n8\nItem 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $16,200 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.305, for failing to adequately inspect the Line 100 transmission pipeline to\nensure that it was constructed in accordance with comprehensive written specifications as\nrequired by Part 192. SESH neither contested the allegation nor presented any evidence or\nargument justifying a reduction in the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed\nthe record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of\n$16,200, which has already been paid by Respondent.\nItem 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $16,200 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.317(a), for failing to take all practicable steps to protect its Line 100 pipeline\nfrom hazards during construction that caused the pipeline to sustain abnormal loads. SESH\nneither contested the allegation nor presented any evidence or argument justifying a reduction\nin the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the\nassessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $16,200, which has already been\npaid by Respondent.\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a total civil penalty of $174,500, which has already been paid by Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 3 in the Notice for violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 192.167(a)(2). Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the\ntransportation of gas or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the\napplicable safety standards established under Chapter 601. The Director indicates that\nRespondent has taken the following actions specified in the proposed compliance order:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.167(a)(2) (Item 3), Respondent has\nreconfigured the Emergency Shutdown system blowdown piping vents at each of\nthe five compressor stations on Line 100 to ensure that any discharged gas will not\ncreate a hazard.\nAccordingly, I find that compliance has been achieved with respect to this violation.\nTherefore, the compliance terms proposed in the Notice are not included in this Order.\n\n\n\n9\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 1, 8, and 9, the Notice alleged probable violations of Parts 191 and 192\nbut did not propose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items. Therefore, these are\nconsidered to be warning items. The warnings were for:\n49 C.F.R. § 191.5 (Item 1) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to give notice of a\npipeline incident that occurred on its SESH Line 100 on January 21, 2010, near\nHazlehurst, MS, at the earliest practicable moment following discovery;\n49 C.F.R. § 192.709(c) (Item 8) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to retain a\nrecord of each required patrol, survey, inspection, and test for at least five years\nor until the next patrol, survey, inspection, or test was completed, whichever\nwas longer. Specifically, Respondent did not have records documenting the\ninspection and the Discharge Pressure Shutdown Setpoint test of the Delhi\ncompressor station, performed on November 3, 2009; and\n49 C.F.R. § 192.745(a) (Item 9) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to inspect and\npartially operate three remotely controlled transmission line mainline valves that\nmight be required during an emergency, at required intervals. Specifically,\nSESH failed to test the functionality of its SCADA remote control system to\nassure the three valves operated when remotely activated and failed to test the\ngas-powered operator component to assure that gas power would operate the\nvalve. The three mainline valves, located at MP 55.79 (BV65685), MP 155.9\n(BV65774), and MP 166.7 (BV 65789) are also required to be remotely\ncontrolled per the Special Permit Order, dated July 17, 2008, Condition No. 23.\nSESH presented information in its Response showing that it had taken certain actions to\naddress the cited items. Accordingly, having considered such information, I find, pursuant to\n49 C.F.R. § 190.205, that probable violations of 49 C.F.R. § 191.5(a) (Notice Item 1),\n49 C.F.R. § 192.709(c) (Notice Item 8), and 49 C.F.R. § 192.745(a) (Notice Item 9) have\noccurred. If OPS finds a violation of any of these items in a subsequent inspection,\nRespondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n_________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":28423}