{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220116004M","title":"NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY-BROSNAN YARD PIPELINE — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-02-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.452(d)(3), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(8), 195.452(g), 195.452(h)(4), 195.452(i)(2), 195.452(j), 195.452(j)(2), 195.452(l)(1)(ii).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220116004m.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220116004m.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220116004m","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220116004M","body":"Notice of Amendment involving NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY-BROSNAN YARD PIPELINE. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(d)(3),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(8),  195.452(g),  195.452(h)(4),  195.452(i)(2),  195.452(j),  195.452(j)(2),  195.452(l)(1)(ii). The case was opened on 2011-02-15 and is reported as closed as of 2011-09-08. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220116004M_closure letter_09082011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116004M/220116004M_closure%20letter_09082011.pdf\n\n220116004M_closure letter_09082011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116004M/220116004M_closure%20letter_09082011_text.pdf\n\n220116004M_notice of amendment_02152011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116004M/220116004M_notice%20of%20amendment_02152011.pdf\n\n220116004M_notice of amendment_02152011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116004M/220116004M_notice%20of%20amendment_02152011_text.pdf\n\n220116004M_Operator response_03162011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116004M/220116004M_Operator%20response_03162011.pdf\n\n220116004M_notice of amendment_02152011_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 15, 2011\nMr. Tim Heilig\nVice President of Mechanical Operations\nNorfolk Southern Corporation\n1200 Peachtree Street NE (Box 184)\nAtlanta, Georgia 30309\nCPF 2-2011-6004M\nDear Mr. Heilig:\nOn September 28- 29, 2009, November 30, 2009, and June 29, 2010, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) inspected the Norfolk\nSouthern Corporation (NSC) procedures for its Integrity Management Program in Macon,\nGeorgia, pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified apparent inadequacies found in NSC’s\nplans or procedures as described below:\n1. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high consequence\narea;\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (d) When must operators complete baseline assessments? Operators must complete\nbaseline assessments as follows:\n.... (3) Newly-identified areas. (i) When information is available from the information\n\n\n\nanalysis (see paragraph (g) of this section), or from Census Bureau maps, that the\npopulation density around a pipeline segment has changed so as to fall within the\ndefinition in §195.450 of a high population area or other populated area, the\noperator must incorporate the area into its baseline assessment plan as a high\nconsequence area within one year from the date the area is identified. An operator\nmust complete the baseline assessment of any line pipe that could affect the newly-\nidentified high consequence area within five years from the date the area is\nidentified.\n• Item 1A: §195.452(f)(1)\nThe Norfolk Southern Pipeline Integrity Management Plan (NSIMP) did not address\nhow NSC determined the volume of product spilled and the buffer distance it used to\nidentify pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area (HCA).\n• Item 1B: §195.452(d)(3)\nNSC’s procedures were inadequate because Section 2 of the NSIMP did not address\nusing Census Bureau maps to determine changes in population density. NSC’s\nprocedures relied solely on the changes in population being reported by personnel who\nperform the bi-weekly foot patrols along the pipeline.\n2. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?....\n.... (3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the\nentire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this section);\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of\neach pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all\navailable information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences\nof a failure. This information includes:\n(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage due\nto excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities, and\ndevelopment or planned development along the pipeline segment;\n(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;\n(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and\npatrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and cathodic\nprotection surveys; and\n(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such as\nlocation of the water intake.\n• Item 2: §195.452(g)\nNSC’s NSIMP did not adequately address how the nine risk factors in the plan were\nevaluated and analyzed to determine the risk.\nThe regulations require that NSC have procedures to analyze all available information\nabout the integrity of its pipeline and the consequences of a failure. The NSIMP\nindicated that NSC used the Subject Matter Expert (SME) method to analyze the\ninformation, with a Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) performing the analysis. The\n2\n\n\n\nSMEs in the RAC analyzed the pipeline segments and determined the relative\nlikelihood and consequences of a failure, from low to high, for each of the nine factors\nin the NSIMP. While the NSIMP indicated the analysis was based on the knowledge\nand experience of the SMEs, and from information from relevant industry\npublications, it did not provide details on how this was accomplished.\nAlso, the NSIMP did not provide a logical, structured, and documented process or\nguidelines for how the SME evaluations were performed. And, the NSIMP did not\nprovide justification or guidance for how the magnitude of relative likelihood and\nconsequence levels were established.\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn\nfrom results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance\ndata, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An\noperator must include, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n.... (8) A process for review of integrity assessment results and information analysis\nby a person qualified to evaluate the results and information (see paragraph (h)(2) of\nthis section).\n• Item 3A: §195.452(f)(8)\nThe NSIMP did not establish a process for the proper review of integrity assessment\nresults. While the NSIMP stated that the Manager of Pipeline Operations was to\nreview risk assessments and included the name of the engineer who witnessed and\napproved NSC’s 2006 pressure test, the NSIMP did not include procedures for the\nreview of integrity assessment results.\n• Item 3B: §195.452(f)(8)\nNSC’s procedures did not address the qualifications required for the personnel who\nreviewed and evaluated the results of NSC’s integrity assessment results and\ninformation analysis. The NSIMP established that the Manager of Pipeline Operations\nwas to review risk assessments. It also included the name of the engineer who\nwitnessed and approved NSC’s 2006 pressure test, but the NSIMP did not include the\nqualifications needed for the persons who reviewed and evaluated integrity assessment\nresults and the information analysis.\n4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? ....\n.... (4) Criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the\nassessment methods and information analysis (see paragraph (h) of this section);\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?\n.... (4) Special requirements for scheduling remediation.\n(i) Immediate repair conditions. An operator’s evaluation and remediation schedule\n3\n\n\n\nmust provide for immediate repair conditions. To maintain safety, an operator must\ntemporarily reduce the operating pressure or shut down the pipeline until the\noperator completes the repair of these conditions. An operator must calculate the\ntemporary reduction in operating pressure using the formula in section 451.7 of\nASME/ANSI B31.4 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3), if applicable. If the\nformula is not applicable to the type of anomaly or would produce a higher\noperating pressure, an operator must use an alternative acceptable method to\ncalculate a reduced operating pressure. An operator must treat the following\nconditions as immediate repair conditions:\n(A) Metal loss greater than 80% of nominal wall regardless of dimensions.\n(B) A calculation of the remaining strength of the pipe shows a predicted burst\npressure less than the established maximum operating pressure at the location of the\nanomaly. Suitable remaining strength calculation methods include, but are not\nlimited to, ASME/ANSI B31G (“Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of\nCorroded Pipelines” (1991) or AGA Pipeline Research Committee Project PR-3-805\n(“A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipe”\n(December 1989)). These documents are available at the addresses listed in §195.3.\n(C) A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above the 4 and 8 o’clock positions)\nthat has any indication of metal loss, cracking or a stress riser.\n(D) A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above the 4 and 8 o’clock positions)\nwith a depth greater than 6% of the nominal pipe diameter.\n(E) An anomaly that in the judgment of the person designated by the operator to\nevaluate the assessment results requires immediate action.\n• Item 4: §195.452(h)(4)(i)\nThe NSIMP did not address how NSC would determine the temporary reduced\noperating pressure for an “immediate repair condition” on its pipeline or explain\nunder what circumstances NSC would shut down the pipeline in lieu of taking a\ntemporary pressure reduction.\nThe regulations in §195.452(h)(4)(i)(A) - (E) define five “immediate repair\nconditions,” which require an operator to have procedures to determine and\nimplement a temporary pressure reduction, or to shut down the pipeline, until the\n“immediate repair condition” can be repaired. While the NSIMP addressed a\nreduction of pressure in the possible responses for some anomalous conditions in\nFigure 8-1(Anomalous Conditions & Responses), it did not provide guidance nor\nspecifics on how NSC would determine the pressure reduction for each of the five\n“immediate repair conditions.”\n5. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? ....\n.... (6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high\nconsequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section);\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the high\nconsequence area?\n.... (2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive and\n4\n\n\n\nmitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release\noccurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area. This\ndetermination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not limited to:\n• Item 5: §195.452(i)(2)\nNSC’s NSIMP did not have adequate procedures to identify preventative and\nmitigative measures based on a risk analysis.\nThe regulations require an operator to have procedures to identify and evaluate\npreventative and mitigative measures based on an analysis of the relevant risk factors.\nThe NSIMP contains a framework structure that states in Section 6, PREVENTATIVE\nAND MITIGATIVE MEASURES, that “The Subject Matter Expert Team will develop\nthe guidelines to develop Preventative and Mitigative Measures required under this\nsection of the Integrity management Plan.” The NSIMP, however, did not include the\n“guidelines” that the Subject Matter Expert Team were required to develop.\n6. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?....\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity?\n.... (2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of\nevaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the baseline\nand periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of this\nsection), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions\n(paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\n• Item 6A: §195.452(j)(2)\nNSC’s NSIMP did not have adequate procedures to address how NSC would conduct\na periodic evaluation as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity and that such\nan evaluation would consider the results of the baseline and periodic integrity\nassessments, information analysis, decisions about remediation, and preventive and\nmitigative actions. Moreover, the procedures did not address the use of risk factors\nspecific to the pipeline to establish the frequency of the evaluation.\nThe NSIMP contains a framework structure and stated in Section 5, REASSESSMENT\nPLANS, that “…the Subject Matter Expert Method described in Section 4 of the\nIntegrity Management Plan” is also used to “develop Reassessment Plans.” The\nNSIMP also discussed operations and maintenance activities (listed as existing\npreventative and mitigative measures), but the NSIMP did not establish procedures to\naddress how NSC would perform a periodic evaluation of the pipeline or how the\nfrequency of the evaluation would be established.\n5\n\n\n\n• Item 6B: §195.452(j)(2)\nNSC’s NSIMP did not have adequate procedures to review its corrosion control\nprogram as part of its consideration of the risk factors required to establish the\nfrequency of the required periodic evaluation of the pipeline or for the information\nanalysis that must be considered as part of the periodic evaluation.\nNSC used hydrostatic pressure testing to assess its pipeline but did not include a\ncomprehensive review of its corrosion control program in the NSIMP, Section 5 -\nREASSESSMENT PLANS.\n7. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (l) What records must be kept? (1) An operator must maintain for review during\nan inspection:\n.... (ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, variances, deviations and determinations made, and actions taken, to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program listed in\nparagraph (f) of this section.\nNSC’s procedures did not address maintaining documents that support the decisions,\nanalysis, justifications, modifications, and actions taken to implement and evaluate\neach element of its NSIMP.\nWhile the NSIMP provided basic guidance to retain Risk Assessment reviews\n(NSIMP Section 4) and program evaluation reviews (NSIMP Section 7), the NSIMP\ndid not address maintaining documents to support its integrity management program\ndecisions and analysis nor other required items.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.237. Enclosed\nas part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document\nyou must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond\nwithin 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the\nallegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to\nfind facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\n6\n\n\n\nIf, after opportunity for a hearing, your plans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in\nthis Notice, you may be ordered to amend your plans or procedures to correct the\ninadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.237). If you are not contesting this Notice, we propose that\nyou submit your amended procedures to my office within 120 days of receipt of this Notice.\nThis period may be extended by written request for good cause. Once the inadequacies\nidentified herein have been addressed in your amended procedures, this enforcement action\nwill be closed.\nIn correspondence concerning this matter, please refer to CPF 2-2011-6004M and, for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nWayne T. Lemoi\nDirector, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Southern Region\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n7\n\n220116004M_closure letter_09082011_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nSeptember 8, 2011\nMr. Tim Heilig\nVice President of Mechanical Operations\nNorfolk Southern Corporation\n1200 Peachtree Street NE (Box 184)\nAtlanta, GA 30309\nCPF 2-2011-6004M\nDear Mr. Heilig:\nOn September 28- 29, 2009, November 30, 2009, and June 29, 2010, a representative of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) inspected the Norfolk\nSouthern Corporation (NSC) procedures for its Integrity Management Program (IMP) in\nMacon, Georgia, pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code. On the basis of the\ninspection, PHMSA identified apparent inadequacies in NSC’s IMP plans or procedures and\nissued a Notice of Amendment (NOA) on February 15, 2011.\nIn late August 2011, PHMSA received letters from NSC and Buckeye Development &\nLogistics, LLC (Buckeye) confirming that as of July 1, 2011, Buckeye is the operator of the\nMacon pipeline and that the Macon pipeline will be incorporated into Buckeye’s IMP.\nThe NOA referenced above required NSC to amend certain written procedures in its written\nIMP. Since NSC is no longer the operator of the pipeline and because the pipeline will be\nincorporated into Buckeye’s IMP, such amendments are now moot. Therefore, no further\naction is necessary with regards to the NOA and this case is now closed.\nPlease be advised that this letter refers only to the NOA (CPF 2-2011-6004M) and not to any\nother PHMSA pending cases. Also be advised that nothing herein states or implies that the\nabove described Buckeye IMP meets the requirements of the federal pipeline safety\nregulations or that the Buckeye IMP is approved. The pipeline system and Buckeye’s written\nIMP remain subject to inspection by PHMSA.\nSincerely,\nWayne T. Lemoi\nDirector, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Southern Region","truncated":false,"body_characters":20146}