{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220116005","title":"NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY-BROSNAN YARD PIPELINE — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-02-17","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(i)(4), 195.452(k), 195.452(l)(1)(ii).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220116005.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220116005.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220116005","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220116005","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY-BROSNAN YARD PIPELINE. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(f)(3),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(i)(3),  195.452(i)(4),  195.452(k),  195.452(l)(1)(ii). The case was opened on 2011-02-17 and is reported as closed as of 2012-02-01. Proposed civil penalty: $77,500. Assessed civil penalty: $77,500. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220116005_closure letter_02012012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116005/220116005_closure%20letter_02012012.pdf\n\n220116005_closure letter_02012012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116005/220116005_closure%20letter_02012012_text.pdf\n\n220116005_Final Order_07222011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116005/220116005_Final%20Order_07222011.pdf\n\n220116005_Final Order_07222011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116005/220116005_Final%20Order_07222011_text.pdf\n\n220116005_nopv_pcp_pco_02172011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116005/220116005_nopv_pcp_pco_02172011.pdf\n\n220116005_nopv_pcp_pco_02172011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116005/220116005_nopv_pcp_pco_02172011_text.pdf\n\n220116005_Operator response_03182011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220116005/220116005_Operator%20response_03182011.pdf\n\n220116005_closure letter_02012012_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 1, 2012\nMr. Tim Heilig\nVice President of Mechanical Operations\nNorfolk Southern Corporation\n1200 Peachtree Street NE (Box 184)\nAtlanta, GA 30309\nCPF 2-2011-6005\nDear Mr. Heilig:\nOn September 28-29, November 30, 2009, and June 29, 2010, a representative of the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) inspected the Norfolk Southern\nCorporation (NSC) Integrity Management (IM) program records and procedures for the\nMacon Pipeline at the Macon, Georgia office pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States\nCode.\nAs a result of the inspections, PHMSA issued a Final Order to NSC on July 22, 2011. The\nFinal Order included a Compliance Order (CO), which required NSC to take certain actions to\nprotect the public and the environment.\nIn late August 2011, PHMSA received letters from both NSC and Buckeye Development &\nLogistics, LLC (Buckeye) confirming that as of July 1, 2011, Buckeye is the operator of the\nMacon Pipeline and implementing Buckeye’s IM plan for the pipeline. Buckeye notified\nPHMSA by letter on January 20, 2012, that the Macon Pipeline has been integrated into\nBuckeye’s IM plan and the CO items have been completed. Therefore, no further action is\nnecessary with regards to this Final Order and this case is now closed.\nPlease be advised that nothing herein states or implies that the above described Buckeye IM\nplan meets the requirements of the federal pipeline safety regulations or that the Buckeye IM\nplan is approved. The pipeline system and Buckeye’s written IM plan remain subject to\ninspection by PHMSA.\nSincerely,\nWayne T. Lemoi\nDirector, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Southern Region\ncc: Mr. Thomas S. Collier, Vice President, Performance Assurance & Asset Integrity,\nBuckeye Partners, L.P.\n\n220116005_Final Order_07222011_text.pdf\n\nJUL 22 2011\nMr. Tim Heilig\nVice President of Mechanical Operations\nNorfolk Southern Corporation\n1200 Peachtree Street, N.E. (Box:184)\nAtlanta, GA 30309\nRe: CPF No. 2-2011-6005\nDear Mr. Heilig:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a civil penalty of $77,500, and specifies actions that need to be taken by\nNorfolk Southern Corporation to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty\npayment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the\nterms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Southern Region, this\nenforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed\neffective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, Pipeline Safety\nMs. A. Gayle Jordan, General Solicitor-Environmental\nMr. Wayne Lemoi, Director, OPS Southern Region\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0075 9671]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nNorfolk Southern Corporation, ) CPF No. 2-2011-6005\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn September 28-29, 2009, November 30, 2009, and June 29, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of\nthe facilities and records of Norfolk Southern Corporation (Norfolk or Respondent) in Macon,\nGeorgia. Respondent operates 5.5 miles of diesel fuel pipeline in Macon, Georgia.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Southern Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated February 17, 2011, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil\nPenalty, and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the\nNotice proposed finding that Norfolk had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195\nand proposed assessing a civil penalty of $77,500 for the alleged violations. The Notice also\nproposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The\nwarning items required no further action, but warned the operator to correct the probable\nviolation.\nNorfolk responded to the Notice by letter dated March 18, 2011 (Response). The company did\nnot contest the allegations of violation but provided an explanation of its actions and requested\nthat the proposed civil penalty be reduced. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore\nhas waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, Norfolk did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R.\nPart 195, as follows:\n1 http://www.nscorp.com/(last accessed 6/20/2011).\n\n\n\n2\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(3), which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.452 -- Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An\nintegrity management program begins with the initial framework. An\noperator must continually change the program to reflect operating\nexperience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity assessments,\nand other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of\nconsequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An operator must\ninclude, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program…\n(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the\nintegrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see\nparagraph (g) of this section)…\n(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the\nintegrity of each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an\noperator must analyze all available information about the integrity of the\nentire pipeline and the consequences of a failure. This information\nincludes:\n(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and\npreventing, damage due to excavation, including current and planned\ndamage prevention activities, and development or planned development\nalong the pipeline segment;\n(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this\nsection;\n(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests,\nsurveillance and patrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control\nmonitoring and cathodic protection surveys; and\n(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence\narea, such as location of the water intake.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(3) by failing to perform an\nanalysis that integrated all available information about the integrity of its covered pipeline\nsegments and the consequences of a failure, in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 195.452(g).\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Norfolk failed to perform an analysis that integrated the nine\nrisk factors2\nrequired by its Integrity Management Program (IMP) to evaluate the integrity of its\ncovered pipeline segments and the consequences of a failure. The Notice also alleged that the\ncompany failed to analyze and evaluate its prior integrity assessments or risks based on its IM\nprocedures. Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a\n2 Section 4 of Norfolk’s Pipeline Integrity Management Program (NSCIMP) requires a Risk Assessment Committee\nperform the risk analysis using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to evaluate the relative likelihood and consequence\nof nine risk factors required for the assessment. The risk factors include (1) the results of prior IM assessments, (2)\npipeline construction, (3) pipeline history (leak history, repair history, cathodic protection history), (4) the product\ntransported, (5) maximum operating pressure (MOP) and percent of specified minimum yield strength (% SMYS),\n(6) activities in the area, (7) local factors, (8) geotechnical factors, and (9) physical support for the pipeline.\n\n\n\n3\nreview of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452 (f)(3) by\nfailing to perform an analysis that integrated nine risk factors to evaluate the integrity of its\ncovered pipeline segments and the consequences of a failure on the pipeline, in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. 195.452(g).\nItem 3A: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1), which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.452 -- Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An\nintegrity management program begins with the initial framework. An\noperator must continually change the program to reflect operating\nexperience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity assessments,\nand other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of\nconsequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An operator must\ninclude, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:…\n(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the\nhigh consequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section)…\ni) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area? —(1) General requirements. An\noperator must take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a\npipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area. These measures\ninclude conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify\nadditional actions to enhance public safety or environmental protection.\nSuch actions may include, but are not limited to, implementing damage\nprevention best practices, better monitoring of cathodic protection where\ncorrosion is a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals, installing\nEFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor\npressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to personnel on\nresponse procedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders\nand adopting other management controls....\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) by failing to perform a\nrisk analysis of its pipeline segments to identify additional measures to prevent and mitigate the\nconsequences of a pipeline failure that could affect HCAs.\nNorfolk failed to conduct a risk analysis of the pipeline to identify additional measures to\nenhance public safety or environmental protection in order to prevent and mitigate the\nconsequences of a pipeline failure that could affect HCAs. Respondent acknowledged that it\n3 Specifically, the Notice alleged that\n3 An HCA is defined as: (1) a commercially navigable waterway, which means a waterway where a substantial\nlikelihood of commercial navigation exists; (2) a high population area, which means an urbanized area, as defined\nand delineated by the Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more people and has a population density of at least\n1,000 people per square mile; (3) an other populated area, which means a place, as defined and delineated by the\nCensus Bureau, that contains a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated city, town,\nvillage, or other designated residential or commercial area; and (4) an unusually sensitive area, as defined in\n§ 195.6. 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.\n\n\n\n4\nfailed to identify additional measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences, as required by its\nIMP. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.452 (i)(1) by failing to conduct a risk analysis to identify measures to take to\nprevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high consequence\narea.\nItem 3B: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3), which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.452 --Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(i) …\n(3) Leak detection. An operator must have a means to detect leaks on\nits pipeline system. An operator must evaluate the capability of its leak\ndetection means and modify, as necessary, to protect the high consequence\narea. An operator's evaluation must, at least, consider, the following\nfactors—length and size of the pipeline, type of product carried, the\npipeline’s proximity to the high consequence area, the swiftness of leak\ndetection, location of nearest response personnel, leak history, and risk\nassessment results…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3) by failing to evaluate the\ncapability of its leak detection system or modify the system, as necessary, to protect HCAs.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Norfolk did not have documentation to demonstrate that it\nevaluated its leak detection capability. The Notice also alleged that Respondent’s personnel\nstated that they could not confirm that an evaluation had been completed. Respondent did not\ncontest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I\nfind that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3) by failing to evaluate the capability of\nits leak detection system or modify the system, as necessary, to protect HCAs.\nItem 3C: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4), which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.452 -- Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(i) …\n4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator\ndetermines that an EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high\nconsequence area in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an\noperator must install the EFRD. In making this determination, an operator\nmust, at least, consider the following factors—the swiftness of leak\ndetection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of commodity\ncarried, the rate of potential leakage, the volume that can be released,\ntopography or pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to\npower sources, location of nearest response personnel, specific terrain\nbetween the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and benefits\nexpected by reducing the spill size.\n\n\n\n5\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4) by failing to perform an\nevaluation on its pipeline to determine the need for Emergency Flow Restricting Devices\npersonnel stated that they could not confirm that an evaluation had been completed. Respondent\ndid not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the\nevidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4) by failing to perform an\nevaluation on its pipeline to determine the need for EFRDs.\n(EFRDs)4 to protect high consequence areas along its pipeline. PHMSA asserted that Norfolk\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k), which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.452 -- Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(j) …\n(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An\noperator's program must include methods to measure whether the program\nis effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline\nsegment and in protecting the high consequence areas. See Appendix C of\nthis part for guidance on methods that can be used to evaluate a program's\neffectiveness.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k) by failing to perform a\nreview of its integrity management program to measure whether the program was effective in\nassessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment and in protecting the high\nconsequence areas. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Norfolk failed to provide documentation\nto demonstrate that it had ever performed an IM program review. Respondent did not contest\nthis allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k) by failing to review the effectiveness of its IM\nprogram to measure whether the program effectively assessed and evaluated the integrity of each\npipeline segment and protected the high consequence areas.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s\nability to pay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing\nbusiness; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety\nregulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without\nany reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require.\nThe Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $77,500 for the violations cited above.\n4 A check valve or remote control valve as defined by 49 C.F.R. §195.450 – Definitions.\n\n\n\n6\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $15,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.452(f) for failing to perform an analysis that integrated the nine risk factors required by its\nIMP to evaluate the integrity of its covered pipeline segments and the consequences of a failure.\nRespondent requested mitigation of the proposed civil penalty based on its efforts to comply by\nanalyzing five risk factors it considered pertinent to its pipeline. I find that although Norfolk’s\nanalysis addressed five risk factors, the company did not analyze and evaluate any of the nine\nrisks factors required by its IM procedures. In terms of the culpability, Respondent knew of its\nresponsibility to meet the various requirements of its IMP; therefore a reduction of the civil\npenalty is not warranted. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the\nassessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $15,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.452(f).\nItem 3A: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $15,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) for failing to perform a risk analysis of its pipeline to identify measures\nto take to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a HCA.\nRespondent acknowledged that it did not follow its IMP to develop the guidelines to identify\nmeasures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect HCAs.\nHowever, the company advised that it did take steps to address the risks it identified that were\nparticular to the pipeline’s location in the railroad yard, including hiring third party contractors to\nrespond immediately to any incident along the pipeline and employ the necessary response\nequipment. In terms of the culpability of the offense, Respondent knew of its responsibility to\nmeet the various requirements of its IMP procedures and acknowledged its non-compliance.\nPerformance of integrity assessments and preventing and mitigating the consequences of a\npipeline failure are vital components of the integrity management regulations, which are\ndesigned to ensure a heightened level of safety for HCAs. Accordingly, having reviewed the\nrecord and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $15,500 for\nviolation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1).\nItem 3B: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $10,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3) for failing to evaluate the capability of its leak detection system or to\nmodify the system, as necessary, to protect high consequence areas. Respondent proffered that\nits failure to comply was due to a misunderstanding of what such an evaluation would entail.\nNorfolk stated that it has a leak detection system that monitors flow into and out of the pipeline\nand that the system has an emergency shutdown valve, and that it receives monitoring data and\ncontinuously evaluates that data. Respondent also stated that it had internal discussions\nconcerning its leak detection system, which included discussions about whether the system\nprovided enough information. Even though Respondent has a leak detection system and engaged\nin discussions about the system, such measures are inconsistent with the regulation’s intent to\nconduct a formal evaluation of the capabilities its leak detection system to protect high\nconsequence areas. Respondent is culpable for the violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the\n\n\n\n7\nrecord and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $10,500 for\nviolation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3).\nItem 3C: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $20,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4), for failing to perform an evaluation on the pipeline to determine the need\nfor Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD) to protect high consequence areas along the\ncompany’s pipeline. In its Response, Norfolk advised that, prior to the inspection, it had\nconducted informal EFRD evaluations, but the evaluations were focused on the understood price\nof additional EFRDs. Norfolk also advised it was not in possession of the EFRD evaluation\nrecords at the time of the inspection but it has since obtained these records from NuStar\nTerminal, which delivers diesel fuel to Norfolk’s pipeline. I find that an informal evaluation of\nthe needs for EFRDs based on pricing is inconsistent with the regulation’s intent to provide\nadditional protection for HCAs. Norfolk has not provided relevant information to support a\nreduction in the proposed civil penalty. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered\nthe assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $20,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.452(i)(4).\nItem 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $15,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.452(k), for failing to failing to perform integrity management program (IMP) reviews to\nmeasure whether the IMP program was effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each\npipeline segment and in protecting the high consequence areas.5 Respondent explained that its\npersonnel do perform these reviews, but did not keep written accounts of the reviews. Without\ndocumentation of IMP reviews it is often difficult, if not impossible, for PHMSA to determine\ncompliance with the integrity management regulations. Congress has recognized the importance\nof maintaining proper documentation by explicitly requiring that every pipeline operator\nmaintain and make available to OPS records and information “[t]o enable the Secretary to decide\nwhether [the operator] is complying with this chapter and standards prescribed or orders issued\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nunder this chapter.”6 Respondent is fully culpable for its failure to follow its IMP procedures.\nRespondent a civil penalty of $15,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. §195.452(k).\nIn summary, having reviewed the entire record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a total civil penalty of $77,500. There is nothing in the record indicating that\npayment of this penalty would adversely affect Respondent’s ability to continue in business.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125. The\nFinancial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8893.\n5 49 U.S.C. § 60109.\n6 49 U.S.C. § 60117(b).\n\n\n\n8\nFailure to pay the $77,500 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual rate\nin accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 3A, 3B, 3C, and4 in the Notice\nfor violations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(f), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(i)(4), and\n195.452(k), respectively. Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the\ntransportation of hazardous liquids or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to\ncomply with the applicable safety standards established under chapter 601. Pursuant to the\nauthority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the\nfollowing actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its\noperations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(g) (Item 1), Respondent must perform a\nrisk analysis of its pipeline in accordance with its revised integrity management\nprogram procedures.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(i)(1) (Item 3A), Respondent must\nperform a risk analysis of its pipeline segments to identify additional preventative\nand mitigative measures to enhance public safety and environmental protection.\n3. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(i)(3) (Item 3B), Respondent must\nperform an evaluation of its leak detection system, in accordance with the\nrequirements of § 195.452(i)(3).\n4. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(i)(4) (Item 3C), Respondent must\nperform an evaluation to determine the need for EFRDs to protect high\nconsequence areas along its pipeline, as required by §195.452(i)(4).\n5. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(k) (Item 4), Respondent must perform a\nreview of its integrity management program to determine whether the program is\neffectively assessing and evaluating the integrity of the pipeline.\n6. Norfolk must provide written documentation to the Director, PHMSA Southern\nRegion, to demonstrate that all Items of this Compliance Order have been\ncompleted within 45 days following receipt of this Final Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\n\n\n\n9\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the\nAttorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nWARNING ITEM\nWith respect to Items 2, the Notice alleged a probable violation of Part 195 but did not propose a\ncivil penalty or compliance order for this item. Therefore, this is considered to be a warning\nitem. The warning is for:\n49 C.F.R. § 195.452 (Item 2) – Respondent’s alleged failure to properly document the decisions,\nanalyses, and actions taken to implement and evaluate each element of its integrity management\nprogram. Specifically, Respondent failed to demonstrate how it selected pressure testing as the\nappropriate assessment method to be used on its pipeline to assess the pipeline for identified\nrisks.\nNorfolk is hereby advised to correct the condition. If OPS finds a violation of this provision in a\nsubsequent inspection, Respondent may be subject to future enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC\n20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA\nwill accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this Final Order by\nthe Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of\nany civil penalty assessed. Unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay, all\nother terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":30533}