{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220126005M","title":"TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO. — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-02-22","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.452(g), 195.452(i), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(i)(4), 195.452(j)(2), 195.452(j)(3), 195.452(j)(5).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220126005m.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220126005m.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220126005m","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220126005M","body":"Notice of Amendment involving TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(g),  195.452(i),  195.452(i)(3),  195.452(i)(4),  195.452(j)(2),  195.452(j)(3),  195.452(j)(5). The case was opened on 2012-02-22 and is reported as closed as of 2013-12-26. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220126005M_closure letter_12262013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_closure%20letter_12262013.pdf\n\n220126005M_closure letter_12262013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_closure%20letter_12262013_text.pdf\n\n220126005M_Notice of Amendment_02222012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_02222012.pdf\n\n220126005M_Notice of Amendment_02222012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_02222012_text.pdf\n\n220126005M_Operator response_03222012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_Operator%20response_03222012.pdf\n\n220126005M_Notice of Amendment_02222012_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 22, 2012\nMr. Robert L. Rose\nPresident\nTampa Bay Pipeline Company\nP.O. Box 35236\nSarasota, FL 34242\nCPF 2-2012-6005M\nDear Mr. Rose:\nFrom September 12-16, 2011, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Southern Region, inspected the Tampa Bay Pipeline Co. (TBPL)\nPipeline Integrity Management Plan (IMP) in Tampa, Florida, pursuant to Chapter 601 of\n49 United States Code.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified apparent inadequacies within TBPL’s\nwritten IMP procedures, as described below:\n1. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of\neach pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all\navailable information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences\nof a failure. This information includes:\n(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage\ndue to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities, and\ndevelopment or planned development along the pipeline segment;\n(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;\n(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and\npatrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and cathodic\nprotection surveys; and\n(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such\nas location of the water intake.\nTBPL’s IMP written procedures did not contain a process for performing the required\ninformation analysis, which should include the analysis of all available information about\nthe integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure.\nTBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its\nIMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the\n\n\n\nrequired written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal\npipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA guidance on the\nsubject to address the characteristics of its IMP and then gave a general description of the\nresults of its work. These general characteristics and the results of items TBPL completed\nare not written procedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in\nits IMP.\nSection 7.0 Integrity Assessment Results Review of TBPL’s IMP described some\ncharacteristics the TBPL IMP program should have, and then stated what TBPL had done\nso far to meet the regulation, the “procedure” did not describe in detail the processes\nTBPL should have used to perform the required information analysis. For example, for\nthe integration of other information with integrity assessment results, TBPL’s IMP simply\nrestated the PHMSA guidance from Protocol # 3.04 - Integrity Assessment Results\nReview: Integration of Other Information with Assessment Results and then briefly\ndescribed what TBPL had done regarding the information analysis prior to the External\nCorrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) assessment of the pipeline, and during the data\nanalysis phase of the ECDA. This is not a valid procedure. Additionally, though TBPL\nused hydrostatic pressure testing to assess the integrity of its pipeline, the IMP simply\nstated that TBPL will develop (not that they had developed) a process which meets the\nrequired characteristic and then repeated the guidance from Protocol # 3.06 - Integrity\nAssessment Results Review: Hydrostatic Pressure Testing. Once again, this is not a valid\nwritten procedure.\n2. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the\nhigh consequence area? (1) General requirements. An operator must take measures to\nprevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high\nconsequence area. These measures include conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline\nsegment to identify additional actions to enhance public safety or environmental\nprotection. Such actions may include, but are not limited to, implementing damage\nprevention best practices, better monitoring of cathodic protection where corrosion\nis a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals, installing EFRDs on the\npipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks,\nproviding additional training to personnel on response procedures, conducting drills\nwith local emergency responders and adopting other management controls.\nTBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process for preventative and mitigative\nmeasures (PMM).\nTBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its\nIMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the\nrequired written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal\npipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and\nguidance on the subject to describe in general terms the characteristics of its IMP. These\ngeneral descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written procedures\nand do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.\nFor example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to identify PMM for\nhigh consequence areas (HCAs), Section 10.0 Preventive and Mitigative Measures in\nTBPL’s IMP only specified the characteristics TBPL’s IMP program should have and did\nso by restating guidance from PHMSA Protocol # 6.01 - Preventive & Mitigative2\n\n\n\nMeasures: Actions Considered, Protocol # 6.02 - Preventive & Mitigative Measures: Risk\nAnalysis Application, Protocol # 6.03 - Preventive & Mitigative Measures: Decision\nBasis; and the regulatory language in §195.452(i)(1) & (2). This is not a valid procedure.\nMoreover, the IMP then briefly described what TBPL had done regarding PMM. This is\nrecordkeeping and not a substitute for a valid written procedure, which should describe\nhow TBPL would identify PMM and the PMM actions it would take to protect HCAs.\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the\nhigh consequence area?\n.... (3) Leak detection. An operator must have a means to detect leaks on its pipeline\nsystem. An operator must evaluate the capability of its leak detection means and\nmodify, as necessary, to protect the high consequence area. An operator's evaluation\nmust, at least, consider, the following factors--length and size of the pipeline, type of\nproduct carried, the pipeline's proximity to the high consequence area, the swiftness\nof leak detection, location of nearest response personnel, leak history, and risk\nassessment results.\nTBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process to evaluate the capability of its\nleak detection system, to include consideration of operator actions.\nTBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its\nIMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the\nrequired written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal\npipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and\nguidance on the subject to describe in general terms the processes and characteristics of its\nIMP. These general descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written\nprocedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.\nFor example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to evaluate the\ncapability of its leak detection system and to modify it as necessary to protect HCAs,\nSection 10.0 Preventive and Mitigative Measures in TBPL’s IMP restated the guidance\nfrom PHMSA Protocol # 6.04 - Leak Detection Capability Evaluation: Evaluation\nFactors, Protocol # 6.05 Leak Detection Capability Evaluation: Operator\nActions/Reactions, and from the regulatory language in §195.452(i)(3). This is not a valid\nprocedure. Moreover, the IMP then briefly described what TBPL had done regarding leak\ndetection. This is not a substitute for a valid written procedure, which should describe how\nTBPL would evaluate the capability of its leak detection system, including the\nconsideration of operator actions.\n4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the\nhigh consequence area?\n.... (4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that an\nEFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in the\nevent of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the EFRD. In\nmaking this determination, an operator must, at least, consider the following factors-\n-the swiftness of leak detection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of\ncommodity carried, the rate of potential leakage, the volume that can be released,\ntopography or pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to power sources,\nlocation of nearest response personnel, specific terrain between the pipeline segment3\n\n\n\nand the high consequence area, and benefits expected by reducing the spill size.\nTBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process to evaluate the need for\nEFRDs on a pipeline segment to protect an HCA in the event of a hazardous liquid\npipeline release and to install the EFRDs, if required.\nTBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its\nIMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the\nrequired written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal\npipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and\nguidance on the subject to describe in general terms the processes and characteristics of its\nIMP. These general descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written\nprocedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.\nFor example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to identify if EFRDs\nare needed, Section 10.0 Preventive and Mitigative Measures in TBPL’s IMP states that\nTBPL will install an EFRD if it determines an EFRD is needed as well as restating the\nguidance from PHMSA Protocol # 6.06 - EFRD Need Evaluation: Factors and the\nregulatory language in §195.452(i)(4). This is not a valid procedure. Moreover, the IMP\nthen briefly described what TBPL had done regarding EFRDs. This is recordkeeping and\nnot a substitute for a valid written procedure, which should describe how TBPL would\nestablish a process to determine the need for EFRDs on a pipeline segment to protect an\nHCA in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release and to install the EFRDs, if\nrequired.\n5. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity?\n.... (2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of\nevaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the baseline\nand periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of this\nsection), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions\n(paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\nTBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process to periodically evaluate the\npipeline as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity.\nTBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its\nIMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the\nrequired written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal\npipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and\nguidance on the subject and then described in general terms the processes and\ncharacteristics of its IMP. These general descriptions are not written procedures and do\nnot establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.\nFor example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to periodically\nevaluate the pipeline as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, Section 11.0\nEvaluation and Assessment in TBPL’s IMP did not establish a process for the periodic\nevaluation of the pipeline, it only restated the guidance from PHMSA Protocol # 7.01 -\nContinual Process of Evaluation and Assessment: Periodic Evaluation and from the\n4\n\n\n\nregulatory language in §195.452(2)(2). This is not a valid procedure. Moreover, while\nSection 6.0 Direct Assessment Plan did establish a procedure for determining\nreassessment intervals for the ECDA process used on some of its pipelines, TBPL did not\nestablish a process for the overall program which includes the use of other assessment\nmethods.\n6. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity?\n.... (3) Assessment intervals. An operator must establish five-year intervals, not to\nexceed 68 months, for continually assessing the line pipe’s integrity. An operator\nmust base the assessment intervals on the risk the line pipe poses to the high\nconsequence area to determine the priority for assessing the pipeline segments. An\noperator must establish the assessment intervals based on the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section, the analysis of the results from the last integrity\nassessment, and the information analysis required by paragraph (g) of this section.\nTBPL’s IMP written procedures did not include a process to establish assessment intervals\nfor continually assessing the pipeline’s integrity.\nTBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its\nIMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the\nrequired written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal\npipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA guidance on the\nsubject and then described in general terms the processes and characteristics of its IMP.\nThese general descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written\nprocedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.\nFor example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to establish\nassessment intervals for continually assessing the pipeline’s integrity, Section 11.0\nEvaluation and Assessment in TBPL’s IMP did not include a process to establish\nassessment intervals for continually assessing the pipeline’s integrity, it only restated the\nguidance from PHMSA Protocol # 7.02 - Continual Process of Evaluation and\nAssessment: Re-assessment Intervals. This is not a valid procedure. Moreover, while\nTBPL’s IMP Section 6.0 Direct Assessment Plan had a procedure for determining\nreassessment intervals for the ECDA process used on some of its pipelines, TBPL uses\nother assessment methods that were not addressed in the procedure.\n7. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n.... (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's\nintegrity?\n.... (5) Assessment methods. An operator must assess the integrity of the line pipe by\nany of the following methods. The methods an operator selects to assess low\nfrequency electric resistance welded pipe or lap welded pipe susceptible to\nlongitudinal seam failure must be capable of assessing seam integrity and of\ndetecting corrosion and deformation anomalies.\nTBPL’s IMP written procedures did not include a process for selecting assessment\nmethods to continually assess its pipeline.\nTBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its\nIMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the\n5\n\n\n\nrequired written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal\npipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA guidance on the\nsubject to describe in general terms the characteristics of its IMP. These general\ndescriptions are not written procedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its\nwill have in its IMP.\nFor example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures for selecting\nassessment methods to continually assess its pipeline, TBPL’s IMP Section 11.0\nEvaluation and Assessment did not establish an adequate process for selecting assessment\nmethods to continually assess the pipeline’s integrity, it restated the guidance from\nPHMSA Protocol # 7.03 - Continual Process of Evaluation and Assessment: Assessment\nMethods. This is not a valid procedure.\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.237. Enclosed\nas part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document\nyou must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond\nwithin 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the\nallegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to\nfind facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.\nIf, after opportunity for a hearing, your plans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in\nthis Notice, you may be ordered to amend your plans or procedures to correct the\ninadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.237). If you are not contesting this Notice, we propose that\nyou submit your amended procedures to my office within 60 days of receipt of this Notice.\nThis period may be extended by written request for good cause. Once the inadequacies\nidentified herein have been addressed in your amended procedures, this enforcement action\nwill be closed. h\nIt is requested (not mandated) that Tampa Bay Pipeline Co. maintain documentation of the\nsafety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/\nrevision of plans, procedures) and submit the total to Wayne T. Lemoi, Director, Southern\nRegion, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence\nconcerning this matter, please refer to CPF 2-2012-6005M and, for each document you\nsubmit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nWayne T. Lemoi\nDirector, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Southern Region\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n6\n\n220126005M_closure letter_12262013_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nDecember 26, 2013\nMr. Robert L. Rose\nPresident\nTampa Bay Pipeline Corporation\nP.O. Box 35236\nSarasota, FL 34242\nCPF 2-2012-6005M\nDear Mr. Rose:\nOn July 23, 2013, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Tampa Bay Pipeline Corporation (TBPL) an Order Directing Amendment (Order),\nwhich required TBPL to amend certain procedures\nTBPL submitted its amended procedures on September 26, 2013. We reviewed TBPL’s\namended procedures and replied on November 14, 2013, noting a deficiency in the revision\naddressing Item 7 of the Order.\nWe received and reviewed your latest response to the Order dated December 16, 2013. This\nletter is to inform you that TBPL has complied with the terms of the Order and that no further\naction is necessary with regards to the Order. This case is now closed.\nPlease be advised that this letter refers only to the Order (CPF 2-2012-6005M) and not to any\nother PHMSA pending cases.\nSincerely,\nWayne T. Lemoi\nDirector, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Southern Region","truncated":false,"body_characters":21811}