# TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO. — Notice of Amendment

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 220126005M
- **title:** TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO. — Notice of Amendment
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2012-02-22
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.452(g), 195.452(i), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(i)(4), 195.452(j)(2), 195.452(j)(3), 195.452(j)(5).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220126005M
**body:**

Notice of Amendment involving TAMPA BAY PIPELINE CO.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(g),  195.452(i),  195.452(i)(3),  195.452(i)(4),  195.452(j)(2),  195.452(j)(3),  195.452(j)(5). The case was opened on 2012-02-22 and is reported as closed as of 2013-12-26. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

220126005M_closure letter_12262013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_closure%20letter_12262013.pdf

220126005M_closure letter_12262013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_closure%20letter_12262013_text.pdf

220126005M_Notice of Amendment_02222012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_02222012.pdf

220126005M_Notice of Amendment_02222012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_02222012_text.pdf

220126005M_Operator response_03222012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220126005M/220126005M_Operator%20response_03222012.pdf

220126005M_Notice of Amendment_02222012_text.pdf

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
February 22, 2012
Mr. Robert L. Rose
President
Tampa Bay Pipeline Company
P.O. Box 35236
Sarasota, FL 34242
CPF 2-2012-6005M
Dear Mr. Rose:
From September 12-16, 2011, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), Southern Region, inspected the Tampa Bay Pipeline Co. (TBPL)
Pipeline Integrity Management Plan (IMP) in Tampa, Florida, pursuant to Chapter 601 of
49 United States Code.
On the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified apparent inadequacies within TBPL’s
written IMP procedures, as described below:
1. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
.... (g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of
each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all
available information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences
of a failure. This information includes:
(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage
due to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities, and
development or planned development along the pipeline segment;
(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;
(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and
patrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and cathodic
protection surveys; and
(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such
as location of the water intake.
TBPL’s IMP written procedures did not contain a process for performing the required
information analysis, which should include the analysis of all available information about
the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure.
TBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its
IMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the



required written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal
pipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA guidance on the
subject to address the characteristics of its IMP and then gave a general description of the
results of its work. These general characteristics and the results of items TBPL completed
are not written procedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in
its IMP.
Section 7.0 Integrity Assessment Results Review of TBPL’s IMP described some
characteristics the TBPL IMP program should have, and then stated what TBPL had done
so far to meet the regulation, the “procedure” did not describe in detail the processes
TBPL should have used to perform the required information analysis. For example, for
the integration of other information with integrity assessment results, TBPL’s IMP simply
restated the PHMSA guidance from Protocol # 3.04 - Integrity Assessment Results
Review: Integration of Other Information with Assessment Results and then briefly
described what TBPL had done regarding the information analysis prior to the External
Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) assessment of the pipeline, and during the data
analysis phase of the ECDA. This is not a valid procedure. Additionally, though TBPL
used hydrostatic pressure testing to assess the integrity of its pipeline, the IMP simply
stated that TBPL will develop (not that they had developed) a process which meets the
required characteristic and then repeated the guidance from Protocol # 3.06 - Integrity
Assessment Results Review: Hydrostatic Pressure Testing. Once again, this is not a valid
written procedure.
2. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
.... (i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the
high consequence area? (1) General requirements. An operator must take measures to
prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high
consequence area. These measures include conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline
segment to identify additional actions to enhance public safety or environmental
protection. Such actions may include, but are not limited to, implementing damage
prevention best practices, better monitoring of cathodic protection where corrosion
is a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals, installing EFRDs on the
pipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks,
providing additional training to personnel on response procedures, conducting drills
with local emergency responders and adopting other management controls.
TBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process for preventative and mitigative
measures (PMM).
TBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its
IMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the
required written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal
pipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and
guidance on the subject to describe in general terms the characteristics of its IMP. These
general descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written procedures
and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.
For example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to identify PMM for
high consequence areas (HCAs), Section 10.0 Preventive and Mitigative Measures in
TBPL’s IMP only specified the characteristics TBPL’s IMP program should have and did
so by restating guidance from PHMSA Protocol # 6.01 - Preventive & Mitigative2



Measures: Actions Considered, Protocol # 6.02 - Preventive & Mitigative Measures: Risk
Analysis Application, Protocol # 6.03 - Preventive & Mitigative Measures: Decision
Basis; and the regulatory language in §195.452(i)(1) & (2). This is not a valid procedure.
Moreover, the IMP then briefly described what TBPL had done regarding PMM. This is
recordkeeping and not a substitute for a valid written procedure, which should describe
how TBPL would identify PMM and the PMM actions it would take to protect HCAs.
3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
.... (i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the
high consequence area?
.... (3) Leak detection. An operator must have a means to detect leaks on its pipeline
system. An operator must evaluate the capability of its leak detection means and
modify, as necessary, to protect the high consequence area. An operator's evaluation
must, at least, consider, the following factors--length and size of the pipeline, type of
product carried, the pipeline's proximity to the high consequence area, the swiftness
of leak detection, location of nearest response personnel, leak history, and risk
assessment results.
TBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process to evaluate the capability of its
leak detection system, to include consideration of operator actions.
TBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its
IMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the
required written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal
pipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and
guidance on the subject to describe in general terms the processes and characteristics of its
IMP. These general descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written
procedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.
For example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to evaluate the
capability of its leak detection system and to modify it as necessary to protect HCAs,
Section 10.0 Preventive and Mitigative Measures in TBPL’s IMP restated the guidance
from PHMSA Protocol # 6.04 - Leak Detection Capability Evaluation: Evaluation
Factors, Protocol # 6.05 Leak Detection Capability Evaluation: Operator
Actions/Reactions, and from the regulatory language in §195.452(i)(3). This is not a valid
procedure. Moreover, the IMP then briefly described what TBPL had done regarding leak
detection. This is not a substitute for a valid written procedure, which should describe how
TBPL would evaluate the capability of its leak detection system, including the
consideration of operator actions.
4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
.... (i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the
high consequence area?
.... (4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that an
EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in the
event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the EFRD. In
making this determination, an operator must, at least, consider the following factors-
-the swiftness of leak detection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of
commodity carried, the rate of potential leakage, the volume that can be released,
topography or pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to power sources,
location of nearest response personnel, specific terrain between the pipeline segment3



and the high consequence area, and benefits expected by reducing the spill size.
TBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process to evaluate the need for
EFRDs on a pipeline segment to protect an HCA in the event of a hazardous liquid
pipeline release and to install the EFRDs, if required.
TBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its
IMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the
required written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal
pipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and
guidance on the subject to describe in general terms the processes and characteristics of its
IMP. These general descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written
procedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.
For example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to identify if EFRDs
are needed, Section 10.0 Preventive and Mitigative Measures in TBPL’s IMP states that
TBPL will install an EFRD if it determines an EFRD is needed as well as restating the
guidance from PHMSA Protocol # 6.06 - EFRD Need Evaluation: Factors and the
regulatory language in §195.452(i)(4). This is not a valid procedure. Moreover, the IMP
then briefly described what TBPL had done regarding EFRDs. This is recordkeeping and
not a substitute for a valid written procedure, which should describe how TBPL would
establish a process to determine the need for EFRDs on a pipeline segment to protect an
HCA in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release and to install the EFRDs, if
required.
5. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
.... (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's
integrity?
.... (2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as
needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of
evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in
paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the baseline
and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of this
section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions
(paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).
TBPL’s IMP written procedures did not establish a process to periodically evaluate the
pipeline as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity.
TBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its
IMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the
required written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal
pipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA regulations and
guidance on the subject and then described in general terms the processes and
characteristics of its IMP. These general descriptions are not written procedures and do
not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.
For example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to periodically
evaluate the pipeline as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, Section 11.0
Evaluation and Assessment in TBPL’s IMP did not establish a process for the periodic
evaluation of the pipeline, it only restated the guidance from PHMSA Protocol # 7.01 -
Continual Process of Evaluation and Assessment: Periodic Evaluation and from the
4



regulatory language in §195.452(2)(2). This is not a valid procedure. Moreover, while
Section 6.0 Direct Assessment Plan did establish a procedure for determining
reassessment intervals for the ECDA process used on some of its pipelines, TBPL did not
establish a process for the overall program which includes the use of other assessment
methods.
6. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
.... (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's
integrity?
.... (3) Assessment intervals. An operator must establish five-year intervals, not to
exceed 68 months, for continually assessing the line pipe’s integrity. An operator
must base the assessment intervals on the risk the line pipe poses to the high
consequence area to determine the priority for assessing the pipeline segments. An
operator must establish the assessment intervals based on the factors specified in
paragraph (e) of this section, the analysis of the results from the last integrity
assessment, and the information analysis required by paragraph (g) of this section.
TBPL’s IMP written procedures did not include a process to establish assessment intervals
for continually assessing the pipeline’s integrity.
TBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its
IMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the
required written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal
pipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA guidance on the
subject and then described in general terms the processes and characteristics of its IMP.
These general descriptions and the results of items TBPL completed are not written
procedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its will have in its IMP.
For example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures to establish
assessment intervals for continually assessing the pipeline’s integrity, Section 11.0
Evaluation and Assessment in TBPL’s IMP did not include a process to establish
assessment intervals for continually assessing the pipeline’s integrity, it only restated the
guidance from PHMSA Protocol # 7.02 - Continual Process of Evaluation and
Assessment: Re-assessment Intervals. This is not a valid procedure. Moreover, while
TBPL’s IMP Section 6.0 Direct Assessment Plan had a procedure for determining
reassessment intervals for the ECDA process used on some of its pipelines, TBPL uses
other assessment methods that were not addressed in the procedure.
7. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
.... (j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's
integrity?
.... (5) Assessment methods. An operator must assess the integrity of the line pipe by
any of the following methods. The methods an operator selects to assess low
frequency electric resistance welded pipe or lap welded pipe susceptible to
longitudinal seam failure must be capable of assessing seam integrity and of
detecting corrosion and deformation anomalies.
TBPL’s IMP written procedures did not include a process for selecting assessment
methods to continually assess its pipeline.
TBPL’s written IMP did not have fully developed written procedures for implementing its
IMP as required by the federal pipeline safety regulations. Instead of providing the
5



required written procedures in sufficient detail to explain how TBPL would meet a federal
pipeline safety regulation, TBPL paraphrased (or mimicked) PHMSA guidance on the
subject to describe in general terms the characteristics of its IMP. These general
descriptions are not written procedures and do not establish the processes TBPL states its
will have in its IMP.
For example, while the regulations require TBPL to have procedures for selecting
assessment methods to continually assess its pipeline, TBPL’s IMP Section 11.0
Evaluation and Assessment did not establish an adequate process for selecting assessment
methods to continually assess the pipeline’s integrity, it restated the guidance from
PHMSA Protocol # 7.03 - Continual Process of Evaluation and Assessment: Assessment
Methods. This is not a valid procedure.
Response to this Notice
This Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.237. Enclosed
as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in
Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be
advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies
for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document
you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted
information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond
within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the
allegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to
find facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
If, after opportunity for a hearing, your plans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in
this Notice, you may be ordered to amend your plans or procedures to correct the
inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.237). If you are not contesting this Notice, we propose that
you submit your amended procedures to my office within 60 days of receipt of this Notice.
This period may be extended by written request for good cause. Once the inadequacies
identified herein have been addressed in your amended procedures, this enforcement action
will be closed. h
It is requested (not mandated) that Tampa Bay Pipeline Co. maintain documentation of the
safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/
revision of plans, procedures) and submit the total to Wayne T. Lemoi, Director, Southern
Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence
concerning this matter, please refer to CPF 2-2012-6005M and, for each document you
submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
Wayne T. Lemoi
Director, Office of Pipeline Safety
PHMSA Southern Region
Enclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
6

220126005M_closure letter_12262013_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
December 26, 2013
Mr. Robert L. Rose
President
Tampa Bay Pipeline Corporation
P.O. Box 35236
Sarasota, FL 34242
CPF 2-2012-6005M
Dear Mr. Rose:
On July 23, 2013, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued to Tampa Bay Pipeline Corporation (TBPL) an Order Directing Amendment (Order),
which required TBPL to amend certain procedures
TBPL submitted its amended procedures on September 26, 2013. We reviewed TBPL’s
amended procedures and replied on November 14, 2013, noting a deficiency in the revision
addressing Item 7 of the Order.
We received and reviewed your latest response to the Order dated December 16, 2013. This
letter is to inform you that TBPL has complied with the terms of the Order and that no further
action is necessary with regards to the Order. This case is now closed.
Please be advised that this letter refers only to the Order (CPF 2-2012-6005M) and not to any
other PHMSA pending cases.
Sincerely,
Wayne T. Lemoi
Director, Office of Pipeline Safety
PHMSA Southern Region
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