{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 220195002W","title":"DIXIE PIPELINE COMPANY LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2019-02-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 190.233(a), 195.406(b), 195.452(f)(4).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220195002w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220195002w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-220195002w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/220195002W","body":"Warning Letter involving DIXIE PIPELINE COMPANY LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 190.233(a),  195.406(b),  195.452(f)(4). The case was opened on 2019-02-15 and is reported as closed as of 2019-02-15. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n220195002W_Warning Letter_02152019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220195002W/220195002W_Warning%20Letter_02152019.pdf\n\n220195002W_Warning Letter_02152019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/220195002W/220195002W_Warning%20Letter_02152019_text.pdf\n\n220195002W_Warning Letter_02152019_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 15, 2019\nMr. Graham Bacon\nGroup Sr. Vice President, Operations & EHS&T\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 2-2019-5002W\nDear Mr. Bacon:\nBetween May 14 and June 7, 2018, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety, inspected Dixie Pipeline\nCompany, LLC (Dixie) records and selected procedures in Dixie’s Houston, TX office,\npursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.). Dixie is a subsidiary of\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that Dixie has committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items\ninspected and the probable violations are:\n1. §190.233 Corrective action orders.\n(a) Generally. Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this section, if the\nAssociate Administrator finds, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing\nin accord with paragraph (c) of this section, a particular pipeline facility is or would\nbe hazardous to life, property, or the environment, the Associate Administrator may\nissue an order pursuant to this section requiring the operator of the facility to take\ncorrective action. Corrective action may include suspended or restricted use of the\nfacility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other appropriate\naction.\n\n\n\nDixie failed to meet the regulation because it did not follow the corrective actions\nprescribed in Corrective Action Order (CAO) 2-2007-5100H. Specifically, Dixie did not\nfollow the written integrity verification plan (IVP), as required by Corrective Action No.\n5 of the CAO, and as approved by the Director, Southern Region.\nFollowing a failure on a segment of Dixie’s 12-inch line between Erwinville, Louisiana,\nand Opelika, Alabama, PHMSA’s Office of Pipeline Safety issued CAO 2-2007-5100H,\ndated November 2, 2007. The CAO prescribed various corrective actions required by\nDixie. Corrective Action No.5 required Dixie submit a written IVP to verify the integrity\nof the referenced segment. Further, Corrective Action No.6 required that the plan be\nsubmitted for approval to the Director, Southern Region, and that the plan be\nimplemented as approved. In response to the referenced requirements of the CAO, Dixie\nsubmitted a Long Term Integrity Verification Plan (LTIVP) on December 15, 2009\nwhich included a Kiefner and Associates report (Kiefner’s Report), titled “Long Term\nIntegrity Verification Plan for the 12-Inch Pipe in the Dixie Pipeline,” dated December\n10, 2009, with an amendment being submitted on February 23, 2010. Following\nPHMSA’s review, the LTIVP was approved on March 19, 2010. The CAO was closed on\nthe same date.\nThe referenced LTIVP specified that reassessment intervals would be determined by pipe\nlife calculations based, in part, on pressure cycle analysis as established in Kiefner’s\nReport. The pressure cycle analysis included in Kiefner’s Report referenced the Paris’\nLaw crack growth equation. This equation, in turn, referenced crack growth constants.\nKiefner’s Report incorporated API/ASME’s crack growth constants, as referenced in the\n2007 Edition of API/ASME Standard 579, titled “Fitness-For-Service Assessment,” for\ncalculation of the Paris’ Law equation.\nDuring PHMSA’s review, it was revealed that Dixie based the following pipe life\ncalculations on PRCI crack growth constants rather than the API/ASME constants, as\nreferenced in the approved IVP:\n LID 120, AID 5459 – 12” Tangipahoa Discharge (Dated 11/08/2017)\n LID 120, AID 5459 – 12” Mt. Herman Discharge (Dated 11/08/2017)\n LID 120, AID 1588 – Baker (Dated 11/09/2017)\nFollowing PHMSA’s review, Dixie conducted new pipe life calculations referencing the\nAPI/ASME constants. These revised calculations decreased the time to failure by\n36-39% when compared to the calculations based on the PRCI constants. This decrease,\nhowever, did not affect the reassessment schedules.\n2\n\n\n\n2. §195.406 Maximum Operating Pressure.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other\nvariations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the operating pressure\nlimit established under paragraph (a) of this section. Each operator must provide\nadequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure within this limit.\nDixie failed to meet the regulation because it did not consider pipeline surges in\nevaluating the adequacy of controls and protective equipment. Specifically, Dixie could\nnot provide documentation that a surge analysis had been completed to ensure controls\nand protective equipment on Line 119 were adequate for control within 110% of the\nestablished MOP.\n3. During PHMSA’s June 5, 2018, records review, Dixie personnel were unable to provide\nrecord of any surge study for Dixie’s Line ID 119. Following PHMSA’s review, Dixie\npersonnel presented PHMSA personnel with a surge study, dated June 6, 2018,\ndocumenting the determination surge pressures on Line ID 119 could not exceed 110%\nwith the existing control points.\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas\n(a) . . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program?\nAn integrity management program begins with the initial framework. An operator\nmust continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) . . . .\n(4) Criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the\nassessment methods and information analysis (see paragraph (h) of this section);\nDixie failed to meet the regulation because it did not include in its written integrity\nmanagement program a mechanism to notify PHMSA if the operator cannot meet the\nschedule for evaluation and remediation and cannot provide safety through a temporary\nreduction in operating pressure, as required by §195.452(h)(1)(i).\nDixie’s IM Procedure 5-01, titled “Determination of Temporary Reduction/Restriction to\nthe Operating Pressure,” prescribes requirements for determination of temporary\nreductions to the operating pressure. Section 1.2 of the above-referenced procedure\nidentifies a “possible pressure reducer” as an “Actionable anomaly that could affect an\nHCA… and cannot be remediated by the required regulatory date.\" The procedure,\nhowever, does not specify the requirement to notify PHMSA if the remediation is not\ncompleted by the regulatory date and a pressure reduction cannot be implemented. The\n3\n\n\n\nprocedure does recognize long term pressure reductions as described in\n§195.452(h)(1)(ii) and requires notification to PHMSA if such an event occurs.\nAs of April 27, 2017, under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, Dixie is subject to a\ncivil penalty not to exceed $209,002 per violation per day the violation persists up to a\nmaximum of $2,090,022 for a related series of violations. We have reviewed the\ncircumstances and supporting documents involved in this case, and have decided not to\nconduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We\nadvise you to correct the items identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in Dixie\nbeing subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer\nto CPF 2-2019-5002W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this\nenforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any\nportion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b),\nalong with the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document\nwith the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of\nwhy you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b).\nSincerely,\nJames A. Urisko\nDirector, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPHMSA Southern Region\n4","truncated":false,"body_characters":8968}