{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 22026004CAO","title":"SG RESOURCES MISSISSIPPI, LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-02-06","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026004cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026004cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026004cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/22026004CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving SG RESOURCES MISSISSIPPI, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-02-06 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n22026004CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_03022026_(26-363868).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026004CAO/22026004CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(AMENDED)_03022026_(26-363868).pdf\n\n22026004CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_03022026_(26-363868)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026004CAO/22026004CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order%20(AMENDED)_03022026_(26-363868)_text.pdf\n\n22026004CAO_Corrective Action Order_02062026_(26-363868).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026004CAO/22026004CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02062026_(26-363868).pdf\n\n22026004CAO_Corrective Action Order_02062026_(26-363868)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026004CAO/22026004CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_02062026_(26-363868)_text.pdf\n\n22026004CAO_Corrective Action Order_02062026_(26-363868)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nFebruary 6, 2026\nVIA EMAIL TO: chad.zamarin@williams.com;matt.hastings@williams.com\nChad Zamarin\nPresident/CEO\nSG Resources, L.L.C.\nOne Williams Center\nTulsa, OK 74172\nCPF 2-2026-004-CAO\nDear Mr. Zamarin:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (“CAO” or “Order”) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO\nrequires SG Resources Mississippi, L.L.C. (SGR), to take certain corrective actions with respect\nto the pipeline failure that occurred on February 3, 2026, on its Southern Pines Natural Gas Line\n300 near Leakesville, Mississippi. SGR is a subsidiary of The Williams Companies, Inc.\nService of the CAO by email is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgment of\nreceipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nLinda G. Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: James Urisko, Director, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, Southern Region,\njames.urisko@dot.gov\nMatt Hastings, VP HSEI, SG Resources Mississippi, L.L.C.,\nmatt.hastings@williams.com\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nSG Resources Mississippi, LLC, ) CPF No. 2-2026-004-CAO\n)\nRespondent )\n)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority\nprovided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires SG Resources Mississippi, L.L.C. (SGR or\nRespondent)1 to take certain necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from the potential hazards associated with the continued operation of its Southern\nPines Natural Gas Pipeline System near Leakesville, Mississippi, in Greene County.\nOn February 3, 2026, at approximately 6:30 PM CST, the Southern Pines Natural Gas Pipeline\nSystem Line 300 ruptured inside the Southern Pines Energy Center located near Leakesville,\nMississippi, in Greene County (hereinafter the “Failure”). The Failure resulted in the separation\nof the 2-inch liquid extraction line from the Line 300, the formation of a crater within the\nSouthern Pines Energy Center, and the release of a currently undetermined volume of natural\ngas.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 SGR is a subsidiary of The Williams Companies, Inc. See SG Resources Mississippi,\nhttps://www.gasnom.com/ip/SOUTHERNPINES/ (last accessed February 6, 2026).\n\n\n\nPreliminary Findings\n• At approximately 6:30 PM CST on February 3, 2026, the Southern Pines Natural Gas\nPipeline System Line 300 ruptured at the Southern Pines Energy Center, an underground\nnatural gas storage facility, near Leakesville, Mississippi, in Greene County.\n• The Failure resulted in the separation of a 2-inch liquid extraction line from Line 300, the\nformation of a crater within the Southern Pines Energy Center, and the release of a\ncurrently undetermined volume of natural gas.\n• The event did not impact the integrity of the underground storage, though the entire\nfacility is currently shut-in. The failure happened in a remote location within the\nSouthern Pines Energy Center facility. There were no reported injuries, fatalities, or\nevacuations, and the escaped gas did not ignite.\n• SGR attempted to isolate the suspected failed segment of Line 300 using facility valves,\nbut it discovered that one of the valves used to isolate the segment was leaking. In\nresponse, SGR isolated the line by closing the upstream and downstream block valves\n(the Southern Pines Energy Center Valve at mile post 0 and the Midway Valve at mile\npost 11.75), which are thirteen miles apart, and blew down the section. SGR successfully\nisolated the failed segment on February 4, 2026.\n• A recovered portion of the failed pipeline shows indications of internal corrosion that is\nbelieved to be microbiologically influenced corrosion. The Southern Pines Energy Center\nfacility has had prior corrosion issues.\n• The Southern Pines Natural Gas Pipeline System consists of 26.14 miles of natural gas\ntransmission pipeline. The pipeline system includes Line 100 running to the west out of\nthe Southern Pine Energy Center with interconnects to multiple customers, including an\ninterconnect at Ranch Road, and Lines 300 and 400 running to the east out of the Center.\nLines 100 and 400 were not disturbed by the Failure; however, SGR also shut in these\npipelines.\n• As a major provider of natural gas along the southern United States, the pipeline system\ntransports natural gas from Mississippi to Alabama. There will be impacts to the supply\nof commercial natural gas until repairs are made.\n• At the discharge side of Southern Pines Energy Center, at mile post 0, where the Failure\noccurred, the Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) reported by Williams\npersonnel is 1480 psig and the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) is 1140 psig.\n• The pipeline was constructed in 2008. The pipeline coating is Fusion Bonded Epoxy\n(FBE) with an undetermined seam type.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\n\n\n\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another\nlaw; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline, the nature of the failure, to include the history of corrosion issues\nat the facility; the hazardous nature of the material transported (natural gas); the existing and\npotential additional impacts to life, property, or the environment; the still-unknown cause of the\nFailure; and the possibility of additional failures on the pipeline system; it is hereby determined\nthat continued operation of the Affected Segment, as defined below, without corrective measures\nis or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order\nexpeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southern Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nCorrective Measures\nDefinitions\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the approximately three miles of Line 100\nfrom the mainline valve at Ranch Road to the Midpoint Valves on Lines 300 and 400\n\n\n\n(approximate Mile Posts 11.75 and 11.8, respectively). The Affected Segment includes the entire\nSouthern Pines Energy Center and all related facility piping.\nThe Failure – The “Failure” means the rupture of Line 300 that occurred at 6:30 PM CST on\nFebruary 3, 2026, at the Southern Pines Energy Center, an underground natural gas storage\nfacility, near Leakesville, Mississippi, in Greene County.\nIsolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the portion of Line 300 from the Southern\nPines Energy Center Compressor Station at mile post 0 to the Midpoint Valve at mile post 11.75.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southern Region.\n1. SGR must not operate the Isolated Segment until authorized to do so by the Director.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. SGR must reduce and maintain a twenty percent\n(20%) pressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the\nAffected\nSegment such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed eighty\npercent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on\nFebruary 3, 2026.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. Within 15 days of receipt of this Order, SGR must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each pump/compressor station and each main line pressure\nregulating station on the Affected Segment at the time of failure and the reduced\npressure restriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, SGR must take into account any\nin-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segment to\nprovide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are completed.\ne. SGR must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating pressure\ndata. SGR must take into account any ILI features or anomalies present in the Affected\nSegment and immediately reduce the operating pressure to maintain the safe operations\nof the Affected Segment, if warranted by the monthly review. SGR must submit the\nresults of the monthly review to the Director. The results must include, at a minimum,\nthe current discharge set-points (including any additional pressure reductions), and any\npressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\n3. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, SGR must develop and\nsubmit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the\nentire plan but the Isolated Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan\nis approved in its entirety.\n\n\n\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference\ninto this Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Isolated Segment\nduring the restart process and must include incremental pressure increases during\nstart up, with each increment to be held for at least 2 hours.\nd. The Restart Plan must include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline during each\npressure increment to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line\nresumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\nf. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Isolated Segment for conditions\nsimilar to those of the Failure including a review of construction, operating and\nmaintenance (O&M) and integrity management records such as ILI results,\nhydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground\npatrols, corrosion, cathodic protection, excavations and pipe replacements. SGR\nmust address any findings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior\nto restart.\ng. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural\nmodifications are incorporated into SGR’s operations and maintenance procedures\nmanual.\nh. Prior to restart, SGR must submit to the Director a contingency plan to operate and\nmonitor the Isolated Segment during flooding conditions, including enhanced\npatrolling and surveillance.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, SGR may return the\nIsolated Segment to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent (80%)\nof the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on February 3, 2026,\nin accordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification of\nthe pressure restriction upon a written request from SGR demonstrating that restoring the\npipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis\nshowing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and\noperating parameters of the pipeline.\n6. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions\nupon a written request from SGR demonstrating that temporary mitigative and preventive\nmeasures are implemented prior to and during the temporary removal or modification of the\npressure restriction. The Director's determination will be based on the Failure cause and\nprovision of evidence that preventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide\nfor the safe operation of the Affected Segment during the temporary removal or modification\nof the pressure restriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this regard will be\ndecided by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n\n\n\n7. Instrumented Leakage Survey. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, SGR must perform\nan aerial or ground instrumented leakage survey of the Affected Segment. SGR must\ninvestigate all leak indications and remedy all leaks discovered. SGR must submit\ndocumentation of this survey to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order.\n8. Records Verification. As recommended in PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 2012-06, SGR must\nverify the records for the Affected Segment to confirm the MAOP. SGR must submit\ndocumentation of this record verification to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order.\n9. Review of Prior Inline Inspection (ILI) Results. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order,\nSGR must conduct a review of any previous ILI results of the Affected Segment; re-evaluate\nall ILI results from the past 10 calendar years, to include a review of the ILI vendors' raw data\nand analysis; and determine whether any features were present in the failed pipe joint and/or\nany other pipe removed. SGR must also determine if any features with similar characteristics\nare present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. SGR shall submit documentation of this ILI\nreview to the Director within 45 days of receipt of this Order as follows:\na. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs.\nb. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures present in the failed joint and/or other pipe removed.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the reevaluation.\n10. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, SGR\nmust complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. The testing and analysis must\nbe completed as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the Failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director\nwith the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS\nrepresentative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to SGR.\n11. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, SGR must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the\nDirector. The RCFA must be supplemented or facilitated by an independent third-party\napproved by the Director and must document the decision-making process and all factors\ncontributing to the failure. SGR must ensure that all reports, whether draft or final, are made\navailable in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to SGR. The\nfinal report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the findings and any\nlessons learned are applicable to other locations within SGR’s pipeline system.\n\n\n\n12. Leak Detection Plan. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, SGR shall perform a review\nand submit to the Director a written plan to improve the leak detection capability on the\nAffected Segment. The review must include a comprehensive analysis of any SCADA, leak\ndetection, surveillance, and other monitoring systems on the Affected Segment. The written\nplan must include a schedule for improving the leak detection capability on the Affected\nSegment through additional instrumentation, updated hardware or software, installation of a\ncomputational pipeline monitoring system and associated software programming, additional\nsurveillance, pipeline control staffing, ongoing leak surveys, and any other appropriate\nmeasures.\n13. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. SGR must review and assess the\neffectiveness of its emergency response plan with regards to the Failure. The review and\nassessment must include the on-scene response and support, coordination, and communication\nwith emergency responders and public officials. SGR must also include a review and\nassessment of the effectiveness of its emergency training program. SGR must amend its\nemergency response plan and emergency training, if necessary, to reflect the results of this\nreview. The documentation of this Emergency Response Plan and Training Review must be\navailable for inspection by OPS or provided to the Director, if requested.\n14. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, SGR must submit a Remedial\nWork Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures SGR will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It must\naddress all known or suspected factors and causes of the Failure identified by, but\nnot limited to, the results of the metallurgical and root cause failure analysis required\nby this Order. SGR should consider both the risk of another failure and the\nconsequence of another failure to develop a prioritized schedule for RWP related\nwork along the Affected Segment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe, both facility and mainline, in the Affected Segment with\ncharacteristics similar to the contributing factors identified for the Failure,\nto include operational or maintenance factors.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and\npressure test failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written\nreport containing all the available information such as the locations, dates,\nand causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis,\nand other corrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-\nexisting operational and assessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-\nexisting operational data includes, but is not limited to, construction,\n\n\n\noperations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and\nany third-party consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data\nincludes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing,\ndirect assessments, close interval surveys, and Direct Current Voltage\nGradient/Alternating Current Voltage Gradient surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure, to\ninclude operational or maintenance conditions, are likely to exist elsewhere\non the Affected Segment.\nv. Conduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the\nFailure and other failures from the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any\nother integrity threats are present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At\na\nminimum, this process must consider all failure causes and specify the use\nof one or more of the following:\n1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the\npipeline system based on the cause of the Failure and that can\nreliably detect and identify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Close-interval surveys,\n4) Cathodic protection surveys, to include interference surveys in\ncoordination with other utilities (e.g. underground utilities,\noverhead power lines, etc.) in the area,\n5) Coating surveys,\n6) Stress corrosion cracking surveys,\n7) Selective seam corrosion surveys; and,\n8) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate\nfor the Failure causes.\nNote: SGR may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations if approved by the Director,\nprovided the results of the tests, inspections, assessments,\nand evaluations are analyzed with regard to the factors\nknown or suspected to have caused the Failure.\nvi. Describe the inspection and repair criteria SGR will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other\nidentified integrity threats. Include a description of how any defects will\nbe graded and a schedule for repairs or replacement.\nvii. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment\ndescribe the methods SGR will use to repair, replace, or take other\ncorrective measures, to include measures to update maintenance or\noperational procedures that may have been causal factors of the Failure,\nin order to remediate the conditions associated with the February 3, 2026,\npipeline failure and to address other known integrity threats along the\nAffected Segment. The repair, replacement, or other corrective measures\nmust meet the criteria specified in (d)(vi) above.\n\n\n\nviii. Implement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity\nverification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and\ncorrective measures undertaken pursuant to the Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. SGR must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate modifications required\nby the Director. SGR must submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior\napproval. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally. Any and all\nrevisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by reference into\nthis Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO Documentation\nReport.\nh. SGR must implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any\nrevisions to the plan.\n15. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). SGR must create and revise, as necessary, a\nCAO Documentation Report (CDR). When SGR has concluded all the items in this Order\nit will submit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to\ncomplete a thorough review of all actions taken by SGR with regards to this Order prior\nto approving the closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities\nand documentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire\nCDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. Summary of the pipeline failure of February 3, 2026, and the response\nactivities;\niii. Summary of pipe data and properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Segment;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis\nrequired by the Order;\nv. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by\nthe Order;\nvi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by SGR to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary\nto incorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order\nand whenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nx. A path forward describing specific actions SGR will take on its entire\n\n\n\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this\nOrder; and\nxi. Appendices (if required).\nOther Requirements:\n16. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the\nsubmission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n17. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\n18. Reporting. SGR must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all\navailable data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe\nthe progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report\nis due on April 1, 2026, covering the period through March 15, 2026. The Director may change\nthe interval for the submission of these reports.\n19. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each quarterly report\nsubmitted the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,\nstudies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,\nreplacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 2-2026-004-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal\nor state law.\n\n\n\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\nLinda Daugherty Date Issued\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n22026004CAO_Corrective Action Order (AMENDED)_03022026_(26-363868)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\nMarch 2, 2026\nVIA EMAIL TO: chad.zamarin@williams.com;matt.hastings@williams.com\nChad Zamarin\nPresident/CEO\nSG Resources, L.L.C.\nOne Williams Center\nTulsa, OK 74172\nCPF 2-2026-004-CAO\nDear Mr. Zamarin:\nEnclosed please find a Corrected Corrective Action Order (Corrected CAO) issued by the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The\nCorrected CAO corrects a typographical error in paragraph 14.e.vii. of the list of corrective actions\nin the Corrective Action Order that was issued on February 6, 2026, regarding the pipeline failure\nthat occurred on February 3, 2026, on the Southern Pines Natural Gas Line 300 near Leakesville,\nMississippi. SGR is a subsidiary of The Williams Companies, Inc.\nService of the Corrected CAO by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission and\nacknowledgment of receipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5.\nSincerely,\nLinda G. Daugherty\nActing Associate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Corrected CAO\ncc: James Urisko, Director, Southern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\njames.urisko@dot.gov\nMatt Hastings, VP HSEI, SG Resources Mississippi, L.L.C.,\nmatt.hastings@williams.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nSG Resources Mississippi, LLC, ) CPF No. 2-2026-004-CAO\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority\nprovided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires SG Resources Mississippi, L.L.C. (SGR or\nRespondent)1 to take certain necessary corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment from the potential hazards associated with the continued operation of its Southern\nPines Natural Gas Pipeline System near Leakesville, Mississippi, in Greene County.\nOn February 3, 2026, at approximately 6:30 PM CST, the Southern Pines Natural Gas Pipeline\nSystem Line 300 ruptured inside the Southern Pines Energy Center located near Leakesville,\nMississippi, in Greene County (hereinafter the “Failure”). The Failure resulted in the separation\nof the 2-inch liquid extraction line from the Line 300, the formation of a crater within the\nSouthern Pines Energy Center, and the release of a currently undetermined volume of natural\ngas.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 SGR is a subsidiary of The Williams Companies, Inc. See SG Resources Mississippi,\nhttps://www.gasnom.com/ip/SOUTHERNPINES/ (last accessed February 6, 2026).\n\n\n\nPreliminary Findings\n• At approximately 6:30 PM CST on February 3, 2026, the Southern Pines Natural Gas\nPipeline System Line 300 ruptured at the Southern Pines Energy Center, an underground\nnatural gas storage facility, near Leakesville, Mississippi, in Greene County.\n• The Failure resulted in the separation of a 2-inch liquid extraction line from Line 300, the\nformation of a crater within the Southern Pines Energy Center, and the release of a\ncurrently undetermined volume of natural gas.\n• The event did not impact the integrity of the underground storage, though the entire\nfacility is currently shut-in. The failure happened in a remote location within the\nSouthern Pines Energy Center facility. There were no reported injuries, fatalities, or\nevacuations, and the escaped gas did not ignite.\n• SGR attempted to isolate the suspected failed segment of Line 300 using facility valves,\nbut it discovered that one of the valves used to isolate the segment was leaking. In\nresponse, SGR isolated the line by closing the upstream and downstream block valves\n(the Southern Pines Energy Center Valve at mile post 0 and the Midway Valve at mile\npost 11.75), which are thirteen miles apart, and blew down the section. SGR successfully\nisolated the failed segment on February 4, 2026.\n• A recovered portion of the failed pipeline shows indications of internal corrosion that is\nbelieved to be microbiologically influenced corrosion. The Southern Pines Energy Center\nfacility has had prior corrosion issues.\n• The Southern Pines Natural Gas Pipeline System consists of 26.14 miles of natural gas\ntransmission pipeline. The pipeline system includes Line 100 running to the west out of\nthe Southern Pine Energy Center with interconnects to multiple customers, including an\ninterconnect at Ranch Road, and Lines 300 and 400 running to the east out of the Center.\nLines 100 and 400 were not disturbed by the Failure; however, SGR also shut in these\npipelines.\n• As a major provider of natural gas along the southern United States, the pipeline system\ntransports natural gas from Mississippi to Alabama. There will be impacts to the supply\nof commercial natural gas until repairs are made.\n• At the discharge side of Southern Pines Energy Center, at mile post 0, where the Failure\noccurred, the Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) reported by Williams\npersonnel is 1480 psig and the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) is 1140 psig.\n• The pipeline was constructed in 2008. The pipeline coating is Fusion Bonded Epoxy\n(FBE) with an undetermined seam type.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\n\n\n\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another\nlaw; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline, the nature of the failure, to include the history of corrosion issues\nat the facility; the hazardous nature of the material transported (natural gas); the existing and\npotential additional impacts to life, property, or the environment; the still-unknown cause of the\nFailure; and the possibility of additional failures on the pipeline system; it is hereby determined\nthat continued operation of the Affected Segment, as defined below, without corrective measures\nis or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order\nexpeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Ord","truncated":true,"body_characters":62502}