{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 22026009CAO","title":"SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-06-01","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026009cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026009cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026009cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/22026009CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-06-01 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n22026009CAO_Corrective Action Order_06012026_(26-373830).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026009CAO/22026009CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06012026_(26-373830).pdf\n\n22026009CAO_Corrective Action Order_06012026_(26-373830)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026009CAO/22026009CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_06012026_(26-373830)_text.pdf\n\n22026009CAO_Corrective Action Order_06012026_(26-373830)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\n1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E.\nWashington, D.C. 20590\nJune 1, 2026\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: steven_romano@kindermorgan.com\nSteven Romano\nChief Operating Officer\nSouthern Natural Gas Company\n1001 Louisiana Street\nSuite 1000\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 2-2026-009-CAO\nDear Mr. Romano:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (“CAO” or “Order”) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO\nrequires Southern Natural Gas Company (SNG) to take certain corrective actions with respect to\nthe pipeline failure that occurred on May 30, 2026, on the South Main System in Clarke County,\nMississippi.\nService of the CAO by email is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgment of\nreceipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nKeith Coyle\nChief Counsel\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: James Urisko, Director, Southern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nZachary Ragain – Director – Codes and Standards, Kinder-Morgan\nZach_Ragain@kindermorgan.com\nClaudia Pankowski, Manager of Engineering, Codes and Standards, Kinder Morgan,\nclaudia_pankowski@kindermorgan.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nSouthern Natural Gas Company, ) CPF No. 2-2026-009-CAO\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority\nprovided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires Southern Natural Gas Company (SNG or\nRespondent), a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, to take certain necessary corrective actions to\nprotect the public, property, and the environment from the potential hazards associated with the\ncontinued operation of the South Main Line. The South Main Line is part of the South Main\nSystem, which transports natural gas from central Mississippi to central Georgia, serving\nnumerous customers throughout the region.\nOn May 30, 2026, the South Main Line pipeline ruptured in a rural area in Clarke County,\nMississippi, resulting in the release of natural gas and evacuation of five nearby homes (Failure\nor Incident). The Failure caused a portion of the pipeline to self-excavate from the ground and\nexposed an adjoining pipeline located in the same right-of-way. The cause of the Failure remains\nunder investigation. Another portion of the same pipeline failed in 2022. PHMSA issued a CAO\nfollowing the 2022 failure.1\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n● The 221 miles of SNG’s South Main System that contains the failed 18-inch South Main\nLine, an 18-inch diameter, 1951 vintage A.O. Smith X52 pipe, traverses from Gwinville\nCompressor Station in Gwinville, Mississippi (MP 0) to Elmore Compressor Station in\nElmore, Alabama (MP 221.6). The South Main Line traverses the following counties in\n1 See Corrective Action Order, Southern Natural Gas Company, CPF 2-2022-007-CAO (February 18, 2022).\n\n\n\n● Mississippi: Jefferson Davis, Simpson, Smith, Jasper, Clarke, and Lauderdale; and the\nfollowing counties in Alabama: Sumter, Marengo, Hale, Perry, Dallas, Autauga, and\nElmore.\n● On May 30, 2026, at approximately 06:34 AM CDT, the 18-inch South Main Line in the\nSouth Main System ruptured in Clarke County, Mississippi, resulting in the release of\nnatural gas. The town nearest to the location of the Incident is Enterprise, Mississippi.\n● The force of the rupture caused a portion of the 18-inch South Main Line to self-excavate\nfrom the ground, resulting in a 35-foot by 35-foot hole approximately 20-feet deep. The\nclosest other pipeline, a 24-inch natural gas pipeline part of the South Main loop system,\nwas exposed from the escaping natural gas. The 24-inch pipeline will remain at 50-psi\nuntil the failed 18-inch South Main Line is repaired; the other 26-inch and 36-inch\npipelines are continuing to operate at normal pressures.\n● Prior to the failure, the 18-inch South Main Line operated at pressure of 1155 pounds per\nsquare inch gauge (psig).\n● The maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of the 18-inch South Main Line is\n1200 psig.\n● Approximately seven miles of the failed South Main Line is currently shut-in.\n● The South Main Line was manufactured in 1951. It is an A.O. Smith pipe with flash weld\nlongitudinal seam, 0.312 wall thickness, API 5L grade X52 (52,000 pounds per square\ninch specified minimum yield strength), with coal tar enamel coating.\n● Cathodic protection (CP) readings taken on site May 31, 2026, indicate that instant off\nCP levels were between -0.950mV and -1.1mV, meeting the adopted -0.850mV criteria.\n● In February 2022, in Perry County, Alabama, the 18-inch South Main Line experienced a\nhard spot failure. That failure was the subject of Corrective Action Order No. 2-2022-\n007-CAO.\n● PHMSA deployed and arrived onsite on May 31, 2026. An investigation is ongoing.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\n\n\n\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another\nlaw; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nThe preliminary findings of fact indicate that the South Main Line was manufactured in 1951, is\nan A.O. Smith pipe with flash weld longitudinal seam, 0.312 wall thickness, API 5L grade X52\n(52,000 pounds per square inch specified minimum yield strength), and coal tar enamel coating.\nThe rupture self-excavated the pipeline, constituting damage to the environment, and resulted in\nthe release of natural gas. The rupture further impacted the nearby 24-inch natural gas pipeline that\nis a part of the South Main loop system. The cause of the Failure is currently unknown, and there\nis a history of failure on the pipeline. Considering the nature of the Failure, the unknown cause or\ncauses of the Failure, the age of the pipe and method of manufacture, the operating pressure, the\npossibility that the cause or causes associated with the Failure may be present elsewhere on the\nSouth Main Line, the areas in which the pipeline facility is located, the nature of the hazardous\nmaterial transported (natural gas), and the existing and potential impacts to life, property, and the\nenvironment, it is hereby determined that continued operation of the Affected Segment, as defined\nbelow, without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment,\nand that failure to issue this Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southern Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nCorrective Measures\nDefinitions\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means approximately 221 miles of SNG’s South\nMain Line that contains the 18-inch diameter, 1951 vintage A.O. Smith X52 pipe from Gwinville\nCompressor Station in Gwinville, Mississippi (MP 0) to Elmore Compressor Station in Elmore,\nAlabama (MP 221.6).\n\n\n\nIsolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the approximately 8.5-mile segment of\nSNG’s South Main Line that contains the 18-inch 1951 vintage A.O. Smith X52 pipe from\nMainline Valve 117 at Mile Post 67.4 to Gate Valve 9 at Mile Post 76.073 at the take off for the\n8-inch South Meridian Line.\nFailure – The “Failure” means the rupture of the 18-inch South Main Line that occurred at\napproximately 6:34 AM CDT on May 30, 2026, in Clarke County, Mississippi.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southern Region.\n1. Shut Down. SNG must not operate the Isolated Segment until authorized to do so by the\nDirector.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. SNG must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%)\npressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected\nSegment such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed\neighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the\nFailure.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from\nthe Director.\nb. Within 15 days of receipt of this Order, SNG must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each pump/compressor station and each main line pressure\nregulating station on the Affected Segment at the time of failure and the reduced\npressure restriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to\nbe adjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, SNG must take into account\nany in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segment\nto provide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are\ncompleted.\ne. SNG must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating\npressure data. SNG must take into account any in-line inspection (ILI) features or\nanomalies present in the Affected Segment and immediately reduce the operating\npressure to maintain the safe operations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by\nthe monthly review. SNG must submit the results of the monthly review to the\nDirector. The results must include, at a minimum, the current discharge set-points\n(including any additional pressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at\ndischarge set-points.\n3. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, SNG must develop and\nsubmit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\n\n\n\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the\nentire plan but the Isolated Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan\nis approved in its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference\ninto this Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Isolated Segment\nduring the restart process and must include incremental pressure increases during\nstart up, with each increment to be held for at least 2 hours.\nd. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\ne. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Isolated Segment for conditions\nsimilar to those of the Failure including a review of construction, operating and\nmaintenance (O&M), and integrity management records such as in-line inspection\n(ILI) results, hydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial\nand ground patrols, corrosion, cathodic protection, excavations, and pipe\nreplacements. SNG must address any findings that require remedial measures to be\nimplemented prior to restart.\nf. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural\nmodifications are incorporated into SNG’s operations and maintenance procedures\nmanual.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, SNG may return the\nIsolated Segment to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent\n(80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on May\n30, 2026 in accordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification\nof the pressure restriction upon a written request from SNG demonstrating that restoring\nthe pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering\nanalysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects,\nanomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\n6. Temporary Modification of Pressure Restrictions. The Director may allow the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions upon a written request from\nSNG demonstrating that temporary mitigative and preventive measures are implemented\nprior to and during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The\nDirector's determination will be based on the Failure cause and provision of evidence that\npreventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe operation of\nthe Affected Segment during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this regard will be decided by the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n7. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, SNG\nmust complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials, and submit the results to\nthe Director for review. SNG must submit the completed final report of this testing and\n\n\n\nanalysis to the Director for review and approval. SNG must ensure that all reports, whether\ndraft or final, are made available in their entirety to the Director at the same time they are\nmade available to SNG. Mechanical and metallurgical testing must be conducted by an\nindependent third-party approved by the Director prior to commencing testing and must\ndocument the decision-making process and all factors contributing to the failure.\nRespondent must complete the testing and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the Failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director\nwith the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS\nrepresentative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to SNG.\n8. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, SNG must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to\nthe Director for review and approval. No later than 30 days following receipt of this Order,\nSNG must provide the scope and protocol of the RCFA to the Director for review and\napproval. The RCFA must be conducted by an independent third-party approved by the\nDirector prior to commencing the analysis and must document the decision-making process\nand all factors contributing to the failure. SNG must direct the third-party to engage in\nonce-a-week calls with PHMSA to provide updates as to the progress of the RCFA. These\ncalls shall be done virtually and continue until the RCFA has been submitted to the\nDirector. SNG must ensure that all reports, whether draft or final, are made available in\ntheir entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to SNG. The final\nreport must include findings, and any lessons learned and whether the findings and any\nlessons learned are applicable to other locations within SNG’s pipeline system.\n9. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 60 days of approval of the RCFA required above, SNG must submit a\nRemedial Work Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures SNG will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It\nmust address all known or suspected factors and causes of the Failure. SNG should\nconsider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\n\n\n\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and\npressure test failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written\nreport containing all the available information such as the locations, dates,\nand causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis,\nand other corrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-\nexisting operational and assessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-\nexisting operational data includes, but is not limited to, construction,\noperations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and\nany third-party consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data\nincludes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing,\ndirect assessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure are likely\nto exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment. Conduct additional field tests,\ninspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to determine whether, and to\nwhat extent, the conditions associated with the Failure and other failures\nfrom the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any other integrity threats are\npresent elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum, this process\nmust consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or more of the\nfollowing:\n1) Inline inspection (ILI) tools that are technically appropriate for\nassessing the pipeline system based on the cause of the Failure and\nthat can reliably detect and identify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Corrosion control methods including cathodic protection and\ncoating evaluations, close-interval surveys, evaluation of stray\ncurrent, and stress corrosion cracking and selective seam corrosion\nsurveys, if applicable,\n4) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate\nfor the Failure causes.\nNote: SNG may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the\nresults of the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are\nanalyzed with regard to the factors known or suspected to have caused\nthe Failure.\nv. Describe the inspection and repair criteria SNG will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats, including those related to processes applied per (e)(iv)\nabove. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\n\n\n\nvi. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment,\ndescribe the methods SNG will use to repair, replace, or take other\ncorrective measures to remediate the conditions associated with the Failure\nand to address other known integrity threats along the Affected Segment.\nThe repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the criteria\nspecified in (e)(v) above.\nvii. Incorporate findings and lessons learned in response to the Failure in all\nrelated programs and procedures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the\nAffected Segment considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and\nevaluations resulting from actions taken in response to this Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. SNG must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate modifications\nrequired by the Director. SNG must submit any plan revisions to the Director for\nprior approval. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally. Any and\nall revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by reference\ninto this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO Documentation\nReport (CDR).\nh. SNG must implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any\nrevisions to the plan.\n10. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). SNG must create and revise, as necessary, a CAO\nDocumentation Report (CDR). When SNG has concluded all the items in this Order it will\nsubmit the final CDR in its entirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to complete\na thorough review of all actions taken by SNG with regards to this Order prior to approving\nthe closure of this Order. The intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities and\ndocumentation associated with this Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire\nCDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. Summary of the pipeline Failure, and the response activities;\niii. Summary of pipe data and properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Segment;\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis\nrequired by the Order;\nv. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the\nOrder;\n\n\n\nvi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by SNG to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and\nwhenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the\nfailure investigation and remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nx. A path forward describing specific actions SNG will take on its entire\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order;\nand\nxi. Appendices (if required).\n11. Reporting. SNG must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available\ndata and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the\nprogress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report\nis due on July 15, 2026, covering the period through July 1, 2026. The Director may change\nthe interval for the submission of these reports.\n12. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each quarterly report\nsubmitted the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,\nstudies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,\nreplacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nAdministrative Actions\n13. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve\nthe submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;\n(d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n14. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\n\n\n\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 2-2026-009-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal\nor state law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\n__________________________ _______________________\nKeith Coyle Date Issued\nChief Counsel\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration","truncated":false,"body_characters":29006}