{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 22026011CAO","title":"TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"current","official":true,"published_on":"2026-07-09","effective_on":null,"summary":"OPEN corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026011cao.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026011cao.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-22026011cao","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/22026011CAO","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2026-07-09 and is reported as open. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n22026011CAO_Corrective Action Order_07092026_(26-377117).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026011CAO/22026011CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_07092026_(26-377117).pdf\n\n22026011CAO_Corrective Action Order_07092026_(26-377117)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/22026011CAO/22026011CAO_Corrective%20Action%20Order_07092026_(26-377117)_text.pdf\n\n22026011CAO_Corrective Action Order_07092026_(26-377117)_text.pdf\n\nU.S. Department\nof Transportation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Materials\nSafety Administration\nJuly 9, 2026\nVIA EMAIL TO: steven_romano@kindermorgan.com\nSteven Romano\nChief Operating Officer\nTennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C.\n1001 Louisiana Street, Suite 1000\nHouston, Texas 77002\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\nDear Mr. Romano:\nEnclosed please find a Corrective Action Order (“CAO” or “Order”) issued by the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). The CAO\nrequires Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, Inc., to take\ncertain corrective actions with respect to the pipeline failure that occurred on July 7, 2026, on the\n24-inch interstate natural gas pipeline Line 100-2 in Boyd County, Kentucky.\nService of the CAO by email is effective upon the date of transmission and acknowledgment of\nreceipt as provided under 49 CFR § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nSincerely,\nKeith Coyle\nChief Counsel\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration\nEnclosure: CAO\ncc: James Urisko, Director, Southern Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\n\n\n\nZachary Ragain, Director of Engineering, Compliance, Codes and Standards\nKinder Morgan, zach_ragain@kindermorgan.com\nClaudia Pankowski, Manager of Engineering, Codes, and Standards\nKinder Morgan, claudia_pankowski@kindermorgan.com\nBen Kendrick, Pipeline Engineer – Codes and Standards, Kinder Morgan\nBen_kendrick@kindermorgan.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nTennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., ) CPF No. 2-2026-011-CAO\na subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, Inc. )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline\nSafety (OPS), is issuing this Corrective Action Order (CAO or Order) pursuant to the authority\nprovided in 49 U.S.C. § 60112. The CAO requires Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C.,\n(TGP or Respondent), a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, Inc.,1 to take certain necessary corrective\nactions to protect the public, property, and the environment from the potential hazards associated\nwith the continued operation of the 24-inch interstate natural gas pipeline Line 100-2 (TGP Line\n100-2) in Boyd County, Kentucky. TGP Line 100-2 is a part of the TGP pipeline system that\ntransports natural gas from the Gulf Coast to the central part of the United States. The system\nalso transports natural gas from the shale gas production areas of Ohio, West Virginia, and\nsouthern Pennsylvania.\nOn the evening of July 7, 2026, TGP Line 100-2 ruptured, resulting in the release of 10,135 mcf\nof natural gas (Failure). The force of the rupture caused a 25-foot section of the pipeline to eject\nfrom the ground and created a crater measuring 56 feet long by 34 feet wide. In response to the\nrupture, TGP shut-in the pipeline between valves 113-2 and 114-2 and stopped the flow of gas.\nThe local fire department also issued a temporary evacuation order for residents within a one-\nmile radius of the Failure site. There were no reported fatalities or injuries.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, PHMSA has initiated an investigation of the Failure. The\npreliminary findings of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., KINDER MORGAN,\nhttps://pipeportal.kindermorgan.com/portalui/DefaultKM.aspx?TSP=TGPD (last accessed July 8, 2026).\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n2\n● On July 7, 2026, at approximately 7:42 PM Central Time, TGP Line 100-2 ruptured in\nBoyd County, Kentucky, resulting in the release of natural gas. A local caller reported the\nrupture. The town nearest to the Failure site is Buchanan, Kentucky.\n● The Failure resulted in: the ejection of a 25-foot section of the pipeline from the ground,\ncreating a crater measuring 56 feet long by 34 feet wide, and damage to nearby vegetation;\nthe reported release of 10,135 mcf of natural gas; the closure of a nearby road; and an\nevacuation order for residents within a one-mile radius of the Failure site. The fire\ndepartment lifted the evacuation order at approximately 11:30 PM Central Time on July 7.\n● There were no reported injuries or fatalities.\n● Following the rupture, TGP isolated the pipeline between valves 113-2 and 114-2 and\nstopped the flow of gas. TGP notified the National Response Center at 7:55 PM Central\nTime on July 7, 2026. The pipeline remains isolated and removed from service.\n● PHMSA Accident Investigation Division deployed and arrived onsite on July 8, 2026. An\ninvestigation is ongoing.\n● TGP Line 100-2 is a 24-inch nominal diameter, 0.25-inch nominal wall thickness, X-52\nGrade pipe manufactured by A.O. Smith in 1948 with an electric fusion welded (EFW)\nseam. The pipe coating is coal tar enamel. The maximum allowable operating pressure of\nLine 100-2 is 765 pounds per square inch gauge (psig).\n● Prior to the release, at 6:33 PM Central Time, TGP Line 100-2 was operating at 758 psig\nas measured at Compressor Station 114. Preliminary information from the same location\nindicates that operating pressure decreased to 610 psig by 7:12 PM Central Time.\n● This vintage A.O. Smith pipe has a history of being susceptible to significant anomalies\ndue to inconsistent weld seam quality and hard spots.\n● An operator-known wrinkle bend is located near the Failure site. Wrinkle bends are a\nvintage construction technique known to be susceptible to various integrity threats,\nprimarily various forms of cracking.\n● TGP Line 100-2 is a part of the TGP pipeline system that transports natural gas from the\nGulf Coast to the central part of the United States. The system also transports natural gas\nfrom the shale gas production areas of Ohio, West Virginia, and southern Pennsylvania.\n● TGP Line 100-2 operates as part of a looped system. Other looped pipelines in the system\ncontinue to operate, relieving any immediate supply issues.\n● On February 11, 2026, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CPF 2-2026-005-CAO)\nfor a pipeline failure that occurred two days earlier on TGP Line 100-3 in Clark County,\nKentucky. The failure involved a wrinkle bend that was visible on the top of the pipe and\nwhich had been formed during original construction. The rupture of that pipeline formed a\ncrater and exposed the pipeline.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of title 49, United States Code, authorizes PHMSA to determine that a pipeline\nfacility is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the environment and if there is a likelihood\nof serious harm, to expeditiously order the operator of the facility to take necessary corrective\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n3\naction, including suspended or restricted use of the facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other appropriate action. An order issued expeditiously must provide an\nopportunity for a hearing as soon as practicable after the order is issued.\nIn deciding whether to issue an order, PHMSA must consider the following, if relevant: (1) the\ncharacteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the pipeline facility, including the age,\nmanufacture, physical properties, and method of manufacturing, constructing, or assembling the\nequipment; (2) the nature of the material the pipeline facility transports, the corrosive and\ndeteriorative qualities of the material, the sequence in which the material is transported, and the\npressure required for transporting the material; (3) the aspects of the area in which the pipeline\nfacility is located, including climatic and geologic conditions and soil characteristics; (4) the\nproximity of the area in which the facility is located to environmentally sensitive areas; (5) the\npopulation density and population and growth patterns of the area in which the pipeline facility is\nlocated; (6) any recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board made under another\nlaw; and (7) any other factors PHMSA may consider as appropriate.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, and having considered the\ncharacteristics of the pipeline; the nature of the Failure; the currently unknown cause of the Failure;\nthe presence of A.O. Smith pipe with known history of manufacturing defects; the recent and\npotentially similar failure of TGP Line 100-3, which had a wrinkle bend on the top of the pipe\nformed during original construction; the presence of a wrinkle bend near the location of the Failure\nlocation; the possibility that the cause of the Failure may be present elsewhere on the Affected\nSegment, as defined below; the hazardous nature of the material transported (natural gas); the\ndamage to the nearby environment; and the existing and potential additional impacts to life,\nproperty, or the environment; it is hereby determined that continued operation of the Affected\nSegment of TGP Line 100-2, as defined below, without corrective measures is or would be\nhazardous to life, property, or the environment, and that failure to issue this Order expeditiously\nwould result in the likelihood of serious harm.\nAccordingly, this Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued expeditiously without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective\nupon completion of service.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southern Region. If a hearing is requested, it will be held in\naccordance with 49 CFR § 190.211.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and, if appropriate, PHMSA will consider a further amended order.\nTo the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n4\nCorrective Measures\nDefinitions\nAffected Segment – The “Affected Segment” means the approximately 45.0 miles of TGP Line\n100-2 bounded by Compressor Station 110 to the west and Compressor Station 114 to the east.\nIsolated Segment – The “Isolated Segment” means the approximately 10.8 miles of TGP Line\n100-2 bounded by Mainline Valve 113-2 to the west and Compressor Station 114 to the east.\nFailure – The “Failure” means the rupture of TGP’s 24-inch interstate natural gas pipeline Line\n100-2 that occurred at approximately 7:42 PM Central Time on July 7, 2026, in Boyd County,\nKentucky.\nDirector – The “Director” means the Director, PHMSA, OPS Southern Region.\n1. Shut Down. TGP must not operate the Isolated Segment until authorized to do so by the\nDirector.\n2. Operating Pressure Restriction. TGP must reduce and maintain a twenty percent (20%)\npressure reduction in the actual operating pressure along the entire length of the Affected\nSegment such that the operating pressure along the Affected Segment will not exceed\neighty percent (80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the\nFailure.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from\nthe Director.\nb. Within 15 days of receipt of this Order, TGP must provide the Director the actual\noperating pressures of each compressor station and each main line pressure\nregulating station on the Affected Segment at the time of failure and the reduced\npressure restriction set-points at these same locations.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical over-pressure devices to\nbe adjusted accordingly.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, TGP must take into account\nany in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the Affected Segment\nto provide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions are\ncompleted.\ne. TGP must review the pressure restriction monthly by analyzing the operating\npressure data. TGP must take into account any ILI features or anomalies present in\nthe Affected Segment and immediately reduce the operating pressure to maintain\nthe safe operations of the Affected Segment, if warranted by the monthly review.\nTGP must submit the results of the monthly review to the Director. The results must\ninclude, at a minimum, the current discharge set-points (including any additional\npressure reductions), and any pressure exceedance at discharge set-points.\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n5\n3. Restart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Isolated Segment, TGP must develop and\nsubmit a written Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the\nentire plan but the Isolated Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan\nis approved in its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference\ninto this Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Isolated Segment\nduring the restart process and must include incremental pressure increases during\nstart up, with each increment to be held for at least 2 hours.\nd. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\ne. The Restart Plan must provide for a review of the Isolated Segment for conditions\nsimilar to those of the Failure including a review of construction, operating and\nmaintenance (O&M), and integrity management records such as ILI results,\nhydrostatic tests, root cause failure analysis of prior failures, aerial and ground\npatrols, corrosion, cathodic protection, excavations, and pipe replacements. TGP\nmust address any findings that require remedial measures to be implemented prior\nto restart.\nf. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all\nmandated actions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural\nmodifications are incorporated into TGP’s operations and maintenance procedures\nmanual.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, TGP may return the\nIsolated Segment to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent\n(80%) of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the Failure on July 7,\n2026, in accordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification\nof the pressure restriction upon a written request from TGP demonstrating that restoring\nthe pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering\nanalysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects,\nanomalies, and operating parameters of the pipeline.\n6. Temporary Modification of Pressure Restrictions. The Director may allow the\ntemporary removal or modification of the pressure restrictions upon a written request from\nTGP demonstrating that temporary mitigative and preventive measures are implemented\nprior to and during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction. The\nDirector’s determination will be based on the Failure cause and provision of evidence that\npreventative and mitigative actions taken by the operator provide for the safe operation of\nthe Affected Segment during the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestriction. Appeals to determinations of the Director in this regard will be decided by the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n6\n7. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, TGP\nmust complete mechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe,\nincluding an analysis of soil samples and any foreign materials. TGP must submit the\ncompleted final report of this testing and analysis to the Director for review and approval.\nTGP must ensure that all reports, whether draft or final, are made available in their entirety\nto the Director at the same time they are made available to TGP. Soil analysis and\nmechanical and metallurgical testing must be conducted by an independent third-party\napproved by the Director prior to commencing testing and must document the decision-\nmaking process and all factors contributing to the failure. Respondent must complete the\ntesting and analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the Failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and\nthe proposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the soil analysis and mechanical and metallurgical testing,\nprovide the Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to\nallow for an OPS representative to witness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their\nentirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to TGP.\n8. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, TGP must\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to\nthe Director for review and approval. No later than 30 days following receipt of this Order,\nTGP must provide the scope and protocol of the RCFA to the Director for review and\napproval. The RCFA must be conducted by an independent third-party approved by the\nDirector prior to commencing the analysis, and must document the decision-making\nprocess and all factors contributing to the Failure. TGP must direct the third-party to engage\nin once-a-week calls with PHMSA to provide updates as to the progress of the RCFA.\nThese calls shall be done virtually and continue until the RCFA has been submitted to the\nDirector. TGP must ensure that all reports, whether draft or final, are made available in\ntheir entirety to the Director at the same time they are made available to TGP. The final\nreport must include findings, and any lessons learned and whether the findings and any\nlessons learned are applicable to other locations within TGP’s pipeline system.\n9. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 60 days of approval of the RCFA required above, TGP must submit a\nRemedial Work Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire\nRWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and\nremedial measures TGP will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It\nmust address all known or suspected factors and causes of the Failure. TGP should\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n7\nconsider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the\ncontributing factors identified for the Failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and\npressure test failures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written\nreport containing all the available information such as the locations, dates,\nand causes of leaks and failures.\niii. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, the RCFA, and other\ncorrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing\noperational and assessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-existing\noperational data includes, but is not limited to, construction, operations,\nmaintenance, testing, repairs, prior metallurgical analyses, and any third-\nparty consultation information. Pre-existing assessment data includes, but\nis not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure testing, direct\nassessments, close interval surveys, and DCVG/ACVG surveys.\niv. Determine if conditions similar to those contributing to the Failure are likely\nto exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment. Conduct additional field tests,\ninspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to determine whether, and to\nwhat extent, the conditions associated with the Failure and other failures\nfrom the failure history (see (e)(ii) above) or any other integrity threats are\npresent elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum, this process\nmust consider all failure causes and specify the use of one or more of the\nfollowing:\n1) ILI tools that are technically appropriate for assessing the pipeline\nsystem based on the cause of the Failure and that can reliably detect\nand identify anomalies,\n2) Hydrostatic pressure testing,\n3) Corrosion control methods including cathodic protection and\ncoating evaluations, close-interval surveys, evaluation of stray\ncurrent, and stress corrosion cracking and selective seam corrosion\nsurveys, if applicable,\n4) Other tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations appropriate\nfor the Failure causes.\nNote: TGP may use the results of previous tests, inspections,\nassessments, and evaluations if approved by the Director, provided the\nresults of the tests, inspections, assessments, and evaluations are\nanalyzed with regard to the factors known or suspected to have caused\nthe Failure.\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n8\nv. Describe the inspection and repair criteria TGP will use to prioritize,\nexcavate, evaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified\nintegrity threats, including those related to processes applied per (e)(iv)\nabove. Include a description of how any defects will be graded and a\nschedule for repairs or replacement.\nvi. Based on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment,\ndescribe the methods TGP will use to repair, replace, or take other\ncorrective measures to remediate the conditions associated with the Failure\nand to address other known integrity threats along the Affected Segment.\nThe repair, replacement, or other corrective measures must meet the criteria\nspecified in (9)(e)(v) above.\nvii. Incorporate findings and lessons learned in response to the Failure in all\nrelated programs and procedures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the\nAffected Segment considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and\nevaluations resulting from actions taken in response to this Order.\nf. Include a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\ng. TGP must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and to incorporate modifications\nrequired by the Director. TGP must submit any plan revisions to the Director for\nprior approval. The Director may approve plan revisions incrementally. Any and\nall revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by reference\ninto this Order will be fully described and documented in the CAO Documentation\nReport (CDR).\nh. TGP must implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any\nrevisions to the plan.\n10. CAO Documentation Report (CDR). TGP must create and revise, as necessary, CDR.\nWhen TGP has concluded all the items in this Order it will submit the final CDR in its\nentirety to the Director. This will allow the Director to complete a thorough review of all\nactions taken by TGP with regards to this Order prior to approving the closure of this Order.\nThe intent is for the CDR to summarize all activities and documentation associated with\nthis Order in one document.\na. The Director may approve the CDR incrementally without approving the entire\nCDR.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the CDR will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nc. The CDR must include but not be limited to:\ni. Table of Contents;\nii. Summary of the pipeline Failure, and the response activities;\niii. Summary of pipe data and properties and all prior assessments of the\nAffected Segment;\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n9\niv. Summary of all tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and analysis\nrequired by the Order;\nv. Summary of the Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing as required by the\nOrder;\nvi. Summary of the RCFA with all root causes as required by the Order;\nvii. Documentation of all actions taken by TGP to implement the RWP, the\nresults of those actions, and the inspection and repair criteria used;\nviii. Documentation of any revisions to the RWP including those necessary to\nincorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and\nwhenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the\nfailure investigation and remedial activities;\nix. Lessons learned while completing this Order;\nx. A path forward describing specific actions TGP will take on its entire\npipeline system as a result of the lessons learned from work on this Order;\nand\nxi. Appendices (if required).\n11. Reporting. TGP must submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available\ndata and results of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the\nprogress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report\nis due on October 6, 2026, covering the period through the date the first quarterly report is\nsubmitted. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these reports.\n12. Documentation of the Costs. It is requested that Respondent maintain documentation of\nthe costs associated with implementation of this CAO. Include in each quarterly report\nsubmitted the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of procedures,\nstudies, and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure, including repairs,\nreplacements, and other modifications; and (3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\nAdministrative Actions\n13. Approvals. With respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of\nthe Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve\nthe submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;\n(d) disapprove in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission, or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of the submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n14. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good\ncause for an extension.\n\n\n\nCPF 2-2026-011-CAO\n10\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 2-2026-011-CAO” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to\nRespondent’s pipeline system under 49 CFR Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of federal\nor state law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 CFR\n§ 190.5.\n__________________________ _______________________\nKeith Coyle Date Issued\nChief Counsel\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration","truncated":false,"body_characters":29726}