{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320045032H","title":"ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2004-10-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320045032h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320045032h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320045032h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320045032H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2004-10-29 and is reported as closed as of 2012-03-30. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320045032H_Closure_03302012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320045032H/320045032H_Closure_03302012.pdf\n\n320045032H_Closure_03302012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320045032H/320045032H_Closure_03302012_text.pdf\n\n320045032H_Corrective Action Order_10292004.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320045032H/320045032H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_10292004.pdf\n\n320045032H_Corrective Action Order_10292004.pdf\n\no\nU.S.Deportment\nof Tronsportotron\nReseorch ond\nSpeciol Progroms Administrqtion 400 Seventh Sl S W\nWashrnglon. D.C 20590\nOCT 2 g ?,:ff.\nMr. Terry L. Hurlburt\nVice President/General Manager Operations\nEnterprise Products Operating L.P.\n2727 Northloop West\nHouston, TX 77008-1044\nRe: CPF No. 3-2004-5032H\nDear Mr. Hurlburt:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued by the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety in the above-referenced case. It requires you to take certain corrective actions, including a\npressure reduction, with respect to the Enid lateral on your anhydrous ammonia system. Service is\nbeing made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective Action Order constitutes\nservice of that document under 49 C.F.R. $ 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Corrective\nAction Order are effective upon receipt.\nSincerely,\n$*\" w\nJames Reynolds\nPipeline Compliance RegistrY\nOffice of Pipeline SafetY\nEnclosure\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nRESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON. DC 20590\nIn the Matter of\nEnterprise Products Operating L.P,\nRespondent.\nCPF No. 3-2004-5032H\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order is being issued, under authority of 49 U.S.C. $ 60112, to require\nEnterprise Products Operating L.P. (Respondent) to take the necessary corrective action to protect\nthe public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with the October 27,\n2004 fallure of Respondent's anhydrous ammonia pipeline near Kingman, Kansas.\nThe October 27,2004, failure resulted in the release ofmore than 3000 bbls of anhydrous ammonia\nfrom the 8-inch diameter Enid lateral. The cause of the failure has not yet been determined.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. $ 601 17, the Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) initiated an\ninvestigation of the accident.\nPreliminary Findings\n1. On October 27,2004, at2:08.p.m. Eastern time, Respondent reported to the National\nResponse Center (t{RC) that a rupture had occurred on its 8-inch anhydrous ammonia\npipeline near Kingman, Kansas. The NRC report stated that the failure had occurred at\napproximately 11 :52 a.m., Central time, on that day.\n2. A vapor cloud approximately %-mile wide that resulted from the failure delayed access to\nthe failure site. Once the vapor cloud dissipated, Respondent was able to uncover the pipe\nat the failure site for an initial visual inspection. Both Respondent's personnel and OPS\npersonnel made the visual inspection. The initial visual inspection found al2-14-inch split\nthat runs longitudinally on the pipe at about the one o'clock position. At the midpoint of the\nsplit, the pipe opened about | lz-inches. The visual inspection reported marks on the pipe\nsimilar to those associated with backhoe teeth marks. There appeared to be a dent at one end\nofthese marks. The split in the pipe was within one of these marks. Visual observation also\nfound parallel marks running along the pipe at about the ten o'clock position. The cause of\nfailure has not yet been determined, but third party damage is suspected\n\n\n\n2\n3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Respondent's anhydrous ammonia system includes the Enid lateral that runs from Enid,\nOklahoma to Partridge, Kansas and the Verdigris lateralthat runs from Verdigris, Oklahoma\nto Enid, Oklahoma. The October 27 failure occured in the Enid lateral. (This section of\nthe line will be referred to as the affected segment.) The Enid lateral runs through Grant\nCounty in Oklahoma and the Kansas counties of Harper, Kingman and Reno.\nThe release occurred in a rural area. The town of Kingman, Kansas is approximately six\nmiles from the failure site. The failure site is approximately one mile north ofHighway 54.\nAt least 3000 bbls of anhydrous ammonia were released from the rupture. Some of the\ndischarge spilled into a drainage ditch approximately 30 feet from the failure site. The ditch\nflowed into a small pond on Smoots Creek. High pH readings were found on Smoots Creek,\nabout 2.2m1les downstream from the pond. Smoots Creek is a tributary of the South Fork\nNinnescah River. The pH readings taken at the river did not indicate that the anhydrous\nammonia had migrated to the river. The area in which the spill occurred is classified as a\ndrinkingwaterunusuallysensitiveenvironmentalareaperthedefinitionin4gC.F.R. $195.6.\nEmergencyresponse officials evacuated 30 homes in a four-square mile area ofthe leak site.\nAnhydrous ammonia is ahazardous substance that is used in the manufacture of fertilizer,\npesticides and plastics. According to its Material Safety Data Sheet, anhydrous ammonia is\nan irritant and corrosive to skin, eye, respiratory tract and mucous membranes.\nThe Enid lateral was constructed in 1973 and hydrostatically tested in Decemb er 1973 and\nearly 1974. The pipeline consists of 8-inch, X-46pipe with 0.156-inch wall thickness. The\npipe was manufactured by Lone Star with ERW longitudinal weld seams.\nThe maximum operating pressure for the line segment at the failure site was established by\nthe pressure test to be 1185 psig. At the time of the failure, the operating pressure at the\nEnid, Oklahoma station was 1329 psig, 1063 psig at the Harper, Kansas station, and 897 psig\nat the Partridge Station. The calculated pressure at the leak site (MP 26) was 981 psig . The\nmaximum operating pressure from the Enid station (MP 118) to MP 87.2 is 1395 psig, from\nMP 87.2 to the Harpet Kansas station (MP 51) 1200 psig, and from the Harper station (MP\n51) to Partridge Station (MP 0 )1185 psig.\nRespondent has scheduled internal inspection of the affected segment of line for 2006; the\nsegment has not been previously inspected using internal inspection tools.\n10. Respondent operates the pipeline. Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P. owns the pipeline.\nDetermination of Necessiff for Corrective Aetion Order and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action, which\n\n\n\n3\nmayinclude the suspended orrestricted use of apipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair,\nreplacement, or other action as appropriate. The basis for making the determination that apipeline\nfacility is hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set forth both in the above referenced statute and\n49 C.F.R. 5 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed\nSection 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provide for the issuance of a Corrective\nAction Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that failure to issue the\nOrder expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property or the environment. In such\ncases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the\nOrder.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing prcliminary ftndings of fact,I findtbatthe continued operation of the\naffected segment without correetive measures would be hazardous to life, property and the\nenvironment. Additionally, after considering the age of the pipe, the proximity of the pipeline to\npopulated areas, highways and waterways, including a drinking water unusually sensitive\nenvironmental area, the lack of information concerning the reason for the failure, and the hazardous\nnature of the product being transported, I find that a failure to expeditiously issue this Order\nrequiring immediate corrective action would likely result in serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued without\nprior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon\nreceipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, delivered\npersonally, by mail or by telecopy at (202) 366-4566. The hearing will be held in Kansas City, MO\nor Washington, DC on a date that is mutually convenient to OPS and Respondent.\nAfter receiving and analyzingadditional data in the course of this investigation, OPS may identify\nother corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to\nthe imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. $ 60l l2,Ihereby order Enterprise Products Operating L.P. to immediately\ntake the following corrective actions with respect to the Enid lateral that runs from Enid Station,\nOklahoma (MP 118) to Partridge Station, Kansas (MP 0) :\n1. Maintain the operating pressure on the affected segment not to exceed 80 percent (80%) of\nthe actual operating pressure in effect just prior to the October 27 ,2004 failure. Specifically,\n\n\n\n2.\na\n4\nthe pressure is not to exceed 785 psig at the failure site. This pressure restriction will remain\nin effect until the Director, Central Region, OPS gives written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure.\nWithin 30 days ofreceipt ofthis Order, develop and submit to the Central Regional Director\naplan for the mechanical and metallurgical testing ofthe failed pipe section. The plan must\ninclude:\n(A) A protocol for the testing of the failed pipe section. The protocol must provide for\ncollecting, cataloging, and sealing the pipe and all other evidence in the presence of\nOPS or an OPS representative and documenting the chain-of-custody. Respondent\nmust obtain prior approval of the testing protocol, from the Director, Central Region,\nOPS;\n(B) Prior to commencing the metallurgical testing, providing the Director, Central\nRegion, OPS with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow an\nOPS representative to witness the testing; and\n(C) Provision for ensuring that the laboratory distributes all resulting metallurgical\nreports, whether draft or final, to the Central Regional Director at the same time as\nthey are made available to Respondent.\nWithin 60 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit a written plan to verify the\nintegrity of the affected segment to the Director, Central Region, OPS. The Director must\napprove the plan before it is implemented.\n(A) The plan must include a detailed description of the integrity verification measures\nproposed.\n(B) The plan must fully address all known or suspected factors that caused or contributed\nto the October 27,2004 failure.\n(B) The plan must include a detailed description of the inspection and repair criteria that\nwill be used in the field evaluation of the anomalies that are excavated..\n(c)\nThe plan must provide for prior notification to the Director, Central Region, OPS of\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of any testing or other integrity verification\nmeasure the plan calls for to allow an OPS representative to witness the test.\n(D)\nThe plan must provide for submitting to the Central Regional Director the records of\nany testing conducted under the integrity verification plan within 30 days after\ncompleting the test.\n\n\n\n5\n4. Submittherequiredplansto: Director,CentralRegion,OfficeofPipelinesafety,g0lLocust\nStreet, Suite 462, Kansas City, MO 64106-2641. The Director may approve plan elements\nincrementally. Implement the plan as it is approved.\n5. The Director, Central Region, OPS may allow the removal or modification of the pressure\nrestriction set forth in Item 1 upon a written request from Respondent demonstra tingthat the\nhazardhas been abated and that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is\njustified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe\nconsidering all known defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the pipeline.\n6. The Director, Central Region, OPS maygrantanextension of time for compliance with any\nof the terms of this Order for good cause. A request for an extension must be in writing.\nThe corrective actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive\nany requirements that apply to the pipeline under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, including the integrity\nmanagement pr o gr am regul ati ons.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator are final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of not more than\n$100,000 per day and in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States\nDistrict Court.\nWut&*- *(W Q g ^ \"\nStacey Gerard\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nOCI 2 g ,:j*ir.4\nDate Issued\n\n320045032H_Closure_03302012_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nTRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY [Mr. Michael Pearson]\nMarch 30, 2012\nMr. Michael Pearson\nVice President\nMagellan Ammonia Pipeline, L.P.\nOne Williams Center\nP.O. Box 22186\nMD 27\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74121-2186\nCPF 3-2004-5032H\nDear Mr. Pearson:\nOn October 29, 2004, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) issued to Enterprise Products Operating LLC a Corrective Action Order (Order)\nin the above-referenced case. This Order included a requirement to take corrective actions\non their pipeline that Magellan Ammonia Pipeline assumed responsibility for on July 1,\n2008, with the acquisition of the system. Based on our review of the documentation you\nprovided, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to\nthe matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nDavid Barrett\nDirector, Central Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":14801}