{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320085007","title":"MAGELLAN PIPELINE COMPANY, LP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2008-06-23","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.401(b), 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(5), 195.402(c)(6), 195.402(d)(3), 195.402(e)(4), 195.402(e)(9), 199.225(a)(1).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320085007.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320085007.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320085007","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320085007","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving MAGELLAN PIPELINE COMPANY, LP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(b),  195.402(a),  195.402(c)(5),  195.402(c)(6),  195.402(d)(3),  195.402(e)(4),  195.402(e)(9),  199.225(a)(1). The case was opened on 2008-06-23 and is reported as closed as of 2011-01-07. Proposed civil penalty: $784,000. Assessed civil penalty: $604,280. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320085007_Closure Letter_01072011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_Closure%20Letter_01072011.pdf\n\n320085007_Closure Letter_01072011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_Closure%20Letter_01072011_text.pdf\n\n320085007_ConsentAgreement_09222009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_ConsentAgreement_09222009.pdf\n\n320085007_ConsentAgreement_09222009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_ConsentAgreement_09222009_text.pdf\n\n320085007_ConsentOrder_09222009.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_ConsentOrder_09222009.pdf\n\n320085007_ConsentOrder_09222009_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_ConsentOrder_09222009_text.pdf\n\n320085007_NOPV PCP PCO_06232008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06232008.pdf\n\n320085007_nopv pcp pco_06232008_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_nopv%20pcp%20pco_06232008_text.pdf\n\n320085007_Operator_Response_and_Request_for_Hearing_07232008.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320085007/320085007_Operator_Response_and_Request_for_Hearing_07232008.pdf\n\n320085007_ConsentOrder_09222009_text.pdf\n\nSEP 22 2009\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nMagellan Pipeline Company, L.L.C., ) CPF No. 3-2008-5007\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCONSENT ORDER\nOn June 23, 2008, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), U.S. Department of Transportation, issued to Magellan Pipeline Company,\nL.L.C. (Respondent) a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and\nProposed Compliance Order in this case.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent had committed violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and\nproposed assessing a civil penalty of $784,000 for the alleged violations. The Notice also\nproposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nIn response to the Notice, Respondent requested an informal hearing and Respondent and\nPHMSA engaged in good faith settlement discussions resulting in the Consent\nAgreement attached to this Order that settles all of the allegations in the Notice.\nAccordingly, the foregoing Consent Agreement is hereby approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order. The Respondent is hereby ordered to comply with the terms of\nthe Consent Agreement, effective immediately.\n\n\n\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. and 49 C.F.R. § 190.221, failure to comply with this\nConsent Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties of up to $100,000 per\nviolation per day, or in the referral of the case for judicial enforcement. The terms and\nconditions of this Consent Order are effective upon receipt.\n____________________________________ _________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n2\n\n320085007_nopv pcp pco_06232008_text.pdf\n\nU 5 Department\nof Transporfation\nPipeline and\nHazardous Matenals Safety\nAdministration\n90t Locust Street Suite 462\nKansas City MO 64106 2641\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTV\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT RE UESTED\nJune 23, 2008\nMr Rtchard Olsen\nSenior Vice President\nOperations and Technical Services\nMagellan Pipehne Company, L L C\nOne Wtlhams Center\nTulsa, OK 74172\nCPF 3-2008-5007\nDear Mr Olsen\nOn May 23, 2005, a representative of the Pipehne and Hazardous Matenals Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code investigated the\naccident on Magellan Pipeline Company's ¹4-8\" Line at milepost 9 46 in the Fairfax lndustnal\nDistrict of Kansas City, Kansas This May 23, 2005 pipehne failure occurred at\napproximately 00 51 hours and resulted in the release of 2936 barrels of unleaded gasohne\nfrom the ptpehne, a portion oi which flotsed into the Missouri River The release also caused\nclosing of a railroad hne, shutdown of a utihty power plant and closing of businesses\nAs a result of the investigation, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations The items investigated and\nthe probable violation(s) are\n\n\n\n1. Subpart F - Operations and Mamtenance\nIl 195. 401 General requirements.\n(b) Whenever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely affect the\nsafe operation of its pipehne system, it shall correct it within a reasonable time.\nHowever, if the condition is of such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard\nto persons or property, the operator may not operate the affected part of the\nsystem untd it has corrected the unsafe condition\nMagellan Pipelme Company, L L C (Magellan) failed to maintam pressure instrumentation\nwithin a reasonable time which conutbuted to the failure The pressure monitors at Milepost\n156 on Magellan's ¹6-10\" were not functioning properly for approximately twelve (12) days\nprior to the failure Servicmg of the umts was not successful dunng this penod resulting in\neleven (11) hi-hi alarms withm five hours prior to the release at 00 51 on May 23 Hi-hi\nalarms from the momtors were bemg ignored by controllers whde they were still operatmg the\nhne At 00 39 a high pressure alartri at the Kansas City Termmal (not at milepost 156) was\nreceived by the controller and cleared without investigation When the \"A/D Fail\" alarm at\nKansas City Terminal indicating that the transmitter had gone out of range was received at\n00 48, the alarm was simply acknowledged without further reaction or recognition that\npressures above normal conditions had occurred The failure to correct the instrumentation\nproblem causing the false hi-hi pressure alarm indications from Milepost 156 instrumentation\nrd\nin a timely manner contributed to mappropnate reaction by the controller on May 23 and was\na contributory factor to the pipehne failure\nZ. ft 195 402 Procedural manual for operations, mamtenance, and emergencies\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of wntten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handhng abnormal operations and emergencies.\nMagellan failed to follovv its written procedures manuals (RPOC-ADM-002 Section 1 2 1) for\nconductmg normal operations pertaining to start-up of a pipehne Operations and monitoring\nof the El Dorado to Kansas City Termmal ¹6-10\"/¹4-8\" pipehne was performed by two\nSCADA controllers Controller ¹1 on Console 4 performed stdrtup and shutdown functions\nand morutortng of the line from El Dorado to Milepost 156 while Controller ¹2 on Console 2\nmonitored alarms for Milepost 156 through the Kansas City Terminal Controller ¹1 did not\nfollow wTttten procedures manual RPOC-ADM-002 Section 1 2 I \"Startup of a Pipehne\nSegment with No units m Current Operation\" by not opening all mamhne valves to deliver the\nproduct stream The last sentence of Section 1 2 1 states, \"The Controller ivill remotel& open\nall mainhne valves to deliver the product stream and e~ther start or have the appropnate field\npersonnel start the umt \" Controller ¹1 failed to open the Kansas City Terminal mainlme valve\n(550 Valve 6S) until 26 mmutes after starting the hne Failure to open this valve per the\nprocedures allov ed abnormally high pressure on the hne resulting m the ¹4-8\" hne's rupture\n\n\n\n3 Il 195 402 Procedural manual for operations, mamtenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipehne system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handhng abnormal operations and emergencies.\nMagellan failed to follow its written procedures manuals (RPOC-ADM-002 Sections 1 2 2 and\n1 2 3) for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handhng abnormal\noperations and emergencies Operations and monitonng of the El Dorado to Kansas City\nTerminal ¹6-10\"/¹4-8\" pipehne was performed by two SCADA controllers Controller ¹1 on\nConsole 4 performed startup and shutdown functions and mont tonng of the hne from El\nDorado to Milepost 156 while Controller ¹2 on Console 2 monitored alarms for Milepost 156\nthrough the Kansas City Terminal Controllers ¹1 and ¹2 did not follow wntten procedures\nmanual RPOC-ADM-002 Sections 1 2 2 and 1 2 3 \"Startup of a Pipelme Segment with No\nunits in Current Operation\" by not appropnately monitonng for abnormal conditions and\ntaking actions to prevent further development of the abnormal operating condition Conditions\nof high pressure and low flow occurred as a result of pumpmg agamst a closed valve at the\nKansas City Termmal Section 1 2 2 states, \"Upon unit startup, the Controller will monitor the\nsegment ol the pipelme affected via the SCADA system (including pressure and flow rates)\nThe Controller will watch for signs of pending abnormal conditions and take appropriate\nactions to prevent further development\" Section 1 2 3 states, \"The Controller should observe\nthe affected segment with heightened awareness until stable operating conditions are\nachieved\" Section 3 3 1 3 2 is also associated with the controllers' actions which states,\n\"While the general auto parameters are deactivated Conlrollers need to heighten their\nawareness for abnormal operating conditions \" Upon the startup of the El Dorado Pump\nStation and the ¹6-10\"/¹4-8\" hnes' operations, these procedures were not followed in regard to\nthe following factors\n1 Parameter alarms were deactivated while the El Dorado to Kansas City hne was in an\nunsteady state dunng start-up\n2 Controller ¹1 received 28 alarms not on the hne wluch ruptured which averted his\nattention &om the start-up of the El Dorado — Kansas City hne\n3 Controller ¹1 did not actively monitor and react to pressure and flow on the hne while\nthe hne was in an unstable condition Controller ¹1 reported that efforts to momtor the\n¹6-10\"/¹4-8 hne segments were hampered by display changes occumng as the result of\nproblems on other pipelines\n4 The line went to an abnormal state of high pressure and low flow with no corrective\nreaction by controllers\nFailure to appropnately monitor the pipehne during start-up per these procedures allowed\nabnormally high pressure on the hne which was a contnbuting factor to the ¹4-8\" hne's\nrupture\n\n\n\n4 h 195 402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) GeneraL Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipehne system a\nmanual of wntten procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handhng abnormal operations and emergencies\nMagellan failed to follow its wntten procedures manuals (RPOC-ADM-002 Sections I 3 I) for\nconductmg normal operations and maintenance activities and handhng abnormal operations\nand emergencies Operations and monhtonng ot the El Dorado to Kansas City Terminal ¹6-\n10\"/¹4-8\" pipehne was performed by two SCADA controllers Controller ¹I on Console 4\nperformed startup and shutdown functions and momtorhng of the line from El Dorado to\nMilepost 156 while Controller ¹2 on Console 2 momtored alarms for Mdepost 156 through the\nKansas City Terminal Controller ¹I did not appropriately follow wntten procedures manual\nRPOC-ADM-002 Section 1 3 I \"Startup of an Intermediate Pumping Unit on a Currently\nOperating Pipelme\" by starting an additional pumping unit when it was not required Section\nI 3 1 states, \"When operatmg conditions require additional pumping units to be placed m\nservice on a pipeline segment that is currently in operation, the Controller shall decide what\numt or umts to start The Controller will observe the conditions on the pipehne segment to be\naffected pnor to startmg a umt\" The controller was not cognizant of the abnormal pipehne\nconditions of the pressure at Kansas City being over 1000 pshg with the flow near zero prior to\nthe rupture, nor the other abnormal flow and pressure conditions along the lme from El Dorado\nto Empona, to Topeka and on to Kansas City that existed pnor to the rupture Controller ¹I\nissued a command at 00 55 to start Topeka pump station at MP 103 82 without properly\nmonitoring and evaluating the pipehne operation The pump station start was initiated afler the\nrupture occurred at 00 51\nrt 195 402 Procedural manual for operathons, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) GeneraL Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipehne system a\nmanual of wntten procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handlmg abnormal operations and emergencies\n(d) Abnormal operation The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section\nmust include procedures for the following to provide safety when operating\ndesign limits have been exceeded;\n(1) Respondhng to, investigating, and correchng the cause of;\n(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal\noperation, or personnel error which could cause a hazard to persons\nor property.\n(3) Correcting vanations from normal operahon of pressure and flow equipment\nand controls.\n\n\n\nMagellan recognizes Il 195 402(d)(3) as a requirement by stating the rule m its abnormal\noperations manual RPOC-ADM-003 Section 1 2 3 3, but failed to follow its wntten procedures\nmanuals (RPOC-ADM-003 Section 1 2 1) addressing this abnormal operation A pipehne\ncontroller did not take immediate action to correct an abnormal operatmg condition on thc El\nDorado-Kansas City Terminal pipelme\nOperations and monitonng of the El Dorado to Kansas City ¹6-10\"/¹4-8\" pipehne was\nperformed by two SCADA controllers Controller ¹1 on Console 4 performed startup and\nshutdown functions and monitonng of the hne from El Dorado to Milepost 156 while\nController ¹2 on Console 2 monitored alarms for Milepost 156 through the Kansas City\nTermmal Controller ¹2 did not appropriately follow wntten procedures manual RPOC-ADM-\n003 Section 1 2 1 states, \"The Controller, upon learning of an abnormal situation, will proceed\nto immediately correct it or have field personnel correct it\" Controller ¹2 received a high\npressure alarm at 00 39 at the Kansas City Termmal According to the Event Summary,\nController ¹2 received an \"A/D - Fail\" alarm at 00 48 which indicated a pressure transmitter\nfor the Kansas City Terminal was out of range Controller ¹2 did not alert Controller ¹1 to the\noccurrence of the two alarms indicative of high pressure at Kansas City Terminal Controller\n¹2 cleared the pressure alarm at 00 49 No further action on the ¹6-10\"/¹4-8\" was taken by\neither Controller until after the hne ruptured at 00 51 Magellan's mtemal accident report\ninterviews of Controllers indicate that Controller ¹2 cleared the high pressure alarm at Kansas\nCity Termmal and did not recogmze this alarm as an abnormal operatmg condition Also this\nreport mdicates that several minutes passed before Controller ¹1 notified Controller ¹2 that a\nrelease had occurred Controller 2 then reviewed the trend at Kansas City Termmal and\nvenfied that a release had occurred The delayed actions of Controller ¹2 cleanng an alarm at\n00 49 on the ¹4-8\" and not notifying Conholler ¹1 of the two alarms indicative ot high\npressure at the Kansas City Terminal caused abnormal conditions to continue which\ncontnbuted to the pipehne failure\nt) 195. 402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipelme system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handhng abnormal operations and emergencies.\n(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section must\ninclude procedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency\ncondition occurs.\n(4) Taking necessarv action, such as emergency shutdo&vn or pressure reduction,\nto mininuze the volume of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide that is released\nfrom an& section of a pipeline system in the event of a fadure\nMagellan failed to follow its wntten procedures (RPOC-ADM-004 Sections 3 2 1 5) for\nconductmg normal operations and maintenance activities and handhng abnormal operations\nand emergencies to minimize the amount of hazardous liquid at the failure site Tulsa\nControllers did not appropnately follow wntten procedure manual RPOC-ADM-004 Section\n\n\n\n3 2 I 5 to determine the need to open or close the KC mainhne valve at the Kansas City\nTermmal followmg the fadure of the ¹4-8\" hne Section 3 2 I 5 states that the controller is to,\n'Review pipehne ahgnment sheet to become famihar with the elevation charactenstics in the\nvicinity of the leak and to determine the Iocanon oi mainhne valves and the proximity of the\nleak to Company facihties In con)unction with the field personnel, utihze the information\ngathered from the ahgnment sheets to determine the need to open or close remote or manual\nmamhne block valves in order to alleviate pressure and to minimize product at the leak site as\nrequired \" Failure to properly evaluate factors to successfully alleviate pressure and minimize\nproduct at the leak site resulted in backflow to the leak site from the Kansas City Tenmnal\nHydraulic factors to consider on the ¹4-8\" line feedmg into the Kansas City Terminal which\ncould cause backflow were I) tank elevations and liquid level to which it was flowing and/or\n2) any pressured hnes in the Kansas City Terminal to wluch the ¹4-8\" would be connected\nThe ¹4-8\" was ahgned through valves and pipmg to a mamfold pressurized to approximately\n60 psig by Tank 1242's booster pump This manifold also connected the Des Momes 6N-12\"\nwhich would receive product from the tank and/or the ¹4-8\" hne The leak site elevation was\napproximately 760 feet compared to the Kansas City Termmal elevation of 742 feet above sea\nlevel, without considenng the tank hquid level Also because the manifold was pressunzed to\n60 psig (equivalent to approximately 189 feet of static head pressure oi unleaded gasoline) the\n18 teet elevation difference would be overcome and flow reversed if pumping ceased on the\n¹4-8\" hne\nThe approximate leak site in regard to the Kansas City Terminal was known by 01 52 on May\n23, yet closure of the Terminal valve, the Kansas City mainhne valve, was not mitiated until\napproximately 02 45-02 47 by the Kansas City Station operator not the Tulsa Controllers\nUpon actuating the valve, a low pressure alarm was received at 02 46 41 on the ¹4-8\" hne,\nconfirmmg that isolation of the failed pipe segment was occumng and backflow from the\ntermmal had taken place Tulsa Controllers had closed the mainhne valve V6 at MP 156\nwhich was 12 97 miles upstream of the leak at approximately 01 02 57 No other downstream\nmainlme SCADA motor-operated valves existed on the line from MP 156 V6 until the Kansas\nCity Station Terminal valve This Kansas City mainhne valve was located approximately 3 0\nmiles downstream from the leak site Magellan's controllers failed to follow m a timely\nmanner its procedures to determme, in con)unction with the field personnel, backflow\ninfluences on the ¹4-8\" hne which would necessitate valve closure to minimize product\nreleased at the leak site Failure to close the Kansas City mainhne valve contnbuted 2200\nbarrels of the 2936 barrels to the gasohne spill volume\ng 195. 402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the followmg to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determme their causes.\n\n\n\n(6) Minimizing the potential for hazards identified under paragraph (c)(4) of this\nsection and the possibihty of recurrence of accidents analyzed under paragraph\n(c)(5) of this section.\nMagellan did not have a wntten procedure established to perform analyses necessary to\nminimize the possibihty of recurrence of an accident After metallurgical analysis reported\nmicrobiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) as the cause of the ¹4-8\" line metal loss at the\nMay 23, 2005 rupture site, Magellan did not have a wntten procedure for testing for it at seven\ndig sites evaluated in the Kansas City Fairfax Comdor Magellan failed to have a MIC testing\nprocedure and test for its presence in a timely manner so as to determine if those seven sites\nwere also at nsk to this factor\nMagellan received the Kiefner and Associates Metallurgical Report regardmg the ruptured ¹4-\n8\" pipe segment on or about September 12, 2005, which stated m the Conclusion on page 2,\n\"The failure was the result of microbiologically influenced corrosion\" (MIC) Magellan\nconducted anomaly digs in the Fairfax Distnct pipehne comdor from September through mid-\nDecember without a procedure to check for microbiological bactena in the soil Magellan\nprovided the documented procedure \"KC Comdor Bactena Samphng Protocol\" dated\n12/1' 05 Seven dig sites were performed dunng the penod from September 12, 2005 to mid-\nDecember without MIC testing or a metallurgical analysis for MIC Only water samples of\nencased pipehnes were taken and evaluated for pH and smell as this was Magellan's usual\nstandard procedure which did not mclude analyzing for MIC\nAfler receiving knowledge of the threat of MIC, Magellan delayed 3 months m producing a\nprotocol to address the samphng for MIC wh~le Magellan continued to perform field\nexcav ations\nof their pipelmes in the suspect area Magellan failed to adequately analyze seven dig sites for\nMIC and mmimize the possibihty of recurrence at these sites as required by ( 195 402 (c)(6)\n8 tI 195. 402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\n(a) GeneraL Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handhng abnormal operations and emergencies.\n(c) Itfaiareaance and normal operanons The manual required by paragraph (a) of\nthis section must include procedures for the following to provide safety dunng\nmaintenance and normal operations.\n(5) Analyzing pipeline accidents to determine their causes.\nMagellan did not follow its procedures (7 02-ADM-002) nor were the procedures adequate\nregarding marking removal and preparation of pipe segments involved in accidents to be sent\nfor metallurgical analysis On May 25, 2005 a PHMSA mspector witnessed Magellan's\n\n\n\npersonnel prepanng the failed segment of the //4-8\" hne and casing for removal and\ntransportation for metallurgical evaluation Magellan's personnel did not have its Pipe\nSpecimen Cut-Out Protocol 7 02-ADM-002 at the failure site and were unclear as to what\nmarkings should be apphed Additionally, the procedures were not specific regarding pipe\nmarking practices for removal ot pipe that is involved in a failure The PHMSA inspector\ndirected Magellan's personnel to properly mark the pipe sequent pnor to cutout and again\nprior to shipment, as the mitial markings had not been transferred to the pipes which had been\nshortened for transportation Protocol 2 1 7 regarding marking the pipe specimen was later\nadded to the Magellan Pipe Specimen Cut-Out Protocol on 01/01/06\n9. t'1 195. 402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies\ne) Emergencies The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section must\ninclude procedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency\ncondition occurs;\n(9) Providing for a post accident review of employee activities to determme\nvvhether the procedures were effective in each emergency and taking corrective\naction where deficiencies are found.\nMagellan did not follow its wntten procedure (RPOC-ADM-004 Section I 5 1) regarding post\naccident review RPOC-ADM-004 Section 1 5 1 states, \"For actual emergencies, the\nManager of Operations Control will ensure that the Incident Investigation for that incident\nincludes a review of the effectiveness of these emergency operations procedures, and will take\ncorrective action as needed \" Magellan did not take sufficient corrective actions to address\nthe findings m the post accident review Magellan's operating personnel both in the SCADA\nControl Center and Kansas City Terminal failed to close the Kansas City Terminal mainhne\nblock valve resulting m an additional 2, 200 barrels of gasoline back flowing from the termmal\nand spilhng at the rupture site The post accident review stated mdividuals' recommendations\nthat emergency operation procedures for the Kansas City Terminal be hne specific for this\nlocation instead of global company wide Also, the post accident review and follow-up\nstudies did not adequately consider pipeline system modifications, such as backflow\nprevention devices, as corrective actions to minimize additional hazardous hquid flowing\nfrom the Kansas City Terminal and being released in the event ot a failure\n10. fI 199. 225 Alcohol tests required\nEach operator shall conduct the following types of alcohol tests for the presence of\nalcohol:\n(a) Post-accident. (1) As soon as practicable following an accident, each operator\nshall test each surviving covered employee for alcohol if that employee's\nperformance of a covered function either contributed to the accident or cannot be\ncompletely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident. The decision not to\n\n\n\nadminister a test under this section shall be based on the operator's determination,\nusing the best available information at the time of the determination, that the\ncovered employee's performance could not have contributed to the accident\n(2)(1) If a test required by this section is not administered within 2 hours following\nthe accident, the operator shall prepare and maintain on file a record stating the\nreasons the test was not promptly administered If a test required by paragraph\n(a) is not administered within 8 hours following the accident, the operator shall\ncease attempts to admunister an alcohol test and shall state in the record the\nreasons for not administering the test.\nMagellan did not comply with the alcohol testing requirement that covered employees be\ntested and that they be tested within the allotted 2 hour time frame or document why testing\nwas not promptly administered\nTwo controllers were operating and monitoring the pipeline at\nthe time of its failure One controller was tested 3 hours and 29 minutes after the accident, and\nMagellan had no records stating the reason for not promptly administering the alcohol test A\nsecond controller was not tested for alcohol Magellan's Drug and Alcohol Policy does state in\nSection 1 Subsection B that it has adopted PHMSA Alcohol Misuse Prevention Plan and its\npolicy is intended to comply with the requirements of 49 FR Parts 199 and 40\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 United States Code, $ 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\nItem number\nPenalty\n$200,000\n2\n$100,000\n$100,000\nS100,000\nS100,000\n$100,000\n$ 43,000\n10\n$ 41,000\nWarning\ne have reviewed the cırcumstances and supporting documents involved in item 8, and hav\ncided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at th\n9\n\n\n\ntime We advise you to correct item 8 identifie m this letter Failure to do so will result in\nMagellan Pipehne Company, L L C being subject to additional enforcement action No reply\nto this item is required\nPro osed Com liance Order\nWith respect to item 9 pursuant to 49 United States Code ) 60118, the Pipehne and Hazardous\nMatenals Safety Admuustration proposes to issue a Comphance Order to Magellan Pipehne\nCompany, L L C Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and\nmade a part ot this Notice\nRes onse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators\nin Compliance Proceedmgs Please refer to this document and note the response options Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enlorcement action is subject to being\nmade pubhcly av ailable lf you beheve that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential lreatment under 5 U S C 552(b), along with the complete original document\nyou must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe quahfy for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation ol why you beheve the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U S C 552(b) If you do not respond\nwithin 30 days of receipt of tins Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the\nallegations in this Notice and authonzes the Associate Admmistrator for Pipehne Safety to find\nfacts as alleged m this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Fmal Order\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2008-5007 and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electromc format whenever possible\nSincerely,\nIvan A Huntoon\nDirector, Central Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admmistration\nEnclosures Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n10\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code ) 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Matenals Safety\nAdmimstration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Magellan Pipehne Company, L L C, a\nComphance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the comphance\nof Magellan Pipehne Company, L L C with the pipeline safety regulations\n1 In regard to Item 9 of the Notice pertainmg to takmg corrective actions based on the\ndeficiencies found dunng the post accident review, Magellan is to estabhsh specific\nwritten emergency procedures to mmimize the volume of hazardous hquid released\nin the Fairfax Industrial District m the event of a failure of mcoming and outgoing\npipehnes at its Kansas City Terminal The wntten emergency procedures shall be\nbased on an analysis of Magellan s incoming and outgomg pipehne systems at the\nKansas City Terminal, including but not hmited to piping configuration, pumps,\ntanks, valves, pipe and tank elevations, mode of pipehne operation (steady state,\nstatic, transient) and pipehne contiol mechamsms\n2 In regard to Item 9 of the Notice pertaming to takmg corrective actions based on the\ndeficiencies found dunng the post ace~dent review, Magellan must install check\nvalves to prevent backflow of hazardous liquid from the Kansas City Terminal to\nmcoming pipehnes in the event of a failure A check valve means a valve that\npermits fluid to flow freely in one direction and contams a mechanism to\nautomatically prevent flow in the other direction\n3 In regard to Item Number I of the Proposed Comphance Order, Magellan shall train\nits personnel at the SCADA Control Center and the Kansas City Terminal on these\nrevised procedures and provide documentation of the traimng to the Director,\nCentral Region, withm 90 days of a receipt of a Final Order\n4 In regard to Item 2 of the Proposed Compliance Order, Magellan shall submit a\nplan and schedule to the Director, Central Region, for approval withm 90 days of\nreceipt of a Final Order\n5 Magellan shall maintam documentation ol the safety improvement costs associated\nwith fultilhng this Comphance Order and submit the total to Ivan Huntoon,\nDirector, Central Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nCosts shall be reported m two categories I) total cost associated with\npreparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost\nassociated with replacements, additions and other changes to pipehne mfrastructure\n11\n\n\n\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\nThe requirements of 49 C F R Part 190, Subpart B ()$ 190 201 — 190 237) govern response to\nNotices issued by a Regional Director Pipeline and Hazardous Matenals Safety Admmistration\n(PHMSAl\nBe adk ised that all material submitted by a iespondent in response to an enforcement action is\nsubIect to being made publicly available If you beheve that any portion of your responsn e\nmatenal qualdies foi confidential treatment under 5 U S C 552(bl along with the complete\nonginal document you must provide a second copy of the document wnth the portions you\nbelieve qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you beheve the\nredacted information quahfies lor confidential treatment under 5 L S C 552(bl\nI Procedures for Res ondrn to a NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION:\nWithin 30 days of receipt of a Notice of Probable Violation, the respondent shall respond\nto the Regional Director who issued the Notice in the following v, ay\na When the Notice contams a ro osed CIVIL PENALTV\"—\nI If you are not contesting any violations alleged m the Notice, pay the\nproposed civil penalty and adk ise the Regional Director of the payment\nThis authorizes PHMSA to make findings and to close the case with\npre&udkce to the respondent Payment terms are outhned below\nII you are not contesting any violations alleged in the Notice but wish to\nsubmit written explanations, information, or other matenals you beheve\nvi arrant mitigation of the civil penalty, you may submit such matenals\nThis authonzes PHMSA to make findings and to issue a Final Order\nassessing a penalty amount up to the amount proposed m the Notice,\nIf you are contestmg one or more of the items in the Notice but are not\nrequesting an oral heanng submit a written response to the allegations\nand/or seek elimination or mitigation of the proposed civil penalty Refer\nto 49 C F R ss 190 225 for assessment considerauons, which include the\nrespondent s ability to pay and the effect on the respondent s ability to\nstay in business, upon which civil penalties are based or\n4 Request a heanng as described belo~ to contest the allegations and/or\nproposed assessment of a civil penalty\nb When the Notice contains a ro used COMPLIANCE ORDER\"—\nI If you are not contesting the comphance order, notify the Regional\nDn ector that you mtend to take the steps m the proposed compliance\norder,\nI of 3\n\n\n\nIf i ou are not contesting the comphance order but wish to submit written\nexplananons, information, or other matenals you beheve ivarrant\nmodification of the proposed comphancc order m whole or in part, or you\nseek claufication of the terms of thc proposed compliance order you may\nsubmit such matenals This authorizes PHMSA to make findings and\nissue a comphance order\nIf you are contesting the proposed compliance order but are not requesting\nan oral hearing, submit written explanations, mformation or other\nmaterials in answer to the allegauons in the Notice and stating your\nreasons for oblecting to the proposed comphance order items in whole or\nm patt, or\n4 Request a heaung as descnbed below to contest the allegations and/or\nproposed comphance order items\nc When the Notice contams a WARNING ITEM\nNo written response is required The respondent is warned that if it does not\ntake appropnate action to correct these items, enforcement action wall be\ntaken if a subsequent inspection reveals a violation\n\" Failure of the respondent to respond to the Notice wtthtn 30 days of receipt\nconstitutes a waivei of the nght to contest the allegations in the Notice and authonzes\nthe Associate Admimstrator for Pipelme Safety to find facts as alleged in the Notice\nwithout further notice to the respondent and to issue a Fmal Order\nII Procedures for Res ondin to a NOTICE OF AMENDMKNT\"—\nWithin 30 days of receipt of a Notice of Amendment, the respondent shall respond to the\nRegional Director who issued the Notice in the following way\na If you are not contesting the Notice, notify the Regional Director of your plans\nto address the madequacies identified in the Notice\nb If you are not contestmg the Notice but wish to submit wntten explanations,\ninformation, or other matenals you beheve warrant modification of the Notice\nof Amendment m whole or in part, or you seek clanfication of the terms of the\nNotice of Amendment you may submit such mateuals This authorizes\nPHMSA to make findings and issue an Order Directing Amendment,\nc If you are contesting the Notice of Amendment but are not requestmg an oral\nheanng, submit written explanations, information or other mateuals m answer\nto the alleganons in the Notice and stating your reasons for obl ecting to the\nNotice of Amendment items in whole or in part, or\n2 ol 5\n\n\n\nd Request a hearing as descnbed below to contest the allegations in the Notice\n* Failure of the respondent to respond to the Notice withm 30 days of receipt\nconstitutes a waiver of the nght to contest the allegations m the Notice and authorizes\nthe Associate Admmistrator for Pipebne Safety to find facts as alleged in the Notice\nwithout further notice to the respondent and to issue a Final Order\nIII Procedure for Re uestin a Heamn\nA request for a heanng must be in writmg and accompanied by a statement of the issues\nthat the respondent intends to raise at the heanng The issues may relate to the\nallegations, new information or to the proposed compliance order or proposed civil\npenalty amount Refer to 49 C F R ( 190 225 for assessment considerations upon which\ncivil penalties are based A respondent's failure to specify an issue may result m waiver\nof the nght to iaise that issue at the heanng I'he respondent's request must also indicate\nwhether or not respondent will be represented b& counsel at the heanng Failure to\nrequest a heanng in writing wtthtn 30 days of receipt of a Notice watves the nght to a\nhearing In addition, if the amount of the proposed civil penalty or the proposed\ncorrective action-is less than $10, 000, the heaimg will be held by telephone unless the\nrespondent submits a wntten request toi an m-person heanng Complete heanng\nprocedures can be found at 49 C F R $ 190 211\nIV Extensions of Time\nAn extension of time to prepare an appropnate response to a Notice ma) be granted, at\nthe agency's discretion, follounng submittal of a written request to the Regional Director\nI'he request must indicate the amount of time needed and the reasons for the extension\nThe request must be submitted within 30 days ol receipt of the Notice\nV Freedom of Information Act\nAny matenal provided to PHMSA by the respondent, and matenals prepared by PHMSA\nincluding the Notice and any order issued in this case may be considered pubhc\nformation and sub3ect to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) If\nyou believe the information you are providing is secunty sensitive, pnvileged,\nconfidential or may cause your company competitive disadvantages please clearly\nidentify the material and provide justification why the documents or portions of a\ndocument, should not be released under FOIA If we receive a request for your matenal,\nwe will notify vou if PHMSA after revtewtng the matenals and your provided\n3usttficatton, determmes that withholdmg the materials does not meet any exemption\nprovided under the FOIA You mal appeal the agency's decision to release matenal\nunder the FOIA at that time Your appeal v:ill stay the release of those matenals until a\nfinal decision is made\nVl Small Business Re ulatorv Enforcement Fairness Act Information\nThe Small Business and Agncultuial Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and 10\nRegional Fairness Boards were estabhshed to receive comments from small businesses\nabout federal agency enforcement actions The Ombudsman v ill annually evaluate the\nenforcement acttv ities and rate each agency's responsiveness to sm","truncated":true,"body_characters":44956}