{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320105008H","title":"ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2010-07-28","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320105008h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320105008h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320105008h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320105008H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2010-07-28 and is reported as closed as of 2015-03-20. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_CAO%20Amendment_09222010.pdf\n\n320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_CAO%20Amendment_09222010_text.pdf\n\n320105008H_CAO_07282010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_CAO_07282010.pdf\n\n320105008H_CAO_07282010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_CAO_07282010_text.pdf\n\n320105008H_Closure_03202015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Closure_03202015.pdf\n\n320105008H_Closure_03202015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Closure_03202015_text.pdf\n\n320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20CAO%20Amendment_09172010.pdf\n\n320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20CAO%20Amendment_09172010_text.pdf\n\n320105008H_Region CAO Status Report Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Region%20CAO%20Status%20Report%20Restart%20Plan%20Disapproved_08102010.pdf\n\n320105008H_Region CAO Status Report Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Region%20CAO%20Status%20Report%20Restart%20Plan%20Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf\n\n320105008H_Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Restart%20Plan%20Disapproved_08102010.pdf\n\n320105008H_Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320105008H/320105008H_Restart%20Plan%20Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf\n\n320105008H_CAO Amendment_09222010_text.pdf\n\nSEP 22 2010\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FACSIMILE TO: (713) 653-6711\nMr. Terry McGill\nPresident\nEnbridge Energy Partners, L.P.\n1100 Louisiana, Suite 3300\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 3-2010-5008H\nAmendment to the July 28, 2010 Corrective Action Order\nDear Mr. McGill:\nIn light of your company’s waiver of a hearing, enclosed is a Amendment to the Corrective\nAction Order issued on July 28, 2010, as proposed in the a Notice of Proposed Amendment to\nthe Corrective Action Order issued on September 17, 2010. Your receipt of this Amendment\nconstitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nPlease direct any questions on this matter to David Barrett, Director, Central Region, Office of\nPipeline Safety, PHMSA, at (816) 329-3800.\nSincerely,\nJeffery Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nFor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures: Amendment to the Corrective Action Order\nCopy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233\n\n\n\nU. S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\n_________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nEnbridge Energy Partners, L.P., ) CPF No. 3-2010-5008H\n)\nRespondent. )\n_________________________________)\nAMENDMENT\nTO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nOn July 28, 2010, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), issued a Corrective\nAction Order (CAO) to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (Enbridge or Respondent), finding that\nthe continued operation of Respondent’s Line 6B extending approximately 286 miles from\nGriffith, Indiana to the U.S.−Canadian border would be hazardous to life, property, and the\nenvironment unless certain corrective actions were taken. PHMSA issued the July 28, 2010\nCAO (Original CAO) in response to a failure on Line 6B near Marshall, Michigan that was\nreported by Enbridge on July 26, 2010 (Marshall Failure). The failure resulted in an estimated\nrelease of 19,500 barrels of crude oil. The spilled oil entered the Talmadge Creek and the\nKalamazoo River. PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Marshall Failure which is ongoing.\nThe Original CAO set forth preliminary findings based upon PHMSA’s initial investigation of\nthe Marshall Failure and requires, among other things, that the line remain out-of-service until\nrepairs under a pre-approved restart plan are completed and restart of the line is approved by the\nDirector, Central Region, PHMSA. The CAO also imposes an ongoing 20 percent pressure\nreduction, requires inspections and evaluations of additional sections of the pipeline to determine\nif conditions similar to those associated with the Marshall Failure were likely to exist elsewhere\non Line 6B, and requires the development, implementation, and completion of an integrity\nverification and remedial work plan before a return to full pressure operations will be permitted.\n1\n1 In the Matter of Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., Corrective Action Order (CPF No. 3-2010-5008H) dated July\n28, 2010 (Original CAO).\n\n\n\n2\nWhile the root cause and all contributing factors to the Marshall Failure have not yet been\nestablished by the National Transportation Safety Board, additional information about the failure\nand the condition of Line 6B has become available to PHMSA since the Original CAO was\nissued as a result of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation. This information includes a visual\nexamination of the failed pipe section under laboratory conditions, the results of six anomaly\ninvestigation digs and repairs, and a review of previous in-line inspection results, and an\nextensive amount of other technical information concerning the pipeline.\nOn September 17, 2010, based on this additional information, PHMSA issued a Notice of\nProposed Amendment to the Original CAO (Notice) notifying Respondent of additional\npreliminary findings of the agency’s investigation and proposing that Respondent take certain\nadditional corrective measures with respect to Line 6B. On September 21, 2010, Enbridge\nresponded to the Notice. Enbridge did not contest the Notice, stated its intent to comply with the\nNotice, and waived its opportunity for a hearing.\nAdditional Preliminary Findings\nThe preliminary findings in the Original CAO are hereby amended by adding the following\nadditional preliminary findings:\n• The timeline of discovery of the failure is as follows:\n07/25/2010 5:56 PM Scheduled shutdown of Line 6B initiated by Enbridge.\n07/25/2010 5:58 PM Actual time of pressure drop on pressure logs.\n07/25/2010 9:32 PM First of nine 911 odor complaints in area.\n07/25/2010 10:54 PM Odor investigation closed by Marshall Township Fire Dept.\n07/26/2010 11:18 AM Consumers Energy reports odor to Enbridge Control Center.\n07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge personnel confirm leak at rupture site.\n07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge emergency response is initiated.\n07/26/2010 1:33 PM Enbridge notifies National Response Center – Report #948903.\n• On June 4, 2008, Enbridge received the final report on the 2007 MFL inspections results\nfrom the tool vendor. The final report indicated a total of 140 anomalies requiring action\nwithin 180 days, of which 26 were repaired and 114 remain.\n• The 2009 in-line inspection using ultrasonic technology identified 250 anomalies, 35 of\nwhich were immediately repaired, and 215 remain. The remaining anomalies are\nbetween mileposts 650 and 753.\n• Following the removal and inspection of the failed pipe, Enbridge performed additional\nanomaly investigation digs at Mile Posts 611.72, 619.57, 654.42, 654.71, and 682.72. In\nsome cases, these investigations revealed the presence of anomalies which were repaired.\n• On August 21, 2010, an engineering analysis of the deformation anomaly under the St.\nClair River at Mile Post 751.22 performed by a third-party laboratory was provided to\nPHMSA.\n\n\n\n3\n• PHMSA secured the services of Oak Ridge National Laboratory to provide an\nindependent review of Enbridge in-line inspection data and support for PHMSA’s review\nof Enbridge actions. Oak Ridge is analyzing the growth rates of certain identified\nanomalies.\n• On January 21, 2010, PHMSA issued a Warning Letter to Enbridge related to the\ndisconnection of five hydrogen permeation internal corrosion monitors installed on Line\n6B, one in January 2006, two in May 2006, and two in October 2007. Enbridge reported\nthat the monitoring systems were disconnected due to communications/instrumentation\nproblems. The warning noted that Enbridge was not able to prove to PHMSA that its\ninterim measures properly managed the threat of internal corrosion.\n• On January 26, 2010, PHMSA issued an Advisory Bulletin reminding hazardous liquid\npipeline operators of the importance of prompt and effective leak detection capability in\nprotecting public safety and the environment.\nFinding of Hazardous Condition\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, including amendments, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing,\nrequiring the operator of a pipeline determined to pose a hazard to take corrective actions to\nprotect the public and the environment. These may include the suspended or restricted use of a\npipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate.\nThe basis for making a determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring\ncorrective action, is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a\ncopy of which is enclosed.\nAfter evaluating the all available information on the safety of Line 6B including the foregoing\nadditional preliminary findings, and considering the nature of the Marshall Failure, the age of the\npipe involved, the manufacturer, the hazardous nature of the product transported, the pressure\nrequired for transporting such product, and the ongoing investigation to determine the root cause\nof the failure, I find that the continued operation of the Line 6B without additional corrective\nmeasures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAccordingly, PHMSA hereby issues this Amendment to the CAO requiring the additional\nactions specified herein be taken to protect life, property, and the environment. The additional\nactions set forth in this Amendment to the CAO are in addition to the actions set forth in the\nOriginal CAO and do not suspend or eliminate the requirements of the Original CAO, unless\notherwise specifically provided herein.\nAmendments to Required Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. is\nordered to comply with this Amendment to the CAO and take the following additional corrective\nactions with respect Line 6B. Enbridge shall comply with the following amendments:\n1. Restart Plan. Item 2 of the Original CAO is amended by adding paragraphs (D)−(F) as\nfollows:\n\n\n\n4\n(D) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of August 10, 2010 including\nadditional anomaly investigations and hydrostatic testing into the plan.\n2\n(E) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of September 3, 2010 into the\nplan.\n3\n(F) Enbridge must secure the services of a third-party monitor to provide monitoring\nduring the restart process. Such monitoring shall include monitoring from the\nEdmonton Control Center as well as review of start-up procedures and\ndocumentation, pipe design criteria, operating parameters and procedures, process\nequipment, monitoring equipment, and SCADA.\n2. Integrity Verification and Remedial Work Plan. Item 5 of the Original CAO is\namended by adding paragraphs (G)−(J) as follows:\n(G) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all remaining\nanomalies identified for action from the 2007 and 2009 in-line inspections and\nidentified to PHMSA on September 16, 2010 in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part\n195, but no later than 180 days of restart. Specifically:\ni. The 40 remaining 180-day conditions from the 2007 in-line inspection must be\nrepaired within 180 days of restart beginning with the anomalies identified in\nTable 6, of the July 15, 2010, Long Term Pressure Reduction Notification.\nii. The 114 remaining 180-day conditions must be repaired within 180 days of\nrestart.\n(H) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all other\nremaining pipe anomalies identified for action in the July 15, 2010 Notification to\nbe completed in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no later than 180 days of\nrestart.\n(I) The plan must include the performance of both a transverse field in-line inspection\ncapable of identifying metal loss and an ultrasonic technology in-line inspection\ncapable of detecting cracks on Line 6B. The in-line inspections must be performed\naccording to the following schedule:\ni. The in-line inspection tools must be run within 14 days of restart.\nii. The tool vendor’s initial report on anomalies meeting immediate repair criteria\nshall be provided to PHMSA within 30 days of completion of the in-line\ninspections.\n2 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Terry McGill, President, Enbridge Energy\nPartners, L.P. dated August 10, 2010.\n3 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Shaun Kavajecz, Manager, Pipeline Safety\nCompliance, Enbridge Pipelines (Lakehead) LLC dated September 3, 2010.\n\n\n\n5\niii. Immediate repairs as defined by 49 C.F.R. 195.452(h)(4) shall be made within\n14 days of discovery regardless of whether such anomaly met a previous\nrepair criterion.\niv. The tool vendor’s final report on all anomalies shall be provided to PHMSA\nwithin 90 days of completion of the in-line inspections and anomalies\nrequiring repair shall be repaired in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no\nlater than 180 days of discovery.\nv. The new in-line inspections results must be integrated into results of prior tool\nruns to reprioritize the focus and schedule of the integrity verification and\nremedial work plan as necessary.\n(J) The plan must include project plans and a schedule for the complete replacement of\nthe pipe in the entire St. Clair River crossing to be completed within one year of\nrestart. Provide such plans and schedules to both PHMSA and the National Energy\nBoard of Canada. To the extent delays arise due to obtaining required permits, the\nRegional Director may grant an extension of time upon written request.\nThe actions required by this Amendment to the CAO are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Line 6B under the Original CAO or to Respondent’s pipeline system\nunder 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, as applicable, or any other Order issued to Respondent\nunder authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other provision of federal or state law.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective actions that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified\nof any additional measures required and further amendment of the CAO will be considered. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\n___________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n320105008H_Notice of Proposed CAO Amendment_09172010_text.pdf\n\nSEP 17 2010\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FACSIMILE TO: (713) 653-6711\nMr. Terry McGill\nPresident\nEnbridge Energy Partners, L.P.\n1100 Louisiana, Suite 3300\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 3-2010-5008H\nProposed Amendment to the July 28, 2010 Corrective Action Order\nDear Mr. McGill:\nEnclosed is a Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Corrective Action Order issued on July 28,\n2010, immediately following the spill of your Lakehead Line 6B in Marshall MI. It stipulates\nadditional requirements to ensure the safety and efficacy of this pipeline upon an eventual and\ngradual interim restart of the line. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your\nreceipt of this Notice constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThe Amendment incorporates previous written communications from PHMSA regarding the\nrequirements of any restart plan. In addition, the Amendment requires Enbridge to secure the\nservices of a third-party monitor to provide monitoring during the restart process.\nWith respect to the integrity verification and remedial work plan that is due on September 26,\n2010, your company’s plan must include specific deadlines for repairs. Specifically, your\ncompany’s plan must include project plans and a schedule for the total replacement of the pipe in\nthe entire St. Clair River crossing within one year of restart. We understand that your company\nmust obtain certain permits to complete this work. We strongly urge you to proceed\naggressively with permitting and replacement. In addition, PHMSA orders Enbridge to repair\nevery already identified anomaly in Line 6B that meets the repair criteria within 180 days.\nThese repairs should be made as soon as practical and focus on replacing portions of the line\nwith multiple and significant colonies of anomalies. Finally, Enbridge must undertake at least\ntwo assessments of the entire Line 6B within 14 days of any restart, and take aggressive action to\nrepair any newly identified anomalies, as required in the timeframes designated by 49 C.F.R.\nPart 195.\nPHMSA will hold your company to the terms of the Amended Corrective Action Order,\nincluding the deadlines and will propose maximum fines per penalty, per day according to\nfederal regulations for any violations.\n\n\n\nPlease direct any questions on this matter to David Barrett, Director, Central Region, Office of\nPipeline Safety, PHMSA, at (816) 329-3800.\nSincerely,\nJeffery Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nFor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures: Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Corrective Action Order\nCopy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233\n\n\n\nU. S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\n_________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nEnbridge Energy Partners, L.P., ) CPF No. 3-2010-5008H\n)\nRespondent. )\n_________________________________)\nNOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT\nTO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nOn July 28, 2010, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), issued a Corrective\nAction Order (CAO) to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (Enbridge or Respondent), finding that\nthe continued operation of Respondent’s Line 6B extending approximately 286 miles from\nGriffith, Indiana to the U.S.−Canadian border would be hazardous to life, property, and the\nenvironment unless certain corrective actions were taken. PHMSA issued the July 28, 2010\nCAO (Original CAO) in response to a failure on Line 6B near Marshall, Michigan that was\nreported by Enbridge on July 26, 2010 (Marshall Failure). The failure resulted in an estimated\nrelease of 19,500 barrels of crude oil. The spilled oil entered the Talmadge Creek and the\nKalamazoo River. PHMSA initiated an investigation of the Marshall Failure which is ongoing.\nThe Original CAO set forth preliminary findings based upon PHMSA’s initial investigation of\nthe Marshall Failure and requires, among other things, that the line remain out-of-service until\nrepairs under a pre-approved restart plan are completed and restart of the line is approved by the\nDirector, Central Region, PHMSA. The CAO also imposes an ongoing 20 percent pressure\nreduction, requires inspections and evaluations of additional sections of the pipeline to determine\nif conditions similar to those associated with the Marshall Failure were likely to exist elsewhere\non Line 6B, and requires the development, implementation, and completion of an integrity\nverification and remedial work plan before a return to full pressure operations will be permitted.\n1\n1 In the Matter of Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P., Corrective Action Order (CPF No. 3-2010-5008H) dated July\n28, 2010 (Original CAO).\n\n\n\n2\nWhile the root cause and all contributing factors to the Marshall Failure have not yet been\nestablished by the National Transportation Safety Board, additional information about the failure\nand the condition of Line 6B has become available to PHMSA since the Original CAO was\nissued as a result of PHMSA’s ongoing investigation. This information includes a visual\nexamination of the failed pipe section under laboratory conditions, the results of six anomaly\ninvestigation digs and repairs, and a review of previous in-line inspection results, and an\nextensive amount of other technical information concerning the pipeline.\nBased on this additional information, PHMSA is issuing this Notice of Proposed Amendment to\nthe Original CAO notifying Respondent of additional preliminary findings of the agency’s\ninvestigation and proposing that Respondent take certain additional corrective measures with\nrespect to Line 6B.\nAdditional Preliminary Findings\nThe preliminary findings in the Original CAO are amended by adding the following additional\npreliminary findings:\n• The timeline of discovery of the failure is as follows:\n07/25/2010 5:56 PM Scheduled shutdown of Line 6B initiated by Enbridge.\n07/25/2010 5:58 PM Actual time of pressure drop on pressure logs.\n07/25/2010 9:32 PM First of nine 911 odor complaints in area.\n07/25/2010 10:54 PM Odor investigation closed by Marshall Township Fire Dept.\n07/26/2010 11:18 AM Consumers Energy reports odor to Enbridge Control Center.\n07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge personnel confirm leak at rupture site.\n07/26/2010 11:45 AM Enbridge emergency response is initiated.\n07/26/2010 1:33 PM Enbridge notifies National Response Center – Report #948903.\n• On June 4, 2008, Enbridge received the final report on the 2007 MFL inspections results\nfrom the tool vendor. The final report indicated a total of 140 anomalies requiring action\nwithin 180 days, of which 26 were repaired and 114 remain.\n• The 2009 in-line inspection using ultrasonic technology identified 250 anomalies, 35 of\nwhich were immediately repaired, and 215 remain. The remaining anomalies are\nbetween mileposts 650 and 753.\n• Following the removal and inspection of the failed pipe, Enbridge performed additional\nanomaly investigation digs at Mile Posts 611.72, 619.57, 654.42, 654.71, and 682.72. In\nsome cases, these investigations revealed the presence of anomalies which were repaired.\n• On August 21, 2010, an engineering analysis of the deformation anomaly under the St.\nClair River at Mile Post 751.22 performed by a third-party laboratory was provided to\nPHMSA.\n• PHMSA secured the services of Oak Ridge National Laboratory to provide an\nindependent review of Enbridge in-line inspection data and support for PHMSA’s review\n\n\n\n3\nof Enbridge actions. Oak Ridge is analyzing the growth rates of certain identified\nanomalies.\n• On January 21, 2010, PHMSA issued a Warning Letter to Enbridge related to the\ndisconnection of five hydrogen permeation internal corrosion monitors installed on Line\n6B, one in January 2006, two in May 2006, and two in October 2007. Enbridge reported\nthat the monitoring systems were disconnected due to communications/instrumentation\nproblems. The warning noted that Enbridge was not able to prove to PHMSA that its\ninterim measures properly managed the threat of internal corrosion.\n• On January 26, 2010, PHMSA issued an Advisory Bulletin reminding hazardous liquid\npipeline operators of the importance of prompt and effective leak detection capability in\nprotecting public safety and the environment.\nAllegation of Hazardous Condition and Right to Hearing\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, including amendments, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing,\nrequiring the operator of a pipeline determined to pose a hazard to take corrective actions to\nprotect the public and the environment. These may include the suspended or restricted use of a\npipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate.\nThe basis for making a determination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring\ncorrective action, is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a\ncopy of which is enclosed.\nAfter evaluating the all available information on the safety of Line 6B including the foregoing\nadditional preliminary findings, and considering the nature of the Marshall Failure, the age of the\npipe involved, the manufacturer, the hazardous nature of the product transported, the pressure\nrequired for transporting such product, and the ongoing investigation to determine the root cause\nof the failure, it appears that the continued operation of the Line 6B without additional corrective\nmeasures would be hazardous to life, property, and the environment.\nAccordingly, PHMSA hereby issues this Notice of Proposed Amendment to the CAO to notify\nRespondent of the agency’s intent to issue an Amendment to the CAO requiring the additional\nactions specified herein be taken to protect life, property, and the environment. The additional\nactions set forth in this Notice of Proposed Amendment to the CAO are in addition to the actions\nset forth in the original CAO and do not suspend or eliminate the requirements of the Original\nCAO, unless otherwise specifically provided herein.\nResponse to this Notice\nRespondent may request a hearing on this Notice, to be held as soon as practicable, by notifying\nthe Director, Central Region, PHMSA (Director), 901 Locust Street, Suite 462, Kansas City, MO\n64106 in writing within 10 days of service of this Notice. Failure to submit such written\nnotification waives the opportunity for a hearing and allows the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety to proceed to amend the CAO as proposed. If a hearing is requested, it will be\nheld telephonically or in-person on a date and in a location mutually acceptable to Respondent\nand PHMSA.\n\n\n\n4\nAmendments to Required Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233 and the terms of the Original CAO,\nPHMSA proposes to issue to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. this proposed amendment to the\nOriginal CAO requiring the following additional corrective actions be taken with respect Line\n6B. Enbridge shall:\n1. Restart Plan. Item 2 of the Original CAO is amended by adding paragraphs (D)−(F) as\nfollows:\n(D) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of August 10, 2010 including\nadditional anomaly investigations and hydrostatic testing into the plan.\n2\n(E) Incorporate the actions set forth in PHMSA’s letter of September 3, 2010 into the\nplan.\n3\n(F) Enbridge must secure the services of a third-party monitor to provide monitoring\nduring the restart process. Such monitoring shall include monitoring from the\nEdmonton Control Center as well as review of start-up procedures and\ndocumentation, pipe design criteria, operating parameters and procedures, process\nequipment, monitoring equipment, and SCADA.\n2. Integrity Verification and Remedial Work Plan. Item 5 of the Original CAO is\namended by adding paragraphs (G)−(J) as follows:\n(G) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all remaining\nanomalies identified for action from the 2007 and 2009 in-line inspections and\nidentified to PHMSA on September 16, 2010 in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part\n195, but no later than 180 days of restart. Specifically:\ni. The 40 remaining 180-day conditions from the 2007 in-line inspection must be\nrepaired within 180 days of restart beginning with the anomalies identified in\nTable 6, of the July 15, 2010, Long Term Pressure Reduction Notification.\nii. The 114 remaining 180-day conditions must be repaired within 180 days of\nrestart.\n(H) The plan must include project plans and schedules for the repair of all other\nremaining pipe anomalies identified for action in the July 15, 2010 Notification to\nbe completed in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no later than 180 days of\nrestart.\n(I) The plan must include the performance of both a transverse field in-line inspection\ncapable of identifying metal loss and an ultrasonic technology in-line inspection\n2 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Terry McGill, President, Enbridge Energy\nPartners, L.P. dated August 10, 2010.\n3 Letter from David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA to Shaun Kavajecz, Manager, Pipeline Safety\nCompliance, Enbridge Pipelines (Lakehead) LLC dated September 3, 2010.\n\n\n\n5\ncapable of detecting cracks on Line 6B. The in-line inspections must be performed\naccording to the following schedule:\ni. The in-line inspection tools must be run within 14 days of restart.\nii. The tool vendor’s initial report on anomalies meeting immediate repair criteria\nshall be provided to PHMSA within 30 days of completion of the in-line\ninspections.\niii. Immediate repairs as defined by 49 C.F.R. 195.452(h)(4) shall be made within\n14 days of discovery regardless of whether such anomaly met a previous\nrepair criterion.\niv. The tool vendor’s final report on all anomalies shall be provided to PHMSA\nwithin 90 days of completion of the in-line inspections and anomalies\nrequiring repair shall be repaired in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 195 but no\nlater than 180 days of discovery.\nv. The new in-line inspections results must be integrated into results of prior tool\nruns to reprioritize the focus and schedule of the integrity verification and\nremedial work plan as necessary.\n(J) The plan must include project plans and a schedule for the complete replacement of\nthe pipe in the entire St. Clair River crossing to be completed within one year of\nrestart. Provide such plans and schedules to both PHMSA and the National Energy\nBoard of Canada. To the extent delays arise due to obtaining required permits, the\nRegional Director may grant an extension of time upon written request.\nThe actions proposed by this Notice of Proposed Amendment to the CAO are in addition to and\ndo not waive any requirements that apply to Line 6B under the Original CAO or to Respondent’s\npipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, as applicable, or any other Order issued\nto Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other provision of\nfederal or state law.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective actions that need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified\nof any additional measures required and further amendment of the CAO will be considered. To\nthe extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\n___________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n320105008H_Region CAO Status Report Restart Plan Disapproved_08102010_text.pdf\n\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL [70072680 0002 5721 4720] and FAX TO: (713) 653-6711\nAugust 10, 2010\nMr. Terry McGill\nPresident\nEnbridge Energy Partners, Ltd\n1100 Louisiana, Suite 3300\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 3-2010-5008H; Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) Notice of Disapproval of Restart Plan Submitted by Enbridge Energy, L.P.\n(Enbridge) on August 9, 2010\nDear Mr. McGill:\nIn response to the oil pipeline failure and spill that was reported on July 26, 2010 near Marshall,\nMichigan, and the Corrective Action Order issued by PHMSA on July 28, 2010, on August 9,\n2010 Enbridge submitted a restart plan for Line 6B and requested approval to restart the pipeline.\nHaving reviewed the plan and found that it does not adequately provide for the safe restart of the\npipeline, PHMSA disapproves the plan and denies your request to restart the pipeline. The plan\nsubmitted on August 9, 2010 does not contain sufficient technical details or adequate steps to\npermit a conclusion that no immediate threats are present elsewhere on the line that require\nrepair prior to any restart of the pipeline, even at a further reduced pressure.\nPHMSA will not approve any restart plan that does not include excavating and exposing\nadditional pipe and repairing or replacing additional pipe as necessary.\nBased on the nature of the failure and the preliminary visual examinations PHMSA made of the\nfailed pipe section on August 6-7, 2010, PHMSA will not approve any restart plan that does not\ninclude the following:\n1. Additional Anomaly Investigations\na. Determine, investigate and remediate as necessary, at least four additional\nanomalies in Line 6B subject to similar operating parameters as the anomaly\nassociated with the pipeline failure. Previous ILI run data must be reviewed and\nintegrated in light of the new information gained from this failure. Also, the\n\n\n\nreview must include focus on coincidental features from each of the individual ILI\nruns and features coincidental with the failure location. Defect growth rates,\ncalculated failure pressures, proximity to pump station discharge sections, and\nenvironmental conditions (wet/dry transitions) must be considered for identifying\nexcavation locations.\nb. Provide ILI vendor reports and details of all reviews to PHMSA by 5:00 pm\n(EDT) on August 13, 2010.\nc. Provide information on the anomalies reported at Mile Posts (MP) 710.74 and MP\n751.22, including the nature of the defects, failure pressure calculations, and the\nplans for remediation for PHMSA review.\n2. Pressure Test\na. Perform a hydrostatic test of the following sections of 6B: MP 607 to MP 610,\nand MP 610 – thru the Kalamazoo River - to MP 620.\nb. Submit a hydrostatic test plan to PHMSA for review, including associated\npressures, prior to commencement of any hydrostatic test.\n3. Provide Additional Clarifications and Requested Changes\na. Define what is meant by “unexpected conditions” as defined in item 1.\nSupplemental Monitoring and “abnormal conditions” as noted in Item 4.\nSupplemental Patrol of the Right-of-Way\nb. Provide detailed procedures related to how start-up of the pipeline will be\nachieved,\nc. Provide additional detail on the functions of the designated Line Fill coordinator,\nsuch as whether or not this will include manual calculations.\nd. Provide a list of all control room and leak detection model improvements (shift\nchange, use of historical trends to determine unusual pressure signature, column\nseparation alarms and response, other procedures, display modifications,\ncommunication plan, maintenance, etc) that have been implemented to enhance leak\ndetection capability.\ne. Specify that all communication outages associated with line 6B will be eliminated\nbefore commencing start-up activities.\nf. Explain how discharge pressures at Stockbridge and Howell pumping stations\nreflect the pressure restrictions required in the Corrective Action Order.\ng. Explain how the representative pressures listed in Table 1 determined.\nh. Provide the results of any independent metallurgical analysis of the failure pipe to\nPHMSA as soon as results are made known, including all drafts of the report.\ni. Describe how the in-line inspection tool and batch pig currently located in the\npipeline will be tracked and how this information will be relayed to the control room.\nj. Require that Shift Leads/Control Center Supervisors shall only be involved if they\nhave had previous experience on the Line 6B operator/controller console.\nSubmit the revised plan to my office by 5:00 pm (EDT) on August 13, 2010 electronically in\nMicrosoft Word format. Include any supplemental actions Enbridge determines are necessary in\nadditions to the actions described above. I will then review the revised plan. I may direct\n\n\n\nEnbridge to make corrections or additional modifications to the plan. PHMSA reserves the right\nto disapprove, comment, or direct modification of any plan provision upon resubmission. Thank\nyou for your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nDavid Barrett\nDirector, Central Region, PHMSA\nCc: Shaun G. Kavajecz, Manager, Pipeline Safety Compliance, Enbridge Pipelines\n(Lakehead) L.L.C., 119 N 25th Street E, Superior, WI 54880\n\n320105008H_Closure_03202015_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMarch 20, 2015\nMr. Bradley F. Shamla\nVice President, US Operations\nEnbridge Energy, LP\n7701 France Avenue South, Suite 600\nEdina, Minnesota 55435\nCPF 3-2010-5008H\nDear Mr. Shamla:\nOn July 28, 2010, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. a Corrective Action Order in the above-referenced\ncase. This Order included a requirement to take corrective actions on your pipeline. Based\non our review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined that you have\ncomplied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to\nthe matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Mr. Andrew J. Harrington, Enbridge, Inc.\nCalgary, Alberta Canada\nMr. Jeffrey D. Wiese, Associate Administrator of Pipeline Safety\nWashington, D.C.","truncated":false,"body_characters":37780}