{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320111009","title":"MoGAS PIPELINE LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-06-09","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.167(a)(4), 192.605(b)(8), 192.615(b)(2), 192.709(c).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320111009.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320111009.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320111009","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320111009","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving MoGAS PIPELINE LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.167(a)(4),  192.605(b)(8),  192.615(b)(2),  192.709(c). The case was opened on 2011-06-09 and is reported as closed as of 2012-04-06. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320111009_Closure_04062012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320111009/320111009_Closure_04062012.pdf\n\n320111009_Closure_04062012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320111009/320111009_Closure_04062012_text.pdf\n\n320111009_Final Order_02222012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320111009/320111009_Final%20Order_02222012.pdf\n\n320111009_Final Order_02222012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320111009/320111009_Final%20Order_02222012_text.pdf\n\n320111009_NOPV PCO_06092011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320111009/320111009_NOPV%20PCO_06092011.pdf\n\n320111009_NOPV PCO_06092011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320111009/320111009_NOPV%20PCO_06092011_text.pdf\n\n320111009_Operator Response to NOPV_07062011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320111009/320111009_Operator%20Response%20to%20NOPV_07062011.pdf\n\n320111009_Final Order_02222012_text.pdf\n\nFEB 22 2012\nMr. David Ries\nPresident\nMoGas Pipeline, LLC\n110 Algana Court\nSt. Peters, MO 63376\nRe: CPF No. 3-2011-1009\nDear Mr. Ries:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and specifies actions that need to be taken by MoGas Pipeline, LLC, to comply with\nthe pipeline safety regulations. When the terms of the compliance order have been completed,\nas determined by the Director, Central Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service\nof the Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as\notherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. David Barrett, Director, Central Region, OPS\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED[71791000164203269833]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nMoGas Pipeline, LLC, ) CPF No. 3-2011-1009\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn October 4-8, 25-29, and November 1-4, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a\nrepresentative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office\nof Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and\nrecords of MoGas Pipeline, LLC (MoGas or Respondent). MoGas is the operator of a 263-mile\ninterstate natural gas pipeline that runs from Madison County, Illinois, to Pike County,\nMissouri.\n1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated June 9, 2011, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Compliance Order\n(Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that MoGas had\ncommitted certain violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and proposed ordering Respondent to take\ncertain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed finding that MoGas\nhad committed certain other probable violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 192 and warning Respondent\nto take appropriate corrective action or be subject to future enforcement action.\nMoGas responded to the Notice by letter dated July 6, 2011 (Response). The company contested\nsome of the allegations of violation and provided information concerning the corrective actions it\nhad taken. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 192, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.167(a)(4), which states:\n§ 192.167 Compressor stations: Emergency shutdown.\n(a) Except for unattended field compressor stations of 1,000\nhorsepower (746 kilowatts) or less, each compressor station must have an\nemergency shutdown system that meets the following:\n1 http://www.gasnom.com/ip/mogas/ipindex.cfm (last accessed December 19, 2011).\n\n\n\n2\n(1) . . . .\n(4) It must be operable from at least two locations, each of which is:\n(i) Outside the gas area of the station;\n(ii) Near the exit gates, if the station is fenced, or near emergency\nexits, if not fenced; and\n(iii) Not more than 500 feet (153 meters) from the limits of the\nstation. . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that MoGas violated §192.167(a)(4) by failing to have an emergency\nshutdown system (ESD System) at a fenced compressor station that was operable from at least\ntwo locations, each of which was outside the gas area of the compressor station and near the\nstation’s exit gates. Specifically, the Notice alleged that, in 2009, Respondent built a compressor\nstation in Curryville, Missouri (Station), and that the two locations nearest the exit gates where\nthe ESD System was operable had one switch at a warehouse exit adjacent to the compressor\nbuilding and one on a fuel gas skid. The Notice alleged that these switches were approximately\n300 feet from the exit gates on the northeast and east side of the station fencing, and that the ESD\nSystem switch on the fuel gas skid was not outside of the gas area.\nIn its Response, MoGas argued that the ESD System at the Station met the requirements in\n§ 192.167. Respondent stated that the ESD System could be manually activated from six\ndifferent locations at the Station, i.e., at each of the four exits for the compressor building and at\ntwo other locations between the perimeter fencing and the compressor building. MoGas further\nargued that the regulation “merely states that the ESD switches should be ‘near’ the exit gates if\nthe station is fenced,” that “this vague terminology is used in lieu of defining an actual distance,”\nand that “the ESD switches at the fuel skid and east door of the office warehouse are ‘near’ the\ngates as required” by the regulation.2\nRespondent also contended that the ESD switch on the fuel gas skid was part of the meter station\nMoGas stated that the ESD System for the Station was part of the pipeline’s Supervisory Control\narea, not the compressor piping and therefore was located “outside of the gas area.”3 Finally,\nand Data Acquisition System (SCADA System) and could be activated by gas control room\npersonnel at any time from any location.\nBecause the Station has perimeter fencing, § 192.167(a)(4) requires that the ESD System be\noperable from at least two locations that are (1) outside of the gas area for the station, (2) near\nthe exit gates, and (3) not more than 500 feet from the limits of the station. The parties only\ndispute MoGas’ compliance with the first and second requirements in this case, namely, whether\nthe Station had two ESD switches outside of the gas area and near the exit gates.\nI find that the Station does not have an ESD System that is operable from two locations outside\nof the gas area. While not explicitly defined in 49 C.F.R. Part 192, the “gas area” for purposes of\n§ 192.167 would include any location likely to be exposed to an unsafe level of gas in the event\nof a leak or failure. Requiring the ESD System to be operable from outside such a location\nensures that onsite personnel can safely shut down the compressor station in an emergency\nsituation.\n2 Response at 1.\n3 Response at 2.\n\n\n\n3\nIn this case, MoGas had installed switches for the ESD System at a number of locations in the\nStation. That included the exits for the compressor building and an adjacent warehouse and on a\nfuel gas skid. None of these locations were located “outside of the gas area” for purposes of\n§ 192.167, which was intended to ensure that compressor stations could be shut down during\nemergencies from safe locations outside of areas where gas could ignite.\nThe switch installed on the fuel gas skid was not isolated from unsafe levels of gas in the event\nof a leak or failure. Gas was transported in the piping and equipment associated with that skid\nand could ignite if a leak or failure occurred. Therefore, onsite personnel could not safely access\nthe ESD switch at that location during emergencies.\nThe same can be said of the ESD switches installed at or near the compressor building. The\npiping and equipment in that building were also used to transport gas, which could ignite if a\nleak or failure occurred. Therefore, onsite personnel could not safely access the ESD switches in\nthis area in the event of an emergency.\nI further find that the ESD System at the Station was not operable from two locations “near the\nexit gates.” This requirement is intended to ensure that onsite personnel can activate the ESD\nSystem from a safe distance before leaving a compressor station in an emergency. The nearest\nESD switches to the exit gates at the Station were located approximately 300 feet away and in\nthe immediate vicinity of areas that could become unsafe if a release and ignition of gas\noccurred. Rather than being able to activate the ESD System while exiting the compressor\nstation, onsite personnel might actually have to head back toward a hazardous area to activate the\nswitches in the event of an emergency.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that MoGas violated § 192.167(a)(4) by\nfailing to have an ESD System at the Station that was operable from at least two locations, each\nof which was located outside the gas area of the Station and near the exit gates.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.709(c), which states:\n§ 192.709 Transmission lines: Record keeping.\nEach operator shall maintain the following records for transmission lines\nfor the periods specified:\n(a) . . . .\n(c) A record of each patrol, survey, inspection, and test required by\nsubparts L and M of this part must be retained for at least 5 years or until the\nnext patrol, survey, inspection, or test is completed, whichever is longer.\nThe Notice alleged that MoGas violated § 192.709(c) by failing to retain a record of each\nrequired patrol, survey, inspection, and test for at least five years or until the next patrol, survey,\ninspection, or test was completed, whichever was longer. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nRespondent did not have records documenting the annual inspections for 34 flowcut regulators\nand 15 first cut regulators for several town border stations located throughout its system. The\nNotice further alleged that MoGas did not have records documenting the annual inspections of\n15 regulators located on the bypass lines of several border stations on the southern portion of its\nsystem. The Notice indicated that Respondent had performed the required inspections but failed\nto maintain proper documentation.\n\n\n\n4\nIn its Response, MoGas did not dispute the alleged violation. The company noted that the\nMissouri Public Service Commission had previously regulated its pipeline system and had not\nrequired MoGas to maintain the annual inspections records in question, because the operability\nof these devices could be continuously monitored through the company’s SCADA System.\nRespondent requested an extension of time to provide the required documentation to the Director\nunder the proposed compliance order.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated § 192.709(c)\nby failing to retain a record of each required patrol, survey, inspection, and test for at least five\nyears or until the next patrol, survey, inspection, or test was completed, whichever was longer.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1 and 4 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.167(a)(4) and 192.709(c), respectively. Under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of gas or who owns or operates a\npipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards established under\nchapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217,\nRespondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety\nregulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 192.167(a)(4) (Item 1), Respondent must install\ntwo ESD switches near the exit gates located on the northeast and east sides of the\nfencing around the perimeter of the Station.\n2. Within 90 days of the date of this Order, Respondent must complete and provide\nthe Director with documentation of the installation required under paragraph 1.\n3. With respect to the violation of § 192.709(c) (Item 4), Respondent must submit\nthe required documentation for the annual inspections of the flowcut regulators, first\ncut regulators, and bypass regulators for the 2011 calendar year to the Director.\n4. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Respondent must comply with the\nrequirements in paragraph 3 above.\n5. It is requested that MoGas maintain documentation of the safety improvement\ncosts associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the\nDirector. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total costs\nassociated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies, and analyses; and\n2) total costs associated with replacements, additions, and other changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure.\n\n\n\n5\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $100,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the\nAttorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 2 and 3, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 192 but did not\npropose a civil penalty or compliance order for these items. Therefore, these are considered to\nbe warning items. The warnings were for:\n49 C.F.R. § 192.605(b)(8) (Item 2) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to prepare\nand follow procedures to periodically review the work done by operator personnel\nto determine the effectiveness and adequacy of the company’s operation and\nmaintenance procedures and to modify them where deficiencies were found; and\n49 C.F.R. § 192.615(b)(2) (Item 3) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to train\nappropriate operating personnel to assure that they were knowledgeable of the\ncompany’s emergency procedures and to verify that the training was effective.\nMoGas presented information in its Response showing that it had taken certain actions to address\nthe cited items. If OPS finds a violation of any of these items, Respondent may be subject to\nfuture enforcement action.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has a right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC\n20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA\nwill accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of this Final Order by\nthe Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. Unless the Associate Administrator, upon request, grants a\nstay, the terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n320111009_Closure_04062012_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nApril 6, 2012\nMr. David Ries\nPresident\nMoGas Pipeline, LLC\n110 Algana Court\nSt. Peters, Missouri 63376\nCPF 3-2011-1009\nDear Mr. Ries:\nOn February 22, 2012, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) issued to MoGas Pipeline LLC a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This\nOrder included a Compliance Order. Based on our review of the documentation you\nprovided, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to\nthe matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nDavid Barrett\nDirector, Central Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":17073}