{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320115008S","title":"ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC — Safety Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2011-06-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED safety order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320115008s.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320115008s.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320115008s","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320115008S","body":"Safety Order involving ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2011-06-15 and is reported as closed as of 2017-12-20. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320115008S_Closure Letter_12202017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Closure%20Letter_12202017.pdf\n\n320115008S_Closure Letter_12202017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Closure%20Letter_12202017_text.pdf\n\n320115008S_Consent Agreement_08082011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent%20Agreement_08082011_text.pdf\n\n320115008S_Consent Order_08082011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent%20Order_08082011.pdf\n\n320115008S_Consent Order_08082011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent%20Order_08082011_text.pdf\n\n320115008S_Consent_Agreement_08082011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Consent_Agreement_08082011.pdf\n\n320115008S_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_06152011.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Safety%20Order_06152011.pdf\n\n320115008S_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_06152011_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320115008S/320115008S_Notice%20of%20Proposed%20Safety%20Order_06152011_text.pdf\n\n320115008S_Notice of Proposed Safety Order_06152011_text.pdf\n\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (580)-395-3190\nJune 15, 2011\nMr. Wes Christensen\nSenior Vice President of Operations\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP\n100 West Fifth Street\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74103-4298\nRe: CPF No. 3-2011-5008S\nDear Mr. Christensen:\nEnclosed please find a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) issued in the above-referenced\ncase. The Notice proposes that you take certain measures with respect to ONEOK NGL\nPipeline, LP’s (ONEOK) North System pipeline. Your options for responding are set forth in the\nNotice. Your receipt of the Notice constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nWe look forward to a successful resolution of this matter to ensure pipeline safety. Please direct\nany questions on this matter to me at (816) 329-3800.\nSincerely,\nDavid Barrett\nDirector, Central Region\nPHMSA – Office of Pipeline Safety\nEnclosures: Notice of Proposed Safety Order and Copy of 49 CFR § 190.239\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nCENTRAL REGION\nKANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP ) CPF No. 3-2011-5008S\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nNOTICE OF PROPOSED SAFETY ORDER\nBackground and Purpose\nPursuant to Chapter 601 of title 49, United States Code, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA) has initiated an investigation of the safety of ONEOK NGL\nPipeline, LP’s (ONEOK) North System pipeline, including an incident that occurred on May 14,\n2011 in which ONEOK’s 106W hazardous liquid pipeline failed in a casing in Romeoville,\nIllinois. In addition to the onsite examination of the failed pipe in Romeoville, Illinois,\nPHMSA’s investigation included a review of ONEOK’s North System control center in Tulsa,\nOklahoma.\nAs a result of the investigation, it appears that a condition or conditions exist on the ONEOK’s\n106W pipeline and North System control systems that pose a pipeline integrity risk to public\nsafety, property or the environment. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(l), PHMSA issues this\nNotice of Proposed Safety Order, notifying you of the preliminary findings of the investigation\nand proposing that you take measures to ensure that the public, property, and the environment\nare protected from the potential risk.\nPreliminary Findings\n• ONEOK’s North System is an interstate hazardous liquids pipeline system that\ntransports natural gas liquids (NGL) between Medford, Oklahoma and Chicago,\nIllinois. The North System is approximately 1,756 miles long with 1,553 miles\nlocated in the states of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. The\n106W line is approximately 35.23 miles long and transports NGL between Lemont\nand Wayne stations located in Illinois. Many portions of the North System are bi-\ndirectional.\n\n\n\n2\n• On May 14, 2011, at approximately 3:40 p.m. CDT, a failure occurred on the 106W\nline near the intersection of West 135th Street and North Weber Road in Romeoville,\nIL. The failure occurred in a cased crossing under West 135th Street. Initial reports\nby the Respondent indicated approximately 100 barrels of refinery grade butane were\nreleased.\n• The released butane pushed dielectric material from the annulus of the casing and out\nthe casing vent at West 135th Street. Local businesses including a gasoline station\nwere closed and evacuated. There were no injuries reported as a result of the release.\n• ONEOK reported the incident to the National Response Center (NRC) on May 14,\n2011 at 8:55 p.m. Eastern Time (NRC Report #976327). PHMSA initiated an\ninvestigation of the incident, which involved an on-site investigation at the failure\nlocation and investigation at the ONEOK’s control center in Tulsa, Oklahoma.\n• The ONEOK North System control center consoles received notification of the\nrelease by two third-parties. The first party provided a call around 3:37 CDT but did\nnot provide an address and hung up. The controllers began to look for any unusual\npipeline response but only had an area code to go from. At 3:42 pm CDT, a second\ncall came to the control room indicating a release and the emergency responder\nprovided a location. Controllers began to close valves in conjunction with contacting\nMagellan at Wayne pump station and reversed flow into Lemont in an effort to\neliminate as much product as possible from the release site. Shutdown, isolation, and\nblow down of the 106W pipeline was completed at 4:49 pm CDT.\n• ONEOK purged the pipeline in the vicinity of West 135th Street and North Weber\nRoad. The crossing was replaced by open cutting West 135th Street and installing\nnew pipe and casing. The pipeline was returned to service on May 24, 2011 with a\n20% pressure reduction.\n• The failure occurred inside a 12-inch steel casing. PHMSA investigators and\nONEOK visually examined the failed pipe and casing at the scene, and observed a\nfailure that was indicative of external corrosion of the carrier pipe at the 12 o’clock\nposition underneath a spacer used to maintain clearance between the carrier pipe and\nthe casing. The failed pipe was transported to Kiefner and Associates near\nColumbus, Ohio for metallurgical examination. The exact condition or conditions on\nthe pipeline that caused the failure are unknown at this time as final metallurgical\nreports have not been completed. Based on the visual examination and the nature of\nthe corrosion, the same condition(s) that caused the failure could be present (or could\ndevelop) on other areas of the pipeline and impair the reliability and serviceability of\nthe pipeline.\n• As reported by ONEOK the 106W pipeline is generally constructed of 8-inch\ndiameter pipe having a multiple wall thickness ranging from 0.188 to 0.322-inch\nwith the predominate wall thickness being 0.188-inch, Grade API 5L X-52 pipe of\n\n\n\n3\nunknown manufacture. ONEOK reports the pipe seam is high frequency electric\nresistance welded (ERW) and was constructed in 1967 but could not produce\ndocumentation confirming the manufacturer. The failed carrier pipe at West 135th\nStreet is 8-inch diameter, 0.250 inch wall thickness. Per the alignment sheets and\nobservations by PHMSA and ONEOK onsite, it is apparent the West 135th Street\ncrossing has been modified since the time of original construction.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the 106W pipeline is 1440 psig. The\ndischarge pressure at Lemont Pump Station was approximately 1148 psig at the time\nof the failure.\n• The 106W pipeline crosses heavily traveled public roadways, including East West\nTollway, Butterfield Road, and Interstate 55. The pipeline also travels through high\npopulation areas. ONEOK indicated there are approximately 120 cased crossings of\nrailroads and public roadways on the 106W pipeline.\n• The previous operator of the 106W pipeline performed an inline inspection (ILI) of\nthe pipeline in 2007 with high resolution magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and caliper\ntools. A 37% deep metal loss anomaly was reported approximately 2.5 feet\ndownstream of the failure. Review of the raw ILI data by ONEOK after the May 14th\nfailure showed an indication of a feature at the point of failure under the spacer in the\ncasing. ONEOK has indicated that at the time of the 2007 ILI, none of the features\nreported at the 135th Street crossing were actionable.\n• On August 12, 2006, the previous operator of the 106W pipeline experienced a failure\non above-grade piping on the Des Plaines River bridge releasing 1,416 barrels of\nbutane. The cause of the failure was determined to be external corrosion.\n• On May 17th PHMSA conducted controller interviews at the ONEOK facility. It was\ndetermined that at the time of the incident, the console logger for one of the two\nconsoles operating the North system had quit logging commands or events and alarms\ncoming from the console. The absence of this SCADA data prevented ONEOK from\nbeing able to verify the exact time certain activities had been performed in\ncomparison with other information.\n• PHMSA determined that computational pipeline monitoring was not installed on the\nNorth system consoles at the time of the incident. The controllers did not have\ninstrumentation on the 106W line except three pressures located in close proximity to\nthe Lemont Pump Station and it was necessary to manually record data about what\nwas being delivered or received.\n• On Jan 26th, 2010, PHMSA issued Advisory Bulletin ADB-10-01 reminding\noperators of the importance of prompt and effective leak detection capability in\nprotecting public safety and the environment. The Advisory Bulletin recommends an\nengineering review of the pipeline system regarding leak detection applicability,\n\n\n\n4\nregular line balance activities, and the implementation of CPM leak detection systems\nwhere feasible.\nProposed Issuance of Safety Order\nSection 60117(l) of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a safety order, after\nreasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective measures, which may\ninclude physical inspection, testing, repair, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making\nthe determination that a pipeline facility has a condition or conditions that pose a pipeline\nintegrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment is set forth both in the above-\nreferenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, a copy of which is enclosed.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact and considering the age of the\npipeline, the proximity of the pipeline to public roadways and populated areas, the hazardous\nnature of the product being transported, the pressure required for transporting the material, the\nongoing investigation to determine the condition(s) that caused the pipeline failure, the\nlikelihood that the condition(s) causing the failure could be present or could develop on other\nareas of the pipeline, and the likelihood that such condition(s) could again impair the\nserviceability of the pipeline, it appears that the continued operation of the pipeline without\ncorrective measures would pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the\nenvironment.\nAccordingly, PHMSA issues this Notice of Proposed Safety Order to notify ONEOK of the\nproposed issuance of a safety order and to propose that the company take the measures specified\nherein to address the potential risk.\nResponse to this Notice\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, you have 30 days following receipt of this Notice to\nsubmit a written response to the Regional Director who issued the Notice. If you do not respond\nwithin 30 days, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the Notice and authorizes the\nAssociate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in the Notice without further\nnotice to you and to issue a safety order.\nIn your response, you may notify the Regional Director that you intend to comply with the terms\nof the Notice as proposed, or you may request that an informal consultation be scheduled.\nInformal consultation provides you with the opportunity to explain the circumstances associated\nwith the risk condition(s) alleged in the notice and, as appropriate, to present a proposal for a\nwork plan or other remedial measures, without prejudice to your position in any subsequent\nhearing. If you and PHMSA agree within 30 days of informal consultation on a plan and\nschedule for you to address each identified risk condition, we may enter into a written consent\nagreement (Agreement). PHMSA would then issue an administrative consent order\nincorporating the terms of the agreement.\nIf a consent agreement is not reached, or if you have elected not to request informal consultation,\nyou may request an administrative hearing in writing within 30 days following receipt of the\n\n\n\n5\nNotice or within 10 days following the conclusion of an informal consultation that did not result\nin a consent agreement, as applicable. Following a hearing, if the Associate Administrator finds\nthe facility to have a condition that poses a pipeline integrity risk to the public, property, or the\nenvironment in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Associate Administrator may issue a\nSafety Order.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2011-5008S and for each document\nyou submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nProposed Corrective Measures\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(l) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, PHMSA proposes to issue to\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP a Safety Order (Order) incorporating the following remedial\nrequirements with respect to the ONEOK 106W pipeline system:\n1. Develop and submit a written restart plan for approval by the Director, Central\nRegion, PHMSA (Director) for this segment. The restart plan must provide for\nadequate patrolling of the pipeline during the restart process, specify a daylight\nrestart, provide details associated with the monitoring of other casings, and detail\nadvance communications with local emergency response officials. The restart plan\nmust include actions taken by ONEOK to confirm the integrity of pipeline facilities\nthat were damaged, or were suspected of being damaged, as a result of the incident,\nprior to restart. After completion of restart ONEOK shall submit within 30 days of\nthe receipt of the Order or Agreement documentation demonstrating the advance\ncommunications with local emergency response officials.\n2. After the line has been restarted, the operating pressure of the 106W pipeline must\nnot exceed 80% of the actual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the\nMay 14, 2011 failure. Specifically, the discharge pressure at Lamont Station into\n106W must not exceed 918 psig. This pressure reduction requires any relevant\nremote or local alarm limits, software programming, set-points or control points, and\nmechanical over-pressure devices to be adjusted accordingly. Documentation of the\nadjustments to alarm limits, software programming, set-points etc shall be submitted.\nThe pressure restriction must remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from\nthe Director, as set forth in Item 17. If the results of any action undertaken pursuant\nto the Order or Agreement necessitate a reduction in the operating pressure permitted\nby the Order or Agreement, ONEOK must further reduce the operating pressure\naccordingly and notify the Director.\n\n\n\n6\n3. Within 15 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, submit a plan to conduct an\ninstrumented leak survey of the 106W pipeline system detailing the schedule for the\nexpeditious completion of the leak survey within 30 days of initiating the survey.\nInclude in the plan a description of the equipment to be used and performance\nspecifications describing sensitivity of leak detection. The plan must include\nprovision for submission of a summary report detailing the findings of the leak survey\nto be provided directly from the instrumented leak survey provider to the Director.\nThis summary report should include a description of any elements affecting the leak\nsurvey data, the area covered and associated ranges of the leak survey findings, and\nany other items of significance such as accuracy of the instrumentation or\nmalfunction of equipment. The Director is to receive distribution of all resulting\nreports in their entirety, including all media, at the same time they are made available\nto ONEOK. The plan must provide for the ongoing performance of patrol\nsurveillance activities for 106W pipeline on a weekly basis until approved otherwise\nby the Director.\nWithin 5 days from of the leak survey completion, submit a separate report detailing\nthe schedule of planned maintenance activities to occur as a result of the leak survey\nfor the 106W pipeline system.\n4. Within 45 days of the Director’s approval of testing protocols, complete third-party\nmechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the 106W pipeline failed\npipe, the associated spacer(s) and casing as relevant to the incident. If a review of the\ncasing vent stacks is required for any reason based on information received from the\nthird-party tester, this shall be completed as well. Provide documentation verifying\nmanufacturer and seam type, or in the alternative the testing shall also include\nexamination of a sample of pipe to confirm wall thickness and seam type (low or high\nfrequency ERW). The testing and analysis must be completed as follows:\n(A) Document the chain of custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence originating from the failure site;\n(B) Utilize mechanical and metallurgical testing protocols which have been\npreviously approved by the Director;\n(C) Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\n(D) Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their\nentirety, including all media, whether draft or final, to the Director at the same\ntime they are made available to ONEOK. Additional testing may be requested\nby the Director based on metallurgical findings.\n\n\n\n7\n5. Within 30 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, conduct an evaluation of the\nprevious in-line inspection (ILI) results, including a review and reporting by the ILI\nvendors’ analysts (including raw data) of the failed 106W pipeline as follows:\n(A) Re-evaluate the 1996 and 2007 in-line inspection results to determine\nwhether any features with similar characteristics to the feature at the failure\nsite are present elsewhere on the pipeline; and\n(B) Within 15 days of the completion of the re-evaluation, submit a report within\ndescribing the process used to re-evaluate ILI results, and the results of the re-\nevaluation.\n6. Within 30 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, perform an ILI of the 106W\npipeline. Before performing the ILI tool run, the Director will review and approve\nthe final criteria and specific technology considerations ONEOK has taken into\naccount when selecting the specific tool. Technology considerations and final criteria\nshould account for the size of anomalies experienced in the casing and other 106W\npipeline specific elements. The data analysis must be completed within 60 days of\nsuccessful completion of the ILI. The ILI must include consideration of best\ntechnology to reliably detect and size anomalies in casings. The ILI vendor shall\nevaluate the results per a performance specification, including consideration of the\nlocation and size of the defect that failed on May 14, 2011. Results of the inline\ninspection must be compared with previous ILI results from 1996 and 2007. Submit\nthe ILI results to the Director including: the comparison with prior results, and a plan\nfor remediation of anomalies requiring immediate action; including criteria for\nimmediate action.\n7. Perform corrective measures to SCADA operations as follows:\n(A) Within 30 days of the receipt of the Order or Agreement, submit a review and\nimplementation plan to the Director for a leak detection system on the entire\nNorth system. The implementation plan shall include a timeline to complete\nimplementation for all pipeline segments on all Consoles for the North system\nand is not to exceed 24 months. A prioritization for all pipeline segments on\nthe Consoles operating the ONEOK North system is to be included in the\nimplementation plan submitted. This review and implementation plan shall\ninclude instrumentation improvements. Upon completion of the review\nsubmit a report for the Director’s approval describing the prioritization,\nconsideration of risk in developing schedule, implementation milestones, and\na detailed explanation of the existing and new instrumentation requirements to\nbe utilized for each prioritized leak detection section.\n(B) Within 90 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, install and activate\nadditional instrumentation on the 106W pipeline. At a minimum, this\ninstrumentation must consist of pressure and flow monitoring at the Wayne\nstation IAP Valve 185 and additional pressure monitoring on either side of\n\n\n\n8\nIAP Valve 184, IAP Valve 416, and IAP Valve 4. This instrumentation shall\nbe used by the future leak detection system. If additional instrumentation is\nrequired for the leak detection, this shall also be installed.\n(C) Within 1 year of receipt of the Order or Agreement, update the SCADA\nsoftware to a version that will allow stale data, forced values, or points off\nscan to be backlit a different color per individual point on each Function\nControl Unit (FCU). Should additional time be required after initiating this\nupgrade for complete implementation, ONEOK will utilize provisions\nidentified in Item 18.\n8. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, identify what caused the\nconsole logger to stop working for the console assigned the tag name TCU2. Contact\nthe vendor and work to design and implement a software alarming system to indicate\nwhen this happens in the future. In addition, create a “re-boot” log that records all\ntimes, dates, identify employee performing, systems involved and /or causing, and\nreasons for rebooting of SCADA PCs or servers. This log shall be kept and available\nfor PHMSA review upon request.\n9. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, thoroughly review and update\nall written control room procedures to reflect ONEOK specific requirements and\nremove references to previous pipeline operator(s).\n10. Within 60 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, submit to the Director a\ncompany-wide management of change process including attached documentation\ndescribing the various departments that utilize the process and how the process is\nimplemented by all departments within ONEOK. Require all revisions to procedures,\nprocess, assets including abandonments or idling of facilities, instrumentation,\ncommunication, networks, or new pipeline facilities involve the control room in such\na manner as their input is provided before final decisions are made and their\ninvolvement is performed with enough time that controller training can occur in\nadvance of operations of any asset associated with changes or newly operated. This\nis required to involve all departments in ONEOK Partners at large including but not\nlimited to: asset management, scheduling, new business development, operations\n(field and headquarters), communications, design and engineering (field and\nheadquarters), maintenance, leak detection, integrity management, IT, etc.\n11. Within 90 days of receipt of the Order or Agreement, design and implement a training\nprogram for all maintenance crews requiring them to call the control room before,\nduring, and upon completion of all maintenance activity. The program must\nemphasize that this required contact should occur as frequently as needed to keep all\ncontrollers aware of the status of maintenance activities. This applies to any pipeline\nor facility repairs, emergency response, routine valve maintenance, routine\ninstrumentation, or other routine maintenance.\n\n\n\n9\n12. Within 120 days of receipt of the Agreement or Order, develop and submit to the\nDirector for prior approval a remedial work plan that includes corrective measures.\nThe work plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of the 106W pipeline\nand must fully address all known or suspected factors that caused or contributed to\nthe May 14, 2011 incident, including, but not limited to:\n(A) The integration of the information developed from the actions required by the\nAgreement or Order with all historical construction, operating, maintenance,\ntesting, and assessment data for the entire pipeline including:\n(i) Within 30 days of completion of the testing and analysis required by\nItems 3-6, complete a root cause failure analysis for 106W pipeline\nrelating to the May 14, 2011 incident that is supplemented and\nfacilitated by an independent third-party expert acceptable to the\nDirector. Elements of the root cause analysis must include, but not be\nlimited to: scoping document of the root cause analysis; procedures\nassociated with root cause analysis; multiple methods used for the\nanalysis and updates on each method as it progresses; contributory\nfactors; documentation of the decision-making process; and a final\nreport of the root cause process results, including any lessons learned\nand whether the findings are applicable to other locations within the\nONEOK System; and\n(ii) Within 30 days of completion of the root cause failure analysis,\nintegrate the findings of the root cause failure analysis into other data\nintegration efforts and the remedial work plan.\n(B) The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the\nfailure, or any other integrity-threatening conditions are present elsewhere on\nthe 106W pipeline. Data-gathering activities must include a review of the\nfailure history (in-service and pressure test failures) of the entire length of the\n106W pipeline and development of a written report to the Director containing\nall available information regarding locations, dates, and causes of failures.\nInclude a detailed description of ONEOK’s plan to confirm the integrity of the\n106W pipeline, including the criteria to be used for the evaluation and\nprioritization of any integrity threats and anomalies that are identified. Make\nthe results of the actions required by this provision available to the Director or\nPHMSA’s representative;\n(C) The performance of repairs or other corrective measures that fully remediate\nthe condition(s) associated with the pipeline failures and any other integrity-\nthreatening condition everywhere along the 106W pipeline where such\nconditions are identified by the evaluation process. Include a detailed\ndescription of the repair criteria and method(s) to be used in undertaking any\nrepairs or other remedial actions;\n\n\n\n10\n(D) Provisions for continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification\nmeasures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the 106W pipeline\nconsidering the results of the analyses, inspections, and corrective measures\nundertaken pursuant to the Safety Order; and\n(E) A proposed risk-based schedule for completion of the actions required by\nparagraphs (A) through (D) of this Item, including a schedule associated with\nall elements of the internal root cause analysis. Provide the Director with\nadvance notice of scheduled repairs.\n13. The remedial work plan becomes incorporated into the Order or Agreement and must\nbe revised as necessary to incorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to\nthe Order or Agreement and whenever necessary to incorporate new information\nobtained during the failure investigations and remedial activities. Submit any such\nplan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan\nelements incrementally.\n14. Implement the remedial work plan as approved by the Director, including any\nrevisions to the plan. The results of all actions taken in accordance with the approved\nplan must be available for review by PHMSA or its representative.\n15. Submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include available data and results of\nthe testing and evaluations required by the Order or Agreement; and (2) describe the\nprogress of the repairs and other actions being undertaken as a result of the Order or\nAgreement. The first monthly report is due on the last day of the month following\nreceipt of the Order or Agreement. The regular intervals for submitting reports may\nbe adjusted with prior approval of the Director.\n16. It is requested (but not required) that ONEOK maintain documentation of the costs\nassociated with implementation of the Safety Order, and include in each report\nsubmitted pursuant to Item16, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation\nand revision of procedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline\ninfrastructure, including repairs, replacements and other modifications; and\n(3) environmental remediation, if applicable.\n17. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction set\nforth in Item 2 upon a written request from ONEOK demonstrating that the hazard\nhas been abated and that restoring the pipeline, or portion thereof, to its pre-failure\noperating pressure would be justified, based on a reliable engineering analysis\nshowing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies,\nand operating parameters of the pipeline.\n18. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of\nthe Safety Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause\nfor an extension.\n\n\n\n11\n19. ONEOK may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator are final.\nThe above actions proposed to be required by this Notice of Proposed Safety Order are in\naddition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to ONEOK’s North System under 49\nC.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, under any other order issued to ONEOK under authority of 49\nU.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision of Federal or State law.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this proceeding and\nimplementation of the work plan, PHMSA may identify other safety measures that need to be\ntaken. In that event, ONEOK will be notified of any proposed additional measures and, if\nnecessary, amendments to the work plan or safety order.\n___________________________________ __\nJune 15, 2011\nDavid Barrett Date issued\nDirector, Central Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320115008S_Consent Order_08082011_text.pdf\n\nAUG 08 2011\nMr. Wes Christensen\nSenior Vice President of Operations\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP\n100 West Fifth Street\nTulsa, OK 74103-4298\nRe: CPF No. 3-2011-5008S\nDear Mr. Christensen:\nEnclosed please find a Consent Order incorporating the terms of the Consent Agreement that you\nsigned on July 18, 2011. Service of the Consent Order and Consent Agreement by certified mail\nis deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, Pipeline Safety\nMr. David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED [7005 1160 0001 0075 9862]\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP, ) CPF No. 3-2011-5008S\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCONSENT ORDER\nBy letter dated June 15, 2011 the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice) to\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP (Respondent) in this case.\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Notice alleged that Respondent’s 8-inch hazardous\nliquid North System pipeline has an apparent condition that, without corrective measures, would\npose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment and proposed that\nRespondent take certain actions to address the condition. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the\nconditions associated with a May 14, 2011 rupture that occurred at a cased crossing in\nRomeoville, Illinois required corrective measures to ensure safety.\nIn response to the Notice, Respondent requested an informal consultation and Respondent and\nPHMSA engaged in good faith settlement discussions resulting in the Consent Agreement\nattached to this Order that settles all of the allegations in the Notice.\nAccordingly, the foregoing Consent Agreement is hereby approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order. The Respondent is hereby ordered to comply with terms of the\nConsent Agreement, effective immediately.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. and 49 C.F.R § 190.221, failure to comply with this Consent\nOrder may result in the assessment of civil penalties of up to $100,000 per violation per day, or\nin the referral of the case for judicial enforcement. The terms and conditions of this Consent\nOrder are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n320115008S_Closure Letter_12202017_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nDecember 20, 2017\nMr. Walter Allen\nVice President of Operations\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P.\n100 West Fifth Street\nTulsa, OK 74103-4298\nCPF 3-2011-5008S\nDear Mr. Allen:\nOn August 8, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to ONEOK NGL Pipeline, L.P. (ONEOK) a Consent Order in the above-referenced\ncase. This Order included a Consent Agreement that described work to be performed on the\n106W pipeline. By letter dated November 6, 2017, ONEOK requested written confirmation\nthat the Agreement is terminated. Based on our review of the documentation you provided, it\nhas been determined that you have completed the terms set forth in Section II (Work to Be\nPerformed) of the Consent Agreement.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320115008S_Consent Agreement_08082011_text.pdf\n\nAUG 08 2011\nDEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, DC 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP ) CPF No. 3-2011-5008S\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCONSENT AGREEMENT\nOn June 15, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), U.S. Department of Transportation, issued a Notice of Proposed Safety Order\n(Notice) to ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP (Respondent). The Notice alleges that\nRespondent’s 106W pipeline and the North System control systems has a condition or\nconditions that, without corrective measures, would pose a pipeline integrity risk to\npublic safety, property, or the environment. Specifically, the Notice alleges that the\nconditions that caused the May 14, 2011 failure at a cased road crossing in Romeoville,\nIllinois demonstrate the presence of integrity risks on the 106W pipeline including risks\nidentified during a post-accident review of the North System control systems.\nIn connection with the issuance of the Notice, Respondent and PHMSA engaged in good\nfaith settlement discussions resulting in this Consent Agreement (the “Agreement”).\nHaving agreed that settlement of this proceeding will avoid further administrative\nproceedings or litigation and that entry of this Consent Agreement is the most appropriate\nmeans of resolving the Notice, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. Part 190, without adjudication of\nany issue of fact or law, and upon consent and agreement of Respondent and PHMSA\n(“the Parties”), the Parties agree as follows:\nI. General Provisions\n1. Respondent acknowledges that as operator of the North System pipeline,\nRespondent and its pipeline system are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal pipeline\nsafety laws, 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq., and the regulations and administrative orders issued\nthereunder. For purposes of this Consent Agreement, Respondent acknowledges that it\nreceived proper notice of PHMSA’s action in this proceeding and that the Notice states\n\n\n\nclaims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq. and the\nregulations and orders issued thereunder.\n2. Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations in the Notice, but agrees, for\npurposes of this proceeding, that the integrity risk identified in the Notice exists as\ndescribed in the Notice and agrees to address it by completing the actions specified in\nSection II of this Consent Agreement (“Work to be Performed”), including the actions set\nforth in any work plans and schedules each of which shall automatically be incorporated\ninto this agreement upon approval. This Consent Agreement does not constitute a finding\nof violation of any Federal law or regulation and may not be used in any civil proceeding\nof any kind as evidence or proof of any fact, fault or liability, or as evidence of the\nviolation of any law, rule, regulation or requirement, except in a proceeding to enforce\nthe provisions of this Agreement. Respondent’s participation in this Consent Agreement\nshall not constitute or be construed as an admission of liability for any purpose except in\na proceeding to enforce the provisions of this Agreement.\n3. After Respondent returns this signed Consent Agreement, PHMSA’s\nrepresentative will present it to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety\nrecommending that the Associate Administrator adopt the terms of this Agreement by\nissuing an administrative order (Consent Order) incorporating the terms of this Consent\nAgreement. The terms of this Consent Agreement constitute an offer of settlement until\naccepted by the Associate Administrator. Upon the effective date of this Agreement, any\nrequest for a hearing submitted by Respondent shall be automatically withdrawn.\n4. Respondent consents to the issuance of the Consent Order, and hereby waives any\nfurther procedural requirements ","truncated":true,"body_characters":64682}