{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320121007","title":"TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-08-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.605(c)(4).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320121007.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320121007.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320121007","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320121007","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 192.605(c)(4). The case was opened on 2012-08-29 and is reported as closed as of 2016-05-27. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320121007_Closure Letter_05272016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320121007/320121007_Closure%20Letter_05272016.pdf\n\n320121007_Closure Letter_05272016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320121007/320121007_Closure%20Letter_05272016_text.pdf\n\n320121007_Final Order_10302013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320121007/320121007_Final%20Order_10302013.pdf\n\n320121007_Final Order_10302013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320121007/320121007_Final%20Order_10302013_text.pdf\n\n320121007_NOPV PCO_08292012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320121007/320121007_NOPV%20PCO_08292012.pdf\n\n320121007_NOPV PCO_08292012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320121007/320121007_NOPV%20PCO_08292012_text.pdf\n\n320121007_Operator Response and Request for Hearing_10012012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320121007/320121007_Operator%20Response%20and%20Request%20for%20Hearing_10012012.pdf\n\n320121007_Closure Letter_05272016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMay 27, 2016\nMr. David G. Dehaemers, Jr.\nChief Executive Officer\nTallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission Company, LLC\n6640 W. 143rd St., Suite 200\nOverland Park, KS 66223\nCPF No. 3-2012-1007\nDear Mr. Dehaemers:\nOn October 30, 2013, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission Company, L.L.C. a Final Order in the above-\nreferenced case. This Order included a Compliance Order. Based on our review of the\ndocumentation you provided, it has been determined that you have complied with the terms of\nthis Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320121007_Final Order_10302013_text.pdf\n\nOCTOBER 30, 2013\nMr. David G. Dehaemers, Jr.\nChief Executive Officer\nTallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission Company, L.L.C.\n6640 W. 143rd St., Suite 200\nOverland Park, KS 66223\nRe: CPF No. 3-2012-1007\nDear Mr. Dehaemers:\nPlease find enclosed the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes a finding of\nviolation and specifies actions that need to be taken by Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission\nCompany, L.L.C. to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. When the terms of the\ncompliance order have been completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this\nenforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is effective upon\nthe date of mailing as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Central Region Director, OPS\nJessica Toll, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, Kinder Morgan, Inc.\n370 Van Gordon St., Lakewood, CO 80228-8304\nRobert Hogfoss, Esq., Hunton & Williams LLP\nBank of America Plaza Suite 4100, 600 Peachtree Street NE, Atlanta, GA 30308\nCERTIFIED MAIL – RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n___________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\n)\n)\nTallgrass Interstate Gas )\nTransmission Company, L.L.C., )\nformerly, )\nKinder Morgan Interstate Gas )\nTransmission Company, L.L.C., )\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\n) CPF No. 3-2012-1007\nFINAL ORDER\nDuring September through November, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the operations and maintenance\nprocedures of Kinder Morgan Interstate Gas Transmission Company, L.L.C. (KMIGT) in\nKearney, Nebraska.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued a Notice of\nProbable Violation and Proposed Compliance Order (Notice) to KMIGT by letter dated August\n29, 2012. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice alleged that KMIGT committed a\nsingle violation of the natural gas pipeline safety regulations and proposed certain remedial\naction. The Notice did not propose a civil penalty.\nKMIGT responded to the Notice on October 1, 2012, by contesting the alleged violation and\nrequesting a hearing. In a pre-hearing submittal dated January 4, 2013, KMIGT provided\nadditional information regarding the alleged violation and informed PHMSA that the company\nhad been acquired by Tallgrass Energy Partners, LP. As a result of the acquisition, the KMIGT\nbusiness entity changed its name to Tallgrass Interstate Gas Transmission Company, L.L.C.\n(TIGT). KMIGT and TIGT are referred to collectively as Respondent in this Order.1\n1 TIGT operates approximately 4,700 miles of gas transmission pipeline in Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, and\nWyoming as indicated by its 2012 annual report filed pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 191.17.\n\n\n\n2\nIn accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a hearing was held on January 15, 2013, in Kansas City,\nMissouri before the Presiding Official from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA. Attendees\nfrom KMIGT, TIGT, and OPS were present at the hearing. After the hearing, Respondent\nprovided a post-hearing written submittal dated February 15, 2013.\nFINDING OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(c)(4), which states:\n§ 192.605 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline,\na manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance\nactivities and for emergency response. For transmission lines, the manual\nmust also include procedures for handling abnormal operations . . . .\n(c) Abnormal operation. For transmission lines, the manual required\nby paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following\nto provide safety when operating design limits have been exceeded:\n(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of:\n(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;\n(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal\noperating limits;\n(iii) Loss of communications;\n(iv) Operation of any safety device; and\n(v) Any other foreseeable malfunction of a component, deviation\nfrom normal operation, or personnel error, which may result in a\nhazard to persons or property . . . .\n(4) Periodically reviewing the response of operator personnel to\ndetermine the effectiveness of the procedures controlling abnormal\noperation and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.605(c)(4) by failing to prepare and\nfollow written procedures for reviewing its response to certain abnormal operations.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Respondent did not review its response to an abnormal\noperation that occurred on March 3, 2010, because Respondent did not consider the event to be\nan abnormal operation. On that date, Respondent’s pipeline experienced a malfunction of a\nregulator pilot and release of gas from a relief valve. The Notice alleged the event was an\nabnormal operation as defined in § 192.605(c)(1) because it involved the operation of a safety\ndevice (i.e., relief valve) and because the operating design limit (i.e., set point of the regulator)\nhad been exceeded resulting in the release of gas. The Notice alleged that Respondent’s\nprocedures and operating personnel did not classify the event as an abnormal operation.\nThe evidence produced by OPS included a Lost Causation Report prepared by Respondent on\nMarch 4, 2010. The report documented the release of gas from the Lexington TBS #2 first-cut\nrelief valve. The release occurred when a “malfunctioning pilot on the regulator prevented the\n\n\n\n3\nregulator from locking up at set point.”2 It also noted that the “1st cut regulator did not lockup\nand the resulting pressure increase caused the relief valve to vent.” Respondent determined the\nroot cause was a filter that had allowed dirt or debris to foul the pilot stem and seat which\nprevented regulator lock up. Also included in evidence was a copy of Respondent’s operations\nand maintenance (O&M) Procedure 1902, Abnormal Operation, dated November 1, 2009.\nRespondent did not contest the facts of the event that occurred on March 3, 2010, but contested\nthe allegation that the event was an abnormal operation under § 192.605(c). In its written\nsubmissions and at the hearing, Respondent argued that an abnormal operation only occurs\n“when operating design limits have been exceeded.”3 Respondent contended that operating\ndesign limits were never exceeded in this case. Instead, the system and the relief valve “operated\nas intended within the limits of normal conditions and operations.”4 Neither the maximum\nallowable operating pressure (MAOP) nor the design parameters of the relief valve were\nexceeded according to Respondent, and the normal operation of the relief valve did not present a\nhazard to persons or property.5\nRespondent argued further that the set points of a regulator cannot be considered an “operating\ndesign limit” because they are just signals transmitted by a controller. Set points vary frequently\nand situationally, according to Respondent, sometimes changing by the day or by the hour\ndepending on the pressure the operator intends to send to a customer.6 Respondent insisted that\nif OPS were to define abnormal operation as either exceeding a regulator set point or the\noperation of any relief valve, it would be a significant change to the industry and require a\nmagnitude of additional reviews for situations commonly occurring within normal operations.\nI. Regulatory requirement\nSection 192.605(a) requires each operator to have and follow a manual of written procedures for\noperations and maintenance activities. The procedures must address, among other things, the\nhandling of abnormal operations to provide safety when operating design limits have been\nexceeded.7 Abnormal operations are pipeline events that occur outside the expected range of\nnormal operations, which could result in an imminent hazard or emergency.\n8\nThe following events are listed in the regulation, which must be responded to, investigated, and\ncorrected: (i) unintended closure of valves or shutdowns; (ii) increase or decrease in pressure or\nflow rate outside normal operating limits; (iii) loss of communications; (iv) operation of any\n2 Pipeline Safety Violation Report, Exhibit A, p. 1 (Aug. 29, 2012).\n3 § 192.605(c).\n4 Response, p. 3 (Oct. 1, 2012).\n5 Respondent noted that in the preamble to the final rule, the agency discussed a pressure excursion above MAOP as\nan example of an abnormal condition. Operation and Maintenance Procedures for Pipelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 6579,\n6582 (Feb. 11, 1994).\n6 Post Hearing Submittal, p. 2 (Feb. 15, 2013).\n7 § 192.605(c).\n8 Operation and Maintenance Procedures for Pipelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 46685, 46688 (proposed Nov. 6, 1989).\n\n\n\n4\nsafety device; and (v) any other foreseeable malfunction of a component, deviation from normal\noperation, or personnel error, which may result in a hazard to persons or property.\nThe parties at the hearing discussed at length the meaning of the phrase “when operating design\nlimits have been exceeded” in § 192.605(c), and whether this terminology limited application of\nthe rule. Respondent essentially argued this phrase creates a threshold for applicability of the\nrule. According to Respondent, an event that is specifically listed in § 192.605(c)(1) is not an\nabnormal operation if design limits were not exceeded.\nReviewing § 192.605(c), the phrase “when operating design limits have been exceeded” appears\nin the introductory text. The phrase completes a sentence that describes the purpose of the\nprocedures required by the rule. The purpose of procedures for addressing abnormal operations\nis “to provide safety when operating design limits have been exceeded.” In this context, the\nphrase is a descriptive reference to the types of events covered by the rule, which are then listed.\n9\nThe regulatory history of the rule supports reading the phrase as a description of the abnormal\noperations covered by the rule. When PHMSA proposed § 192.605(c) in 1989, the agency\nexplained that it would make the O&M procedural requirements for Parts 192 and 195\n“reasonably similar.”10 At the time, § 195.402(d) already required procedures for responding to\nabnormal operations on hazardous liquid pipelines and PHMSA believed it was appropriate for\nthe same requirements to be adopted for natural gas transmission lines. In discussing the\nstandard proposed for § 192.605(c), the agency stated that the regulation requires procedures for\nsafety “when operating design limits are exceeded, as indicated by, among other items, operation\nof safety devices, unintended closure of valves or shutdowns, pressure excursions beyond normal\nlimits, and loss of communications.”11 This suggests the events listed in § 192.605(c)(1) are\nexamples of when operating design limits are exceeded.\nCurrent PHMSA staff manuals describe the regulation in the same manner. For example, in\n“Operations & Maintenance Enforcement Guidance: Part 192 Subparts L and M” (Dec. 7, 2011),\nthere is a glossary that defines an abnormal operation as: “Exceeding operating design limits,\nincluding . . . (iv) operation of any safety device; and (v) any other foreseeable malfunction of a\ncomponent . . . .”12 While guidance does not constitute a rule, it can demonstrate a consistent\nregulatory interpretation adopted by the agency. In this case, PHMSA interprets abnormal\noperations as defined by the list of events in § 192.605(c)(1).\nBoth the regulatory history and applicable guidance suggest that the events listed in\n§ 192.605(c)(1) are abnormal operations because they are instances in which operating design\n9 The words “abnormal operations” do not actually appear in the introductory text.\n10 54 Fed. Reg. 46687.\n11 54 Fed. Reg. 46688 (emphasis added).\n12 (Emphasis added.) See also “Operations & Maintenance Enforcement Guidance Part 195 Subpart F” (Dec. 7,\n2011). PHMSA makes certain administrative staff manuals available on its website at\nhttp://www.phmsa.dot.gov/foia/e-reading-room.\n\n\n\n5\nlimits are exceeded. In other words, the events are abnormal operations subject to the rule\nbecause they are inherently “outside the limits of normal conditions.”13\nII. Analysis and finding\nOn March 3, 2010, Respondent’s system experienced a malfunction of a pipeline component\nresulting in the operation of a safety device and release of gas.\nWith respect to whether the event in question was an abnormal operation, I have considered\nRespondent’s argument that no abnormal operation occurred because the relief valve operated as\nintended and because the MAOP and design parameters of the valve were never exceeded.\nA surge in pressure above MAOP is only one example of an abnormal condition.14 Not all\nabnormal operations are associated with increases in pressure. For example, the rule states that a\ndecrease in pressure outside the normal range is also an abnormal operation.15 In addition, some\nabnormal operations are not associated with changes in pressure, such as the loss of\ncommunications and a malfunction of a component.16 The fact that MAOP was not exceeded in\nthis case does not necessarily mean the event was a normal operation.\nLikewise, it is not determinative that the relief valve operated as intended. All safety devices are\nexpected to operate as designed. The regulation still requires operators to treat the operation of a\nsafety device as an abnormal operation under § 192.605(c)(1)(iv). Although Respondent argued\nthat some relief valves may activate during normal operations, the relief valve in this case did not\nactivate during normal operations. It activated in association with the malfunction of a regulator,\nwhich is an abnormal operation under § 192.605(c)(1)(v).\nI have considered Respondent’s argument that the set point of a regulator cannot be considered\nthe “operating design limit” and that a decision to the contrary would be a significant change in\nthe industry.\nThe issue of whether pressure exceeding a regulator set point, by itself, constitutes an abnormal\noperation is not presented in the facts of this case. The event that occurred in this case involved\ntwo separate criteria that are listed as abnormal operations in § 192.605(c)(1): the malfunction of\na component and the operation of a safety device.\nAlthough Respondent argued there would be significant change to the industry were PHMSA to\nfind an abnormal operation in this case, I conclude that finding an abnormal operation is required\nby the text of the regulation. The finding is also consistent with prior administrative\nexplanations in both regulatory history and applicable guidance. Furthermore, I do not agree this\nfinding will broaden the scope of the regulation to cover normal operations. The application of\n13 59 Fed. Reg. 6582.\n14 § 192.605(c)(1)(ii).\n15 § 192.605(c)(1)(ii).\n16 § 192.605(c)(1)(iii).\n\n\n\n6\nthe regulation remains limited by its terms. Section 192.605(c) only applies to operations outside\nnormal operating limits and other types of deviation from normal operation. In this case, the\nmalfunction of a regulator pilot resulting in the operation of a relief valve was outside normal\noperations and should have been recognized by Respondent as an abnormal operation.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated above, I find the malfunction of the regulator pilot resulting in the\noperation of a relief valve was an abnormal operation under § 192.605(c)(1)(iv) and (v).\nAccordingly, Respondent was required to review the response of personnel to such conditions\nperiodically to determine the effectiveness of its procedures under § 192.605(c)(4). Respondent\ndid not have and follow procedures for reviewing the response of operator personnel to such\nevents and therefore did not comply with the regulation.\nThis finding of violation will be considered a prior offense in any subsequent enforcement action\ntaken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to the violation of § 192.605(c)(4). Under\n49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of natural gas by pipeline\nor who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety\nstandards established under chapter 601 of title 49, United States Code.\nThe proposed compliance order sought to require Respondent to develop procedures for\nidentifying abnormal operations like the event at issue in this case. It also sought to require\nRespondent to amend training and qualification materials to ensure that personnel can follow the\nnew procedures.\nIn its post-hearing submission, Respondent objected to Item 1(iv) of the proposed compliance\norder, which sought to require Respondent to go back one year to identify abnormal operations\nthat were not previously identified and to review the response of operator personnel under\n§ 192.605(c)(4). Respondent argued it would be difficult to reclassify events as abnormal\noperations after the fact when they were not initially identified as such.\nHaving considered Respondent’s objection, I agree that requiring Respondent to review past\nactions to determine the effectiveness of new procedures is not a necessary exercise.17 It would\nbe more appropriate for Respondent to prospectively comply with § 192.605(c)(4) by reviewing\nits future actions taken under the new procedures, and to determine the effectiveness of those\nprocedures. For this reason, the retroactive review sought under Item 1(iv) of the proposed\ncompliance order is not included.\n17 I did not find additional justification for ordering this action in the Notice or Violation Report.\n\n\n\n7\nPursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is\nordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations\napplicable to its operations:\n1. Amend the written procedures for the periodic review of the response of personnel to\nabnormal operations under § 192.605(c)(4). The procedures must clarify the types of\nevents that are abnormal operations under § 192.605(c)(1) consistent with this Final\nOrder.\n2. Amend any associated training materials and written qualification programs, as\nappropriate, to ensure that personnel can follow the procedures prepared under Item 1 of\nthis Compliance Order.\n3. Submit documentation demonstrating compliance with Items 1 and 2 of this Compliance\nOrder within 90 days of receipt of this Order. Documentation must be submitted to the\nDirector, Central Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 901\nLocust St., Suite 462, Kansas City, MO 64106.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by Respondent demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties not to exceed\n$200,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney\nGeneral for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent may submit a petition for reconsideration of this final\norder to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,\nEast Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, D.C. 20590, no later than 20 days after receipt of the\nFinal Order by Respondent. Any petition submitted must contain a statement of the issue(s) and\nmeet all other requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The terms of the order, including the\ncorrective action, remain in effect upon the filing of a petition for reconsideration unless the\nAssociate Administrator, upon request, grants a stay.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n_____________________________ ____________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":22690}