# ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 320125012
- **title:** ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2012-06-15
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402(c)(13), 195.402(d)(1), 195.406(b), 195.422(a), 195.428(a), 195.49, 195.569.
- **machine formats:** - **json:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125012.json
- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125012.md
- **app url:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125012
- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320125012
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(c)(13),  195.402(d)(1),  195.406(b),  195.422(a),  195.428(a),  195.49,  195.569. The case was opened on 2012-06-15 and is reported as closed as of 2016-12-29. Proposed civil penalty: $78,600. Assessed civil penalty: $78,600. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

320125012_Closure Letter_12292016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_Closure%20Letter_12292016.pdf

320125012_Closure Letter_12292016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_Closure%20Letter_12292016_text.pdf

320125012_Final Order_06122014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_Final%20Order_06122014.pdf

320125012_Final Order_06122014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_Final%20Order_06122014_text.pdf

320125012_NOPV PCP PCO_06152012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06152012.pdf

320125012_NOPV PCP PCO_06152012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06152012_text.pdf

320125012_Operator Response to Notice_08202012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125012/320125012_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_08202012.pdf

320125012_NOPV PCP PCO_06152012_text.pdf

NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION
PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY
and
PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
June 15, 2012
Mr. Wes Christensen
Sr. Vice President, Operations
ONEOK NGL Pipeline L.P.
100 West 5th Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
CPF 3-2012-5012
Dear Mr. Christensen:
On July 24-29, August 15-18, and 22-25, 2011, representatives of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49
United States Code inspected your records for the Medford area in Medford, Oklahoma,
and the facilities in Kansas and Oklahoma. For the North System, facilities and records
were inspected in Des Moines and Iowa City, Iowa.
As a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of
the Pipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items
inspected and the probable violation(s) are:
1. §195.49 Annual report
Each operator must annually complete and submit DOT Form PHMSA F 7000-
1.1 for each type of hazardous liquid pipeline facility operated at the end of the
previous year. An operator must submit the annual report by June 15 each
year, except that for the 2010 reporting year the report must be submitted by
August 15, 2011. A separate report is required for crude oil, HVL (including
anhydrous ammonia), petroleum products, carbon dioxide pipelines, and fuel



grade ethanol pipelines. For each state a pipeline traverses, an operator must
separately complete those sections on the form requiring information to be
reported for each state.
For the North System, ONEOK NGL Pipeline L.P. (ONEOK) did not submit
separate annual reports for the refined products and diesel that are transported in
addition to the HVL transported. All the mileage for these pipelines has been
submitted under the HVL annual report.
Since 2007, ONEOK has not been correctly submitting the annual report for the
North System. ONEOK’s North System transports refined products and diesel on
Lines 113, 114, 119, 112, 101, and 103. However, these lines are being reported in
the HVL annual report. No separate reports for the refined products are being
submitted. ONEOK resubmitted the annual reports for 2010 after this was brought
to their attention during PHMSA’s inspection.
2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(d) Abnormal operation. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety when operating
design limits have been exceeded;
(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of;
(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;
(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal operating
limits;
(iii) Loss of communications;
(iv) Operation of any safety device;
(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal
operation, or personnel error which could cause a hazard to persons or
property.
ONEOK did not follow up and correct the cause of an abnormal operation that
occurred in the Des Moines area in 2010.
ONEOK’s procedures specify certain actions that must be taken when abnormal
operations occur. On the North System, ONEOK personnel indicated that all
abnormal operations are documented in the SHAVRs program. However, review of
the records found that the recommended actions noted during the investigation were
not addressed or followed up on. For example, SHAVR Report 2494 had a
recommendation of investigating why a HI pressure switch remained on SCADA for
more than an entire shift without being investigated. At the time of PHMSA’s
2



inspection, there was no documentation indicating that this was completed.
ONEOK’s response to the Letter for Request for Specific Information indicated that
they did look into it, but no further action was taken to remedy the situation and to
prevent this from happening again.
3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph
(a) of this section must include procedures for the following to provide safety
during maintenance and normal operations:
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator to determine the
effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance and
taking corrective action where deficiencies are found.
For the Medford area and the North System, ONEOK personnel did not periodically
review the work done by personnel to determine the effectiveness of their
procedures.
ONEOK was not able to demonstrate that they periodically reviewed work done by
personnel to determine the effectiveness of the procedures. Furthermore, ONEOK’s
procedures indicated that the “ONP Business manager or designee shall be
responsible for conducting a review of the work done by personnel, incident, and
near miss reports to determine the effectiveness of operating procedures at intervals
not exceeding15 months, but at least once each calendar year.” ONEOK did not
have any records that indicated that this was being completed.
4. §195.422 Pipeline Repairs.
(a) Each operator shall, in repairing its pipeline systems, insure that the repairs
are made in a safe manner and are made so as to prevent damage to persons
or property.
In the Medford area, ONEOK is not making repairs in a safe manner that will
prevent damage to persons or property.
ONEOK utilized composite sleeves to repair crack-like indications. Review of
inline inspection dig repair reports found one report where a composite sleeve was
used as a temporary repair on some crack-like features in the pipe seam in 2008.
Consistent with industry standards such as ASME B31.4, the composite sleeve
manufacturer’s technical guidance specifically states that the composite sleeve is not
to be used to repair cracks without grinding out the crack defect. The use of a repair
3



method on a defect for which its use is not permitted by the manufacturer and
referenced industry standards is insufficient to safely prevent damage to persons or
property.
5. §195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other
variations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the operating
pressure limit established under paragraph (a) of this section. Each operator
must provide adequate controls and protective equipment to control the
pressure within this limit.
ONEOK did not provide adequate controls and protective equipment at Winterset
Station on the North System to ensure that the pressure in the pipeline would not
exceed the maximum operating pressure (MOP).
On May 23, 2008, a management-of-change (MOC) memorandum was issued to
reduce the pressure on the Massena to Des Moines section of Line 102 because
MOP-reducing anomalies were present. This line section included the Winterset
pump station and required that the over-pressure protection be reset to 1930 psig for
protection a lower MOP of 1950 psig from the original 2160 psig. On June 6, 2008,
a second MOC was issued on Line 102 after a failure occurred on May 31, 2008.
The June 6th MOC affected the line segment from Massena to Tabor (downstream of
the Massena to Des Moines section) and lowered the MOP to 1704 psig. On June
13, 2008, a third MOC was issued to reduce the maximum operating pressure for the
entire Line 102 from Des Moines, Iowa, to Bushton, Kansas. The June 13th MOC
was in addition to the June 6th MOC, and superseded the May 23, 2008, MOC.
The MOC issued on June 13, 2008, did not address resetting the pipeline over-
pressure protection at Winterset pump station. As a result, from the time of the June
13, 2008, MOC to the time of the PHMSA inspection, the set points of the over
pressure protection at Winterset remained at 1930 psig, which exceeded the
maximum operating pressure. Review of the discharge records during this time
period found that the line did not operate at pressures above 1704 psig, but did spike
above the 1704 psig MOP for short periods of time during pump start up and shut
downs. The line pressures never exceeded the 1704 psig plus 10% (1874psi).
6. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in
the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to
exceed 7½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each
4



pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of
pressure control equipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in
good mechanical condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and
reliability of operation for the service in which it is used.
For the Winterset pump station on the North System, ONEOK did not adequately
check the overpressure protection device for reliability of operation at 1930 psig for
the service in which it is used from October 2008 to the time of PHMSA’s
inspection.
In May of 2008, a Management of Change (MOC) was issued on the Des Moines to
Massena section of Line 102 to change the over-pressure protection set points to
1930 psig. This set-point remained in effect until the PHMSA inspection in 2011.
The semi-annual inspection of the transmitter utilized as the over-pressure protection
of the new maximum operating pressure (MOP) simply documented that the
transmitters were calibrated and spanned, but there was no indication that the device
activated at the set point (1930 psig) at which the transmitters send the signals to
shut down the pumps.
After PHMSA’s onsite inspection, in September of 2011, ONEOK personnel reset
the physical shut down switch to protect at a MOP of 1704 psig.
7) §195.569 Do I have to examine exposed portions of buried pipelines?
Whenever you have knowledge that any portion of a buried pipeline is exposed,
you must examine the exposed portion for evidence of external corrosion if the
pipe is bare, or if the coating is deteriorated. If you find external corrosion
requiring corrective action under Sec. 195.585, you must investigate
circumferentially and longitudinally beyond the exposed portion (by visual
examination, indirect method, or both) to determine whether additional
corrosion requiring remedial action exists in the vicinity of the exposed portion.
ONEOK is not inspecting their pipelines when they utilize a vacuum excavation
process to expose their lines for the purposes of confirming pipeline location.
During the review of locate records and Inspect and Investigate (INI) forms, it was
noted that ONEOK utilizes an excavation process that vacuums out soil to locate
pipelines. This is performed to confirm the location and depth of the pipelines when
a foreign utility is intended to cross ONEOK’s pipelines. The pipeline does become
exposed during this process; however, the exposed pipe section where the condition
of the pipe is supposed to be recorded on the INI form was left blank. Further
discussion with ONEOK personnel indicated that they were not doing the
inspections.
5



Proposed Civil Penalty
Under 49 United States Code, §60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed
$100,000 for each violation for each day the violation persists up to a maximum of
$1,000,000 for any related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed the
circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the above probable violation(s)
and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $78,600 as
follows:
Item number PENALTY
3 $32,100
6 $46,500
Warning Items
With respect to items 1, 2, 4, and 7, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting
documents involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement
action or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct
these items. Be advised that failure to do so may result in ONEOK NGL Pipeline L.P.
being subject to additional enforcement action.
Proposed Compliance Order
With respect to items 3 and 5, pursuant to 49 United States Code §60118, the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to
ONEOK NGL Pipeline L.P. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is
enclosed and made a part of this Notice.
Response to this Notice
Enclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline
Operators in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the
response options. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement
action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your
responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with
the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with
the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of
why you believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5
U.S.C. 552(b). If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this
constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes
the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this Notice
without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order.
6



In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2012-5012 and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
David Barrett
Director, Central Region
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosures: Proposed Compliance Order
Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
7



PROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER
Pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to ONEOK NGL Pipelines L.P. a
Compliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the
compliance of ONEOK NGL Pipelines L.P. with the pipeline safety regulations:
1. In regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to the periodic review
of employees work to determine the effectiveness of the procedures,
ONEOK must revise O&M procedure PRC 1410.100 Section 3.1 to better
define how ONEOK plans to review the work done by personnel.
ONEOK shall submit the revised procedure within 60 days of the date of
the Final Order.
2. ONEOK shall immediately begin implementation of the new procedure
and submit the records verifying compliance with the procedure within
one year after the effective date of the new procedure.
3. In regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to the set point of the
over-pressure protection equipment at Winterset station, ONEOK shall
investigate why the set point of the shut down devices were set too high
and left at that set point for multiple years. This investigation shall
include the review and revision (if necessary) to the Management of
Change (MOC) procedures to determine why Winterset station was
missed in the MOC. The review shall also look into how ONEOK ensures
that the conditions of the MOC are implemented. The results of the
investigation and the revised procedure must be submitted to PHMSA
Central Region within 180 days of the date of the Final Order.
4. It is requested that ONEOK NGL Pipelines L.P. maintain documentation
of the safety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance
Order and submit the total to David Barrett, Director, Central Region,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested
that these costs be reported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with
preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2)
total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to
pipeline infrastructure.
8

320125012_Final Order_06122014_text.pdf

JUNE 12, 2014
Mr. Terry K. Spencer
President
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP
100 West 5th Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
Re: CPF No. 3-2012-5012
Dear Mr. Spencer:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a civil penalty of $78,600, and specifies actions that need to be taken by
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty
payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the
terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this
enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed
effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Central Region Director, OPS
Mr. Wes Christensen, Sr. Vice President-Operations, ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
ONEOK NGL Pipeline, LP, ) CPF No. 3-2012-5012
)
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
Between July 24 and August 25, 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities of ONEOK NGL Pipeline,
LP (ONEOK or Respondent), in Kansas and Oklahoma and reviewed company records in
Medford, Oklahoma. For the company’s North System, facilities and records were inspected in
Des Moines and Iowa City, Iowa. ONEOK owns and operates over 2,440 miles of pipelines that
transport natural gas liquids from production areas throughout Oklahoma, Kansas and Texas.1
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,
by letter dated June 15, 2012, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Compliance Order
(Notice), which also included a warning pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205. In accordance with
49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that ONEOK had committed various violations
of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged
violations. The warning items required no further action, but warned the operator to correct the
probable violations or face possible enforcement action in the future.
ONEOK responded to the Notice by letter dated August 20, 2012 (Response). The company
contested the allegations for Items 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 but not for Items 1 and 4. It offered
additional information in response to the Notice and requested that the proposed civil penalty be
reduced. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195 as follows:
1 ONEOK Partners, LP, http://www.oneokpartners.com/Customers/NaturalGasLiquids/Pipelines/NGLPipeline.aspx
(last accessed on February 19, 2014).



2
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13), which states:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15
months, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made
as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. . . .
(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to
provide safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) . . .
(13) Periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to
determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and
maintenance and taking corrective action where deficiencies are found. . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow, for
the company’s Medford area and North System, its own manual of written procedures for
periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to determine the effectiveness of the
procedures used in normal operation and maintenance. Specifically, the Notice alleged that
ONEOK’s procedures indicated the “[b]usiness manager or designee shall be responsible for
conducting a review of the work done by personnel, incident, and near miss reports to determine
the effectiveness of operating procedures at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once
each calendar year.” According to the Notice, ONEOK failed to follow its own procedures
requiring such periodic reviews.
In its Response, ONEOK contested this allegation of violation, asserting that it conducts weekly
meetings with supervisors from across the operating organization to evaluate “near miss” events.
According to ONEOK, the meetings are conducted to discuss and evaluate such events to
identify any necessary changes to operations, procedures, etc. When procedural deficiencies are
identified, the matter is entered into its near-miss database and tracked through to completion.
ONEOK also referred to PHMSA inspection guidance regarding documentation of accident and
near-miss data, submissions from employees, and meetings to discuss procedures as possible
means of determining the adequacy of operator procedures.
ONEOK conceded that “execution of the procedure was not well-documented” but contended
that Part 195 did not require such documentation. “As such, failure to maintain documentation
does not equate to failure to follow the procedure.”2
I find Respondent’s arguments unpersuasive. First, it appears that the company’s weekly
meetings, as documented by “Weekly Event Review Reports,” are basically a routine means of
noting problems in the field and documenting discussions regarding “near miss” events. While
such meetings are certainly important in identifying problem areas, they do not demonstrate
2 Response at 5.



3
compliance with the requirement that ONEOK have and follow a process for undertaking a
comprehensive or organized review of all company procedures to evaluate their overall
effectiveness, nor do they constitute evidence of the results of such comprehensive reviews. For
example, ONEOK was unable to provide any annual review records from the company’s
business manager or his designee, nor any examples of suggested changes in company
procedures arising out of the reviews.
Second, ONEOK was unable to provide any information demonstrating compliance with its own
procedure during the PHMSA inspection and was only able to provide supporting evidence (e.g.,
the compliance manager’s email explaining his role in the weekly meetings) as part of its
Response in this proceeding.3
Third, PHMSA’s published guidance does not suggest that routine weekly meetings, such as
those held by ONEOK to discuss security incidents and “near miss” events, constitute the sort of
procedure review contemplated by the regulation. In fact, the guidance indicates that an operator
should be able to produce documentation showing that it had conducted an actual analysis of its
procedures used in normal operation and maintenance, that it had implemented a process by
which it had determined whether its procedures were adequate or not, and that it had corrected
any procedures found to be deficient.4 ONEOK was unable to document this sort of ongoing and
comprehensive process.
Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13) by failing to follow, for the company’s Medford area and North
System, its own procedures for periodically reviewing the work done by operator personnel to
determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal operation and maintenance.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b), which states:
§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(a) …
(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges
or other variations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the
operating pressure limit established under paragraph (a) of this section.
Each operator must provide adequate controls and protective equipment to
control the pressure within this limit.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) by failing to provide
adequate controls and protective equipment to control the pressure in a pipeline during surges or
other variations from normal operations exceeding 110 percent of the operating pressure limit
established under paragraph (a) of § 195.406. Specifically, the Notice alleged that on
May 23, 2008, Respondent reduced the maximum operating pressure (MOP) on Line 102
between Massena to Des Moines to 1950 psig. The overpressure protection was then reset to
3 Response at Attachment F.
4 PHMSA Operations and Maintenance Enforcement Guidance, Part 195. See
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/foia/e-reading-room, at 43-44.



4
1930 psig at the Winterset pump station. After a failure occurred on May 31, 2008, the MOP
was lowered downstream of this segment to 1704 psig, but the overpressure protection set-point
at the Winterset pump station was never reset to reflect that the MOP had been lowered
downstream of this segment. It remained at 1930 psig until the time of the inspection.
ONEOK contested this violation, arguing that the pipeline pressure did not exceed 110% of the
MOP of 1704; therefore, ONEOK argued that it had fulfilled its primary performance
obligation.5 ONEOK also argued that even though it failed to reset the Winterset pump station’s
overprotection device as part of the company’s Management of Change (MOC) process, there
was no violation because the company’s control center had adjusted programmable logic control
points in the company’s Supervisory Control and Data (SCADA) System, which served as the
“primary” pressure control device for the Winterset pump station. According to ONEOK, such
administrative change control procedures are considered under PHMSA’s enforcement guidance
to be part of an operator’s pressure control system. Therefore, the points set at the control center
were enough to satisfy the requirements of § 195.406(b).6
I disagree. First, the issue at hand is not whether the pipeline exceeded the MOP by 110% but
whether ONEOK failed to provide adequate controls and protective equipment to control the
pressure within this limit. Second, ONEOK’s failure to re-set the local set-points at the
Winterset pump station left that local station inadequately protected from an overpressure event
over a long period of time that could not be properly monitored by SCADA personnel. Third,
PHMSA’s enforcement guidance does not suggest that an operator’s SCADA system may serve
as a substitute for proper local protective equipment.
By setting the local overpressure protection above 110% of MOP, ONEOK failed to meet the
requirement of § 195.406. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that
Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) by failing to provide adequate controls and
protective equipment to control the pressure in a pipeline during surges or other variations from
normal operations not to exceed 110 percent of the operating pressure limit established under
paragraph (a) of § 195.406.
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:
§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator
shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar
year, or in the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at
intervals not to exceed 7½ months, but at least twice each calendar year,
inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure
regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it
5 By email dated March 19, 2012, ONEOK provided PHMSA with records of the pipeline control-center discharge
pressures over the relevant time period, arguing that the records supported the conclusion that pipeline operating
pressure in the subject system did not exceed the MOP (except as allowed for surges) and at no time did it exceed
110% of MOP.
6 Response at 8.



5
is functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate
from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service
in which it is used.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect and test
its Winterset pump station overpressure protection device to determine that it was functioning
properly, was in good mechanical condition, and had adequate capacity and reliability for the
service in which it was used. Specifically, the Notice alleged, as discussed above in Item 5, that
in May 2008 ONEOK issued an MOC directive regarding the Des Moines to Massena section of
Line 102 to change the overpressure protection set-point to 1930 psig. This set-point remained
in effect until the PHMSA inspection in 2011. According to the Notice, the semiannual
inspection of the transmitter utilized as over-pressure protection of the new MOP simply
documented that the transmitter had been calibrated and spanned, but did not establish that the
device had been tested or activated at the actual set-point at which the programmable logic
controller (PLC) would send the signal to shut down the pumps.
Respondent contested this allegation of violation on two grounds. First, the company asserted
that PHMSA had failed to comply with the requirement in 49 C.F.R. § 190.207(b)(1) insofar as
the Notice did not include “a statement of the evidence upon which the allegations are based.”
According to ONEOK, the Notice simply stated a “conclusion” but did not include a proper
statement of the evidence upon which the allegation was based.7
I reject this argument. The Notice charged that the company’s records failed to indicate that the
overpressure device had actually activated at the proper set-point. When read as a whole, Item 6
of the Notice provides sufficient information to apprise Respondent of the nature of the
allegation and the evidence upon which it is based, which meets the purpose and intent of
§ 190.207(b)(1). In addition, detailed evidence and exhibits were attached to the supporting
Violation Report,8 a copy of which was provided to Respondent and which provides all of the
evidence upon which the Item is based.
Second, ONEOK contended that it had provided documentation to PHMSA showing the
company had, in fact, inspected and tested the overpressure protection equipment to ensure it
was working properly. Specifically, it contended that:
[a]t the time a technician performs the necessary inspection and test, the
technician attaches a test set (an electronic instrument) to the local
programmable logic controller (“PLC”) and causes the transmitter
electronically to detect a pressure that exceeds the maximum set point limits
(HI and HIHI) during the process of checking the transmitter span.
ONEOK asserted that, depending on whether or not the system was in operation at the time,
7 Response at 9.
8 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (June 15, 2012) (on file with PHMSA).



6
these alarms would be recorded in the company’s PLC alarm log and uploaded to its SCADA
System central alarm log. The company provided copies of several of these logs as examples,
asserting that the alarms were logged at the same points at which the transmitter had been
calibrated and spanned. According to ONEOK, these records confirmed that the company had
properly inspected and tested the PLC in accordance with the regulation.
Again, I disagree. Under 49 C.F.R. § 195.428, every pressure regulator or other equipment
designed to control pressure, including electronic equipment such as a PLC or a series of PLCs,
must be inspected and tested “to determine that it is functioning properly.” This means that the
communication paths between the PLC and the end device (e.g., a mechanical pump or valve)
and the pressure at which the pressure limiting device is set to activate must all be checked and
documented to ensure that the PLC system is functioning properly. Although ONEOK may have
provided an explanation as to how its PLC system is supposed to function and may have properly
tested the transmitter itself, there is still no indication at what pressure the PLC was tested and
what, if any, readings or calibrations of pressure or signal transmittal were required to verify that
the PLC was properly limiting maximum operating pressure to satisfy 49 C.F.R. § 195.406.
Without verification of this pathway and the pressure at which the PLC actually activated, there
is no way to ensure that the PLC device was functioning properly. Accordingly, based upon a
review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to
inspect and test its Winterset pump station overpressure protection device to determine it was
functioning properly, was in good mechanical condition, and had adequate capacity and
reliability for the service in which it was used.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any
related series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.
§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the
degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s
ability to pay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing
business; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety
regulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without
any reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require.
The Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $78,600 for the violations cited above.
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $32,100 for Respondent’s violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13), for failing to follow its own procedure for periodically reviewing the
work done by operator personnel to determine the effectiveness of the procedures used in normal
operation and maintenance. ONEOK argued that the civil penalty for Item 3 should be



7
withdrawn on several grounds.
First, it argued that no violation occurred. As discussed above, I found that ONEOK did not
conduct the type of generalized review of normal operating procedures called for in the
regulation. The purpose of this regulation is not only to ensure that an operator routinely review
“near miss” events and incidents but also to periodically review and improve all of the
company’s operation and maintenance procedures.
Second, ONEOK asserted that the penalty assessment considerations of 49 C.F.R. § 190.225
were unsubstantiated in both the Notice and the Violation Report. ONEOK argued that a simple
conclusion was made in the Violation Report as to the consideration of the gravity assessment
criterion, stating that “the pipeline integrity or safe operation was potentially compromised in
others areas.”9 However, PHMSA did address the gravity factor when it stated in the Violation
Report: “Failure to meet this requirement that refines and improves the procedure can lead to
consequences that endanger the lives of the public and company personnel.”
ONEOK further claimed that the culpability factor was only addressed by the conclusory
statement in the Violation Report that the “operator failed to take any action or made a minimal
attempt to comply with a regulatory requirement that was clearly applicable.” Again, PHMSA
did support this allegation by stating in the Violation Report that ONEOK “specified what they
would do to meet the requirements of 195.402(c)(13) and they did not follow that for several
years.”
In other words, the Violation Report alleged that by adopting procedures for the periodic review
of its normal operating procedures, ONEOK had demonstrated an awareness of the regulatory
requirements of § 195.402(c)(13) but then failed to take any meaningful steps to implement its
own periodic review process. This means that under PHMSA’s penalty assessment criteria, the
company is not entitled to a penalty reduction on the basis of diminished culpability. As for the
good-faith factor, the Violation Report stated that “ONEOK did not follow the requirements of
their own [Operations & Maintenance] manual.” Again, this means that ONEOK is not entitled
to a penalty reduction based upon a reasonable interpretation of the regulation or a credible belief
that it had faithfully met its regulatory obligations.
Respondent has not presented any evidence or legal argument regarding any of these penalty
factors that would warrant a reduction. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and considered
the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $32,100 for violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.402(c)(13).
Item 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $46,500 for Respondent’s violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), for failing to inspect and test its Winterset pump station overpressure
protection device to determine it was functioning properly, was in good mechanical condition,
and had adequate capacity and reliability for the service in which it was used. As discussed
above, I found that ONEOK failed to properly test its PLC system pathways to determine that the
company’s overpressure protection equipment actually functioned properly. ONEOK objected
to the proposed penalty, raising similar arguments as those discussed above in Item 3, including
9 Response at 12-13.



8
that the Violation Report m
- **truncated:** true
- **body characters:** 50774