{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320125013","title":"ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-07-05","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.401(b), 195.402(a), 195.440(c), 195.452(h)(2), 195.452(h)(4), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(i)(2)(i), 195.452(i)(2)(ii), 195.452(i)(2)(iii), 195.452(i)(2)(iv), 195.452(j)(2), 195.505(c), 195.52(a), 195.52(b), 195.54(a), 195.54(b).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125013.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125013.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125013","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320125013","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(b),  195.402(a),  195.440(c),  195.452(h)(2),  195.452(h)(4),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(i)(2)(i),  195.452(i)(2)(ii),  195.452(i)(2)(iii),  195.452(i)(2)(iv),  195.452(j)(2),  195.505(c),  195.52(a),  195.52(b),  195.54(a),  195.54(b). The case was opened on 2012-07-05 and is reported as closed as of 2012-09-07. Proposed civil penalty: $3,699,200. Assessed civil penalty: $3,699,200. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320125013_Final Order_09072012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_Final%20Order_09072012.pdf\n\n320125013_Final Order_09072012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_Final%20Order_09072012_text.pdf\n\n320125013_Operator_Response_to_Notice_08102012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_Operator_Response_to_Notice_08102012.pdf\n\n320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012.pdf\n\n320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012_text.pdf\n\n320125013_Final Order_09072012_text.pdf\n\nSeptember 07 2012\nMr. Richard Adams\nVice President, U.S. Operations\nEnbridge Energy, Limited Partnership\nCity Center Office\n1409 Hammond, Avenue\nSuperior, WI 54880-5247\nCPF 3-2012-5013\nDear Mr. Adams:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation of PHMSA regulations and assesses an administrative civil penalty of $3,699,200. This\nis to acknowledge receipt of payment of the full penalty amount, by wire transfer, dated\nAugust 10, 2012. This enforcement action is now closed. Service of the Final Order by certified\nmail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. David Coburn, Esq., Counsel for Respondent,\nSteptoe & Johnson LLP, 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036-1795\nMr. David Barrett, Director, Central Region, OPS\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nEnbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, ) )\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCPF No. 3-2012-5013\nFINAL ORDER\nBeginning on July 26, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated\nan investigation of an accident involving the Line 6B pipeline system operated by Enbridge\nEnergy, Limited Partnership (Enbridge or Respondent). Respondent is a subsidiary of Enbridge,\nInc., a Canadian company, and owns and operates approximately 17,700 miles of pipeline\ntransporting crude oil and natural gas in the Midwest. Line 6B is a part of Respondent’s\nLakehead Pipeline System.1\nThe investigation followed a failure that occurred on Enbridge’s 30-inch diameter Line 6B\npipeline near Marshall, Michigan, on July 25, 2010, and that ultimately resulted in the release of\nmore than 20,000 bbls of crude oil (Release).\n2 The pipeline ruptured at approximately\n17:58 EDT (all times cited below are Eastern Daylight Time, unless otherwise noted) on\nJuly 25, 2010, approximately 0.6 miles downstream of the company’s Marshall pumping station,\nwhile its Control Center Operations (CCO) in Edmonton, Alberta (Canada), was in the process of\nexecuting a scheduled 10-hour shutdown of the pipeline (Scheduled Shutdown), as more fully\ndetailed in the Notice.\nThe investigation revealed a number of probable violations of regulations promulgated under the\nfederal Pipeline Safety Laws. As a result, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued\nto Respondent, by letter dated July 2, 2012, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil\n1 SEC Form 10-K, Enbridge Energy Partners, LP, February 2011, at 6. Respondent also files annual reports with\nPHMSA under the name Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, which is a subsidiary of Enbridge Energy Partners,\nLP.\n2 On July 28, 2010, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) [CPF No. 3-2010-5008H] to Enbridge,\nfinding that Line 6B would be hazardous to life, property and the environment unless Enbridge took certain\ncorrective actions. Among other things, the CAO required a pressure reduction on the re-started line; testing and\nevaluation of the failed pipe; submission of a plan for verification of pipeline integrity; and integration of various\nassessment information to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the pipeline, considering all risk factors. That CAO\nis still open.\n\n\n\n2\nPenalty. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, it proposed finding that Enbridge had\ncommitted various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed assessing an administrative\ncivil penalty of $3,699,200 for the alleged violations. On July 5, 2012, PHMSA issued a\ncorrected Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty (Notice) to address several\ntypographical errors in the original letter. The Notice advised Enbridge that it had a right to\ncontest the allegations.\nEnbridge submitted a preliminary response by letter on July 6, 2012. On August 10, 2012, the\ncompany paid the proposed administrative civil penalty of $3,699,200, as provided under\n49 C.F.R. § 190.209(a)(1). The company also submitted a formal response by letter of the same\ndate (Response). The Response stated that the company was not contesting the proposed\npenalty, but indicated that Enbridge took “issue with many of the allegations set forth in the\nNOPV” and “respectfully request[ed] that PHMSA take this [letter] into consideration.”3 Under\n49 C.F.R. § 190.209(a)(1), however, payment of the penalty serves to close the case with\nprejudice to Respondent. Therefore, the additional information provided and the defenses\nasserted by Respondent are neither discussed nor considered in this Order. The findings and\nconclusions set forth below are based entirely on the information referenced in the Notice and\ndiscussed in this Order, insofar as such information relates to the specific regulatory violations\nalleged in the Notice.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, Enbridge, by counsel, did not contest the penalties proposed in the Notice for\nthe alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1)-(2), which\nstates, in relevant part:\n§ 195.452 4\nPipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take prompt action to\naddress all anomalous conditions the operator discovers through the integrity\nassessment or information analysis. In addressing all conditions, an operator\nmust evaluate all anomalous conditions and remediate those that could reduce\na pipeline’s integrity…\n(2) Discovery of condition. Discovery of a condition occurs when an\noperator has adequate information about the condition to determine that the\ncondition presents a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. An operator\nmust promptly, but no later than 180 days after an integrity assessment, obtain\nsufficient information about a condition to make that determination, unless the\n3 Response at 1.\n4 High Consequence Areas (HCAs) are defined as high population areas, other populated areas, unusually sensitive\nareas, and commercially navigable waterways. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.\n\n\n\n3\noperator can demonstrate that the 180-day period is impracticable.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1)-(2) by failing to\npromptly obtain sufficient information about anomalous conditions on Line 6B to make a\ndetermination that the conditions presented a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline and\nto take prompt action to address those conditions that could reduce the pipeline’s integrity.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed, within 180 days after receiving a\ncontractor’s report on a high-resolution MFL integrity assessment that had been conducted on\nLine 6B on October 13, 2007, to obtain sufficient information about the anomalies noted in the\nreport to determine whether they posed a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline.\nPHMSA asserted that the 180-day deadline was April 10, 2008, but that Enbridge failed to\nimplement pressure restrictions until July 17, 2009, approximately 462 days after the 180-day\ndeadline.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1)-(2)\nby failing to promptly obtain sufficient information about anomalous conditions on Line 6B to\nmake a determination that the conditions presented a potential threat to the integrity of the\npipeline and to take prompt action to address such conditions.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4), which states, in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?\n(1) . . .\n(4) Special requirements for scheduling remediation – (i) . . .\n(iii) 180-day conditions. Except for conditions listed in paragraph (h)(4)(i)\nor (ii) of this section, an operator must schedule evaluation and remediation of\nthe following within 180 days of discovery of the condition:…\n(H) Corrosion of or along a longitudinal seam weld. . . .\n(iv) Other conditions. In addition to the conditions listed in paragraphs\n(h)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, an operator must evaluate any condition\nidentified by an integrity assessment or information analysis that could impair\nthe integrity of the pipeline, and as appropriate, schedule the condition for\nremediation. Appendix C of this part contains guidance concerning other\nconditions that an operator should evaluate.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4) by failing to properly\nschedule the evaluation and remediation of certain anomalous conditions that were required to be\nremediated within 180 days of their discovery. Specifically, it alleged that, beginning with a\n2004 Ultra-Sonic Wall Measurement (USWM) in-line inspection (ILI), Enbridge did not\nschedule remediation of corrosion anomalies involving the longitudinal weld seam of pipe joint\n#217720 within 180 days of discovery of the conditions, as required by§ 195.452(h)(4)(iii)(H).5\n5 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (July 2, 2012) (Violation Report), Exhibit B.\n\n\n\n4\nThe Notice further alleged that Enbridge failed to remediate other crack-like anomalies on the\nsame pipe joint #217720, as required by § 195.452(h)(4)(iii)(H) and in accordance with the\nguidance set forth in Part 195, Appendix C(VII)(D) for scheduling remediation of anomalous\nconditions.6 According to the Notice, assessments of this pipe joint had revealed corrosion or\ncrack-like anomalies that were longitudinal in orientation but Enbridge had failed to select the\njoint for excavation. This same joint ultimately ruptured in service on July 25, 2012, resulting in\na release of crude oil.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4) by\nfailing to properly schedule the evaluation and remediation of certain anomalous conditions on\nLine 6B that had to be remediated within 180 days of their discovery.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) and (2)(i)-(iv),\nwhich state, in relevant part:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area? - (1) General requirements. An operator\nmust take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline\nfailure that could affect a high consequence area. These measures include\nconducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify additional actions\nto enhance public safety or environmental protection. . .\n(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive\nand mitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline\nrelease occurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area.\nThis determination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not\nlimited to:\n(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage systems\nsuch as small streams and other smaller waterways that could act as a conduit to\nthe high consequence area;\n(ii) Elevation profile;\n(iii) Characteristics of the product transported;\n(iv) Amount of product that could be released; . . . .\n6 Appendix C(VII) states, in relevant part:\nVII. Conditions that may impair a pipeline’s integrity.\nSection 195.452(h) requires an operator to evaluate and remediate all pipeline integrity\nissues raised by the integrity assessment or information analysis. An operator must develop\na schedule that prioritizes conditions discovered on the pipeline for evaluation and\nremediation. The following are some examples of conditions that an operator should\nschedule for evaluation and remediation:\nA . . .\nD. An anomaly longitudinal on orientation….\n\n\n\n5\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) and (2)(i-iv) by failing to\nperform a proper risk analysis to identify the need for additional preventive and mitigative\nmeasures to protect HCAs. Specifically, the Notice alleged that in preparing its risk analysis,\nEnbridge failed to consider all relevant risk factors associated with the determination of the\namount of product that could potentially be released from a rupture on Line 6B.7\nPHMSA asserted that Enbridge’s risk analysis process assumed a pipeline rupture of this\nmagnitude would be identified by instrumentation (SCADA and Leak Detection System) within\nfive minutes and that remotely-operated valves on either side of the rupture would be closed\nwithin an additional three minutes.8 The Notice alleged that the company’s risk analysis should\nhave considered that the amount of product that could potentially be released would be impacted\nby different operating scenarios, including transient conditions such as start-ups and shutdowns\nor personnel response to abnormal operating conditions.9\nPrior to the Failure, Enbridge estimated the worst-case scenario for an oil release at the Mile Post\n(MP) 608 location would be 1,670 bbls initial volume out, plus 1,938 bbls stabilization loss\n(drain down), or a total release of 3,608 bbls.10 The Notice alleged that the Failure demonstrated\nthat Enbridge had not properly recognized the risk associated with the actual release scenario, as\nthe isolation valves did not close until approximately 17 hours after the release occurred. It\nfurther alleged that at least 20,000 bbls were actually released, 16,431 bbls more than Enbridge’s\nworst-case scenario.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) and\n(2)(i)-(iv) by failing to perform a proper risk analysis to identify the need for additional\npreventive and mitigative measures to protect HCAs.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a\npipeline’s integrity? - (1) General. After completing the baseline integrity\nassessment, an operator must continue to assess the line pipe at specified\nintervals and periodically evaluate the integrity of each pipeline segment that\ncould affect a high consequence area….\n(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as\nfrequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the\n7 Violation Report, Exhibit B.\n8 Id.\n9 Violation Report, Exhibits B and C.\n10 Violation Report, Exhibit C.\n\n\n\n6\nfrequency of evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the\nfactors specified in paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider\nthe results of the baseline and periodic integrity assessments, information\nanalysis (paragraph (g) of this section), and decisions about remediation, and\npreventive and mitigative actions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by failing to conduct\nperiodic evaluations as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, based upon an analysis\nof risk factors specific to its pipeline. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge did not\nproperly consider the results of corrosion and cracking assessments it had performed, nor did it\nintegrate the information from these assessments to properly ensure overall pipeline integrity.\nAccording to the Notice, the PHMSA investigation, witness interviews, and a review of prior ILI\nassessments of Line 6B (including 2004 USWM, 2005 USCD, 2007 MFL, and 2009 USWM\nassessments) revealed that Enbridge had a long history of performing integrity assessments using\nILI tools, but that those assessment results had been evaluated independently and not properly\nintegrated in a fashion that would ensure pipeline integrity.\n11\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by\nfailing to conduct periodic evaluations as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, based\nupon an analysis of risk factors specific to its pipeline.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b), which states:\n§ 195.401 General requirements.\n(a) . . .\n(b) Whenever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely\naffect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it shall correct it within a\nreasonable time. However, if the condition is of such a nature that it presents an\nimmediate hazard to persons or property, the operator may not operate the\naffected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe condition.12\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b) by failing to correct, within\na reasonable time after discovery, conditions that could adversely affect the safe operation of its\npipeline. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to correct conditions that it\ndiscovered as a result of a series of SCADA/instrumentation alarms and events occurring within\nseconds and minutes of the Failure, including a 5-minute MBS (Material Balance System) alarm,\na Unit Shutdown on Low Suction Pressure, Low Pressure Alarms, and an abnormal and abrupt\npressure drop (to 0 psig) at the Marshall pumping station.\nPHMSA asserted that the SCADA/instrumentation alarms and events indicated conditions that\n11 Violation Report, Exhibits B, C and D.\n12 Section 195.401 was amended subsequent to the date of the Failure, effective August 11, 2010.\n\n\n\n7\ncould adversely affect the safe operation of the pipeline unless and until they were determined to\nhave been the result of known conditions that did not affect the safe operation of the pipeline.\nThe Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to investigate and mitigate the effects of such unsafe\nconditions until approximately 17 hours after their discovery.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b) by\nfailing to correct, within a reasonable time following discovery, conditions that could adversely\naffect the safe operation of its pipeline.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and\n(3-4), which states in relevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nThis manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\nonce each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure\nthat the manual is effective . . . .\n(d) Abnormal operation. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this\nsection must include procedures for the following to provide safety when\noperating design limits have been exceeded:\n(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of:\n(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;\n(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal operating\nlimits;\n(iii) Loss of communications;\n(iv) Operation of any safety device;\n(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal\noperation, or personnel error which could cause a hazard to persons or\nproperty. . .\n(3) Correcting variations from normal operation of pressure and flow\nequipment and controls.\n(4) Notifying responsible operator personnel when notice of an abnormal\noperation is received.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and (3-4) by\nfailing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, the\nNotice alleged that Enbridge did not follow its own written procedures for responding to,\ninvestigating, and correcting the cause of pressure events outside of normal operating limits\n(LPM Invalid Pressure Alarms) that had been indicated during a scheduled 10-hour shutdown of\nLine 6B (Scheduled Shutdown).13 The Notice further alleged that Enbridge did not notify\n13 Violation Report, Exhibits E and F.\n\n\n\n8\nresponsible personnel in accordance with the procedure.\nPHMSA alleged that Respondent’s Line 6B controller had initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at\napproximately 17:55 EDT. Beginning at 17:58, Line Pressure Monitor (LPM) Invalid Pressure\nalarms at the Marshall pumping station had initiated and then cleared within a few seconds. The\nNotice alleged that the LPM alarm occurred when the SCADA system sensed one or more\npressure transmitters at 0 psig, and then cleared when the pressure went above 0 psig.14 This\ncycle repeated six times before it finally remained active at 18:02. The LPM alarm had been\ndesignated by Enbridge procedures as a Severity Level 6 (S6 - Severe) Alarm.\nPHMSA asserted that Enbridge had not developed a specific written procedure for responding to\nan LPM Invalid Pressure Alarm, but had instead developed a written procedure for required\nactions based on alarm severity. For an S6 -Severe Alarm, the procedures required the controller\nto: (1) notify the Shift Lead; (2) advise on­site/on-call personnel; and (3) create a “FACMAN”\n(an Enbridge term for a Facility Management record-keeping system used to document abnormal\noperating conditions).15 PHMSA alleged that Enbridge failed to take any of these required\nactions.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and\n(d)(1) and (3-4) by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195. 402(a) and (d)(1) and\n(3-4), as quoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting\nnormal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge did not follow its own written\nprocedures for responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of pressure events outside\nof normal operating limits (Low Pressure Alarms) that had been indicated during the Scheduled\nShutdown.16 The Notice further alleged that Respondent did not notify responsible personnel in\naccordance with the procedure.\nPHMSA alleged that the company’s Line 6B controller had initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at\napproximately 17:55 on July 25, 2010. Beginning at 17:58, a Low Suction Pressure alarm\ninitiated, cleared within five seconds, then recurred and remained active 10 seconds later. The\nNotice alleged that this alarm occurred when the suction pressure dropped below 25 psig, and\ncleared when the suction pressure exceeded 25 psig. This alarm had been designated by\nEnbridge procedures as a Severity Level 4 (S4- Warning) Alarm.17\n14 Id.\n15 Violation Report, Exhibit F.\n16 Violation Report, Exhibit E.\n17 Violation Report, Exhibit E.\n\n\n\n9\nPHMSA asserted that Enbridge had not developed a specific written procedure for responding to\na Low Suction Pressure Alarm, but had instead developed a written procedure for required\nactions based on alarm severity. PHMSA explained that for an S4 -Warning Alarm, the\nprocedures required: (1) discretionary controller response to the alarm, depending on operating\nconditions; (2) notification of the Shift Lead if unsure of response; (3) if multiple S4 alarms were\nactive for a related issue, the response and severity might be raised; (4) FACMAN creation might\nbe required; and (5) advising on-site/on-call personnel if required. PHMSA further asserted that\nEnbridge had not taken any of the above actions, or any other actions, in response to this alarm.\nPHMSA alleged that when the Marshall suction pressure abruptly dropped to 0 psig (which was\nunexpected and abnormal), the drop dictated follow­up investigative actions in accordance with\nthe procedure to determine the reason/source of the alarm.\n18\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and\n(d)(1) and (3-4) by failing to follow its own written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and\n(3-4), as quoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting\nnormal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge did not follow its own written\nprocedures for responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of an unintended shutdown\n(Marshall Unit 2 was in Sequence Off Alarm) that occurred during the Scheduled Shutdown.\nThe Notice further alleged that Enbridge did not notify responsible personnel, as required by its\nprocedure.\nPHMSA alleged that the Line 6B controller had initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at\napproximately 17:55 on July 25, 2010. At 17:58, a Marshall Unit 2 Sequence Off Alarm\noccurred, indicating that the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) for the Marshall station had\nstopped Unit 2 based on a condition sensed by the station control logic, which, in this\ncircumstance, was low suction pressure.19 PHMSA asserted that the alarm had been designated\nby Enbridge procedures as a Severity Level 4 (S4-Warning) Alarm.20 Enbridge’s written\nprocedure for Pump Unit Lockout ­ Station required the controller to enter lockout information in\nFACMAN.21 However, no FACMAN was created in response to this alarm. The Notice alleged\nthat Enbridge’s failure to respond to, investigate, and correct the cause of an unintended\nshutdown resulted in a missed opportunity to identify the Failure when it occurred.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and\n18 Violation Report, Exhibits E and F.\n19 Violation Report, Exhibit F.\n20 Violation Report, Exhibit E.\n21 Violation Report, Exhibit G.\n\n\n\n10\n(d)(1) and (3-4) by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4) and (7),\nwhich states in relevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nThis manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\nonce each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure\nthat the manual is effective . . . .\n(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section\nmust include procedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency\ncondition occurs:\n(1) . . .\n(4) Taking necessary action, such as emergency shutdown or pressure\nreduction, to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide that is\nreleased from any section of a pipeline in the event of a failure . . . .\n(7) Notifying fire, police, and other appropriate public officials of\nhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline emergencies and coordinating with\nthem preplanned and actual responses during an emergency, including\nadditional precautions necessary for an emergency involving a pipeline system\ntransporting a highly volatile liquid.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4) and (7) by failing\nto follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged\nthat Enbridge failed to follow its Emergency Notification procedure, which required the company\nto take necessary action to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid released when the Failure\noccurred and to notify fire, police and other public officials during the emergency.22 The Notice\nfurther alleged that Enbridge’s Suspected Column Separation procedure required the Shift Lead\nto execute the Emergency Notification procedure.23\nPHMSA alleged that a Suspected Column Separation condition was identified and reported to\nthe Shift Lead by CCO support personnel (an MBS Analyst) shortly after the Scheduled\nShutdown. The Line 6B controller initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at approximately 17:55 on\nJuly 25, 2010. At 18:03, an MBS 5-Minute Alarm for the Griffith to Marshall section of Line 6B\noccurred.24 The alarm was reported by the controller to the Shift Lead, who requested MBS\n22 Violation Report, Exhibits E, F, and H.\n23 Violation Report, Exhibit H.\n24 The MBS 5-Minute Alarm is designated by Respondent as a Severity Level 6 (S6-Severe) Alarm. Id.\n\n\n\n11\nSupport to analyze the leak detection alarm. The MBS Analyst reported back to the controller\n(via telephone) and the Shift Lead (in person), that the MBS model was indicating column\nseparation, a condition in which the pipeline pressure is less than the vapor pressure of the\nproduct. PHMSA asserted that although Enbridge’s written procedure, Suspected Column\nSeparation, required the Shift Lead to execute the Emergency Notification procedure, the Shift\nLead failed to do so. Execution of this procedure would have resulted in notification of Regional\nManagement (and field personnel), police and other public officials, and the CCO Admin On-\nCall or Designate.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195. 402(a) and\n(e)(4) and (7) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4) and (7),\nas quoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to follow its Emergency Notification\nprocedure that required it to take necessary action to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid\nreleased when a failure occurred and to notify police and other public officials during an\nemergency.25 It alleged that Enbridge failed to follow its Leak Triggers- SCADA Data\nprocedure, which required that if one or two leak triggers occurred, then Respondent must\nexecute its Suspected Leak procedure.26 The Notice also alleged that Enbridge failed to follow\nits Confirmed Leak procedure, which required that if three or more triggers occurred, then the\nConfirmed Leak procedure must be executed. PHMSA asserted that neither the Suspected Leak\nprocedure nor the Confirmed Leak procedure was executed by the CCO in response to the Leak\nTriggers that occurred shortly after the Scheduled Shutdown.\nPHMSA alleged that the Line 6B controller initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at approximately\n17:55 on July 25, 2010. The pipeline ruptured at approximately 17:58, approximately 0.6 miles\ndownstream of the Marshall pumping station, resulting in a sudden drop in upstream discharge\npressure (0 psig). Multiple alarms and events were received within seconds of the rupture,\nincluding low suction pressure at the Marshall pumping station, a shutdown at the Marshall\nstation, and invalid pressure(s) at the station. A 5-Minute MBS alarm occurred on the Griffith to\nMarshall section of Line 6B at 18:03. These alarms and events all constituted Leak Triggers.\nPHMSA asserted that had Enbridge followed either procedure, it would have led to the execution\nof the Emergency Notification procedure by the Shift Lead, and Enbridge would have notified\nRegional/Field personnel, police and other public officials, and the CCO Admin On-Call or\nDesignate.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and\n25 Violation Report, Exhibit I.\n26 Id.\n\n\n\n12\n(e)(4) and (7) by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b), as quoted above,\nby continuing to operate its pipeline system without correcting a condition that presented an\nimmediate hazard to persons or property. Specifically, the Notice alleged that at approximately\n04:00 on July 26, 2010, Enbridge initiated the scheduled start-up of Line 6B after an\napproximate 10-hour shutdown (First Restart).27 Enbridge was unable to build pressure at the\nMarshall pumping station and multiple alarms occurred within minutes of initiating operation.\nAlarms continued throughout the operation but Enbridge did not terminate the attempted First\nRestart until after approximately one hour of operation.\nThe Notice alleged that approximately 10,600 bbls of crude oil was injected into the pipeline\nduring the First Restart, which increased the size of the release and resulted in the displacement\nof a number of local residents, contamination of approximately 38 miles of the Kalamazoo River,\nand contamination of affected fish and wildlife.\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b) by\noperating its pipeline system without correcting a condition that presented an immediate hazard\nto persons or property.\nItem 13: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4), as\nquoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that shortly after initiating the First Restart, Enbridge failed to\nfollow its own MBS Leak Alarm procedure, which required that if a leak detection (MBS) alarm\noccurred, then the controller was to notify the Shift Lead and record the AOC (Abnormal\nOperating Condition) in FACMAN.28 The procedure then required the Shift Lead to assess the\nalarm and take appropriate action based on the assessment.\nRecorded telephone transcripts and witness interviews indicated that the Line 6B controller\ncontacted the Shift Lead at 04:23, but did not specifically report that MBS alarms had occurred.\nThen, the controller reported to the Shift Lead that the MBS was starting to react to some flow in\nthe area, but no FACMAN was created to record the AOC.\nAs discussed above, Respondent’s MBS Leak Alarm procedure required the Shift Lead to assess\nan MBS alarm. If there were any doubt about the reliability of the leak detection model, the\nShift Lead must then execute the MBS Alarm-Analysis by MBS Support procedure. This required\nthat if, after 10 minutes, the analysis of the alarm was not complete then the pipeline was to be\nshut down. Enbridge neither followed this procedure nor shut down the pipeline until 48 minutes\n27 Violation Report, Exhibit K.\n28 Violation Report, Exhibits K and L.\n\n\n\n13\nafter the first MBS alarm occurred.\n29\nRespondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,\nbased upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and\n(e)(4) by failing to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nItem 14: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and\n(3)-(4), which state, in relevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and\nmaintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.\nThis manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\nonce each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure\nthat the manual is effective. . . .\n(d) Abnormal operation. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this\nsection must include procedures for the following to provide safety when\noperating design limits have been exceeded:\n(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of:\n(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;\n(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal operating\nlimits;\n(iii) Loss of communications;\n(iv) Operation of any safety device;\n(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal\noperation, or personnel error which could cause a hazard to persons or\nproperty. . .\n(3) Correcting variations from normal operation of pressure and flow\nequipment and controls.\n(4) Notifying responsible operator personnel when notice of an abnormal\noperation is received. . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and (3)-(4) by\nfailing to follow a manual of written procedures for condu","truncated":true,"body_characters":82716}