# ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 320125013
- **title:** ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2012-07-05
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.401(b), 195.402(a), 195.440(c), 195.452(h)(2), 195.452(h)(4), 195.452(i)(1), 195.452(i)(2)(i), 195.452(i)(2)(ii), 195.452(i)(2)(iii), 195.452(i)(2)(iv), 195.452(j)(2), 195.505(c), 195.52(a), 195.52(b), 195.54(a), 195.54(b).
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**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(b),  195.402(a),  195.440(c),  195.452(h)(2),  195.452(h)(4),  195.452(i)(1),  195.452(i)(2)(i),  195.452(i)(2)(ii),  195.452(i)(2)(iii),  195.452(i)(2)(iv),  195.452(j)(2),  195.505(c),  195.52(a),  195.52(b),  195.54(a),  195.54(b). The case was opened on 2012-07-05 and is reported as closed as of 2012-09-07. Proposed civil penalty: $3,699,200. Assessed civil penalty: $3,699,200. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

320125013_Final Order_09072012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_Final%20Order_09072012.pdf

320125013_Final Order_09072012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_Final%20Order_09072012_text.pdf

320125013_Operator_Response_to_Notice_08102012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_Operator_Response_to_Notice_08102012.pdf

320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012.pdf

320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125013/320125013_REVISED_NOPV_PCP_07052012_text.pdf

320125013_Final Order_09072012_text.pdf

September 07 2012
Mr. Richard Adams
Vice President, U.S. Operations
Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership
City Center Office
1409 Hammond, Avenue
Superior, WI 54880-5247
CPF 3-2012-5013
Dear Mr. Adams:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation of PHMSA regulations and assesses an administrative civil penalty of $3,699,200. This
is to acknowledge receipt of payment of the full penalty amount, by wire transfer, dated
August 10, 2012. This enforcement action is now closed. Service of the Final Order by certified
mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under
49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. David Coburn, Esq., Counsel for Respondent,
Steptoe & Johnson LLP, 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036-1795
Mr. David Barrett, Director, Central Region, OPS
Mr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
In the Matter of )
Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, ) )
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
CPF No. 3-2012-5013
FINAL ORDER
Beginning on July 26, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated
an investigation of an accident involving the Line 6B pipeline system operated by Enbridge
Energy, Limited Partnership (Enbridge or Respondent). Respondent is a subsidiary of Enbridge,
Inc., a Canadian company, and owns and operates approximately 17,700 miles of pipeline
transporting crude oil and natural gas in the Midwest. Line 6B is a part of Respondent’s
Lakehead Pipeline System.1
The investigation followed a failure that occurred on Enbridge’s 30-inch diameter Line 6B
pipeline near Marshall, Michigan, on July 25, 2010, and that ultimately resulted in the release of
more than 20,000 bbls of crude oil (Release).
2 The pipeline ruptured at approximately
17:58 EDT (all times cited below are Eastern Daylight Time, unless otherwise noted) on
July 25, 2010, approximately 0.6 miles downstream of the company’s Marshall pumping station,
while its Control Center Operations (CCO) in Edmonton, Alberta (Canada), was in the process of
executing a scheduled 10-hour shutdown of the pipeline (Scheduled Shutdown), as more fully
detailed in the Notice.
The investigation revealed a number of probable violations of regulations promulgated under the
federal Pipeline Safety Laws. As a result, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued
to Respondent, by letter dated July 2, 2012, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil
1 SEC Form 10-K, Enbridge Energy Partners, LP, February 2011, at 6. Respondent also files annual reports with
PHMSA under the name Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, which is a subsidiary of Enbridge Energy Partners,
LP.
2 On July 28, 2010, PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) [CPF No. 3-2010-5008H] to Enbridge,
finding that Line 6B would be hazardous to life, property and the environment unless Enbridge took certain
corrective actions. Among other things, the CAO required a pressure reduction on the re-started line; testing and
evaluation of the failed pipe; submission of a plan for verification of pipeline integrity; and integration of various
assessment information to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the pipeline, considering all risk factors. That CAO
is still open.



2
Penalty. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, it proposed finding that Enbridge had
committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed assessing an administrative
civil penalty of $3,699,200 for the alleged violations. On July 5, 2012, PHMSA issued a
corrected Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty (Notice) to address several
typographical errors in the original letter. The Notice advised Enbridge that it had a right to
contest the allegations.
Enbridge submitted a preliminary response by letter on July 6, 2012. On August 10, 2012, the
company paid the proposed administrative civil penalty of $3,699,200, as provided under
49 C.F.R. § 190.209(a)(1). The company also submitted a formal response by letter of the same
date (Response). The Response stated that the company was not contesting the proposed
penalty, but indicated that Enbridge took “issue with many of the allegations set forth in the
NOPV” and “respectfully request[ed] that PHMSA take this [letter] into consideration.”3 Under
49 C.F.R. § 190.209(a)(1), however, payment of the penalty serves to close the case with
prejudice to Respondent. Therefore, the additional information provided and the defenses
asserted by Respondent are neither discussed nor considered in this Order. The findings and
conclusions set forth below are based entirely on the information referenced in the Notice and
discussed in this Order, insofar as such information relates to the specific regulatory violations
alleged in the Notice.
FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
In its Response, Enbridge, by counsel, did not contest the penalties proposed in the Notice for
the alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1)-(2), which
states, in relevant part:
§ 195.452 4
Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?
(1) General requirements. An operator must take prompt action to
address all anomalous conditions the operator discovers through the integrity
assessment or information analysis. In addressing all conditions, an operator
must evaluate all anomalous conditions and remediate those that could reduce
a pipeline’s integrity…
(2) Discovery of condition. Discovery of a condition occurs when an
operator has adequate information about the condition to determine that the
condition presents a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. An operator
must promptly, but no later than 180 days after an integrity assessment, obtain
sufficient information about a condition to make that determination, unless the
3 Response at 1.
4 High Consequence Areas (HCAs) are defined as high population areas, other populated areas, unusually sensitive
areas, and commercially navigable waterways. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.



3
operator can demonstrate that the 180-day period is impracticable.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1)-(2) by failing to
promptly obtain sufficient information about anomalous conditions on Line 6B to make a
determination that the conditions presented a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline and
to take prompt action to address those conditions that could reduce the pipeline’s integrity.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed, within 180 days after receiving a
contractor’s report on a high-resolution MFL integrity assessment that had been conducted on
Line 6B on October 13, 2007, to obtain sufficient information about the anomalies noted in the
report to determine whether they posed a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline.
PHMSA asserted that the 180-day deadline was April 10, 2008, but that Enbridge failed to
implement pressure restrictions until July 17, 2009, approximately 462 days after the 180-day
deadline.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1)-(2)
by failing to promptly obtain sufficient information about anomalous conditions on Line 6B to
make a determination that the conditions presented a potential threat to the integrity of the
pipeline and to take prompt action to address such conditions.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4), which states, in
relevant part:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?
(1) . . .
(4) Special requirements for scheduling remediation – (i) . . .
(iii) 180-day conditions. Except for conditions listed in paragraph (h)(4)(i)
or (ii) of this section, an operator must schedule evaluation and remediation of
the following within 180 days of discovery of the condition:…
(H) Corrosion of or along a longitudinal seam weld. . . .
(iv) Other conditions. In addition to the conditions listed in paragraphs
(h)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, an operator must evaluate any condition
identified by an integrity assessment or information analysis that could impair
the integrity of the pipeline, and as appropriate, schedule the condition for
remediation. Appendix C of this part contains guidance concerning other
conditions that an operator should evaluate.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4) by failing to properly
schedule the evaluation and remediation of certain anomalous conditions that were required to be
remediated within 180 days of their discovery. Specifically, it alleged that, beginning with a
2004 Ultra-Sonic Wall Measurement (USWM) in-line inspection (ILI), Enbridge did not
schedule remediation of corrosion anomalies involving the longitudinal weld seam of pipe joint
#217720 within 180 days of discovery of the conditions, as required by§ 195.452(h)(4)(iii)(H).5
5 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (July 2, 2012) (Violation Report), Exhibit B.



4
The Notice further alleged that Enbridge failed to remediate other crack-like anomalies on the
same pipe joint #217720, as required by § 195.452(h)(4)(iii)(H) and in accordance with the
guidance set forth in Part 195, Appendix C(VII)(D) for scheduling remediation of anomalous
conditions.6 According to the Notice, assessments of this pipe joint had revealed corrosion or
crack-like anomalies that were longitudinal in orientation but Enbridge had failed to select the
joint for excavation. This same joint ultimately ruptured in service on July 25, 2012, resulting in
a release of crude oil.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4) by
failing to properly schedule the evaluation and remediation of certain anomalous conditions on
Line 6B that had to be remediated within 180 days of their discovery.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) and (2)(i)-(iv),
which state, in relevant part:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to
protect the high consequence area? - (1) General requirements. An operator
must take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline
failure that could affect a high consequence area. These measures include
conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify additional actions
to enhance public safety or environmental protection. . .
(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive
and mitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline
release occurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area.
This determination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not
limited to:
(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage systems
such as small streams and other smaller waterways that could act as a conduit to
the high consequence area;
(ii) Elevation profile;
(iii) Characteristics of the product transported;
(iv) Amount of product that could be released; . . . .
6 Appendix C(VII) states, in relevant part:
VII. Conditions that may impair a pipeline’s integrity.
Section 195.452(h) requires an operator to evaluate and remediate all pipeline integrity
issues raised by the integrity assessment or information analysis. An operator must develop
a schedule that prioritizes conditions discovered on the pipeline for evaluation and
remediation. The following are some examples of conditions that an operator should
schedule for evaluation and remediation:
A . . .
D. An anomaly longitudinal on orientation….



5
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) and (2)(i-iv) by failing to
perform a proper risk analysis to identify the need for additional preventive and mitigative
measures to protect HCAs. Specifically, the Notice alleged that in preparing its risk analysis,
Enbridge failed to consider all relevant risk factors associated with the determination of the
amount of product that could potentially be released from a rupture on Line 6B.7
PHMSA asserted that Enbridge’s risk analysis process assumed a pipeline rupture of this
magnitude would be identified by instrumentation (SCADA and Leak Detection System) within
five minutes and that remotely-operated valves on either side of the rupture would be closed
within an additional three minutes.8 The Notice alleged that the company’s risk analysis should
have considered that the amount of product that could potentially be released would be impacted
by different operating scenarios, including transient conditions such as start-ups and shutdowns
or personnel response to abnormal operating conditions.9
Prior to the Failure, Enbridge estimated the worst-case scenario for an oil release at the Mile Post
(MP) 608 location would be 1,670 bbls initial volume out, plus 1,938 bbls stabilization loss
(drain down), or a total release of 3,608 bbls.10 The Notice alleged that the Failure demonstrated
that Enbridge had not properly recognized the risk associated with the actual release scenario, as
the isolation valves did not close until approximately 17 hours after the release occurred. It
further alleged that at least 20,000 bbls were actually released, 16,431 bbls more than Enbridge’s
worst-case scenario.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(1) and
(2)(i)-(iv) by failing to perform a proper risk analysis to identify the need for additional
preventive and mitigative measures to protect HCAs.
Item 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2), which states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . .
(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a
pipeline’s integrity? - (1) General. After completing the baseline integrity
assessment, an operator must continue to assess the line pipe at specified
intervals and periodically evaluate the integrity of each pipeline segment that
could affect a high consequence area….
(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as
frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the
7 Violation Report, Exhibit B.
8 Id.
9 Violation Report, Exhibits B and C.
10 Violation Report, Exhibit C.



6
frequency of evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the
factors specified in paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider
the results of the baseline and periodic integrity assessments, information
analysis (paragraph (g) of this section), and decisions about remediation, and
preventive and mitigative actions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by failing to conduct
periodic evaluations as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, based upon an analysis
of risk factors specific to its pipeline. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge did not
properly consider the results of corrosion and cracking assessments it had performed, nor did it
integrate the information from these assessments to properly ensure overall pipeline integrity.
According to the Notice, the PHMSA investigation, witness interviews, and a review of prior ILI
assessments of Line 6B (including 2004 USWM, 2005 USCD, 2007 MFL, and 2009 USWM
assessments) revealed that Enbridge had a long history of performing integrity assessments using
ILI tools, but that those assessment results had been evaluated independently and not properly
integrated in a fashion that would ensure pipeline integrity.
11
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by
failing to conduct periodic evaluations as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, based
upon an analysis of risk factors specific to its pipeline.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b), which states:
§ 195.401 General requirements.
(a) . . .
(b) Whenever an operator discovers any condition that could adversely
affect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it shall correct it within a
reasonable time. However, if the condition is of such a nature that it presents an
immediate hazard to persons or property, the operator may not operate the
affected part of the system until it has corrected the unsafe condition.12
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b) by failing to correct, within
a reasonable time after discovery, conditions that could adversely affect the safe operation of its
pipeline. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to correct conditions that it
discovered as a result of a series of SCADA/instrumentation alarms and events occurring within
seconds and minutes of the Failure, including a 5-minute MBS (Material Balance System) alarm,
a Unit Shutdown on Low Suction Pressure, Low Pressure Alarms, and an abnormal and abrupt
pressure drop (to 0 psig) at the Marshall pumping station.
PHMSA asserted that the SCADA/instrumentation alarms and events indicated conditions that
11 Violation Report, Exhibits B, C and D.
12 Section 195.401 was amended subsequent to the date of the Failure, effective August 11, 2010.



7
could adversely affect the safe operation of the pipeline unless and until they were determined to
have been the result of known conditions that did not affect the safe operation of the pipeline.
The Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to investigate and mitigate the effects of such unsafe
conditions until approximately 17 hours after their discovery.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b) by
failing to correct, within a reasonable time following discovery, conditions that could adversely
affect the safe operation of its pipeline.
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and
(3-4), which states in relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least
once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure
that the manual is effective . . . .
(d) Abnormal operation. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety when
operating design limits have been exceeded:
(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of:
(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;
(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal operating
limits;
(iii) Loss of communications;
(iv) Operation of any safety device;
(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal
operation, or personnel error which could cause a hazard to persons or
property. . .
(3) Correcting variations from normal operation of pressure and flow
equipment and controls.
(4) Notifying responsible operator personnel when notice of an abnormal
operation is received.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and (3-4) by
failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, the
Notice alleged that Enbridge did not follow its own written procedures for responding to,
investigating, and correcting the cause of pressure events outside of normal operating limits
(LPM Invalid Pressure Alarms) that had been indicated during a scheduled 10-hour shutdown of
Line 6B (Scheduled Shutdown).13 The Notice further alleged that Enbridge did not notify
13 Violation Report, Exhibits E and F.



8
responsible personnel in accordance with the procedure.
PHMSA alleged that Respondent’s Line 6B controller had initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at
approximately 17:55 EDT. Beginning at 17:58, Line Pressure Monitor (LPM) Invalid Pressure
alarms at the Marshall pumping station had initiated and then cleared within a few seconds. The
Notice alleged that the LPM alarm occurred when the SCADA system sensed one or more
pressure transmitters at 0 psig, and then cleared when the pressure went above 0 psig.14 This
cycle repeated six times before it finally remained active at 18:02. The LPM alarm had been
designated by Enbridge procedures as a Severity Level 6 (S6 - Severe) Alarm.
PHMSA asserted that Enbridge had not developed a specific written procedure for responding to
an LPM Invalid Pressure Alarm, but had instead developed a written procedure for required
actions based on alarm severity. For an S6 -Severe Alarm, the procedures required the controller
to: (1) notify the Shift Lead; (2) advise on­site/on-call personnel; and (3) create a “FACMAN”
(an Enbridge term for a Facility Management record-keeping system used to document abnormal
operating conditions).15 PHMSA alleged that Enbridge failed to take any of these required
actions.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and
(d)(1) and (3-4) by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195. 402(a) and (d)(1) and
(3-4), as quoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting
normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge did not follow its own written
procedures for responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of pressure events outside
of normal operating limits (Low Pressure Alarms) that had been indicated during the Scheduled
Shutdown.16 The Notice further alleged that Respondent did not notify responsible personnel in
accordance with the procedure.
PHMSA alleged that the company’s Line 6B controller had initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at
approximately 17:55 on July 25, 2010. Beginning at 17:58, a Low Suction Pressure alarm
initiated, cleared within five seconds, then recurred and remained active 10 seconds later. The
Notice alleged that this alarm occurred when the suction pressure dropped below 25 psig, and
cleared when the suction pressure exceeded 25 psig. This alarm had been designated by
Enbridge procedures as a Severity Level 4 (S4- Warning) Alarm.17
14 Id.
15 Violation Report, Exhibit F.
16 Violation Report, Exhibit E.
17 Violation Report, Exhibit E.



9
PHMSA asserted that Enbridge had not developed a specific written procedure for responding to
a Low Suction Pressure Alarm, but had instead developed a written procedure for required
actions based on alarm severity. PHMSA explained that for an S4 -Warning Alarm, the
procedures required: (1) discretionary controller response to the alarm, depending on operating
conditions; (2) notification of the Shift Lead if unsure of response; (3) if multiple S4 alarms were
active for a related issue, the response and severity might be raised; (4) FACMAN creation might
be required; and (5) advising on-site/on-call personnel if required. PHMSA further asserted that
Enbridge had not taken any of the above actions, or any other actions, in response to this alarm.
PHMSA alleged that when the Marshall suction pressure abruptly dropped to 0 psig (which was
unexpected and abnormal), the drop dictated follow­up investigative actions in accordance with
the procedure to determine the reason/source of the alarm.
18
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and
(d)(1) and (3-4) by failing to follow its own written procedures for conducting normal operations
and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and
(3-4), as quoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting
normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and
emergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge did not follow its own written
procedures for responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of an unintended shutdown
(Marshall Unit 2 was in Sequence Off Alarm) that occurred during the Scheduled Shutdown.
The Notice further alleged that Enbridge did not notify responsible personnel, as required by its
procedure.
PHMSA alleged that the Line 6B controller had initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at
approximately 17:55 on July 25, 2010. At 17:58, a Marshall Unit 2 Sequence Off Alarm
occurred, indicating that the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) for the Marshall station had
stopped Unit 2 based on a condition sensed by the station control logic, which, in this
circumstance, was low suction pressure.19 PHMSA asserted that the alarm had been designated
by Enbridge procedures as a Severity Level 4 (S4-Warning) Alarm.20 Enbridge’s written
procedure for Pump Unit Lockout ­ Station required the controller to enter lockout information in
FACMAN.21 However, no FACMAN was created in response to this alarm. The Notice alleged
that Enbridge’s failure to respond to, investigate, and correct the cause of an unintended
shutdown resulted in a missed opportunity to identify the Failure when it occurred.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and
18 Violation Report, Exhibits E and F.
19 Violation Report, Exhibit F.
20 Violation Report, Exhibit E.
21 Violation Report, Exhibit G.



10
(d)(1) and (3-4) by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 9: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4) and (7),
which states in relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least
once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure
that the manual is effective . . . .
(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section
must include procedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency
condition occurs:
(1) . . .
(4) Taking necessary action, such as emergency shutdown or pressure
reduction, to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide that is
released from any section of a pipeline in the event of a failure . . . .
(7) Notifying fire, police, and other appropriate public officials of
hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline emergencies and coordinating with
them preplanned and actual responses during an emergency, including
additional precautions necessary for an emergency involving a pipeline system
transporting a highly volatile liquid.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4) and (7) by failing
to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Specifically, the Notice alleged
that Enbridge failed to follow its Emergency Notification procedure, which required the company
to take necessary action to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid released when the Failure
occurred and to notify fire, police and other public officials during the emergency.22 The Notice
further alleged that Enbridge’s Suspected Column Separation procedure required the Shift Lead
to execute the Emergency Notification procedure.23
PHMSA alleged that a Suspected Column Separation condition was identified and reported to
the Shift Lead by CCO support personnel (an MBS Analyst) shortly after the Scheduled
Shutdown. The Line 6B controller initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at approximately 17:55 on
July 25, 2010. At 18:03, an MBS 5-Minute Alarm for the Griffith to Marshall section of Line 6B
occurred.24 The alarm was reported by the controller to the Shift Lead, who requested MBS
22 Violation Report, Exhibits E, F, and H.
23 Violation Report, Exhibit H.
24 The MBS 5-Minute Alarm is designated by Respondent as a Severity Level 6 (S6-Severe) Alarm. Id.



11
Support to analyze the leak detection alarm. The MBS Analyst reported back to the controller
(via telephone) and the Shift Lead (in person), that the MBS model was indicating column
separation, a condition in which the pipeline pressure is less than the vapor pressure of the
product. PHMSA asserted that although Enbridge’s written procedure, Suspected Column
Separation, required the Shift Lead to execute the Emergency Notification procedure, the Shift
Lead failed to do so. Execution of this procedure would have resulted in notification of Regional
Management (and field personnel), police and other public officials, and the CCO Admin On-
Call or Designate.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195. 402(a) and
(e)(4) and (7) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 10: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4) and (7),
as quoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to follow its Emergency Notification
procedure that required it to take necessary action to minimize the volume of hazardous liquid
released when a failure occurred and to notify police and other public officials during an
emergency.25 It alleged that Enbridge failed to follow its Leak Triggers- SCADA Data
procedure, which required that if one or two leak triggers occurred, then Respondent must
execute its Suspected Leak procedure.26 The Notice also alleged that Enbridge failed to follow
its Confirmed Leak procedure, which required that if three or more triggers occurred, then the
Confirmed Leak procedure must be executed. PHMSA asserted that neither the Suspected Leak
procedure nor the Confirmed Leak procedure was executed by the CCO in response to the Leak
Triggers that occurred shortly after the Scheduled Shutdown.
PHMSA alleged that the Line 6B controller initiated the Scheduled Shutdown at approximately
17:55 on July 25, 2010. The pipeline ruptured at approximately 17:58, approximately 0.6 miles
downstream of the Marshall pumping station, resulting in a sudden drop in upstream discharge
pressure (0 psig). Multiple alarms and events were received within seconds of the rupture,
including low suction pressure at the Marshall pumping station, a shutdown at the Marshall
station, and invalid pressure(s) at the station. A 5-Minute MBS alarm occurred on the Griffith to
Marshall section of Line 6B at 18:03. These alarms and events all constituted Leak Triggers.
PHMSA asserted that had Enbridge followed either procedure, it would have led to the execution
of the Emergency Notification procedure by the Shift Lead, and Enbridge would have notified
Regional/Field personnel, police and other public officials, and the CCO Admin On-Call or
Designate.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and
25 Violation Report, Exhibit I.
26 Id.



12
(e)(4) and (7) by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b), as quoted above,
by continuing to operate its pipeline system without correcting a condition that presented an
immediate hazard to persons or property. Specifically, the Notice alleged that at approximately
04:00 on July 26, 2010, Enbridge initiated the scheduled start-up of Line 6B after an
approximate 10-hour shutdown (First Restart).27 Enbridge was unable to build pressure at the
Marshall pumping station and multiple alarms occurred within minutes of initiating operation.
Alarms continued throughout the operation but Enbridge did not terminate the attempted First
Restart until after approximately one hour of operation.
The Notice alleged that approximately 10,600 bbls of crude oil was injected into the pipeline
during the First Restart, which increased the size of the release and resulted in the displacement
of a number of local residents, contamination of approximately 38 miles of the Kalamazoo River,
and contamination of affected fish and wildlife.
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.401(b) by
operating its pipeline system without correcting a condition that presented an immediate hazard
to persons or property.
Item 13: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (e)(4), as
quoted above, by failing to follow a manual of written procedures for conducting normal
operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that shortly after initiating the First Restart, Enbridge failed to
follow its own MBS Leak Alarm procedure, which required that if a leak detection (MBS) alarm
occurred, then the controller was to notify the Shift Lead and record the AOC (Abnormal
Operating Condition) in FACMAN.28 The procedure then required the Shift Lead to assess the
alarm and take appropriate action based on the assessment.
Recorded telephone transcripts and witness interviews indicated that the Line 6B controller
contacted the Shift Lead at 04:23, but did not specifically report that MBS alarms had occurred.
Then, the controller reported to the Shift Lead that the MBS was starting to react to some flow in
the area, but no FACMAN was created to record the AOC.
As discussed above, Respondent’s MBS Leak Alarm procedure required the Shift Lead to assess
an MBS alarm. If there were any doubt about the reliability of the leak detection model, the
Shift Lead must then execute the MBS Alarm-Analysis by MBS Support procedure. This required
that if, after 10 minutes, the analysis of the alarm was not complete then the pipeline was to be
shut down. Enbridge neither followed this procedure nor shut down the pipeline until 48 minutes
27 Violation Report, Exhibit K.
28 Violation Report, Exhibits K and L.



13
after the first MBS alarm occurred.
29
Respondent did not contest the proposed penalty for this allegation of violation. Accordingly,
based upon a review of the record, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and
(e)(4) by failing to follow its manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
Item 14: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and
(3)-(4), which state, in relevant part:
§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and
emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline
system a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and
maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies.
This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least
once each calendar year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure
that the manual is effective. . . .
(d) Abnormal operation. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this
section must include procedures for the following to provide safety when
operating design limits have been exceeded:
(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of:
(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;
(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal operating
limits;
(iii) Loss of communications;
(iv) Operation of any safety device;
(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal
operation, or personnel error which could cause a hazard to persons or
property. . .
(3) Correcting variations from normal operation of pressure and flow
equipment and controls.
(4) Notifying responsible operator personnel when notice of an abnormal
operation is received. . . .
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) and (d)(1) and (3)-(4) by
failing to follow a manual of written procedures for condu
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