{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320125016H","title":"WEST SHORE PIPELINE CO — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-07-20","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125016h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125016h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125016h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320125016H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving WEST SHORE PIPELINE CO. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2012-07-20 and is reported as closed as of 2020-06-03. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320125016H_Closure Letter_06032020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125016H/320125016H_Closure%20Letter_06032020.pdf\n\n320125016H_Closure Letter_06032020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125016H/320125016H_Closure%20Letter_06032020_text.pdf\n\n320125016H_Corrective Action Order_07202012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125016H/320125016H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_07202012.pdf\n\n320125016H_Corrective Action Order_07202012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125016H/320125016H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_07202012_text.pdf\n\n320125016H_Corrective Action Order_07202012_text.pdf\n\nJULY 20 2012\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (610) 904-4645\nMr. Clark Smith\nPresident & Chief Executive Officer\nBuckeye Partners, L.P.\nOne Greenway Plaza\nSuite 600\nHouston, TX 77046\nMr. Carl Ostach\nVice President, Domestic Field Operations\nWest Shore Pipeline Company\n5 Tek Park, 9999 Hamilton Blvd., Breinigsville, PA 18031\nRe: CPF No. 3-2012-5016H\nDear Sirs:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It finds that\noperation of the 10-inch diameter West Shore hazardous liquid pipeline, Line 254, is hazardous\nAction Order requires you to take immediate action to protect the public, property, and the\nenvironment in connection with the failure of Line 254 that occurred on July 17, 2012, near\nto life, property, and the environment without immediate corrective action.1 The Corrective\nJackson, Wisconsin (WI). Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of\nthis Corrective Action Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The\nterms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.\nWe look forward to a successful resolution of the concerns arising out of this failure to ensure\nthe safe operation of the pipeline. Please direct any questions on this matter to David Barrett,\nDirector, Central Region, OPS, at (816) 329-3800.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n1 Buckeye is the fifty percent owner of a joint venture partnership that owns interest in West Shore Pipe Line\nCompany. West Shore owns and operates the refined products pipeline system.\nhttp://www.buckeye.com/BusinessOperations/JointVenturesMinorityInterests/tabid/589/Default.aspx (last accessed\nJuly 20, 2012)\n\n\n\nEnclosure: Corrective Action Order and Copy of 49 C.F.R. §190.233\ncc: Mr. Robert Malecky, President of Domestic Pipelines & Terminals, Buckeye Partners,\nLP, 5 Tek Park, 9999 Hamilton Blvd., Breinigsville, PA 18031\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. David Barrett, Director, Central Region, PHMSA\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nWest Shore Pipeline Company, ) CPF No. 3-2012-5016H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent )\n____________________________________)\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to\nWest Shore Pipeline Company (West Shore or Respondent), the operator of the 10-inch diameter\nhazardous liquid pipeline, designated as Line 254, that runs from Respondent’s Granville\nterminal and pump station in Granville, Wisconsin (WI) to its Green Bay terminal located in\nGreen Bay, WI (Affected Pipeline). This Order finds that operation of the pipeline without\ncorrective action is hazardous to life, property, or the environment and requires Respondent to\ntake immediate action to ensure the safe operation of the pipeline.\nOn July 17, 2012, Respondent experienced a failure on the Affected Pipeline requiring\nshutdown. On July 18, 2012, Respondent reported a refined petroleum products release to the\nNational Response Center (NRC) and subsequently, submitted a second notification to report to\nthe NRC that it had identified the failure site in Jackson, WI (Failure). Respondent currently\nestimates the volume of the product spill to be approximately 1,000 barrels of unleaded gasoline.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the Failure. OPS\ndetermined that the release originated from the Affected Segment, but the cause of the Failure\nhas not yet been determined. The preliminary findings of the investigation are as follows:\nPreliminary Findings\n• At approximately 10:40 a.m. CDT, on July 17, 2012, Respondent experienced a sudden\npressure drop that corresponded with a sudden increase in flow rate on the Affected\nPipeline requiring shut down of the line and the notification of field personnel in\nWisconsin\n\n\n\n2\n• Following the Failure, Respondent isolated the failed pipe by closing remote valves at\nGranville Terminal and Elkhart Lake Station, located upstream and downstream of the\nFailure site. Respondent also closed a check valve at the Elkhart Lake Station that\nprevented backflow to the Failure site. The Elkhart Lake Station is an intermediate pump\nstation located approximately 48 miles north of Granville Terminal .Field personnel\nclosed manual valves located at Mile Post (M.P.) M.P. 18.3 and M.P. 40.7.\n• On July 17, 2012, Respondent initiated aerial patrols on the Affected Pipeline, but\ndiscovered no spill. Respondent set up an Incident Command Center in Granville, WI.\n• At 9:01 a.m. CDT, on July 18, 2012, Respondent notified the NRC of a potential\ndischarge of gasoline (NRC Report No. 1018117). At approximately 11:05 am CDT, the\nFailure site was identified by ground patrol between the Granville and Elkhart Lake\npump stations at MP 9.43 located in Jackson, WI.\n• At approximately 12:14 p.m. CDT on July 18, 2012, Respondent submitted a\nsupplemental report to the NRC (Report No. 1018156). The report indicated that the\nlocation of the pipeline release had been determined to be at 1880 Western Ave in\nJackson, WI, and estimated the volume of the spill to be 1,000 barrels of unleaded\ngasoline.\n• Due to the Failure site’s proximity to a populated area, at least two homes were\nevacuated.\n• The 10-inch diameter Line 254 pipeline system originates at the Granville Terminal\nproceeds north for approximately 98 miles and terminates at the Green Bay Terminal (the\nAffected Pipeline).\n• The Affected Pipeline crosses a navigable waterway, the Fox River, near Green Bay and\nintersects approximately 31.3 miles of High Consequence Areas (HCAs) and 34.3 miles\nof could affect HCAs, including drinking water sources, “Other Populated Areas”, and\n“High Population Areas”, before terminating in the Green Bay area. The first seven\nmiles of the Affected Pipeline, downstream of Granville, WI, runs parallel to a railroad\nand another pipeline near Germantown, WI (other populated area). The remainder of the\npipeline route is mostly rural.\n• The cause of the failure is unknown and the investigation is ongoing. PHMSA initiated\nan onsite investigation. Preliminary observation indicates the presence of longitudinally\noriented split of the pipe associated with the seam at the 3 o’clock position. The pipeline\ncurrently remains out of service.\n• The Affected Pipeline was constructed in 1961 of 10-inch, grade X52, low frequency\nelectric resistance welded (ERW) pipe manufactured by Jones & Laughlin with a 0.203-\ninch wall thickness at the Failure site. It has a coal tar enamel coating and an impressed-\ncurrent cathodic protection system.\n\n\n\n3\n• Respondent reported that approximately 97 miles of the Affected Pipeline was\nconstructed in 1961 with pipe containing a low frequency ERW seam.\n• At the time of the Failure, the discharge pressure at the Granville terminal and pump\nstation, located approximately 10 miles upstream of the Failure site, was 1,342 psig. The\nestablished maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the pipeline is 1342 psig.\n• Respondent performed a hydrostatic test of the pipeline on May 22, 1990 to a minimum\ntest pressure of 1,822 psig. During the hydrotest, one failure occurred due to a crack in a\nbutt weld at MP 166.\n• Respondent performed an inline inspection (ILI) of the pipeline utilizing a combination\nmagnetic flux leakage (MFL) and geometry tool on September 3, 2009. The pipeline was\nassessed using transverse MFL technology on October 24, 2009.\n• In October 2006, two barrels were released at Granville Terminal and pump station due\nto an equipment failure. In January 1999, third party damage caused a release of 975\nbarrels near Germantown, WI.\n• PHMSA’s predecessor agency, the Research and Special Programs Administration,\nissued Alert Notice ALN-88-01 alerting operators of the susceptibility of failure of ERW\nseam pipe manufactured prior to 1970. The Alert Notice advised operators to take steps\nto prevent failures on pipe manufactured using a low frequency ERW process.\n• West Shore is an affiliate of Buckeye Partner, L.P., which owns and operates\napproximately 6,000 miles of pipelines transporting refined petroleum products and\nhighly volatile liquids.2\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60112 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety (Associate Administrator) may issue a corrective action order after providing reasonable\nnotice and the opportunity for a hearing if he finds that a particular pipeline facility is or would\nbe hazardous to life, property, or the environment. The terms of such an order may include the\nsuspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement,\nor any other action as appropriate. The Associate Administrator may also issue a corrective\naction order without providing any notice or the opportunity for a hearing if he finds that a\nfailure to do so expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or the\nenvironment. The opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable after the\nissuance of the CAO in such cases.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of\nthe pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property and the\nenvironment. Additionally, after considering the age of the pipe, circumstances surrounding this\n2 http://www.buckeye.com/BusinessOperations/tabid/56/Default.aspx and\nhttp://www.buckeye.com/AboutUs/tabid/54/Default.aspx (last accessed on July 19, 2012).\n\n\n\n4\nFailure, the proximity of the pipeline to populated areas, water bodies and drinking water\nresources, public roadways and high consequence areas, the hazardous nature of the product the\npipeline transports, the uncertainties as to the cause of the failure, and the ongoing investigation\nto determine the cause of the failure, I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to\nrequire immediate corrective action would result in likely serious harm to life, property, and the\nenvironment. Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action\nis issued without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this\nOrder are effective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, delivered\npersonally, by mail or by telecopy at (202) 366-4566. The hearing will be held in Kansas City,\nMissouri or Washington, D.C. on a date that is mutually convenient to PHMSA and Respondent.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior\nto the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Action\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, West Shore Pipeline Company is ordered to immediately take the\nfollowing corrective actions to ensure the safe operation of the Affected Pipeline:\n1. Develop and submit a written re-start plan for prior approval of the Director, Central\nRegion, OPS (Director). Obtain written approval from the Director prior to resuming\noperation of the Affected Pipeline. Submit the written plan to the Director at the Pipeline\nand Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 901 Locust Street, Suite 462, Kansas\nCity, MO 64106-2641. The restart plan must specify an incremental start-up with each\npressure increment to be held for at least 2 hours. Updates at these 2 hour increments\nshall be provided to the Director that indicate status, pressure and flow conditions and\nany abnormal operating condition development. The plan must also provide for adequate\npatrolling of the Affected Pipeline during the restart process to ensure the prompt\ndetection of leaks, include a daylight restart, and detail advance communications with\nlocal emergency response officials.\n2. After receiving approval from the Director to restart the Affected Pipeline, maintain a\ntwenty percent (20%) pressure reduction in the operating pressure of the Affected\nPipeline. The discharge pressure at Granville pump station must be reduced 20% from\nthe actual operating pressure at the time of failure. Specifically the discharge pressure at\nGranville Station is not to exceed 1,073 psig. The discharge pressure at Elkhart Lake\npump station must be reduced 20% from the highest minimum operating pressure\nexperienced for 1 hour within ten days prior to the failure. Specifically, the discharge\npressure at the Elkhart Lake station is not to exceed 804 psig. This pressure restriction\nwill remain in effect until written approval to increase the pressure or return the pipeline\nto its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the Director pursuant to Item 10.\n\n\n\n5\n3. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete mechanical and metallurgical testing\nand failure analysis of the failed pipe, including analysis of soil samples and any foreign\nmaterials. Complete the testing and analysis as follows:\nA. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe\nsection and other evidence from the failure site;\nB. Use the testing protocol provided by PHMSA and submit the selection of the\ntesting laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nC. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the\nDirector with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\nD. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Director at the same time as\nthey are made available to Respondent.\n4. Within 30 days of receipt of this Order, conduct an evaluation of the previous inline\ninspection (ILI) results, including a review and reporting by the ILI vendors’ analysts\n(including raw data) of the failed Affected Pipeline as follows:\nA. Submit any and all reports as received from the vendors utilized for the 2009 ILI\nruns.\nB. Re-evaluate the 2009 inline inspection results to determine whether any features\nwere present in the failed pipe joint. Determine if any features with similar\ncharacteristics are present elsewhere on the pipeline;\nC. Evaluate West Shore’s process for reviewing ILI results, utilizing an independent\nthird party consultant acceptable to the Director;\nD. Within 15 days of the completion of the re-evaluation of the 2009 ILI results and\nevaluation of West Shores ILI process, submit a report describing the ILI features\npresent in the failed joint, the process used to re-evaluate ILI results, and the\nresults of the re-evaluation including characterization of the size and location of\nsimilar features on the pipeline. The report must also describe West Shore’s ILI\nresults review process and any identified improvements by the third party\nconsultant to ensure that integrity-threatening anomalies are acted upon.\n5. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, submit an integrity verification and\nremedial work plan (“Work Plan”) to the Director for approval. The Work Plan must\nprovide for the verification of the integrity of the pipeline and must address all factors\nknown or suspected in the July 17, 2012 failure, including, but not limited to the\nfollowing:\n\n\n\n6\nA. The integration of the results of the failure analyses and other actions required by\nthis Order with all relevant operating data including all historical repair\ninformation, construction, operating, maintenance, testing, metallurgical analysis\nor other third party consultation information, and assessment data for the delivery\nline. Data gathering activities must include a review of the failure history (in\nservice and pressure test failures) of the pipeline and development of a written\nreport containing all available information regarding locations, dates, and causes\nof leaks and failures;\nB. The performance of additional field testing, inspections, and evaluations to\ndetermine whether and to what extent the conditions associated with the failures,\nor any other integrity-threatening conditions are present elsewhere on the\npipeline. At a minimum, the inspections and evaluations must consider use of in-\nline inspection that can reliably detect and identify anomalies, and close-interval\nsurveys or other cathodic protection surveys. Include a detailed description of the\ncriteria to be used for the evaluation and prioritization of any integrity threats and\nanomalies that are identified with the necessity of establishing a 1.39 x MOP\nfactor of safety upon completion of testing, inspections and evaluations;\nC. The performance of repairs or other corrective measures that fully remediate the\ncondition(s) associated with the pipeline failures and any other integrity-\nthreatening condition everywhere along the Affected Pipeline. Based on the\nknown history and condition of the pipeline, the plans for repairs must include:\n(1) replacement of the Affected Pipeline or portions thereof (or technical\njustification for not doing so); and/or (2) confirmatory hydrostatic pressure testing\nof the entire Affected Pipeline. Include a detailed description of the criteria and\nmethod(s) to be used in undertaking any repairs, replacements, or other remedial\nactions;\nD. The implementation of continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity\nverification measures to ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected\nPipeline considering the results of the analyses, inspections, and corrective\nmeasures undertaken pursuant to the Order, and;\nE. A schedule for completion of the Items A−D.\n6. The Work Plan becomes incorporated into this Order. Respondent must revise the work\nplan as necessary to incorporate the results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order\nand whenever necessary to incorporate new information obtained during the failure\ninvestigation and remedial activities. Submit any such plan revisions to the Director for\nprior approval. The Director may approve plan elements incrementally.\n7. Implement the Work Plan as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the\nplan.\n8. Submit monthly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and results of\nthe testing and evaluations required by this Order; and (2) describe the progress of the\n\n\n\n7\nrepairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first monthly report for the\nperiod from July 20 through August 31, 2012 shall be due by August 17, 2012.\n9. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain documentation of the costs\nassociated with implementation of this Corrective Action Order. Include in each monthly\nreport submitted, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure,\nincluding repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental\nremediation, if applicable.\n10. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction set forth\nin Item 2 upon a written request from Respondent demonstrating that the hazard has been\nabated and that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is justified\nbased on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe\nconsidering all known defects, anomalies and operating parameters of the pipeline.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of this Order\nupon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nWith respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the submission on\nspecified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove in whole\nor in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission, or (e) any\ncombination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or modification\nby the Director, Respondent must take all action required by the submission as approved or\nmodified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of the submission,\nRespondent must correct all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director, and resubmit\nit for approval. If a resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in part, the Director may again\nrequire Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with the foregoing procedure, and\nthe Director may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this Order.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), you must provide, along with the complete original\ndocument, a second copy of the document with those portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted, along with an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to “CPF No. 3-2012-5016H” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The\nactions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Part 195, under any\nother order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq., or under any other\nprovision of Federal or State law.\n\n\n\n8\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n320125016H_Closure Letter_06032020_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: ccsmith@buckeye.com and costach@buckeye.com\nJune 3, 2020\nMr. Clark Smith\nPresident & Chief Executive Officer Buckeye\nPartners, L.P.\nOne Greenway Plaza\nSuite 600\nHouston, TX 77046\nMr. Carl Ostach\nVice President, Domestic Field Operations\nWest Shore Pipeline Company\n5 Tek Park, 9999 Hamilton Blvd., Breinigsville, PA 18031\nCPF 3-2012-5016H\nDear Sirs:\nOn July 20, 2012, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued\nto West Shore Pipeline Company Corrective Action Order in the above-referenced case. This\nOrder included a requirement to take corrective actions on your pipeline. Based on our review\nof the documentation you provided, it has been determined that you have complied with the\nterms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nC.C. Claudia Pankowski - CPankowski@buckeye.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":24905}