{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320125023","title":"ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-10-18","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.402, 195.422(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125023.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125023.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320125023","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320125023","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS OPERATING LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402,  195.422(a). The case was opened on 2012-10-18 and is reported as closed as of 2014-04-15. Proposed civil penalty: $437,500. Assessed civil penalty: $437,500. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320125023_Final Order_03252014.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125023/320125023_Final%20Order_03252014.pdf\n\n320125023_Final Order_03252014_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125023/320125023_Final%20Order_03252014_text.pdf\n\n320125023_NOPV PCP_10182012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125023/320125023_NOPV%20PCP_10182012.pdf\n\n320125023_NOPV PCP_10182012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125023/320125023_NOPV%20PCP_10182012_text.pdf\n\n320125023_Operator Response to NOPV PCP_01172013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320125023/320125023_Operator%20Response%20to%20NOPV%20PCP_01172013.pdf\n\n320125023_Final Order_03252014_text.pdf\n\nMARCH 25, 2014\nMr. Michael A. Creel\nPresident & CEO\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC\n1100 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002-5227\nRe: CPF No. 3-2012-5023\nDear Mr. Creel:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and assesses a civil penalty of $437,500. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the\nFinal Order. This enforcement action closes automatically upon receipt of payment. Service of\nthe Final Order by certified mail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise\nprovided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Director, Central Region, OPS\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nEnterprise Products Operating, LLC ) CPF No. 3-2012-5023\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn April 14, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an investigation of an accident that occurred at a pump station operated by Enterprise\nProducts Operating, LLC (Enterprise or Respondent) in Seymour, Indiana. While conducting\nmaintenance of the sump system associated with the P35 pipeline sump system, product from a\nleaking valve ultimately ignited, resulting in a flash fire. Two employees were burned, one of\nwhom required extended hospitalization1 and two contractors were also exposed to the flames.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated October 18, 2012, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty\n(Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Enterprise\ncommitted various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of\n$437,500 for the alleged violations.\nEnterprise requested and received an extension, then responded to the Notice by letter dated\nJanuary 17, 2013 (Response). Respondent contested one allegation of violation and requested\nthat the proposed civil penalty be reduced. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore\nhas waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195.402, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in\nrelevant part:\n1 Pipeline Safety Violation Report A & B (Violation Report A) (Violation Report B), (October 18, 2012) (on file\nwith PHMSA), at 4. Please note that there is one Violation Report, but it has been divided into two subparts, the\nlatter composed of appendices to the actual report.\n\n\n\n2\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall\nbe prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in\naccordance with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of\nthis part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402 by failing to follow its manual\nof written procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing its pipeline system. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that Enterprise did not perform lockout and tagout isolation during the\nmaintenance project at the Seymour pump station, in accordance with its procedures.\nBackground2\nRespondent undertook the maintenance project of the sump system in order to address a chronic\nHighly Volatile Liquids (HVL) contamination issue at its pump station in Seymour, Indiana. At\nsome point, the Seymour facility handled crude oil. Since that time, the facility has ceased\ntransport of crude oil, but traces remain in the piping that contaminate the current products\ntransported by this facility. To address the product quality issue caused by the contamination,\nEnterprise undertook a number of projects, including a manifold rebuild program, abandonment\nof crude oil piping and valve replacements. During removal of the old piping and valve\nreplacement, some modifications to the original layout were also planned to remove outdated or\nunnecessary structures. The employees involved in this accident were in the process of\nconsolidating and abandoning certain piping and replacing valves when the flash fire occurred.\nOn April 13, 2010, the day before the accident, Enterprise employees closed the mainline valves\nand shut down the main line pipe to the sump in preparation for the work described above. On\nthe day of the accident, April 14, 2010, an Enterprise employee completed draining the piping,\npumping the sump “dry” and closing the sump system valves. Two teams, one comprised of two\nEnterprise employees and the other of two contract employees were to remove 2” drain valves.\nWhile attempting to remove a valve on the south side of the bell hole, the Enterprise team\n2 This description of events was composed from the evidence section of the Violation Report. The Violation\nReport’s evidence was based on the site visit and interviews conducted with Enterprise personnel, including Ryan\nAutry, Roby Abernathy, and Luke Abernathy. Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (May 17, 2007)\n(on file with PHMSA), 4-13.\n\n\n\n3\nstruggled to remove some valve flange bolts that were corroded and difficult to access. To speed\nthis work, the Enterprise employees bypassed the available manual tools and began\npredominantly using an electric impact wrench supplied by the contract employees. The\nEnterprise employees then removed the sump side of their valve and unbolted the downstream\nflange. Sometime after this point, both teams took a lunch break, leaving the bell hole. The\npiping was not monitored for the presence of vapors during this time.\nAfter lunch, both teams returned to the bell hole. When the Enterprise team resumed removing\nbolts on the upstream side of the valve, product began escaping from a flange. At the same time,\nthe contractors cracked a flange while unbolting their valve, allowing diesel to escape. A station\noperator making rounds at the bell hole noticed vapors coming from the contract employees’\ncracked flange. In an attempt to contain the product leaking from their flange, the Enterprise\nemployees began tightening a bolt with the electric impact wrench, precipitating the flash fire.\nThese employees sustained burns to their hands and face, while the contract employees were\nsinged. In order to extinguish the fire, the contract employees left the bell hole to retrieve a fire\nextinguisher from their truck.\nAnalysis - Item 1\nEPCO’s Section 3.3.5 General Procedures and Requirements3 states that, prior to beginning\nmaintenance work, the Operations Supervisor or designee must identify “all mechanical isolating\ndevice(s) that must be closed, blinded, or disconnected” on an Isolation/Blind List. 4 Then,\npursuant to Section 3.3.1.3, Acceptable Energy Isolation Devices, the devices identified on the\nIsolation/Blind List are locked out and tagged “prior to any work being performed on the\nupstream/downstream deenergized side of these devices.”5 During PHMSA’s investigation of\nthe accident, the investigator collected evidence demonstrating that Enterprise failed to identify\nall of the devices on the Isolation/Blind List prior to beginning this work project. Furthermore,\nthe valves6 from the HVL skid to the sump system were not tagged out.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation, but argued that the civil penalty should be\nreduced based on its good faith attempts to comply with this regulatory requirement. I will\naddress this argument in the penalty section of this order.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402 by failing to follow its manual of written procedures for operating,\nmaintaining, and repairing its pipeline system when it did not perform lockout and tagout\nisolation during the April 2010 maintenance project at the Seymour pump station.\n3 Respondent’s procedures are entitled “EH&S Management System Safety Policies & Procedures Manual\n(Effective Date 05/31/2006).”\n4 Violation Report B, at 29.\n5 Id. at 26.\n6 Violation Report A, at 6.\n\n\n\n4\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall\nbe prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in\naccordance with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of\nthis part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402 by failing to follow its manual\nof written procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing its pipeline system. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that Enterprise failed to comply with its procedure requiring continuous\nLower Explosive Limit (LEL) monitoring in the presence of certain electrical equipment.\nDuring maintenance of the sump pump system, Enterprise personnel used an electric impact\nwrench without actively monitoring for the presence of flammable vapors. While an LEL\nmonitor was present at the work site, it was not connected and therefore did not extend to the\nbottom of the trench, where the work was actually being performed. Enterprise acknowledges as\nmuch in its Accident Investigation Report, which cited the LEL monitor as a causal factor.\n7\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation but again asserted in its Response that it\nacted with good faith and therefore the penalty assessment should be reconsidered. I will address\nthis argument in the penalty section of this order.\nAccordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402 by failing to follow its procedure requiring the use of LEL monitoring when\ncertain electrical equipment is used in classified areas.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\n7 Enterprise Accident Investigation Report (Investigation Report), (May 21, 2010) (on file with PHMSA). Page 1.\n“Causal Factors: 2. Non-Intrinsically Safe tool (Electric Impact Wrench) introduced into the job area without an\nadditional hazard evaluation being conducted.” Violation Report B, at 3.\n\n\n\n5\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall\nbe prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in\naccordance with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of\nthis part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402 by failing to follow its manual\nof written procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing its pipeline system. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that Enterprise failed to abide by Section 3.11.3.28, which requires the\nreissuance of any permit upon “any changes in the operating area that may affect the validity of\nthe permit as originally issued (emphasis added).” Enterprise’s original hot work permit only\nreferred to the use of gasoline and diesel powered equipment. Upon introducing the electric\nimpact wrench, Enterprise was required to reissue the permit and inform all relevant parties of\nthe change.\nIn its Response, Enterprise admits that, “there was a lack of follow up by operating personnel,”\nbut contends that it demonstrated good faith in complying with this regulatory requirement. 9\nConsequently, Enterprise requests mitigation of the proposed civil penalty. The penalty section\nwill address this issue.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402 by failing to follow its manual of written procedures, which required reissuance of a\npermit following a change in the operating area that affected the validity of the original hot work\npermit.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402, which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies. This manual shall be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year, and appropriate changes\n8 Violation Report B, at 17.\n9 Respondent’s Response to the Notice (Response), at 2.\n\n\n\n6\nmade as necessary to insure that the manual is effective. This manual shall\nbe prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system commence, and\nappropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to\nprovide safety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in\naccordance with each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of\nthis part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402 by failing to follow its manual\nof written procedures for operating, maintaining, and repairing its pipeline system. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that, contrary to its procedures, Enterprise failed to post a fire watch during\nmaintenance of the sump pump system. Enterprise’s procedure, 3.11.8 Hot Work Permit\nRequirements, requires that a “stand by” or fire watch to be present and monitor any potential\nignition sources.\nIn its Response, Enterprise acknowledges that it should have posted a fire watch during the sump\npump maintenance.10 However, it contests the Violation Report, which states that its failure to\npost a fire watch was a contributing factor in this accident or increased the severity of the\nconsequences of this accident. It is Enterprise’s position that its personnel’s failure to follow\nprocedures was the causal factor in this accident. Accordingly, Enterprise requests that PHMSA\namend the gravity and culpability designations in recognition of its attempts to comply with the\nregulatory requirements. I will address these arguments in the penalty section of this order, as\nthey relate to the circumstances of the violation and not whether or not Enterprise is in violation\nof this regulatory requirement.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402 by failing to follow its manual of written procedures, which required posting a “stand-\nby” or fire watch during maintenance of the sump system.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a), which states:\n§ 195.422 Pipeline Repairs.\n(a) Each operator shall, in repairing its pipeline systems, insure that the\nrepairs are made in a safe manner and are made so as to prevent damage to\npersons or property.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a) by failing to insure that\nrepairs are made in a safe manner so as to prevent damage to persons or property. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that Enterprise’s collective actions and inactions on the day of the sump\nmaintenance collectively were made in an unsafe manner, causing damage to persons and\n10 Note that Enterprise’s Products Operating LP Incident Investigation Report: “Causal Factors: 4. No fire watch on\nstation.” Violation Report B, at 6.\n\n\n\n7\nproperty.\nIn its Response, Enterprise argues that this allegation of violation is duplicative of Items 1-4 and\nshould therefore be dismissed. Admittedly, Enterprise’s failure to lockout and tagout, monitor\nfor flammable vapors, seek reissuance of a permit after a material change, or post a fire watch\ncontributed to the unsafe manner in which this project was conducted. However, the question of\nwhether an operator acted in such a way as to avoid damage and act safely requires an evaluation\nof the totality of the circumstances. Respondent’s personnel repeatedly ignored Enterprise’s own\nprocedures, to the detriment of their own safety. Furthermore, Enterprise’s own Investigation\nReport11 cites several other factors, including: “1. Operator 1 trying to coordinate too many\nevents the morning of the incident….5. Contractor heard indications of pressure in the system\n(burps) but failed to pass the information onto the three other workers…8. The inability of all our\nworkers to hear the warning above the work site noise level.” The persistency and degree of\nboth the regulatory noncompliance, combined with the other causal factors cited in the\nInvestigation Report, lead to the conclusion that the Respondent failed to “insure” that its\npersonnel was safely repairing its system, with an eye towards safeguarding life and property.\nThere is no evidence that Enterprise took any steps to monitor for the compliance of its\nemployees or to conduct these repairs so as to “prevent damage to persons or property.”\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.422(a) by failing to insure that repairs are made in a safe manner and are made so as to\nprevent damage to persons or property.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$100,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $1,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations. In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; the Respondent’s\nability to pay the penalty and any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing\nbusiness; and the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety\nregulations. In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without\nany reduction because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require.\nThe Notice proposed a total civil penalty of $437,500 for the violations cited above.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $37,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402, for failing to follow its manual of written procedures for operating, maintaining, and\nrepairing its pipeline system. Enterprise concedes that its employees failed to properly\nimplement its policies and procedures, which state that lockout and tagout must be performed\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\n11 Violation Report, Appendix 1.\n\n\n\n8\nprior to initiating any work. Nevertheless, Respondent argues that it demonstrated good faith by\nproperly implementing policies and procedures. Notwithstanding the fact that Respondent\nevinced intent through its policies and procedures, its own employees failed to act in accordance\nwith the procedures. The Violation Report articulates that good faith “does not exist if … the\noperator did not act in accordance with its duty to meet the regulatory obligation (emphasis\nadded).” 12 Therefore, I cannot impute good faith to the Respondent. Accordingly, having\nreviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of\n$37,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402.\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402, for failing to comply with its procedure requiring continuous LEL\nmonitoring in the presence of certain electrical equipment. Enterprise argues that it should be\naccorded good faith for having the appropriate policies and procedures in place, irrespective of\nits employees’ noncompliance. Once again, I find that good faith requires that the Respondent\ntake some affirmative action towards compliance. If Respondent’s personnel had installed the\nLEL monitor properly in accordance with the procedures, this accident could have been averted.\nAccordingly, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $100,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402.\nItem 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402, for failing to follow its manual of written procedures requiring the\nreissuance of any permit when changed circumstances call the validity of the original permit into\nquestion. Enterprise states that PHMSA’s evaluation of its culpability and good faith in the\nViolation Report should be reconsidered. First, the Respondent argues that it made an attempt to\ncomply with the regulatory requirement by establishing procedures and training, though its\npersonnel failed to comply. As stated before, the culpability determination is primarily\nconcerned with action or inaction, not intention. The record shows that the Respondent took no\naffirmative steps to comply with its own procedure, which required that a permit be reissued in\ncertain circumstances. Second, as to good faith, Respondent repeats the argument that it\nimplemented policies and procedures and therefore acted with good faith despite its employees’\nnoncompliance. Once again, the operator’s failure to act is dispositive here. I therefore find that\nboth the culpability and good faith determinations are appropriate. Accordingly, having\nreviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of\n$100,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402.\nItem 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402, for failure to post a fire watch during maintenance of the sump pump\nsystem. Enterprise does not dispute that it violated the regulatory requirement by failing to\nfollow its own procedures, but states that the penalty should be mitigated on account of three\nseparate factors. First, Enterprise disputes the “gravity” designation in the Violation Report.\nEnterprise states that the lack of a fire watch was not causal to the accident13 and that its\n“employee’s failure to follow multiple other established policies and procedures . . . are the\n12 Violation Report A, at 17.\n13 See, Incident Investigation Report. “Causal Factors. 4. No fire watch on station.”\n\n\n\n9\ncontributing and causal factors of the flash fire that occurred.” Posting a fire watch is required\nby Section 3.11.8.6 of Enterprise’s procedures and its failure to do so undoubtedly contributed to\nboth the actual severity of the accident and the attendant consequences. The contractor\nemployees, who did not sustain actual burns in the accident, were required to leave the bell hole\nin order to extinguish “several burning areas.”14 The Violation Report states that “The non-\ncompliance contributed to the cause of an accident/incident or increas[ed] the severity of the\nconsequences of an accident/incident (emphasis added).” If a fire watch had been properly\nposted, the fire would have been extinguished sooner and the severity of the consequences\npotentially abated. The gravity designation is therefore appropriate. Second, Enterprise asserts\nthat its “Culpability” designation should be changed from “failed to take any action or made\nminimal attempt” to “took some steps to address the issue” in light of the fact that it trained its\nemployees on the proper procedures. I disagree. Whatever training was implemented by the\nRespondent, its personnel did not comply with the requirement that a fire watch be posted.\nLastly, I disagree with Enterprise’s contention that it demonstrated good faith with respect to this\nitem. While it argues that its training, policies, and procedures were established in good faith\nand its employees simply failed in implementing them, Respondent cannot disavow its own\nemployees. Having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria, I assess\nRespondent a civil penalty of $100,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402.\nItem 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a), for failing to insure that repairs to its pipeline system are made in a safe\nmanner and to prevent damage to persons or property. As I stated above, Enterprise failed in\nseveral respects to insure the safe repair of its system. Evaluating the totality of circumstances, I\nfind that the penalty assessment is appropriate. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and\nconsidered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $100,000 for violation\nof 49 C.F.R. § 195.422(a).\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the\nItems cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $437,500.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMZ-341), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, P.O. Box 269039, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125. The\nFinancial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8893.\nFailure to pay the $437,500 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual\nrate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\n14 Violation Report A, at 36.\n\n\n\n10\nUnder 49 C.F.R. § 190.215, Respondent has the right to submit a Petition for Reconsideration of\nthis Final Order. The petition must be sent to: Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline\nSafety, PHMSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, East Building, 2nd Floor, Washington, DC\n20590, with a copy sent to the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA, at the same address. PHMSA\nwill accept petitions received no later than 20 days after receipt of service of the Final Order by\nthe Respondent, provided they contain a brief statement of the issue(s) and meet all other\nrequirements of 49 C.F.R. § 190.215. The filing of a petition automatically stays the payment of\nany civil penalty assessed but does not stay any other provisions of the Final Order, including\nany required corrective actions. If Respondent submits payment of the civil penalty, the Final\nOrder becomes the final administrative decision and the right to petition for reconsideration is\nwaived.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order [CPF No. 3-2012-5023] are effective upon service\nin accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":30869}