{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320126003","title":"SUPERIOR REFINING COMPANY LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2012-12-28","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(i)(4), 195.452(j)(2), 195.452(k).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320126003.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320126003.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320126003","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320126003","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving SUPERIOR REFINING COMPANY LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.452(f)(1),  195.452(i)(3),  195.452(i)(4),  195.452(j)(2),  195.452(k). The case was opened on 2012-12-28 and is reported as closed as of 2016-06-27. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320126003_Closure Letter_06272016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320126003/320126003_Closure%20Letter_06272016.pdf\n\n320126003_Closure Letter_06272016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320126003/320126003_Closure%20Letter_06272016_text.pdf\n\n320126003_Final Order_07232013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320126003/320126003_Final%20Order_07232013.pdf\n\n320126003_Final Order_07232013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320126003/320126003_Final%20Order_07232013_text.pdf\n\n320126003_NOPV PCO_12282012.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320126003/320126003_NOPV%20PCO_12282012.pdf\n\n320126003_NOPV PCO_12282012_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320126003/320126003_NOPV%20PCO_12282012_text.pdf\n\n320126003_Operator Response to Notice_01212013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320126003/320126003_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_01212013.pdf\n\n320126003_Closure Letter_06272016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJune 27, 2016\nMr. F. William Grube\nChief Executive Officer\nCalumet GP, LLC\n2780 Waterfront Parkway East Drive\nSuite 200\nIndianapolis, Indiana 46214\nCPF 3-2012-6003\nDear Mr. Grube:\nOn July 23, 2013, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued\nto Calumet Specialty Products Partners, LP a Final Order in the above-referenced case. This\nOrder included a Compliance Order. Based on our review of the documentation you provided, it\nhas been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320126003_Final Order_07232013_text.pdf\n\nJULY 23, 2013\nMr. F. William Grube\nChief Executive Officer\nCalumet GP, LLC\n2780 Waterfront Parkway East Drive\nSuite 200\nIndianapolis, Indiana 46214\nRe: CPF No. 3-2012-6003\nDear Mr. Grube:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation and specifies actions that need to be taken by your limited partnership, Calumet\nSpecialty Products Partners, LP, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. When the terms\nof the compliance order have been completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region,\nthis enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is deemed\neffective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. David Barrett, Director, Central Region, OPS\nMr. Alan Mayberry, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Timothy Barnhart, Vice President of Operations, Calumet GP, LLC\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nCalumet Specialty Products Partners, LP, ) CPF No. 3-2012-6003\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n_________________________________________ )\nFINAL ORDER\nOn April 4-5, 2011, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),\nconducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the records and pipeline integrity management\nprogram (IMP) of Murphy Oil USA (Murphy) in Superior, Wisconsin. On September 30, 2011,\nCalumet Specialty Products Partners, LP (Calumet or Respondent), acquired Murphy’s Superior,\nWisconsin refinery and associated assets, including the pipeline that is the subject of this Final\nOrder. Calumet is a refiner and processor of specialty hydrocarbon products with operations in\nIllinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.1 Its Superior, Wisconsin\nrefinery receives crude oil by pipeline and produces transportation fuels and paving asphalt.2\nThe associated PHMSA-regulated pipeline system contains nearly six miles of steel pipeline and\nthree breakout tanks.3\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Calumet, by\nletter dated December 28, 2012, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Compliance Order\n(Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Calumet, as\nsuccessor-in-interest of Murphy, had committed various violations of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452 and\nproposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nCalumet responded to the Notice by letter dated January 21, 2013 (Response). The company did\nnot contest the allegations of violation but provided information concerning the corrective\nactions it had taken. The company did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to\none.\n1 Calumet, About Calumet Specialty Products Partners, available at\nhttp://www.calumetspecialty.com/About/AboutCalumet.aspx (last accessed June 12, 2013).\n2 Calumet, Manufacturing: Superior, Wisconsin, available at\nhttp://www.calumetspecialty.com/Manufacturing/Superior.aspx (last accessed June 12, 2013).\n3 Calumet Superior, LLC, Annual Report for Calendar Year 2012 Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems, PHMSA\nReport No. 20130084-11780 (May 20, 2013) (on file with PHMSA), at 7-9.\n\n\n\n2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nIn its Response, Calumet did not contest the allegations in the Notice that it violated 49 C.F.R.\nPart 195, as follows: 4\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(1), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An\nintegrity management program begins with the initial framework. An\noperator must continually change the program to reflect operating\nexperience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity assessments,\nand other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of\nconsequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An operator must\ninclude, at minimum, each of the following elements in its written\nintegrity management program:\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a\nhigh consequence area; . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(1) by failing to include in its\nwritten IMP a process for identifying which of its pipeline segments could affect high\nconsequence areas (HCAs).\n5 Specifically, the Notice alleged that Murphy’s IMP had\ninadequately identified pipeline segments that “could affect” HCAs because it had considered\npotential spills from only two points along the pipeline, that the IMP lacked sufficient\ndescriptions of the spill coverage areas for those points, that the program lacked a map showing\npotential releases on overland, water, and combination transports for all areas along the pipeline,\nand that it had failed to consider the effects of breakout tanks on spill volumes.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(1) by failing to include in\nits written IMP a process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect HCAs.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area? —(1) . . . .\n(3) Leak detection. An operator must have a means to detect leaks on\nits pipeline system. An operator must evaluate the capability of its leak\n4 The Notice alleged that Murphy had committed the violations set forth below, as of the date of the inspection. In\nits Response, Calumet did not object to the issuance of the Notice to Calumet as Murphy’s successor, presumably\nbecause Calumet had assumed operational control of the facilities that are the subject of this Order and had been re-\nassigned Murphy’s “Operator Identification Number” by PHMSA as of such date.\n5 “High Consequence Areas” are defined as commercially navigable waterways, high population areas, other\npopulated areas, and unusually sensitive areas. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.\n\n\n\n3\ndetection means and modify, as necessary, to protect the high consequence\narea. An operator’s evaluation must, at least, consider, the following\nfactors—length and size of the pipeline, type of product carried, the\npipeline’s proximity to the high consequence area, the swiftness of leak\ndetection, location of nearest response personnel, leak history, and risk\nassessment results.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3) by failing to evaluate the\ncapability of its pipeline leak detection system to detect leaks that could affect HCAs.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Murphy did not perform an adequate evaluation of its leak\ndetection system. The company’s leak detection system merely signaled a leak when a pressure\nreading at one particular point reached 10 psig.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(3) by failing to evaluate\nthe capability of its pipeline leak detection system to detect leaks that could affect HCAs.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to\nprotect the high consequence area? —(1) . . . .\n(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator\ndetermines that an EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high\nconsequence area in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an\noperator must install the EFRD. In making this determination, an operator\nmust, at least, consider the following factors—the swiftness of leak\ndetection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of commodity\ncarried, the rate of potential leakage, the volume that can be released,\ntopography or pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to\npower sources, location of nearest response personnel, specific terrain\nbetween the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and benefits\nexpected by reducing the spill size.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4) by failing to properly\ndetermine whether EFRDs were needed on a pipeline segment to protect an HCA in the event of\na release. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Murphy had not adequately considered the\nrelevant factors in making such a determination. Instead, it had merely completed an EFRD\nstudy determining that check valves were impractical because the pipeline was bi-directional.\nThat study did not consider using other types of EFRDs, nor how the system’s three breakout\ntanks could affect the volume of product released during a leak.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(i)(4) by failing to properly\ndetermine whether EFRDs were needed on a pipeline segment to protect an HCA in the event of\na release.\n\n\n\n4\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to\nmaintain a pipeline’s integrity? —(1) . . . .\n(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as\nfrequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base\nthe frequency of evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline,\nincluding the factors specified in paragraph (e) of this section. The\nevaluation must consider the results of the baseline and periodic integrity\nassessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of this section), and\ndecisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions\n(paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by failing to conduct a\nperiodic evaluation as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, based on all relevant risk\nfactors and results of the baseline and integrity assessments, information analysis, and decisions\nabout remedial, preventive, and mitigative actions. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Murphy\nhad not performed an adequate evaluation because it had not properly accounted for the use of\nhydrostatic testing as its sole integrity assessment method. In addition, an adequate evaluation\nwould have considered other risk factors, including corrosion and the potential for third-party\ndamage.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by failing to conduct a\nperiodic evaluation as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity, based on all relevant risk\nfactors and results of integrity assessments, information analysis, and decisions about remedial,\npreventive, and mitigative actions.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An\noperator’s program must include methods to measure whether the program\nis effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline\nsegment and in protecting the high consequence areas. See Appendix C of\nthis part for guidance on methods that can be used to evaluate a program’s\neffectiveness.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k) by failing to include\nmethods in its IMP to measure whether the program had effectively assessed and evaluated the\nintegrity of each pipeline segment and protected HCAs. Specifically, the Notice alleged that\nMurphy had not developed methods to measure whether its IMP was effective.\n\n\n\n5\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all\nof the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(k) by failing to include\nmethods in its IMP to measure whether the program had effectively assessed and evaluated the\nintegrity of each pipeline segment and protected HCAs.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(f)(1), (i)(3), (i)(4), (j)(2), and (k), respectively. Under\n49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of hazardous liquids or who\nowns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the applicable safety standards\nestablished under chapter 601. Pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the\npipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(f)(1) (Item 1), Respondent must\ndetermine which pipeline segments could affect HCAs along the entire pipeline route.\nRespondent’s analysis must consider features that affect transport, including ground\nslope, ditches, and storm sewers. It must also consider leak volumes along the right-\nof-way and the effects of Respondent’s tank farm. Respondent must develop maps\nshowing overland transport, water transport, or combination overland and water\ntransport for all areas along the pipeline.\n2. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(i)(3) (Item 2), Respondent must\ndevelop a plan to evaluate and improve its leak detection system and a schedule to\nimplement that plan.\n3. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(i)(4) (Item 3), Respondent must review\nand document the potential benefits of remotely controlled valves, other than check\nvalves. Its review must consider breakout tanks and the tanks’ effects contributing to\nspill quantities.\n4. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(j)(2) (Item 4), Respondent must\nperform evaluations to address threats on its pipeline and propose additional\npreventative and mitigative actions.\n5. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(k) (Item 5), Respondent must develop\nprocedures to measure its IMP’s effectiveness. It must apply those procedures to\ndetermine if it should take additional actions to ensure the integrity of applicable\npipeline segments.\n6. Respondent must submit a plan and schedule to perform compliance Items 1-5 to\nthe Director within 30 days of receipt of this Final Order. This plan will require\n\n\n\n6\napproval of the Director.\n7. PHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the\ntotal to the Director. PHMSA requests that Respondent report these costs in two\ncategories: (1) total cost associated with preparation and revision of plans,\nprocedures, studies, and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with replacements,\nadditions, and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $200,000 for each violation for each day the violation continues or in referral to the\nAttorney General for appropriate relief in a district court of the United States.\nThe terms and conditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with\n49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n___________________________________ __________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":18771}