{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320135004","title":"BP PIPELINE (NORTH AMERICA) INC. — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-02-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.420(b), 195.432(b), 195.452(h)(1), 195.452(h)(4), 195.452(j)(1), 195.452(j)(2).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320135004.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320135004.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320135004","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320135004","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving BP PIPELINE (NORTH AMERICA) INC.. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.420(b),  195.432(b),  195.452(h)(1),  195.452(h)(4),  195.452(j)(1),  195.452(j)(2). The case was opened on 2013-02-15 and is reported as closed as of 2017-11-15. Proposed civil penalty: $100,000. Assessed civil penalty: $100,000. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320135004_Closure Letter_11152017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135004/320135004_Closure%20Letter_11152017.pdf\n\n320135004_Closure Letter_11152017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135004/320135004_Closure%20Letter_11152017_text.pdf\n\n320135004_Final Order_09252015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135004/320135004_Final%20Order_09252015.pdf\n\n320135004_Final Order_09252015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135004/320135004_Final%20Order_09252015_text.pdf\n\n320135004_NOPV PCP PCO_02152013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135004/320135004_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_02152013.pdf\n\n320135004_NOPV PCP PCO_02152013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135004/320135004_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_02152013_text.pdf\n\n320135004_Operator_Response_to_Notice_and_Request_for_Hearing_03222013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135004/320135004_Operator_Response_to_Notice_and_Request_for_Hearing_03222013.pdf\n\n320135004_Closure Letter_11152017_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nNovember 15, 2017\nGerald Maret\nPresident\nBP Pipelines (North America) Inc.\nMC 9S-169\n30 S. Wacker Drive\nChicago, IL 60606\nCPF 3-2013-5004\nDear Mr. Maret:\nOn September 25, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) issued to BP Pipelines (North America) Inc. a Final Order in the above-referenced\ncase. This Order included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment. Based on our\nreview of the documentation you provided and confirmation of payment of the civil penalty, it\nhas been determined that you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320135004_NOPV PCP PCO_02152013_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nFebruary 15, 2013\nMr. Steve Pankhurst\nPresident\nBP Pipelines (North America) Inc.\n150 West Warrenville Road\nNaperville, Illinois 60563\nCPF 3-2013-5004\nDear Mr. Pankhurst:\nBetween August 2-December 10, 2010, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Minnesota Office of Pipeline Safety, and\nWashington Utilities and Transportation Commission, pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United\nStates Code inspected BP Pipelines (North America) Inc. (BP) records and facilities for\nOperations and Maintenance, Operator Qualification, Public Awareness, Damage Prevention\nand Integrity Management through an Integrated Inspection process in BP’s offices and field\nlocations in Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and\nWashington. The systems included in the inspection were BP Pipeline (North America) Inc.,\nOlympic Pipeline, Amoco Pipeline, BP USFO/Logistics, Main Pass Oil Gathering, BP Oil\nPipeline, Tri-States NGL Pipeline and Black Lake Pipe Line.\nAs a result of the inspection, it appears that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The items inspected and\nthe probable violation(s) related to the Operations and Maintenance Program (Items 1-2) are:\n\n\n\n1. §195.420 Valve maintenance.\n(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice\neach calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is\nfunctioning properly.\nBP did not inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year to determine\nthey were functioning properly.\na. b. c. A mainline block valve on the Sugar Creek to Council Bluffs line was not\ninspected at least twice in the calendar year of 2007.\nMainline Block Valve BV#27157 - (EQNUM #35641) was not inspected in the\nfirst half of 2007.\nIn 2008, two (2) mainline block valves on the Sugar Creek to Council Bluffs line\nand three (3) mainline block valves on different Ohio pipeline segments were not\ninspected at least twice in the calendar year of 2008.\nMainline Block Valves BV#5455 – (EQNUM #302178) and BV#27158 –\n(EQNUM #35369) were not inspected in the second half of 2008.\nMainline Block Valves WT6 REFY Spool 696+89 – (EQNUM #33657) and WT6\nRFY Spool 697+03 – (EQNUM #33656) were not inspected the last half of 2007,\nall of 2008, and the first half of 2009.\nMainline Block Valve Dock Heavy Oil Scraper Trap – (EQNUM #32830) was not\ninspected in last half of 2008 and all of 2009.\nIn 2009, the following three (3) mainline valves: 0106 Inbound Colonial PL HDR,\n2704 12-inch Yellow HDR Underground, and 2706 12-inch Buckeye HDR\nUnderground were not inspected at least twice in the calendar year\nIn 2009 the following three (3) mainline valves: 0106 Inbound Colonial PL HDR,\n2704 12-inch Yellow HDR Underground, and 2706 12-inch Buckeye HDR\nUnderground were not inspected at least twice in the calendar year to determine\nthey were functioning properly. The first inspection cycle of mainline valve\ninspections performed in 2009 was completed on June 11 & 12, 2009, and the\nsecond inspection cycle of mainline valve inspections was completed on January\n6 & 7, 2010, missing the requirement of twice each calendar year (2009).\n2. §195.432 Breakout tanks.\n(b) Each operator shall inspect the physical integrity of in-service atmospheric\nand low-pressure steel aboveground breakout tanks according to section 4 of\nAPI Standard 653.\n2\n\n\n\nBP did not inspect each breakout tank for physical integrity according to API\nStandard 653, which requires a monthly inspection.\nOn the Olympic Pipeline System, three (3) breakout tanks were missed for monthly\ninspections.\nThe DOT Utility/Surge Relief Tank – (EQNUM #17712) was not inspected for\nFebruary and April of 2007.\nThe DOT Tank #202 – (EQNUM #18990) was not inspected February 2007.\nThe DOT Renton Utility Tank #116 – (EQNUM #18405) was not inspected February\n2007.\nThe items inspected and the probable violation(s) related to the Integrity Management\nProgram (Items 3-6) are:\n3. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take prompt action to address all\nanomalous conditions the operator discovers through the integrity assessment or\ninformation analysis. In addressing all conditions, an operator must evaluate all\nanomalous conditions and remediate those that could reduce a pipeline’s\nintegrity. An operator must be able to demonstrate that the remediation of the\ncondition will ensure the condition is unlikely to pose a threat to the long-term\nintegrity of the pipeline. An operator must comply with § 195.422 when making\na repair.\nBP did not take prompt action to address all anomalous conditions it discovered\nthrough information analysis. As part of its integrity management program, BP\nidentified close interval surveys (CIS) to be conducted for certain HCAs including\nBlack Lake Station to Toro Station, Toro Station to Hardin Station, and Hardin\nStation to Mt. Belvieu, Texas. The CIS conducted from Hardin Station to Mt.\nBelvieu, Texas, identified several locations where the IR-Off readings were outside of\nestablished criteria and the findings were discovered during the 2005 surveys. BP\nprocedures did not require investigations of those CIS findings until December 31,\n2010. PHMSA’s review of the data on August 28, 2010, showed the operator had not\ncompleted the investigations. The rule requires that an operator promptly “address all\nanomalous conditions the operator discovers through the integrity assessment or\ninformation analysis.” Exceeding four years to address findings resulting from\ninformation analysis is not prompt action.\n3\n\n\n\n4. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?\n(4) Special requirements for scheduling remediation.\n(iv) Other conditions. In addition to the conditions listed in paragraphs (h)(4)(i)\n- (iii) of this section, an operator must evaluate any condition identified by an\nintegrity assessment or information analysis that could impair the integrity of\nthe pipeline, and as appropriate, schedule the condition for remediation.\nAppendix C contains guidance concerning other conditions that an operator\nshould evaluate.\nBP did not evaluate a condition identified by an integrity assessment that could impair\nthe integrity of the pipeline. BP conducted an inline inspection (ILI) of its Endymion\nPipeline in January of 2010. By June of 2010, the operator had received the report\nfrom the ILI vendor and determined that the run was unacceptable. On June 30, 2010,\nthe operator then submitted to PHMSA a notification to extend the assessment\ninterval due to the inadequate tool run, stating a subsequent MFL tool would be re-run\nlater in 2010. On August 16, 2010, the operator attempted to retract its notification of\nJune 30, 2011, indicating the tool run was of acceptable quality. During the PHMSA\ninspection, the results of the run were reviewed and BP was asked about the internal\ncorrosion indication reported by the January 2010 ILI run. The indication measured\n39.3 inches in an axial direction and 26.9 inches in a circumferential direction and\nwas reported to be 11% in depth, which is characteristic of an “anomaly over a large\narea” that should be evaluated. The operator was asked about its follow-up actions\nregarding the indication and BP formally responded on January 7, 2011. There\nappears to have been no formal process for reviewing and addressing this anomaly or\nactions to mitigate the potential for internal corrosion. The operator’s IM procedure\n“Remedial Actions Procedure #P-195.452.f4” requires in section “1.3 Remedial\nActions Tracking and Maintenance” that “each HCA condition that is discovered\neither through ILI assessment or the normal course of pipeline operations to assure\ntimely remedial action implementation.” At the time of PHMSA’s inspection, BP\ncould not document any actions were taken to address the indication of potential\ninternal corrosion over a large area. BP eventually inspected the pipe at the location\nto verify this condition did not require repair; although not in a timely manner.\n5. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a\npipeline's integrity?\n(1) General. After completing the baseline integrity assessment, an operator\nmust continue to assess the line pipe at specified intervals and periodically\nevaluate the integrity of each pipeline segment that could affect a high\nconsequence area.\n4\n\n\n\n6. a) b) c) d) BP could not demonstrate that adequate periodic evaluations of pipeline\nintegrity were performed because its procedure “Continual Evaluation and\nAssessment Procedure #P-195-452.f5” was vague and non-specific. It does not\naddress in detail the evaluation requirements of §195.452(j)(2) such as risk\nfactors in paragraph (e) which includes, but is not limited to: results of previous\nintegrity assessments, leak history, repair history, cathodic protection history,\nproduct transported, operating stress level, existing or projected activities in the\narea, local environmental factors, geo-technical hazards, etc. Although the\noperator did perform some paragraph (g) information analysis, the actual\nanalysis for each HCA was vague and poorly documented. Effects of\npreventive and mitigative actions [paragraphs (h) and (i)] were not considered.\nBP could not demonstrate that adequate continual assessments were identified\nand performed because BP’s procedure did not sufficiently address the re-\nassessments of Low Frequency ERW and Lap Welded longitudinal seam pipe\nand ensure assessments are completed. Where pipelines are identified as\nsusceptible to seam failure for these types of pipe, BP allowed re-assessments\nintervals longer than five years.\nBP could not demonstrate that their re-assessment methods and periodic\nevaluations were adequate to address interactive threats because BP’s procedure\ndid not address a process to assess, evaluate and mitigate seam threats which are\nalso susceptible to external corrosion in certain pipe.\nBP had pre-determined that assessment intervals could not be less than three\nyears as described in the procedure. The re-assessment intervals should be\nbased on contemporaneous information that is gathered through ongoing\nperiodic evaluation, assessments, information analysis, and other data. BP’s\nintegrity management program excluded the potential for shorter assessment\nintervals.\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\nj) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a\npipeline's integrity?\n(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of\nevaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified\nin paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the\nbaseline and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g)\nof this section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative\nactions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\n5\n\n\n\nBP did not complete periodic evaluations to assure pipeline integrity on all of its\npipelines, including facilities. BP identified 109 facilities in HCAs and provided a\nspreadsheet which indicated the assessment and evaluation for each of the facilities,\nwhich included dates of inspection and the inspection types. At the time of PHMSA’s\ninspection, BP had not documented that the FIMP/FIP (Facility Integrity Management\nProgram/Facility Implementation Plan) evaluations had been started on 47 of their\nfacilities; consequently, there was no associated documentation to indicate that all\nnecessary inspections, assessments, and evaluations had been completed to assure\npipeline integrity.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 United States Code, § 60122, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for a\nrelated series of violations. For violations occurring prior to January 4, 2012, the maximum\npenalty may not exceed $100,000 per violation per day, with a maximum penalty not to\nexceed $1,000,000 for a related series of violations. The Compliance Officer has reviewed\nthe circumstances and supporting documentation involved in the above probable violation(s)\nand has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $100,000 as\nfollows:\nItem number PENALTY\n#6 $100,000\nWarning Items\nWith respect to items 1 and 2, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocuments involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement\naction or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct\nthese items. Be advised that failure to do so may result in BP Pipelines (North America) Inc.\nbeing subject to additional enforcement action.\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to items 3-6 pursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to BP\nPipelines (North America) Inc. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is\nenclosed and made a part of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline\nOperators in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response\noptions. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is\nsubject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive6\n\n\n\nmaterial qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete\noriginal document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you\nbelieve qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the\nredacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b). If you do\nnot respond within 30 days of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to\ncontest the allegations in this Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety to find facts as alleged in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue a Final\nOrder.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2013-5004 and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nDavid Barrett\nDirector, Central Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n7\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to BP Pipelines (North America) Inc. a\nCompliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the\ncompliance of BP Pipelines (North America) Inc. (BP) with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. 2. 3. 4. In regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to prompt action to address all\nanomalous conditions, BP shall review and revise all procedures that allow timing of\nactions longer than one year, unless a detailed justification is provided documenting\nthe rationale for a longer interval. BP must complete the review and revisions within\n30 days of the receipt of the Final Order and submit a report documenting the\nprocedures reviewed and revisions made per Item #9 of this Compliance Order.\nIn regard to Item Number 4 of the Notice pertaining to evaluation of any condition\nidentified by an integrity assessment, BP must revise its “Remedial Actions\nProcedure” to ensure that all future assessments are properly evaluated, appropriate\nactions are taken in a timely fashion, and all activities are clearly documented. BP\nmust review all current assessments and ensure the findings are properly evaluated,\nappropriate actions are being taken, and all activities are documented. BP must\ncomplete the requirements outlined within 120 days of receipt of the Final Order, and\nsubmit a report documenting the review and follow-up actions taken per Item #9 of\nthis Compliance Order.\nIn regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to continual process of evaluation\nand assessment to maintain pipeline integrity, BP shall fully develop its “Continual\nEvaluation and Assessment Procedure” and include all the elements required in\nparagraph (e) which include but are not limited to results of previous integrity\nassessments, leak history, repair history, cathodic protection history, product\ntransported, operating stress level, existing or projected activities in the area, local\nenvironmental factors, geo-technical hazards, etc. BP must complete the\nrequirements outlined within 60 days of receipt of the Final Order and submit the\nprocedures per Item #9 of this Compliance Order.\nIn regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to continual process of evaluation\nand assessment to maintain pipeline integrity, BP shall revise its procedures involving\nre-assessments of Low Frequency ERW and Lap Welded longitudinal seam pipe and\nensure assessments are completed. In addition, when pipelines are susceptible to\nthreats related to these types of pipe, BP must ensure that reassessments are no longer\nthan every five (5) years. BP must complete the requirements outlined within 60 days\nof receipt of the Final Order and submit the procedures per Item #9 of this\nCompliance Order.\n8\n\n\n\n5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. In regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to continual process of evaluation\nand assessment to maintain pipeline integrity, BP shall revise its procedure to assess\nand mitigate against seam threats which are also susceptible to external corrosion. BP\nmust complete the requirements outlined within 60 days of receipt of the Final Order\nand submit its procedures per Item #9 of this Compliance Order.\nIn regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to continual process of evaluation\nand assessment to maintain pipeline integrity, BP shall revise its procedure on\nreassessment methods and intervals to include the potential for assessments less than\nthree (3) years, which is currently excluded from the operator’s program. BP must\ncomplete the requirements outlined within 60 days of receipt of the Final Order and\nsubmit its procedures per Item #9 of this Compliance Order.\nIn regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to continual process of evaluation\nand assessment to maintain pipeline integrity, BP shall develop a plan to review the\npipelines in the integrity management program after its procedures have been revised\n(per Items 3-6 of this Compliance Order). BP shall re-evaluate the integrity of each\npipeline segment, and modify assessment methods and schedules where appropriate.\nBP must complete the requirements outlined within 150 days of receipt of the Final\nOrder and submit the plan and results of the re-evaluation per Item #9 of this\nCompliance Order.\nIn regard to Item Number 6 of the Notice pertaining to the failure to evaluate all of its\nfacilities located in HCAs, BP shall revise its procedures to ensure future facilities\nwill be properly evaluated. BP shall complete all of its facility assessments and\nimplement any required actions as soon as practicable. Within 60 days of receipt of\nthe Final Order, submit a plan with a list of all current facilities and the timing for\nassessment and associated actions for approval from the Regional Director. BP must\ncomplete the assessments per the approved plan and submit quarterly reports until\ncompletion of the plan per Item #9 of this Compliance Order.\nAll documentation demonstrating compliance with each of the items outlined in this\norder must be submitted to David Barrett, Director, Central Region, Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration, 901 Locust Street, Kansas City, MO\n64106, for review and acceptance within 30 days after their completion.\nIt is requested that BP Pipelines (North America) Inc. maintain documentation of the\nsafety improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit\nthe total to David Barrett, Director, Central Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories:\n1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and\nanalyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes\nto pipeline infrastructure.\n9\n\n320135004_Final Order_09252015_text.pdf\n\nSeptember 25, 2015\nMr. Donald W. Porter\nPresident\nBP Pipelines (North America) Inc.\n150 West Warrenville Road\nNaperville, IL 60563\nRe: CPF No. 3-2013-5004\nDear Mr. Porter:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws certain\nallegations of violation, makes other findings of violation, assesses a civil penalty of $100,000,\nand specifies actions that need to be taken by BP Pipelines (North America) Inc., to comply with\nthe pipeline safety regulations. This is to acknowledge receipt of payment of the full penalty\namount, by wire transfer, dated December 16, 2014.\nWhen the terms of the compliance order have been completed, as determined by the Director,\nCentral Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by certified\nmail is deemed effective upon the date of mailing, or as otherwise provided under 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Allan Beshore, Director, Central Region, OPS\nMr. David O. Barnes, Manager, DOT Compliance, BP Pipelines (North America) Inc.\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nBP Pipelines (North America) Inc., ) CPF No. 3-2013-5004\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nBetween August 2 and December 10, 2010, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), the Minnesota Office of Pipeline Safety, and the Washington Utilities and Transportation\nCommission inspected BP Pipelines (North America) Inc.’s (BP or Respondent) facilities and\nrecords for Operations and Maintenance, Operator Qualification, Public Awareness, Damage\nPrevention, and Integrity Management in BP’s offices and field locations in Illinois, Iowa,\nMissouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. The BP systems\nincluded in the inspection were Olympic Pipeline, Amoco Pipeline, BP USFO/Logistics, Main\nPass Oil Gathering, BP Oil Pipeline, Tri-States NGL Pipeline, and Black Lake Pipe Line. BP\noperates numerous large hazardous liquid pipeline systems in the U.S., totaling approximately\n2,983 miles of pipe.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated February 15, 2013, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and\nProposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included warning items pursuant to 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that BP had\ncommitted various violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and assessing a civil penalty of $100,000 for\none of the alleged violations. The Notice also ordering Respondent to take certain measures to\ncorrect four of the alleged violations. The warning items required no further action, but warned\nthe operator to correct the probable violations or face future possible enforcement action.\nBP responded to the Notice by letter dated March 22, 2013 (Response), as supplemented by\nletter dated April 2, 2014 (Supplemental Response). The company did not contest one of the\nallegations of violation and paid the proposed civil penalty of $100,000, as provided in 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.227. Payment of the penalty serves to close that item with prejudice to Respondent. BP\ndid contest the allegations in Notice Items 4 and 5, offered additional information in response to\nthe Notice, requested that the proposed compliance order be modified, and reserved its right to a\n1 Pipeline Safety Violation Report, (Feb. 15, 2013) (on file with PHMSA), at 1.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2013-5004\nPage 2\nhearing. By letter dated April 7, 2014, Respondent withdrew its request for a hearing and\nthereby authorized the entry of this Final Order without further notice.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.2\n(a) …\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?—\n(1) General requirements. An operator must take prompt action to address\nall anomalous conditions the operator discovers through the integrity\nassessment or information analysis. In addressing all conditions, an\noperator must evaluate all anomalous conditions and remediate those that\ncould reduce a pipeline's integrity. An operator must be able to\ndemonstrate that the remediation of the condition will ensure the condition\nis unlikely to pose a threat to the long-term integrity of the pipeline. An\noperator must comply with §195.422 when making a repair.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(1) by failing to take prompt\naction to address all anomalous conditions the company had discovered through information\nanalysis. Specifically, the Notice alleged that BP did not address deficiencies identified in a\n2005 close interval survey (CIS) conducted on the Hardin Station to Mt. Belvieu, Texas segment\nof the Black Lake Pipeline until 2010.\nIn its Response, BP stated that it had revised its CIS procedures to clarify that areas requiring\nmitigation were properly identified and actions put in place to correct identified deficiencies\nwithin one year.3 BP further explained that in certain circumstances, mitigation activities could\nextend beyond one year if activities such as extensive re-coating, rectifier installation, or pipe\nreplacement were involved. Finally, BP expressed the view that the proposed compliance order\nwas broad enough to arguably include not just BP’s CIS procedures but all of BP’s procedures,\nand requested that the order be narrowed.\nUnder the cited regulation, BP was required to take prompt action and Respondent did not\ndispute that action was not taken until approximately four years after the CIS survey in question.\nWe recognize BP ultimately took action, including amending its procedures to correct the alleged\nviolation. Such action, however, does not negate the period of non-compliance.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n2 For purposes of 49 C.F.R. § 452, the term “High Consequence Area” or “HCA” covers commercially navigable\nwaterways, high population areas, other populated areas, and unusually sensitive areas. See 49 C.F.R. § 195.450.\n3 Supplemental Response, Attachment 1 at 1.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2013-5004\nPage 3\n§ 195.452(h)(1) by failing to take prompt action to address all anomalous conditions it\ndiscovered through information analysis. The scope of the proposed compliance order will be\naddressed in the Compliance Order section below.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4)(iv), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence\nareas.\n(a) …\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity\nissues?\n(1) …\n(4) Special requirements for scheduling remediation -\n(i) …\n(iv) Other conditions. In addition to the conditions listed in\nparagraphs (h)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, an operator must\nevaluate any condition identified by an integrity assessment or\ninformation analysis that could impair the integrity of the pipeline, and\nas appropriate, schedule the condition for remediation. Appendix C of\nthis part contains guidance concerning other conditions that an\noperator should evaluate.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4)(iv) by failing to evaluate\na condition identified by an integrity assessment and that could impair the integrity of a pipeline.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that BP failed to evaluate an anomaly at a specified location that,\nbased on 2010 in-line inspection (ILI) results, appeared to be of sufficient magnitude to impair\nthe integrity of the pipeline.\nIn its Response, BP provided information showing that it did perform a field inspection and\nevaluation of the specified anomaly in a timely manner following receipt of the tool vendor’s\nreport. Specifically, the field inspection was performed in November 2010 and determined that\nthe majority of the feature involved depths of less than 2%, equating to 1/100 of an inch in\n0.661” wall pipe. Moreover, no part of the feature exceeded the 9% depth specification tolerance\nfor newly manufactured pipe.4 Based on the severity of this feature, as reported by the ILI\nvendor, I do not believe that the time period between BP’s receipt of the vendor’s report and the\nfield inspection was inappropriate.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that BP was not out of compliance with\n49 C.F.R. § 195.452(h)(4)(iv) and therefore order that Item 4 and the associated provision in the\nProposed Compliance Order be withdrawn.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(1), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n4 Response, Attachment 1 at 4.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2013-5004\nPage 4\n(a) …\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to\nmaintain a pipeline's integrity?— (1) General. After completing the\nbaseline integrity assessment, an operator must continue to assess the line\npipe at specified intervals and periodically evaluate the integrity of each\npipeline segment that could affect a high consequence area.\n(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as\nfrequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base\nthe frequency of evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline,\nincluding the factors specified in paragraph (e) of this section. The\nevaluation must consider the results of the baseline and periodic integrity\nassessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of this section), and\ndecisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions\n(paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(1) by failing to continue\nassessing each pipe segment at specified intervals and periodically evaluating the integrity of\neach segment that could affect a High Consequence Area. Specifically, Sub-items (a)-(d) in Item\n5 alleged that BP violated the regulation by failing to: (a) have and implement a process for\ncontinual assessments that included all relevant factors, including, among other things, previous\nintegrity assessment results, leak history, repair history, cathodic protection history, product\ntransported, and operating stress level; (b) address low frequency electric resistance welded\n(ERW) pipe and lap welded pipe susceptible to seam failures and ensure that these types of pipe\nbe reassessed within five years;5 (c) address interactive threats; and (d) properly establish\nintervals between assessments.\nIn its Response, BP did not contest Sub-items (a), (c), or (d) and provided information\nconcerning the actions it had taken to correct these items. With respect to Sub-item (b), BP\nexplained that its integrity management program did fully address the reassessment of low\nfrequency ERW and lap welded pipe. Specifically, BP demonstrated that its procedures were\nconsistent with PHMSA’s accepted technical report, OPS TT05 – Low Frequency ERW and Lap\nWelded Longitudinal Seam Evaluation Report, and provided for appropriate reassessment\nintervals for these types of pipe and appropriate notification for any intervals exceeding five\n6\nyears.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that PHMSA has not provided sufficient\nevidence to conclude that BP had reassessed pipe at intervals longer than the five-year period\nspecified in the regulation; I therefore order that Sub-item 5(b) and the associated provision in\nthe Proposed Compliance Order be withdrawn. With respect to Sub-items (a), (c), and (d), I find\nthat Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(1) by failing to have and implement a process\nfor continual assessments that included all relevant factors, addressed interactive threats, and\nproperly established intervals between assessments.\n5 Under 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j), operators must be able to justify and document reassessment intervals longer than\nfive years.\n6 Response, Attachment 1 at 5\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2013-5004\nPage 5\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2), as quoted above,\nby failing to conduct periodic evaluations to assure pipeline integrity on all of its pipelines and\nfacilities. Specifically, the Notice alleged that BP had not undertaken periodic evaluations on 47\nof 109 covered facilities.\nIn its Response, BP did not contest the allegation. Accordingly, after considering all of the\nevidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2) by failing to conduct\nperiodic evaluations to assure pipeline integrity on all of its pipelines and facilities.\nThe findings of violation for Items 3, 5, and 6 will be considered prior offenses in any\nsubsequent enforcement action taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.7 In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I must consider the following criteria: the nature,\ncircumstances, and gravity of the violation, including adverse impact on the environment; the\ndegree of Respondent’s culpability; the history of Respondent’s prior offenses; and any effect\nthat the penalty may have on its ability to continue doing business; and the good faith of\nRespondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. In addition, I may\nconsider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction because of\nsubsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice proposed a total\ncivil penalty of $100,000 for the violation cited in Item 6 above.\nItem 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $100,000 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2), for failing to conduct periodic evaluations to assure pipeline integrity\non all of its pipelines and facilities. As noted above, BP paid the proposed penalty, which serves\nto close the case with prejudice as to this Item. I further find that the penalty amount proposed in\nthe notice is warranted, considering the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation and\nRespondent’s culpability for the violation. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and\nconsidered the assessment criteria, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $100,000 for violation\nof 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(j)(2).\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for the Item cited\nabove, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $100,000, which amount has already been paid\nby Respondent.\n7 The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, § 2(a)(1), 125 Stat.\n1904, January 3, 2012, increased the civil penalty liability for violating a pipeline safety standard to $200,000 per\nviolation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any related series of violations.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2013-5004\nPage 6\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Items 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the Notice for\nviolations of 49 C.F.R. §§ 195.452(h)(1), 195.452(h)(4)(iv), 195.452(j)(1), and 195.452(j)(2),\nrespectively. Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the transportation of\nhazardous liquids or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to comply with the\napplicable safety standards established under chapter 601. Item 4 and Sub-item 5(b) have been\nwithdrawn, as have the proposed compliance terms associated with them. With respect to Items\n3, 5(a), (c), (d), and 6, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the following actions to ensure compliance with the\npipeline safety regulations applicable to its operations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 195.452(h)(1) (Item 3), within 30 days of receipt\nof this Order, Respondent must review and revise all procedures related to Close\nInterval Survey f","truncated":true,"body_characters":46306}