{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320135032S","title":"TESORO HIGH PLAINS PIPELINE COMPANY LLC — Safety Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2013-10-31","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED safety order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320135032s.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320135032s.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320135032s","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320135032S","body":"Safety Order involving TESORO HIGH PLAINS PIPELINE COMPANY LLC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2013-10-31 and is reported as closed as of 2016-03-24. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320135032S_Closure Letter_03242016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135032S/320135032S_Closure%20Letter_03242016.pdf\n\n320135032S_Closure Letter_03242016_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135032S/320135032S_Closure%20Letter_03242016_text.pdf\n\n320135032S_NOPSO_10302013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135032S/320135032S_NOPSO_10302013_text.pdf\n\n320135032S_NOPSO_10312013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135032S/320135032S_NOPSO_10312013.pdf\n\n320135032S_Safety Order_10312013.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135032S/320135032S_Safety%20Order_10312013.pdf\n\n320135032S_Safety Order_10312013_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320135032S/320135032S_Safety%20Order_10312013_text.pdf\n\n320135032S_Closure Letter_03242016_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMarch 24, 2016\nMr. Don Sorensen\nSenior Vice-President, Logistics\nTesoro High Plains Pipeline Company, LLC\n19100 Ridgewood Parkway\nSan Antonio, Texas 78259\nCPF 3-2013-5032S\nDear Mr. Sorensen:\nOn October 31, 2013, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) issued to Tesoro High Plains Pipeline Company, LLC a Safety Order in the\nabove-referenced case. This Order included required actions to be taken on and along your\npipeline. Based on our review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined\nthat you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320135032S_Safety Order_10312013_text.pdf\n\nTRANSMITTED VIA EMAIL &\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMr. Rick D. Weyen, Vice President, Logistics\nTesoro High Plains Pipeline Company LLC\n19100 Ridgewood Parkway\nSan Antonio, Texas 78259\nRE: CPF 3-2013-5032S\nDear Mr. Weyen:\nEnclosed please find the Safety Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes a finding\nthat Tesoro High Plains Pipeline Company LLC's pipeline system has a condition or conditions\nthat pose a pipeline integrity risk and specifies actions that must be taken by THPP to ensure\nthat the public, property, and the environment are protected from the risk. When the terms of\nthe order have been completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this\nenforcement action will be closed. Your receipt of the Safety Order constitutes service of the\ndocument as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\n___________________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Safety Order\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Director, Central Region, PHMSA\nMr. Greg Henderson, Vice President, Mid-Continent Operations\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\n)\n)\nTesoro High Plains Pipeline Company, LLC )\nRespondent )\n__________________________________________)\n) CPF No. 3-2013-5032S\nSAFETY ORDER\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an investigation of the safety of Tesoro\nHigh Plains Pipeline Company, LLC’s (THPP or Respondent) pipeline system, including an\naccident that was discovered on September 29, 2013. THPP operates the Tesoro High Plains\nSystem (THPP System), which consists of approximately 700 miles of mainline and gathering\npipelines, both regulated and unregulated.\nAs a result of the investigation, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to\nRespondent, by letter dated October 31, 2013, a Notice of Proposed Safety Order (Notice). In\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, the Notice proposed finding that conditions exist on the\npipeline system that pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property or the environment,\nand proposed that Respondent take certain measures to ensure that the public, property, and the\nenvironment are protected from the potential risk.\nTHPP responded to the Notice by letter dated October 31, 2013. In its letter, Respondent did not\ncontest the Notice and expressed its intent to comply with its proposed terms, authorizing the\nentry of this Safety Order. Respondent did not request a hearing, and therefore has waived its\nright to one.\nFINDINGS\nRespondent did not contest the proposed findings in the Notice that THPP has a condition or\nconditions that pose a pipeline integrity risk. Accordingly, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(1) and\n49 C.F.R. § 190.239, I find as follows:\n• The THPP System includes different segments with the mainline extending from\nStampede to Mandan, North Dakota, and a western gathering loop which extends into\nMontana. This Safety Order applies to the regulated portions of the THPP System.\n\n\n\n• THPP’s Tioga to Black Slough 35 mile line segment (hereinafter referred to as the\n“Line”) is part of an interstate crude oil system that transports crude oil from local\ncrude production in North Dakota.\n• On September 29, 2013, at approximately 10:35 p.m. local time, a failure was\ndiscovered on the Line eight miles north of Tioga, North Dakota (reported specific GPS\nlocation is Latitude N48 31.45, and Longitude W102 51.42). A farmer in the area,\nwhile harvesting his crops, noticed oil seeping from the ground. It is a rural location\nwith no surface waters in the vicinity.\n• The failure was reported to the National Response Center (NRC) on September 30,\n2013 at 1:16 a.m. (NRC Report Number 1061615) EDT. PHMSA initiated an\ninvestigation of the accident, which involved an on-site investigation at the failure\nlocation and a review of control room operations, in San Antonio, Texas.\n• The pipeline section on which the failure occurred is a six-inch pipeline that was\ninstalled in 1993. It was manufactured by IPSCO with a 0.219 wall, ERW, X42, and\nhas Pri-tec coating. The failed pipe joint has since been removed and sent for\nmechanical and metallurgical testing. A preliminary report has been provided to\nPHMSA.\n• THPP performed an inline inspection (ILI) of the Line on September 10-11, 2013. The\nILI identified a metal loss anomaly 76% deep, 0.590” long by 0.579” wide, which\ncorresponds with the leak site. The anomaly was reported to Tesoro subsequent to\ndiscovery of the leak.\n• The Line was carrying crude oil from the Bakken field area at the time of the leak.\nTHPP identified that the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of the Line was 1390\npsig at the location of the failure. The operating pressure at the failure location was\napproximately 350 psig at the time of the reported release.\n• A leak clamp was installed on September 30, 2013, once the leak source was discovered.\nBased on the impacted area of the release, the estimated spill volume is about 20,000\nbarrels of crude oil as reported by THPP in NRC Report Number 1062440 on October\n8, 2013.\n• A preliminary mechanical and metallurgical analysis report has been provided. The\npreliminary report points to a strong electrical discharge as the cause of the failure, but\na final determination as to the exact cause has not been made.\n\n\n\nCompleted Corrective Measures\nThrough coordination with PHMSA, THPP has:\n1. Removed the failed pipe joint, and sent it to a third party laboratory for mechanical and\nmetallurgical analysis per PHMSA protocols.\n2. Submitted a repair plan for PHMSA approval.\n3. Received and provided the preliminary mechanical and metallurgical analysis report.\n4. Removed approximately 1200 feet of existing 6 inch pipeline.\n5. Installed and rerouted approximately 1500 feet of new 6 inch, 0.281 wall, seamless, FBE\ncoated pipeline.\n6. Submitted a restart plan for PHMSA approval.\n7. Notified local and State emergency responders and officials of its potential restart\nactions.\n8. Installed and made operational leak detection equipment, to be compliant with API 1130,\nfor the Tioga to Stampede segment.\n9. Started a close interval survey on the Line.\n10. Filled the pipeline and performed a tightness test.\n11. Added high-high alarms on pressure and flow on available instrumentation.\n12. Modified controller screen displays to reflect the new leak detection equipment.\n13. Performed controller training as necessary for the new system modifications.\n14. Reviewed pressure history from various points on the THPP system.\n15. Reviewed shift reports, In-Line-Inspection (ILI) data, communication outage and weather\ndata.\n16. Started a root cause failure analysis, facilitated and supported by an independent third\nparty.\n17. Performed additional integrity testing on the system, including dynamic flow balance\ntests, and static pressure tests.\n\n\n\n18. Performed acoustic leak testing on portions of the mainline system, including both\ncrossings at Lake Sakakawea.\nISSUANCE OF SAFETY ORDER\nSection 60117(1) of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a safety order,\nafter reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective measures, which\nmay include physical inspection, testing, repair, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for\nmaking the determination that a pipeline facility has a condition or conditions that pose a\npipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the environment is set forth both in the above\nreferenced statute and 49 C.F.R. §190.239.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing findings and considering the age of the pipe involved, the\nmanufacturer, the hazardous nature of the product transported and the pressure required for\ntransporting such product, the characteristics of the geographical areas where the pipeline is\nlocated, and the likelihood that the conditions could develop on other areas of the pipeline and\npotentially impact its serviceability, PHMSA finds that Respondent's THPP Pipeline has a\ncondition or conditions that pose a pipeline integrity risk to public safety, property, or the\nenvironment. Accordingly, PHMSA issues this Safety Order, which requires that Respondent\ntake measures specified below to address the risk.\nCorrective Measures\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117(l) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.239, THPP must take the following\nremedial requirements:\n1. Provide for adequate aerial patrol of the pipeline during the restart process and first 72\nhours thereafter. After this time, provide weekly aerial patrols for 1 year, weather and\nsafety conditions permitting.\nImplement ground patrols for Tioga to Black Slough pipeline segment on a daily basis\nthe first 3 days following restart, and on a weekly basis thereafter, weather and safety\nconditions permitting, for 30 days after restart or until leak detection equipment has\nestablished final thresholds.\nImprove process and associated documentation to ensure adequate communication of\nchanges with the control room regarding operation, construction, or maintenance\nactivities.\nInstall and implement leak detection equipment compliant with 49 CFR §195.444 and\n195.134 according to API 1130 requirements for all remaining THPP system (all\nregulated pipelines). Installation of devices should be completed within 12 months in\naccordance with a risk based schedule provided to PHMSA.\n2. 3. 4.\n\n\n\na. High priority for leak detection implementation shall be placed on areas\nassociated with Lake Sakakawea, Little Missouri River, Yellowstone River, and\nother water crossings over 100 feet wide.\n5. Within 90 days implement instrumentation maintenance and repair tracking system such\nthat all control room instruments remain functional and receive a high priority regarding\nmaintenance response.\n6. Within 1 year, implement and/or provide adequate documentation of a tank monitoring\nprogram that prevents and detects leaks on regulated tanks.\na. High priority shall be placed on those tanks of larger volume, located near rivers\nor other water bodies, and unusually sensitive areas.\n7. Within 6 months, update and distribute a mapping system such that map overlays for the\nentire THPP System are available; identifying high consequence areas (HCA), could\naffect HCA areas, water bodies, and all commodity receipt and delivery points.\n8. Within 30 days, provide the final mechanical and metallurgical testing report of the failed\npipe.\n9. Within 30 days, conduct an evaluation of previous in-line inspection (ILI) results, of the\nTHPP System where results are available to determine whether any features with similar\ncharacteristics to the feature at the failure site are present elsewhere.\n10. Within 6 months provide documentation of all enhanced Supervisory Control And Data\nAcquisition (SCADA) and control room activities. This shall include but not be limited\nto display reviews for consistency with API RP1165 application and added\ninstrumentation, point to point completed checkouts for leak detection and associated\ninstrumentation such as flow and pressure monitoring, low-low alarm pressure limits for\nthose points that do not operate in slack line condition, verification of the accuracy of all\npoints while running in reverse flow, pressure cycle monitoring, implementation of\n“Pressmon” or similar application where possible, manual leak calculations to be\nperformed by controllers in the control room where possible and the impact to controller\ntraining. Leak detection and monitoring system enhancements identified per this Safety\norder must also be employed if the control room or monitoring location changes. A\nchange to control room monitoring or operation locations may not result in decreased\noperations monitoring or leak detection performance. If third parties are utilized for\noperations and monitoring control room activities, contracts shall be kept current and\nperformance of the third party periodically audited.\n11. Within 90 days complete a root cause failure analysis for the Line that contains a detailed\ntimeline of events. A detailed review associated with the timeline development must\ninclude, but not be limited to all information sources that could help identify the likely\ndate of the failure (shift logs, pressure and flow information, controller logs, maintenance\nactivities, communication outages, aerial patrols, ILI data runs, initial public\n\n\n\nnotifications, reversal, etc.). A review of any known failure history (in-service and\npressure test failures) should be included as part of the root cause failure analysis. In\naddition, any lessons learned must be identified and reviewed for applicability to other\nlocations within the THPP System. The report should provide a specific summary\nregarding whether or not the controllers had adequate information to recognize an\nabnormal operating condition. If adequate information did not exist to recognize these\nconditions, identify enhancements for the SCADA activities that could provide the\nnecessary data and allow for controller recognition should this not be covered by other\nitems in the order.\n12. Within 6 months, evaluate and implement, as appropriate, cathodic protection\nimprovements as identified by any previous reports.\n13. Develop and implement a risk based plan for additional testing and surveys of the THPP\nSystem to identify and mitigate potential coating, cathodic protection and interference\nissues. Tesoro must show measurable progress and commitment to full implementation\non this multi-year plan before PHMSA will close out this action as acceptable. PHMSA\nwill monitor long term completion of this item as part of its normal safety inspection\nprogram. This plan must be submitted to the Director for review and approval within 6\nmonths.\n14. Perform a detailed evaluation of the THPP System to identify potential preventative and\nmitigative measures designed to minimize the consequence of spills near Lake\nSakakawea, Little Missouri River, Yellowstone River, and other water crossings over 100\nfeet wide. This must include a review of the existing and potential locations for\nEmergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD) as a way to minimize the consequence of\nspills to Lake Sakakawea, Little Missouri River, Yellowstone River, and other water\ncrossings over 100 feet wide. This evaluation must be submitted to the Director for\nreview and approval within 6 months.\n15. The work identified in this Safety Order shall be referred to collectively as a “work plan”\nwhich shall automatically be incorporated by reference into this order including any\namendments. The work plan must be revised as necessary to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to the Order and whenever necessary to incorporate new\ninformation obtained during the failure investigations and remedial activities.\n16. Submit any proposed work plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. may approve, disapprove, approve with conditions, or approve elements of the plan\nincrementally.\nThe Director\n17. Implement the conditions of the Safety Order as approved by the Director. The results of\nall actions taken in accordance with the approved plan must be available for review by\nPHMSA or its representative.\n18. Submit monthly reports to the Director on the status of individual Safety Order items.\nThe first monthly report is due on the 15th day of the month following receipt of the\n\n\n\nOrder. The regular intervals for submitting reports may be adjusted with prior approval\nof the Director.\n19. It is requested that THPP maintain documentation of the costs associated with\nimplementation of the Safety Order, and include in each report submitted pursuant to\nItem 14, the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; (2) physical changes to pipeline infrastructure,\nincluding repairs, replacements and other modifications; and (3) environmental\nremediation, if applicable.\n20. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of the\nSafety Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\n21. THPP may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator are final.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 3-2013-5032S and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a secon0d copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nThe actions taken pursuant to this Safety Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199,\nunder any other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under\nany other provision of Federal or state law.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this proceeding and\nimplementation of the required tests and analysis, PHMSA may identify other safety measures\nthat need to be taken. In that event, Respondent will be notified of any proposed additional\nmeasures and, if necessary, amendments to the Safety Order.\nThe terms and conditions of this Safety Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5.\n____________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":20131}