{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320151002","title":"NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO OF AMERICA (KMI) — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-04-30","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 192.933(d)(1)(ii).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320151002.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320151002.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320151002","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320151002","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO OF AMERICA (KMI). PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulation as 192.933(d)(1)(ii). The case was opened on 2015-04-30 and is reported as closed as of 2017-03-30. Proposed civil penalty: $47,500. Assessed civil penalty: $0. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320151002_Final Order_03302017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320151002/320151002_Final%20Order_03302017.pdf\n\n320151002_Final Order_03302017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320151002/320151002_Final%20Order_03302017_text.pdf\n\n320151002_NOPV PCP_04302015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320151002/320151002_NOPV%20PCP_04302015.pdf\n\n320151002_NOPV PCP_04302015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320151002/320151002_NOPV%20PCP_04302015_text.pdf\n\n320151002_Operator Post-Hearing Submission - Brief_04082016.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320151002/320151002_Operator%20Post-Hearing%20Submission%20-%20Brief_04082016.pdf\n\n320151002_Operator Response to Notice and Requests Hearing_05292015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320151002/320151002_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice%20and%20Requests%20Hearing_05292015.pdf\n\n320151002_Final Order_03302017_text.pdf\n\nMarch 30, 2017\nMr. David Devine\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nNatural Gas Pipeline Company of America LLC\n1001 Louisiana Street\nHouston, TX 77002\nRe: CPF No. 3-2015-1002\nDear Mr. Devine:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws the\nallegation of violation that was included in the Notice of Probable Violation issued April 30,\n2015. This enforcement action is now closed. Service of the Final Order by certified mail is\neffective as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Allan Beshore, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMs. Jessica Toll, Assistant General Counsel, Kinder Morgan\n370 Van Gordon St., Lakewood, CO 80228\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-1002\nPage 2\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\n)\n)\nNatural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, a subsidiary of Kinder Morgan, Inc., )\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\n) CPF No. 3-2015-1002\nFINAL ORDER\nOn August 20-22 and November 5-7, 2013, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a representative of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Natural\nGas Pipeline Company of America (NGPL or Respondent) in Joilet, Illinois. NGPL, a\nsubsidiary of Kinder Morgan, Inc., operates approximately 9,200 miles of pipeline transporting\nnatural gas in the South and Midwest.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated April 30, 2015, a Notice of Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty\n(Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that NGPL had\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 192.933(d)(1)(ii) and proposed a civil penalty of $47,500.\nNGPL responded to the Notice by letter dated May 29, 2015, contested the allegation, and\nrequested a hearing. NGPL submitted a pre-hearing brief on February 22, 2016 (Brief). In\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, a hearing was held in Kansas City, Missouri on March 3,\n2016, before a Presiding Official from the Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA. After the hearing,\nRespondent submitted additional written materials dated April 8, 2016, and August 9, 2016.\nPursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), the Director submitted a written evaluation of Respondent’s\nresponse material on July 12, 2016.\n1 This information is reported by Respondent for calendar year 2015 pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 191.17.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-1002\nPage 3\nWITHDRAWAL OF ALLEGATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.933(d)(1)(ii), as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.933(d)(1)(ii), which states\nin relevant part:\n§ 192.933 What actions must be taken to address integrity issues?\n(a) General requirements. An operator must take prompt action to\naddress all anomalous conditions the operator discovers through the\nintegrity assessment. In addressing all conditions, an operator must\nevaluate all anomalous conditions and remediate those that could reduce a\npipeline's integrity . . . .\n(b) Discovery of condition. Discovery of a condition occurs when an\noperator has adequate information about a condition to determine that the\ncondition presents a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. A\ncondition that presents a potential threat includes, but is not limited to,\nthose conditions that require remediation or monitoring listed under\nparagraphs (d)(1) through (d)(3) of this section. An operator must\npromptly, but no later than 180 days after conducting an integrity\nassessment, obtain sufficient information about a condition to make that\ndetermination, unless the operator demonstrates that the 180-day period is\nimpracticable.\n(c) Schedule for evaluation and remediation. An operator must\ncomplete remediation of a condition according to a schedule prioritizing\nthe conditions for evaluation and remediation . . . .\n(d) Special requirements for scheduling remediation—(1) Immediate\nrepair conditions. An operator’s evaluation and remediation schedule\nmust follow ASME/ANSI B31.8S, section 7 in providing for immediate\nrepair conditions. To maintain safety, an operator must temporarily reduce\noperating pressure in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section or shut\ndown the pipeline until the operator completes the repair of these\nconditions. An operator must treat the following conditions as immediate\nrepair conditions . . .\n(ii) A dent that has any indication of metal loss, cracking or a stress\nriser.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.933(d)(1)(ii) by failing to\ntemporarily reduce operating pressure after receiving information of six pipeline dents with\nmetal loss, which are classified by the regulation as “immediate repair conditions.” Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that NGPL received a tool vendor final report on May 6, 2010, for an inline\ninspection (ILI) assessment of a pipeline segment from Compressor Station 13 to Brainard Road\nand the report identified six immediate repair conditions. The Notice alleged that Respondent\ndid not temporarily reduce pressure on the pipeline until May 13, 2010, seven days after the\nconditions were discovered.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-1002\nPage 4\nIn its written submissions and at the hearing, Respondent argued that it did not have adequate\ninformation to discover the immediate repair conditions on May 6, 2010. Pursuant to\n§ 192.933(b), Respondent contended, “discovery” of an immediate repair condition occurs when\nan operator has adequate information about a condition to determine that it presents a potential\nintegrity threat. Respondent explained that it discovered the immediate conditions on May 13,\n2010, after the Company had aligned “the data from the ILI vendor’s Final Report with existing\ncompany data, including data on the locations of HCAs [high consequence areas] and prior\nrepairs.”2 Within two business hours of completing the alignment, Respondent discovered the\nconditions and initiated and completed a pressure reduction.\nRespondent explained that until it had completed alignment of the data, it did not have adequate\ninformation to determine if immediate repair conditions were present. In particular, Respondent\nclaimed that the ILI vendor’s final report did not provide adequate information on its own,\nbecause it did not indicate whether the dents with metal loss were located in HCAs or whether\nthey had been previously evaluated and repaired. Respondent stated that its data alignment\nprocess was necessary in order to: (1) establish the location of each anomaly; (2) determine if the\nlocation was within an HCA; and (3) determine whether an anomaly had previously been\nevaluated or repaired.3\nAt the hearing, OPS argued that Respondent discovered the immediate conditions on May 6,\n2010, when the Company received the ILI vendor’s final report that identified dents with metal\nloss. The report included latitude and longitude coordinates, as well as above ground markers\nthat had been placed along the pipeline for the ILI tool run. OPS claimed this information was\nenough for Respondent to cross index the location of the dents with HCAs on other maps to\ndetermine an immediate pressure reduction was required.\nAnalysis\nSection 192.933(d) requires a pipeline operator to temporarily reduce pressure or shut down a\npipeline upon discovery of an immediate repair condition, including any dent with metal loss.\nDiscovery of a condition occurs when an operator has “adequate information about a condition to\ndetermine that the condition presents a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline.”4\nDiscovery is not tied “solely to the date of the tool run but to the fact that at the completion of a\ntool run there are assessment results from which an operator can obtain sufficient information\nabout the condition to determine that condition presents a potential threat to the integrity of the\npipeline.”5\nPHMSA has found that “the type of information contained in a vendor report is generally\nsufficient to enable the operator to determine whether there are immediate repair conditions on\n2 Brief at 2.\n3 Brief at 7-8.\n4 49 C.F.R. § 192.933(b).\n5 BP Pipelines (North America), Inc., Decision on Petition for Reconsideration, CPF No. 3-2005-5030, at\n6, 2006 WL 7129217 (Sept. 6, 2006).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-1002\nPage 5\nthe pipeline.”6 An operator, therefore, will normally have sufficient information to enable\ndiscovery of an immediate repair condition upon receipt of the vendor’s report. PHMSA has\nalso acknowledged, however, “there may be specific instances when discovery is delayed in\norder for an operator to gather and integrate additional information from other sources.”7 In\nthose instances “discovery sometimes requires the gathering and integration of information from\nother sources,” but an operator must be able to demonstrate there was a need to gather and\nintegrate information from sources other than the ILI reports.8\nHaving reviewed the evidence in the record, I find adequate support for Respondent’s argument\nthat the ILI report did not provide enough data on its own and that integration of additional\ninformation was necessary to determine if conditions presented a potential threat to the integrity\nof the pipeline. Specifically, Respondent demonstrated that integration of information was\nnecessary to determine if the conditions were in fact located in an HCA and were not previously\nrepaired. While OPS argued this information could have been determined more quickly based\non above-ground markers, Respondent explained at the hearing why the above-ground markers\nwere only intended to be used for the pig run and were not accurate enough to be used for HCA\nidentification.9 In addition, I note that Respondent completed its data integration, declared\ndiscovery of the conditions, and implemented a pressure reduction only 70 days into the 180-day\nregulatory deadline for discovering conditions following an assessment.\nAccordingly, after considering the record, I find there is insufficient evidence in the record to\nprove Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 192.933(d)(1)(ii) in the manner alleged by the Notice.\nThis allegation is therefore withdrawn and the proposed penalty is not assessed. The terms and\nconditions of this Final Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nMarch 30, 2017\n___________________________________ _________________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n(Aug.\n6 Sunoco Pipeline L.P., Order Directing Amendment, CPF No. 4-2007-5007M, at 3, 2009 WL 5538651\n(Dec. 1, 2009); Magellan Pipeline Co., Final Order, CPF No. 4-2004-5006, at 1-2, 2005 WL 6956543 18, 2005).\n7 Sunoco Pipeline L.P., CPF No. 4-2007-5007M, at 3.\n8 ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., Final Order, CPF No. 4-2005-5037, at 4, 2007 WL 1202565 (Jan. 9,\n2007).\n9 Transcript at 65.","truncated":false,"body_characters":12651}