{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320155003H","title":"MAGELLAN PIPELINE COMPANY, LP — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-05-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320155003h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320155003h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320155003h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320155003H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving MAGELLAN PIPELINE COMPANY, LP. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2015-05-15 and is reported as closed as of 2018-11-06. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320155003H_Closure Letter_11062018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155003H/320155003H_Closure%20Letter_11062018.pdf\n\n320155003H_Closure Letter_11062018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155003H/320155003H_Closure%20Letter_11062018_text.pdf\n\n320155003H_Corrective Action Order_05152015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155003H/320155003H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_05152015.pdf\n\n320155003H_Corrective Action Order_05152015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155003H/320155003H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_05152015_text.pdf\n\n320155003H_Closure Letter_11062018_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nNovember 6, 2018\nMr. Michael C. Pearson\nVice President of Asset Integrity\nMagellan Pipeline Company, LP\nOne Williams Center,\nOTC-9\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74172\nCPF 3-2015-5003H\nDear Mr. Pearson:\nOn May 15, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Magellan Pipeline Company, LP a Corrective Action Order (CAO) in the above-\nreferenced case. This Order included required actions to be taken on and along your pipeline.\nBased on our review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined that you have\ncomplied with the terms of this Order.\nBased on the successful completion of the required items outlined in the CAO referenced\nabove, PHMSA approves Magellan’s request to restore the operating pressure on the El\nDorado to Kansas City #6-10” refined products pipeline to its pre-release operating pressure.\nTo ensure the continued safe operation of the El Dorado to Kansas City #6-10” line,\nPHMSA Central Region will continue to monitor and evaluate Magellan's progress and the\nresults of the measures contained in the integrity verification plan for satisfactory\ncompletion.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320155003H_Corrective Action Order_05152015_text.pdf\n\nMay 15, 2015\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (918) 573-6714\nMr. Michael C. Pearson\nVice President of Technical Services\nMagellan Pipeline Company, LP\nOne Williams Center,\nMD-27\nTulsa, Oklahoma 74172\nRe: CPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nDear Mr. Pearson:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. It requires Magellan\nPipeline Company, LP to take certain corrective actions with respect to the Magellan El Dorado\nto Kansas City #6-10 refined products pipeline, which failed on May 4, 2015, in Butler County,\nKansas. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Service by electronic\ntransmission is deemed complete upon transmission and acknowledgement of receipt, or as\notherwise provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon completion of service.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Allan C. Beshore, Director, Central Region, OPS\nMr. Jason Smith, Director, Integrity Management, Magellan Pipeline Company, LP\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nMagellan Pipeline Company, LP ) CPF No. 3-2015-5003H\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n___________________________________ )\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to\nrequire Magellan Pipeline Company, LP (Magellan or Respondent), to take the necessary\ncorrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards\nassociated with the recent failure on Respondent’s El Dorado to Kansas City refined products\npipeline.\nA reportable accident occurred on the #6-10 portion of the El Dorado to Kansas City pipeline in\nButler County, Kansas, on May 4, 2015, resulting in the release of an estimated 1,861 barrels of\ndiesel fuel. The cause of the failure has not yet been determined. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §\n60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of\nPipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The investigation remains\nongoing. The preliminary findings of the ongoing investigation are as follows.\nPreliminary Findings:\n• On May 4, 2015, at approximately 4:11 a.m. Central Daylight Time (CDT), a failure\noccurred on the 10-inch nominal diameter El Dorado to Kansas City #6-10 portion of the\npipeline in the town of El Dorado, KS.\n• The accident was reported to the National Response Center (NRC Report #1115408) on\nMay 4, 2015, at approximately 4:44 a.m. CDT. PHMSA received this notification at\napproximately 5:02 a.m. CDT.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 2\n• The pipeline is 170.16 miles long and comprised of 166.8 miles of 10-inch nominal\ndiameter pipeline from East El Dorado Pump Station to the 18th street valve setting (#6-\n10), and 3.36 miles of 8-inch (#4-8) nominal diameter pipeline from the 18th street valve\nsetting to Kansas City Terminal. The pipeline delivers refined petroleum products to the\nTopeka and Kansas City terminals.\n• The East El Dorado to 18th street valve setting was originally constructed in 1955. The\npipe at the failure location was 10-inch nominal diameter, low frequency electric\nresistance welded, X-46, 0.250 wall, pipe manufactured by Youngstown Steel with coal-\ntar coating and an impressed current cathodic protection system. An estimated 166.8\nmiles of “like” pipe exist in this section.\n• The maximum operating pressure (MOP) of the El Dorado to Topeka portion of the\npipeline is 1,142 psig. The maximum discharge pressure at East El Dorado pump station,\nthe only active pump station on the pipeline, is 1,008 psig. At the time of the failure, the\ndischarge pressure was 1,001 psig.\n• In response to receiving SCADA system indications of a possible leak at 4:11 am CDT,\nMagellan shutdown the pipeline starting at 04:14:42 CDT. This involved the actuation of\nvalves located at Kanas City Terminal, 18th Street, Emporia, Mile Post (MP) 156,\nTopeka, and East El Dorado pump station. Magellan completed the shutdown operation\nby 04:18:06 am CDT. After this had been established, Magellan also closed manual\nvalves at MP 2, MP 7, and MP 12.\n• The pipeline was hydrostatically tested in 1991 to a pressure of 1,937 psig. The MOP\nwas established at 1,142 psig based on 72% specified minimum yield strength (SMYS)\nfor 10-inch nominal diameter, 0.203 wall thickness, X-42 line pipe in 2003.\n• The failure occurred in a High Consequence Area (HCA). Homes were located within\n625 feet of the failure location and a large NuStar tank facility was within 180 feet. An\nactive railroad crosses over Constant Creek and diesel fuel flowed down the creek into\nthis area and traveled approximately 0.5 miles from the failure location.\n• The failure site is located approximately 688 feet downstream of East El Dorado Pump\nStation known as MP 0.2 in initial reports. This location is in a common corridor with an\noverhead electric line, and six other pipelines (5 connecting tank lines and the #7-16”\nfrom El Dorado to Wathena Junction). The El Dorado to Kansas City pipeline crosses\nnumerous public roads, several HCAs due to population, and Unusually Sensitive Areas\n(USA).\n• As a result of the failure, an estimated 1,861 barrels of diesel fuel were released with a\nreported 672 barrels recovered. Of the 672 barrels recovered, 627 barrels made it into\nConstant Creek.\n• The Magellan El Dorado to Kansas City Terminal pipeline remains shut down. The pipe\nhas been delivered to a metallurgical laboratory for testing and failure analysis.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 3\n• The cause of the failure has not yet been confirmed, butinitial observations indicate\nselective seam corrosion as the likely failure mechanism.\n• The pipeline’s recent leak history includes:\no 2/28/2011- the #6-10 portion of the pipeline experienced a 20 barrel release of\ngasoline in Emporia, KS as a result of a malfunction of Control/Relief equipment.\no 10/06/2011- the #6-10 portion of the pipeline experienced a 590 barrel release of\nrefined products near Lawrence, KS due to a third party excavation damage.\no 05/23/2005 – the #4-8 portion of the pipeline experienced a 2936 barrel release of\ngasoline in Kansas City, KS reported by the operator as being caused by external\ncorrosion.\no The #6-10 portion of the pipeline experienced a manufacturing defect failure in\n1998 and several external corrosion failures in 1989 and 1986 respectively.\n• Magellan conducted an in-line inspection (ILI) of the El Dorado to Topeka segment in\n2011. A preliminary review of the ILI results indicates that the joint that failed had an\nanomaly called out in the ILI data as a 27% metal loss feature.\nA new section of pipe has been installed at the failure location and the pipeline was filled\nwith product on May 6, 2015 to assist with identification of any leak areas. However,\nMagellan has not placed the line back into operational status and has not resumed\noperations\n• ERW pipe manufactured prior to 1970 has a history of increased risk of seam failures.\nPHMSA issued two advisory bulletins (ALN-88-01 on January 28, 1988, and ALN-\n89-01 on March 8, 1989) regarding factors contributing to operational failures of\npipelines constructed with ERW pipe manufactured prior to 1970. PHMSA identified\nselective corrosion of the ERW seam as a contributing cause of failure in a significant\nnumber of these accidents. Other failures have occurred due to the growth of\nmanufacturing defects in ERW seams. The advisory bulletins recommended that\noperators re-evaluate the potential for safety problems on their high-pressure pre-1970\nERW pipelines by hydrostatic testing on those pipelines, ensuring the effectiveness of\ncathodic protection systems, and taking additional safety measures.\nMagellan operates one of the largest products pipeline systems in the country and its\nassets consist of 9,500 miles of refined products pipelines with 53 connected terminals\nand 27 independent terminals.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, requiring corrective action, is set\nforth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R. § 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 4\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order, without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life,\nproperty, or the environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing and expedited review\nwill be provided as soon as practicable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that continued operation of the\npipeline without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property, or the\nenvironment. Additionally, having considered the nature of the failure; the proximity of the\npipeline to public road crossings and residences; the location of portions of the pipeline in\nHCAs; the age and manufacture of the pipeline; the hazardous nature of the product the pipeline\ntransports; the pressure required for transporting the material; and the ongoing investigation to\ndetermine the cause of the failure, I find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require\nimmediate corrective action would result in the likelihood of serious harm to life, property, or the\nenvironment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may contest its issuance obtain expedited\nreview either by answering in writing or requesting a hearing under 49 C.F.R. § 190.211, to be\nheld as soon as practicable under the terms of such regulation, by notifying the Associate\nAdministrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Central Region,\nPHMSA (Director). If Respondent requests a hearing, it will be held telephonically or in-person\nin Central Region Office or Washington, D.C.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. In that event, PHMSA will notify\nRespondent of any additional measures that are required and an amended Order issued, if\nnecessary. To the extent consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an\nopportunity for a hearing prior to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60112, I hereby order Magellan to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions on the El Dorado to Kansas City pipeline:\nDefinitions:\n“Affected Segment” - The “Affected Segment” means the El Dorado to Kansas City #6-10\npipeline extending 166.8 miles from East El Dorado Pump Station to 18th Street valve\nsetting and includes the Isolated Segment.\n\"Isolated Segment\" - The \"Isolated Segment\" means the approximately 2-mile segment of\nthe #6-10 pipeline from East El Dorado Pump Station to the valve setting at MP 2.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 5\n1. 2. 3. \"Director\"\n- The \"Director\" means the Director, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety, Central Region. The Director’s\naddress is 901 Locust, Suite 462, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.\nOperating Restriction. Magellan must not operate the Isolated Segment until authorized to\ndo so by the Director.\nPressure Restriction. Upon returning the pipeline to operational status, Magellan must\nimplement and maintain a twenty percent (20%) pressure reduction in the actual operating\npressure along the entire length of the Affected Segment such that the operating pressure\nalong the Affected Segment will not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the actual operating\npressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on May 4, 2015. Specifically, the East El\nDorado pump station discharge pressure cannot exceed 801 psig.\na. This pressure restriction is to remain in effect until written approval to increase the\npressure or return the pipeline to its pre-failure operating pressure is obtained from the\nDirector.\nb. By May 31, 2015, Magellan must provide the Director the actual operating pressures and\nflows for any locations monitored on the pipeline between East El Dorado Pump Station\nand Kansas City terminal. This shall include pressures and flows available on the entire\n#6-10 pipeline and the number #4-8 or other lines continuing off of the #6-10 between\nEast El Dorado Pump Station and Kansas City terminal.\nc. This pressure restriction requires any relevant remote or local alarm limits, software\nprogramming set-points or control points, and mechanical overpressure devices to be\nadjusted accordingly and supporting documentation provided to the Director.\nd. When determining the pressure restriction set-points, Magellan must take into account\nany “like pipe” locations, in-line inspection (ILI) features or anomalies present in the\nAffected Segment to provide for continued safe operation while further corrective actions\nare completed.\nRestart Plan. Prior to resuming operation of the Affected Segment develop and submit a\nwritten Restart Plan to the Director for prior approval.\na. The Director may approve the Restart Plan incrementally without approving the entire\nplan but the Affected Segment cannot resume operation until the Restart Plan is approved\nin its entirety.\nb. Once approved by the Director, the Restart Plan will be incorporated by reference into\nthis Order.\nc. The Restart Plan must provide for adequate patrolling of the Affected Segment during the\nrestart process and must include incremental pressure increases during start up, with each\nincrement to be held for at least 2 hours.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 6\nd. The Restart Plan must include sufficient surveillance of the pipeline during each pressure\nincrement to ensure that no leaks are present when operation of the line resumes.\ne. The Restart Plan must specify a day-light restart and include advance communications\nwith local emergency response officials.\nf. The Restart Plan must also include documentation of the completion of all mandated\nactions, and a management of change plan to ensure that all procedural modifications are\nincorporated into Magellan’s operations and maintenance procedures manual.\n4. Return to Service. After the Director approves the Restart Plan, Magellan may return the\npipeline to service but the operating pressure must not exceed eighty percent (80%) of the\nactual operating pressure in effect immediately prior to the failure on May 4, 2015, in\naccordance with Item 2 above.\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction.\na. The Director may allow the removal or modification of the pressure restriction upon a\nwritten request from Magellan demonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-failure\noperating pressure is justified based on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the\npressure increase is safe considering all known defects, anomalies, and operating\nparameters of the pipeline.\nb. The Director may allow the temporary removal or modification of the pressure\nrestrictions upon a written request from Magellan demonstrating that temporary\nmitigative and preventive measures are implemented prior to and during the temporary\nremoval or modification of the pressure restriction. The Director's determination will be\nbased on the failure cause and provision of evidence that preventative and mitigative\nactions taken by the operator provide for the safe operation of the Affected Segment\nduring the temporary removal or modification of the pressure restriction.\n6. Review of Prior Inline Inspection (ILI) Results. Conduct a review of any previous inline\ninspection (ILI) results of the Affected Segment. Re-evaluate all ILI results from the past 10\ncalendar years. Review the ILI vendors' raw data and associated analysis. Determine\nwhether any features were present in the failed pipe joint and/or any other pipe removed.\nAlso, determine if any features with similar characteristics are present elsewhere on the\nAffected Segment. Magellan must submit documentation of this ILI review to the Director\nwithin 45 days of receipt of this Order as follows:\na. List all ILI tool runs, tool types, and the calendar years of the tool runs.\nb. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures present in the failed joint and/or other pipe removed.\nc. List, describe (type, size, wall loss, etc.), and identify the specific location of all ILI\nfeatures with similar characteristics present elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nd. Explain the process used to review the ILI results and the results of the reevaluation.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 7\n7. Mechanical and Metallurgical Testing. Within 45 days of receipt of this Order, complete\nmechanical and metallurgical testing and failure analysis of the failed pipe, including an\nanalysis of soil samples as may be possible and any foreign materials. Complete the testing\nand analysis as follows:\na. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed pipe section\nand other evidence from the failure site.\nb. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol and the\nproposed testing laboratory to the Director for prior approval.\nc. Prior to beginning the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Director with the\nscheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow for an OPS representative to\nwitness the testing.\nd. Ensure the testing laboratory distributes all reports whether draft or final in their entirety\nto the Director at the same time they are made available to Magellan.\n8. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, complete a\nroot cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final report of this RCFA to the Director.\nThe RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an independent third-party acceptable to the\nDirector and must document the decision making process and all factors contributing to the\nfailure. The final report must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the\nfindings and any lessons learned are applicable to other locations within Magellan’s pipeline\nsystem.\n9. Remedial Work Plan (RWP).\na. Within 90 days following receipt of this Order, Magellan must submit a Remedial Work\nPlan (RWP) to the Director for approval.\nb. The Director may approve the RWP incrementally without approving the entire RWP.\nc. Once approved by the Director, the RWP will be incorporated by reference into this\nOrder.\nd. The RWP must specify the tests, inspections, assessments, evaluations, and remedial\nmeasures Magellan will use to verify the integrity of the Affected Segment. It must\naddress all known or suspected factors and causes of the May 4, 2015 failure. Magellan\nshould consider both the risk of another failure and the consequence of another failure to\ndevelop a prioritized schedule for RWP related work along the Affected Segment.\ne. The RWP must include a procedure or process to:\ni. Identify pipe in the Affected Segment with characteristics similar to the contributing\nfactors identified for the May 4, 2015 failure.\nii. Gather all data necessary to review the failure history (in service and pressure test\nfailures) of the Affected Segment and to prepare a written report containing all the\navailable information such as the locations, dates, and causes of leaks and failures.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 8\nf. g. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. ix. Integrate the results of the metallurgical testing, root cause failure analysis, and other\ncorrective actions required by this Order with all relevant pre-existing operational and\nassessment data for the Affected Segment. Pre-existing operational data includes, but\nis not limited to, construction, operations, maintenance, testing, repairs, prior\nmetallurgical analyses, and any third party consultation information. Pre-existing\nassessment data includes, but is not limited to, ILI tool runs, hydrostatic pressure\ntesting, direct assessments, close interval surveys, DCVG/ACVG surveys, rectifier\nand cathodic protection data, maintenance records, and systems specific to Magellan\nthat may record field findings and observations or concerns associated with\nmaintenance, historical construction, or operations activities.\nDetermine if conditions similar to those contributing to the failure on May 4, 2015 are\nlikely to exist elsewhere on the Affected Segment.\nConduct additional field tests, inspections, assessments, and/or evaluations to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, the conditions associated with the failure on\nMay 4, 2015 and other failures from the failure history or any other integrity threats\nare present elsewhere on the Affected Segment. At a minimum, this process must\nconsider all failure causes and specify that the Affected Segment will receive an\nassessment appropriate for the RCFA within 1 one year of the date of receipt of this\nOrder.\nDescribe the inspection and repair criteria Magellan will use to prioritize, excavate,\nevaluate, and repair anomalies, imperfections, and other identified integrity threats.\nInclude a description of how any defects will be graded and a schedule for repairs or\nreplacement.\nBased on the known history and condition of the Affected Segment, describe the\nmethods Magellan will use to repair, replace, or take other corrective measures to\nremediate the conditions associated with the pipeline failure on 5/4/2015 and to\naddress other known integrity threats along the Affected Segment.\nImplement continuing long-term periodic testing and integrity verification measures\nto ensure the ongoing safe operation of the Affected Segment considering the results\nof the analyses, inspections, evaluations, and corrective measures undertaken\npursuant to the Order.\nReview existing pressure cycling program and determine enhancements that can be\nimplemented to reduce chances of future failures as the RCFA may determine is\nappropriate.\nInclude a proposed schedule for completion of the RWP.\nMagellan must revise the RWP as necessary to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities, to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order, and/or to incorporate modifications required by\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 9\nthe Director.\ni. ii. iii. Submit any plan revisions to the Director for prior approval.\nThe Director may approve plan revisions incrementally.\nAny and all revisions to the RWP after it has been approved and incorporated by\nreference into this Order will be fully described and documented.\nh. Implement the RWP as it is approved by the Director, including any revisions to the plan.\n11. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review.\nMagellan must review and assess the effectiveness of its emergency response procedures,\nplan and associated performance in regards to the failure of May 4, 2015. Include in the\nassessment a detailed review of the on-scene response and support activities (including\ntimeline), coordination with all parties (including regulatory requests and proceeding with\nwork), site security (including all phases of the response), procedures for improvements,\nlessons learned, and communication with emergency responders, third party contractors,\npublic officials, and internal resources. Assess the effectiveness of communication with all\nother modes of transportation that could have been impacted by this type of spill such as\nmunicipal water impacts, roads, railroad, electric power, the local refinery operations and\nwater intake considerations. This should include a review of the Federal Response Plan, an\nunderstanding of the worst case discharge in the area for the pipeline and the other pipelines\nor facilities in the area that may need communication and coordination activities such as\nNustar or Jayhawk or Holly Energies. The review will include existing training under the\nIncident Command structure and emergency procedures. Also included will be a review and\nassessment of the effectiveness of other Magellan company emergency training or responses\nelements such as SOP. Magellan must amend its FRP or emergency response operating\nprocedures and associated training, if necessary, to reflect the results of this detailed review.\nThe documentation associated with this detailed Emergency Response Plan and Training\nReview must be provided to the Director.\n12. Topography Review\nWithin 90 days of the receipt of this Order, review the topography, soil types, and water\nrunoff patterns associated with the failure location and prepare a report that identifies type,\nlocation, and options for improvements to be made in the immediate area designed to\nminimize potential product migration into Constant Creek. Submit this report along with\nrecommendations to the Director.\nOther Requirements:\n1. Reporting. Submit quarterly reports to the Director that: (1) include all available data and\nresults of the testing and evaluations required by this Order; (2) document any approved\nrevisions to the RWP and their implementation; and (3) describe the progress of the\nrepairs or other remedial actions being undertaken. The first quarterly report is due on\nJuly 1, 2015. The Director may change the interval for the submission of these reports.\n2. Documentation of Costs. It is requested but not required that Respondent maintain\ndocumentation of the costs associated with implementation of this Order. Include in each\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 10\nquarterly report the to-date total costs associated with: (1) preparation and revision of\nprocedures, studies and analyses; and (2) physical changes to pipeline facilities, including\nrepairs, replacements and other modifications.\n3. Approvals. With respect to each submission requiring the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve the submission in whole or in part; (b) approve the submission\non specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d)\ndisapprove the submission in whole or in part and direct Respondent to modify the\nsubmission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action\nrequired by the submission, as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director\ndisapproves all or any portion of a submission, Respondent must correct all deficiencies\nwithin the time specified by the Director and resubmit it for approval.\n4. Extensions of Time. The Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with\nany of the terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted and demonstrating\ngood cause for an extension.\nThe actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent’s pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190-199, under\nany other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq., or under any\nother provision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60120.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF No. 3-2015-5003H and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5003H\nPage 11\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon receipt.\n__________________________________ __________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":31630}