{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320155007H","title":"PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P. — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2015-07-14","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320155007h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320155007h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320155007h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320155007H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P.. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2015-07-14 and is reported as closed as of 2019-09-25. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320155007H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07162015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07162015.pdf\n\n320155007H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07162015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07162015_text.pdf\n\n320155007H_Closure Letter_09252019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Closure%20Letter_09252019.pdf\n\n320155007H_Closure Letter_09252019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Closure%20Letter_09252019_text.pdf\n\n320155007H_Closure Letter_09252019_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nSeptember 25, 2019\nMr. Dean Gore\nVice President-Environmental, Health & Safety\nPlains Pipeline, LP\n333 Clay Street, Suite 1600\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 3-2015-5007H\nDear Mr. Gore:\nFollowing an incident that occurred at Plains Pipeline, LP’s (Plains) Pocahontas Station in Bond\nCounty, Illinois on July 10, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) in the above-referenced case to Plains on\nJuly 14, 2015. The CAO ordered Plains to take certain corrective measures. On July 16, 2015,\nPHMSA issued an Amended CAO, updating one of the preliminary findings.\nBased on our review of the documentation you provided in reference to this matter, it has been\ndetermined that you have complied with the terms of the CAO.\nAccordingly, this case, CPF 3-2015-5007H, is now closed. Thank you for your cooperation in\nthis matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320155007H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07162015_text.pdf\n\nJuly 16, 2015\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: 713-646-4310\nMr. Troy Valenzuela\nVice President - Environmental, Health & Safety\nPlains Pipeline, LP\n333 Clay Street, Suite 1600\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nDear Mr. Valenzuela:\nEnclosed is an Amended Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. This\nOrder corrects one of the preliminary findings. It is corrected to read the following:\nThe pipeline moves crude oil from Patoka, Illinois to Wood River,\nIllinois. During the 24 hours prior to the Failure, the pipeline had undergone a\ncleaning-pig run. The pipeline was operating at the time of the leak and was\ndelivering crude oil to Wood River.\nService is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective Action\nOrder constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of\nthis Order are effective upon receipt.\nPlease direct any questions on this matter to Allan Beshore, Region Director, Central Region,\nOPS, at (816)329-3811.\nSincerely,\nJeffrey D. Wiese\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Corrective Action Order and Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Allan Beshore, Region Director, OPS\nMr. Greg L. Armstrong, President and CEO, Plains Pipeline, LP\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n-------------------------------------------------------\nIn the Matter of )\nPlains Pipeline, LP, ) CPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nRespondent. )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n-------------------------------------------------------\nAMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to\nrequire Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains or Respondent), to take necessary corrective actions to protect\nthe public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with a failure\ninvolving the Pocahontas Station (Pocahontas Station or Affected Pipeline Facility), which\nserves as a booster pump location for Respondent's 20-inch-diameter hazardous-liquid pipeline\nrunning from Wood River, Illinois, to Patoka, Illinois. Plains is a publicly traded master limited\npartnership that operates approximately 17,800 miles of crude oil and natural gas liquids\npipelines and gathering systems throughout the United States.1 This Order finds that continued\noperation of the Affected Pipeline Facility without corrective action would be hazardous to life,\nproperty, or the environment and requires Respondent to take immediate action to ensure its safe\noperation.\nOn July 10, 2015, in the morning hours, a failure was identified at the Pocahontas Station located\nin Bond County, Illinois, resulting in the release of an estimated 100 barrels of crude oil\n(Failure). The commodity exited the pipeline through a failed 1” fitting used to connect the\npipeline to a gravitometer.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The\npreliminary findings of the agency's ongoing investigation are as follows:\n1 https://www.plainsallamerican.com/what-we-do/transportation (last accessed July 14, 2015).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 2\nPreliminary Findings:\n• The accident was initially reported by Plains to the National Response Center at 11:10\nam CDT on July 10, 2015 (NRC Report No. 1122376), indicating the quantity\nreleased as “0 barrels” and an unknown value for volume spilled in water. This\nNRC report was updated on 7/12/2015 with NRC Report No. 1122561 at 1:04 pm\nCDT, to reflect 100 barrels as the quantity released and a “0” unknown value for the\nvolume spilled in water.\n• At approximately 07:44 am CDT on July 10, 2015, Respondent’s operations control\ncenter received a call from the public reporting a leak in the area of the Affected\nPipeline Facility. The Pocahontas Station is located in a rural agricultural area,\napproximately 2.5 miles from the town of Pocahontas, Illinois, and six miles from the\ntown of Highland, Illinois. The Pocahontas Station is a booster pump facility for the\nCapwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” pipeline. The Failure resulted in the\nrelease of an estimated 100 barrels of crude oil. The failure occurred at Mile Post 26 in\nBond County, Illinois.\n• A valve closure did not occur as intended in the initial control room response (Valve\n001 upstream of Pocahontas Station). The valve closure was attempted several\ntimes without success.\n• In response to the public notification, Plains dispatched a technician to the Pocahontas\nStation, which was not running at the time of the notification. Plains shut down the\nCapwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline and isolated the failed\nfitting and associated piping.\n• The immediate cause of the leak was a fitting failure at the Pocahontas Station. The\nreason the fitting failed is still under investigation and unknown at this time. A third-\nparty metallurgist has been contacted by the Respondent to evaluate the Failure.\n• The Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline consists of a 20-inch\npipeline and has three pump stations (i.e., the Patoka Station located in Marion County,\nIllinois; the Pocahontas Station located in Bond County, Illinois; and the Wood River\nStation located in Madison County, Illinois). The pipeline is 20” in nominal diameter\nand 55.72 miles long.\n• The pipeline has 25.86 miles listed as “could affect” High Consequence Areas (HCAs)\nand travels through and crosses wetlands and a state park. The pipeline also\ntransverses 9.23 miles of high population areas, 14.13 miles of other populated areas\nand approximately 21.17 miles of areas potentially affecting public drinking water\nsupplies. The pipeline crosses many public roadways and I-70.\n• The Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline is comprised\npredominately of pipe manufactured by National Tube, constructed in 1951, with a\nwall thickness ranging from 0.312-0.344 inch, Seamless, X-46, and coal tar coated.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 3\nThe pipeline does have one area approximately 0.55 miles in length that is Grade B,\nSeamless, 0.500 inch wall thickness constructed in 1951 and manufactured also by\nNational Tube. Small portions of the pipeline are of newer vintage as late as 1994 but\nare of similar or thicker wall, different seam and pipe manufacturer characteristics,\nand newer coatings.\n• The Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline was purchased by\nPlains from Shell Pipeline in 2003. The pipeline was last hydrotested in the year\n2000. This hydrotest and certain design considerations were used by Plains to\ndetermine the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of the pipeline. The\nPocahontas Station was last hydrotested in 2013. The MOP of the pipeline at the\nstation discharge is 1,033 psig. The pressure at the Pocahontas Station prior to the\nFailure was 633 psig. A section of the pipeline between the W. Kaskaskia River to\nPocahontas Station has a lower MOP of 987 psig.\n• The pipeline moves crude oil from Patoka, Illinois to Wood River, Illinois. During\nthe 24 hours prior to the Failure, the pipeline had undergone a cleaning-pig run. The\npipeline was operating at the time of the leak and was delivering crude oil to Wood\nRiver.\n• The Pocahontas Station is a booster facility utilized intermittently to increase\npipeline throughput by changing the pressure profile and is not required for normal\nmainline operations. The Pocahontas Station is located in a “could affect HCA” area.\n• The crude oil flowed from the pump station to a road ditch into Little Silver Creek and\nthen into Silver Lake. Silver Lake is an approximately five mile by ½-mile man-made\nreservoir constructed to supply the town of Highland, Illinois with drinking water. The\nCity of Highland’s primary drinking water source is from the south end of Silver Lake.\nCrude oil reached the north end of the reservoir following the Failure. Several oil\ncontainment booms were placed across the reservoir.\n• Removal of crude oil from Little Silver Creek and Silver Lake is underway. Various\nstate and federal agencies, including the Local Emergency Management Agency,\nIllinois Environmental Protection Agency, Illinois Department of Natural Resources,\nU. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region V, numerous contractors working on\nbehalf of the operator, and other operating personnel are performing clean-up,\nremediation, and monitoring activities.\n• The City of Highland’s water intake was shut down on the evening of July 10, 2015.\nThe water supply was tested on the morning of July 11, 2015, and no contamination of\nthe City of Highland’s water supply was found. Workers continue to flush the roadside\nditch and connecting ditch from the Pocahontas Station to Little Silver Creek. Thus far,\nPlains has collected 59,500 gallons of water and crude-oil mix.\n• Removal of the crude oil from the road ditch and creek area is ongoing and drinking\nwater monitoring will continue. Highland has an alternate supply of water plumbed up\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 4\nwith pump in the event it is necessary to stop taking water from the lake. Drinking-\nwater tests are showing no crude oil. Silver Lake appears to be improving but pools of\ncrude oil in the inlet to the lake remain. All recreational activities were banned on\nSilver Lake over the weekend following the Failure and this order is still in place.\n• The investigation is on-going and as such the time of the Failure could change. It is\nestimated currently as being around 7:29 am CDT on July 10, 2015.\n• The Pocahontas Station has no history of failures associated with tubing fittings.\n• The worst-case discharge at Pocahontas Station is reported as 2,691 barrels. This\nvalue assumes that the pipeline could be shut down in 15 minutes and all Motor\nOperated Valves were used for isolation.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,\nwhich may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,\ntesting, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the\ndetermination that a pipeline facility is hazardous and requiring corrective action is set forth both\nin the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R.§ 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property or the\nenvironment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable\nafter the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of\nthe Affected Pipeline Facility without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property\nand the environment. Additionally, after considering the age of the pipe, the circumstances\nsurrounding the Failure, the proximity of the Pocahontas Station to a public water supply,\npopulated areas, public roadways and High Consequence Areas, the hazardous nature of the\nproduct being transported, the pressure required for transporting the material, the uncertainties as\nto the cause of the Failure, and the ongoing investigation to determine the cause of the Failure, I\nfind that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would\nresult in likely serious harm to life, property, and the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Central Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 5\ntelephonically or in-person in Kansas City, Missouri.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior\nto the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order Plains Pipeline to immediately take the following\ncorrective actions with respect to the Affected Pipeline Facility:\n1. Shutdown of the Affected Pipeline Facility. The Pocahontas Station and the Capwood\nPipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline are currently out of service. The Affected\nPipeline Facility must remain shut down until the Central Region Director has approved a\nReturn-to-Service Plan under this Order. The Central Region Director will work together\nwith Respondent to determine a suitable restart date and time for the Affected Pipeline\nFacility.\n2. Return-to-Service Plan. Respondent must develop a Return-to-Service Plan and submit\nthe plan to the Central Region Director for approval prior to returning the Pocahontas\nStation to service. The plan must include a provision that the failed fitting will be replaced\nand that the choice of a replacement fitting will be based upon sound engineering analysis.\nThe replacement fitting must be installed by a qualified employee (technician or similar)\nfollowing manufacturer’s instructions.\n3. Testing of Fitting. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent must remove the\nfailed fitting and pipe/tubing inserted into the fitting from the pump station, complete third-\nparty mechanical and metallurgical testing, and perform failure analysis of the fitting.\nComplete the testing and analysis as follows:\nA. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed fitting\nand pipe/tubing and other evidence from the failure site (if any);\nB. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol,\nincluding selection of the testing laboratory, to the Central Region Director for prior\napproval;\nC. Determine if fatigue, vibration or pulsation, or tubing lack of support contributed or\ncaused this leak;\nD. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Central\nRegion Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a\nPHMSA representative to witness the testing; and\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 6\nE. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety\n(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Central Region Director at the\nsame time as they are made available to Respondent.\n4. Integrity Verification and Remedial Work Plan. Within 120 days following receipt of\nthis Order, submit an integrity verification and remedial work plan (RWP) to the Central\nRegion Director for approval. The plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of\nthe Pocahontas Station piping and must address all factors known or suspected in the leak,\nincluding, but not be limited to the integration of information as follows:\nA. Integrate the results of the metallurgical analysis required by Item 3 with all relevant\noperating data, and perform a root cause analysis of the Failure;\nB. Review the failure history of all pump stations on Respondent’s Capwood Pipeline\nand Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline over the past 20 years and develop a written\nreport containing all available information on the locations of failures, dates of\nfailures, and causes of failures. This report shall include a review of remote valve\nactivation failures, other valve-type failures, and all valve maintenance records,\nregardless of type. Submit the report to the Central Region Director within 90 days of\nreceipt of this Order.\nC. Provide, maintain, and submit a project schedule associated with all elements of the\ninternal root cause analysis, including, but not limited to:\n1. Scoping document of the root cause analysis;\n2. Internal procedures associated with root cause analysis;\n3. Multiple methods used and updates on each method as it progresses;\n4. Contributory factors; and\n5. Final Summary, including any internal lessons learned, recommendations that\nmay be apparent from the failure analysis and designed to prevent\nreoccurrence, and conclusions about whether any of the findings are\napplicable to other locations within the Plains Capwood Pipeline and Patoka\nto Wood River 20” mainline system.\nD. Utilizing all information gained through history review, operational experience,\nfailure investigation, and root cause analysis, conduct an integrity review designed to\nprevent reoccurrence.\n5. SCADA and Control Room Operations Review. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order,\ndetermine if control room or SCADA-related activities contributed to the size of the leak.\nReview and identify possible enhancements and provide a summary report to the Central\nRegion Director regarding enhancements, findings, recommendations, and implementation of\nimprovements to the associated systems. This shall include, but not be limited to, added\ninstrumentation (pressure, flow meters, temperatures, automated valves, etc.), work load\nreview of the console involved in the Failure as compared to others in the system, controller\nresponse, improved alarming, controller training, remote-valve operations, maintenance\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 7\nrequests and the status of such requests from Respondent’s control center, a review of the\ndeployment of an American Petroleum Institute 1130 compliant leak detection system on an\naccelerated basis, and alarming provisions.\n6. Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA). Within 90 days following receipt of this Order,\ncomplete a root cause failure analysis for the Failure that is supplemented and facilitated by\nan independent third party. Respondent should consider conflicts of interest in selecting an\nindependent third party. Once a third party has been selected, provide the Central Region\nDirector with the selected third-party’s credentials and experience within 10 days of receipt\nof this Order. Elements of the root cause analysis must include but not be limited to: a\nscoping document of the root cause analysis; procedures associated with root cause analysis;\nmultiple methods used for the analysis and periodic (not to exceed monthly) updates on each\nmethod as it progresses. This root cause failure analysis shall include control room activities\nto establish a timeline, including manual calculations associated with over and short material\nbalance efforts, meter PLM imbalance calculations, emergency response procedures and\nexecution of these procedures by personnel as may be necessary for timeline development,\nand associated personnel response to the Failure. Provide the Central Region Director with\nthe scheduled date, time, and location of personnel interviews and document reviews to be\nconducted as part of this RCFA to allow a PHMSA representative to attend either in-person\nor via teleconference. The root cause analysis must document all contributing factors and\nthe decision-making process. Submit a final report of the root cause analysis results to the\nCentral Region Director, including any lessons learned and whether the findings are\napplicable to other locations within the Respondent's Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to\nWood River 20” mainline.\n7. Spill Mitigation Study. Respondent must review the topography and water run-off\npatterns associated with the Pocahontas Station to mitigate crude-oil migration offsite in the\nevent of another leak at that location. Investigate the use of surveillance monitoring and/or\nleak detectors (hazardous vapor detectors) at this facility. Also, consider topography\nmodification, surveillance monitoring and/or leak detectors (hazardous vapor detectors) at\nother unmanned facilities along the Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20”\nmainline to help immediately identify potential leaks.\n8. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Respondent must review and assess\nthe effectiveness of its emergency response procedures, plan, response, associated\nperformance in regards to the Failure, and associated training. Include in the assessment a\ndetailed review of the on-scene response and support activities (including timeline),\ncoordination with all parties (including regulatory requests and proceeding with work), site\nsecurity (including all phases of the response), procedures for improvements, lessons learned,\nand communication with emergency responders, third party contractors, public officials, and\ninternal resources. Assess the effectiveness of communication with all other modes of\ntransportation that could have been impacted by this type of spill, such as municipal water\nimpacts, roads, railroads, electric power, and water intake considerations. This should\ninclude a review of Respondent’s Federal Response Plan (FRP), an understanding of the\nworst-case discharge in the area for the pipeline and the other pipelines or facilities in the\narea that may need communication and coordination activities. The review will include\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 8\nexisting training under the Incident Command structure and emergency procedures. Also\nincluded will be a review and assessment of the effectiveness of other Plains emergency\ntraining or response elements such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Plains must\namend its FRP or emergency response operating procedures and associated training, if\nnecessary, to reflect the results of this detailed review. This review must be conducted by an\nindependent third-party consultant who specializes in the emergency response and\nmanagement aspects of hazardous liquids. A final report shall be the result of this review\nand it shall detail in the report findings, recommendations, potential process enhancements,\nlessons learned and other applicable information to improve the emergency response of\nPlains and associated contractors. The documentation associated with this detailed\nEmergency Response Plan and Training Review must be provided to the Central Region\nDirector no later than 90 days after receipt of this Order.\n9. Data Management Software Study. Respondent shall review and evaluate Plains’\nexisting data management system software tools. Determine if improvements or\nenhancements could be made to allow integrity data to be quickly accessed by various\nstakeholders in the event of a failure. Report on these potential findings to the Central\nRegion Director within 120 days of receipt of this Order.\n10. Order Revisions. Upon approval by the Central Region Director, the remedial work plan\nbecomes incorporated into this Order and shall be revised as necessary to incorporate the\nresults of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever necessary to incorporate\nnew information obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities. Submit\nany such plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Central Region Director may\napprove plan elements incrementally.\n11. Implementation of Approved Work Plan. Implement the work plan as approved by the\nCentral Region Director, including any revisions to the plan.\n12. Quarterly Reports. Submit quarterly reports to the Central Region Director that:\n(1) include all available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this\nOrder; and (2) describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being\nundertaken. The first quarterly report for the period from July 15, 2015 through October\n15, 2015 shall be due by November 15, 2015.\nThe Central Region Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the\nterms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nWith respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the Central\nRegion Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the\nsubmission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;\n(d) disapprove, in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the\nsubmission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon\nconditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required\nby the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2015-5007H\nPage 9\nany portion of the submission, Respondent shall correct all deficiencies within the time specified\nby the Director, and resubmit it for approval. If a resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in\npart, the Director may again require Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with\nthe foregoing procedure, and the Director may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this\nOrder.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to \"CPF No. 3-2015-5007H” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The\nactions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any\nrequirements that apply to Respondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199,\nunder any other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under\nany other provision of Federal or State law.\nRespondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline\nSafety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon service in\naccordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\n_________________________________ ________________\nJeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":29250}