# PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P. — Corrective Action Order

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 320155007H
- **title:** PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P. — Corrective Action Order
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2015-07-14
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED corrective action order.
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- **markdown:** https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320155007h.md
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320155007H
**body:**

Corrective Action Order involving PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P.. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2015-07-14 and is reported as closed as of 2019-09-25. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

320155007H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07162015.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07162015.pdf

320155007H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07162015_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Amended%20Corrective%20Action%20Order_07162015_text.pdf

320155007H_Closure Letter_09252019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Closure%20Letter_09252019.pdf

320155007H_Closure Letter_09252019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320155007H/320155007H_Closure%20Letter_09252019_text.pdf

320155007H_Closure Letter_09252019_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
September 25, 2019
Mr. Dean Gore
Vice President-Environmental, Health & Safety
Plains Pipeline, LP
333 Clay Street, Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77002
CPF 3-2015-5007H
Dear Mr. Gore:
Following an incident that occurred at Plains Pipeline, LP’s (Plains) Pocahontas Station in Bond
County, Illinois on July 10, 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) issued a Corrective Action Order (CAO) in the above-referenced case to Plains on
July 14, 2015. The CAO ordered Plains to take certain corrective measures. On July 16, 2015,
PHMSA issued an Amended CAO, updating one of the preliminary findings.
Based on our review of the documentation you provided in reference to this matter, it has been
determined that you have complied with the terms of the CAO.
Accordingly, this case, CPF 3-2015-5007H, is now closed. Thank you for your cooperation in
this matter.
Sincerely,
Allan C. Beshore
Director, Central Region, OPS
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

320155007H_Amended Corrective Action Order_07162015_text.pdf

July 16, 2015
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: 713-646-4310
Mr. Troy Valenzuela
Vice President - Environmental, Health & Safety
Plains Pipeline, LP
333 Clay Street, Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77002
CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Dear Mr. Valenzuela:
Enclosed is an Amended Corrective Action Order issued in the above-referenced case. This
Order corrects one of the preliminary findings. It is corrected to read the following:
The pipeline moves crude oil from Patoka, Illinois to Wood River,
Illinois. During the 24 hours prior to the Failure, the pipeline had undergone a
cleaning-pig run. The pipeline was operating at the time of the leak and was
delivering crude oil to Wood River.
Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective Action
Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of
this Order are effective upon receipt.
Please direct any questions on this matter to Allan Beshore, Region Director, Central Region,
OPS, at (816)329-3811.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey D. Wiese
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure: Corrective Action Order and Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233
cc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS
Mr. Allan Beshore, Region Director, OPS
Mr. Greg L. Armstrong, President and CEO, Plains Pipeline, LP



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
-------------------------------------------------------
In the Matter of )
Plains Pipeline, LP, ) CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Respondent. )
)
)
)
)
-------------------------------------------------------
AMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER
Purpose and Background:
This Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued, under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112, to
require Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains or Respondent), to take necessary corrective actions to protect
the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with a failure
involving the Pocahontas Station (Pocahontas Station or Affected Pipeline Facility), which
serves as a booster pump location for Respondent's 20-inch-diameter hazardous-liquid pipeline
running from Wood River, Illinois, to Patoka, Illinois. Plains is a publicly traded master limited
partnership that operates approximately 17,800 miles of crude oil and natural gas liquids
pipelines and gathering systems throughout the United States.1 This Order finds that continued
operation of the Affected Pipeline Facility without corrective action would be hazardous to life,
property, or the environment and requires Respondent to take immediate action to ensure its safe
operation.
On July 10, 2015, in the morning hours, a failure was identified at the Pocahontas Station located
in Bond County, Illinois, resulting in the release of an estimated 100 barrels of crude oil
(Failure). The commodity exited the pipeline through a failed 1” fitting used to connect the
pipeline to a gravitometer.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation of the accident. The
preliminary findings of the agency's ongoing investigation are as follows:
1 https://www.plainsallamerican.com/what-we-do/transportation (last accessed July 14, 2015).



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 2
Preliminary Findings:
• The accident was initially reported by Plains to the National Response Center at 11:10
am CDT on July 10, 2015 (NRC Report No. 1122376), indicating the quantity
released as “0 barrels” and an unknown value for volume spilled in water. This
NRC report was updated on 7/12/2015 with NRC Report No. 1122561 at 1:04 pm
CDT, to reflect 100 barrels as the quantity released and a “0” unknown value for the
volume spilled in water.
• At approximately 07:44 am CDT on July 10, 2015, Respondent’s operations control
center received a call from the public reporting a leak in the area of the Affected
Pipeline Facility. The Pocahontas Station is located in a rural agricultural area,
approximately 2.5 miles from the town of Pocahontas, Illinois, and six miles from the
town of Highland, Illinois. The Pocahontas Station is a booster pump facility for the
Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” pipeline. The Failure resulted in the
release of an estimated 100 barrels of crude oil. The failure occurred at Mile Post 26 in
Bond County, Illinois.
• A valve closure did not occur as intended in the initial control room response (Valve
001 upstream of Pocahontas Station). The valve closure was attempted several
times without success.
• In response to the public notification, Plains dispatched a technician to the Pocahontas
Station, which was not running at the time of the notification. Plains shut down the
Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline and isolated the failed
fitting and associated piping.
• The immediate cause of the leak was a fitting failure at the Pocahontas Station. The
reason the fitting failed is still under investigation and unknown at this time. A third-
party metallurgist has been contacted by the Respondent to evaluate the Failure.
• The Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline consists of a 20-inch
pipeline and has three pump stations (i.e., the Patoka Station located in Marion County,
Illinois; the Pocahontas Station located in Bond County, Illinois; and the Wood River
Station located in Madison County, Illinois). The pipeline is 20” in nominal diameter
and 55.72 miles long.
• The pipeline has 25.86 miles listed as “could affect” High Consequence Areas (HCAs)
and travels through and crosses wetlands and a state park. The pipeline also
transverses 9.23 miles of high population areas, 14.13 miles of other populated areas
and approximately 21.17 miles of areas potentially affecting public drinking water
supplies. The pipeline crosses many public roadways and I-70.
• The Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline is comprised
predominately of pipe manufactured by National Tube, constructed in 1951, with a
wall thickness ranging from 0.312-0.344 inch, Seamless, X-46, and coal tar coated.



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 3
The pipeline does have one area approximately 0.55 miles in length that is Grade B,
Seamless, 0.500 inch wall thickness constructed in 1951 and manufactured also by
National Tube. Small portions of the pipeline are of newer vintage as late as 1994 but
are of similar or thicker wall, different seam and pipe manufacturer characteristics,
and newer coatings.
• The Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline was purchased by
Plains from Shell Pipeline in 2003. The pipeline was last hydrotested in the year
2000. This hydrotest and certain design considerations were used by Plains to
determine the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of the pipeline. The
Pocahontas Station was last hydrotested in 2013. The MOP of the pipeline at the
station discharge is 1,033 psig. The pressure at the Pocahontas Station prior to the
Failure was 633 psig. A section of the pipeline between the W. Kaskaskia River to
Pocahontas Station has a lower MOP of 987 psig.
• The pipeline moves crude oil from Patoka, Illinois to Wood River, Illinois. During
the 24 hours prior to the Failure, the pipeline had undergone a cleaning-pig run. The
pipeline was operating at the time of the leak and was delivering crude oil to Wood
River.
• The Pocahontas Station is a booster facility utilized intermittently to increase
pipeline throughput by changing the pressure profile and is not required for normal
mainline operations. The Pocahontas Station is located in a “could affect HCA” area.
• The crude oil flowed from the pump station to a road ditch into Little Silver Creek and
then into Silver Lake. Silver Lake is an approximately five mile by ½-mile man-made
reservoir constructed to supply the town of Highland, Illinois with drinking water. The
City of Highland’s primary drinking water source is from the south end of Silver Lake.
Crude oil reached the north end of the reservoir following the Failure. Several oil
containment booms were placed across the reservoir.
• Removal of crude oil from Little Silver Creek and Silver Lake is underway. Various
state and federal agencies, including the Local Emergency Management Agency,
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Illinois Department of Natural Resources,
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region V, numerous contractors working on
behalf of the operator, and other operating personnel are performing clean-up,
remediation, and monitoring activities.
• The City of Highland’s water intake was shut down on the evening of July 10, 2015.
The water supply was tested on the morning of July 11, 2015, and no contamination of
the City of Highland’s water supply was found. Workers continue to flush the roadside
ditch and connecting ditch from the Pocahontas Station to Little Silver Creek. Thus far,
Plains has collected 59,500 gallons of water and crude-oil mix.
• Removal of the crude oil from the road ditch and creek area is ongoing and drinking
water monitoring will continue. Highland has an alternate supply of water plumbed up



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 4
with pump in the event it is necessary to stop taking water from the lake. Drinking-
water tests are showing no crude oil. Silver Lake appears to be improving but pools of
crude oil in the inlet to the lake remain. All recreational activities were banned on
Silver Lake over the weekend following the Failure and this order is still in place.
• The investigation is on-going and as such the time of the Failure could change. It is
estimated currently as being around 7:29 am CDT on July 10, 2015.
• The Pocahontas Station has no history of failures associated with tubing fittings.
• The worst-case discharge at Pocahontas Station is reported as 2,691 barrels. This
value assumes that the pipeline could be shut down in 15 minutes and all Motor
Operated Valves were used for isolation.
Determination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:
Section 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action
Order, after reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, requiring corrective action,
which may include the suspended or restricted use of a pipeline facility, physical inspection,
testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate. The basis for making the
determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous and requiring corrective action is set forth both
in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R.§ 190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.
Section 60112, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, provide for the issuance of a
Corrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing upon a finding that
failure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property or the
environment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable
after the issuance of the Order.
After evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of
the Affected Pipeline Facility without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property
and the environment. Additionally, after considering the age of the pipe, the circumstances
surrounding the Failure, the proximity of the Pocahontas Station to a public water supply,
populated areas, public roadways and High Consequence Areas, the hazardous nature of the
product being transported, the pressure required for transporting the material, the uncertainties as
to the cause of the Failure, and the ongoing investigation to determine the cause of the Failure, I
find that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would
result in likely serious harm to life, property, and the environment.
Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued
without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are
effective upon receipt.
Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as
practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy
to the Director, Central Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 5
telephonically or in-person in Kansas City, Missouri.
After receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may
identify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any
additional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent
consistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior
to the imposition of any additional corrective measures.
Required Corrective Actions:
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order Plains Pipeline to immediately take the following
corrective actions with respect to the Affected Pipeline Facility:
1. Shutdown of the Affected Pipeline Facility. The Pocahontas Station and the Capwood
Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline are currently out of service. The Affected
Pipeline Facility must remain shut down until the Central Region Director has approved a
Return-to-Service Plan under this Order. The Central Region Director will work together
with Respondent to determine a suitable restart date and time for the Affected Pipeline
Facility.
2. Return-to-Service Plan. Respondent must develop a Return-to-Service Plan and submit
the plan to the Central Region Director for approval prior to returning the Pocahontas
Station to service. The plan must include a provision that the failed fitting will be replaced
and that the choice of a replacement fitting will be based upon sound engineering analysis.
The replacement fitting must be installed by a qualified employee (technician or similar)
following manufacturer’s instructions.
3. Testing of Fitting. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent must remove the
failed fitting and pipe/tubing inserted into the fitting from the pump station, complete third-
party mechanical and metallurgical testing, and perform failure analysis of the fitting.
Complete the testing and analysis as follows:
A. Document the chain-of-custody when handling and transporting the failed fitting
and pipe/tubing and other evidence from the failure site (if any);
B. Within 10 days of receipt of this Order, develop and submit the testing protocol,
including selection of the testing laboratory, to the Central Region Director for prior
approval;
C. Determine if fatigue, vibration or pulsation, or tubing lack of support contributed or
caused this leak;
D. Prior to commencing the mechanical and metallurgical testing, provide the Central
Region Director with the scheduled date, time, and location of the testing to allow a
PHMSA representative to witness the testing; and



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 6
E. Ensure that the testing laboratory distributes all resulting reports in their entirety
(including all media), whether draft or final, to the Central Region Director at the
same time as they are made available to Respondent.
4. Integrity Verification and Remedial Work Plan. Within 120 days following receipt of
this Order, submit an integrity verification and remedial work plan (RWP) to the Central
Region Director for approval. The plan must provide for the verification of the integrity of
the Pocahontas Station piping and must address all factors known or suspected in the leak,
including, but not be limited to the integration of information as follows:
A. Integrate the results of the metallurgical analysis required by Item 3 with all relevant
operating data, and perform a root cause analysis of the Failure;
B. Review the failure history of all pump stations on Respondent’s Capwood Pipeline
and Patoka to Wood River 20” mainline over the past 20 years and develop a written
report containing all available information on the locations of failures, dates of
failures, and causes of failures. This report shall include a review of remote valve
activation failures, other valve-type failures, and all valve maintenance records,
regardless of type. Submit the report to the Central Region Director within 90 days of
receipt of this Order.
C. Provide, maintain, and submit a project schedule associated with all elements of the
internal root cause analysis, including, but not limited to:
1. Scoping document of the root cause analysis;
2. Internal procedures associated with root cause analysis;
3. Multiple methods used and updates on each method as it progresses;
4. Contributory factors; and
5. Final Summary, including any internal lessons learned, recommendations that
may be apparent from the failure analysis and designed to prevent
reoccurrence, and conclusions about whether any of the findings are
applicable to other locations within the Plains Capwood Pipeline and Patoka
to Wood River 20” mainline system.
D. Utilizing all information gained through history review, operational experience,
failure investigation, and root cause analysis, conduct an integrity review designed to
prevent reoccurrence.
5. SCADA and Control Room Operations Review. Within 90 days of receipt of this Order,
determine if control room or SCADA-related activities contributed to the size of the leak.
Review and identify possible enhancements and provide a summary report to the Central
Region Director regarding enhancements, findings, recommendations, and implementation of
improvements to the associated systems. This shall include, but not be limited to, added
instrumentation (pressure, flow meters, temperatures, automated valves, etc.), work load
review of the console involved in the Failure as compared to others in the system, controller
response, improved alarming, controller training, remote-valve operations, maintenance



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 7
requests and the status of such requests from Respondent’s control center, a review of the
deployment of an American Petroleum Institute 1130 compliant leak detection system on an
accelerated basis, and alarming provisions.
6. Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA). Within 90 days following receipt of this Order,
complete a root cause failure analysis for the Failure that is supplemented and facilitated by
an independent third party. Respondent should consider conflicts of interest in selecting an
independent third party. Once a third party has been selected, provide the Central Region
Director with the selected third-party’s credentials and experience within 10 days of receipt
of this Order. Elements of the root cause analysis must include but not be limited to: a
scoping document of the root cause analysis; procedures associated with root cause analysis;
multiple methods used for the analysis and periodic (not to exceed monthly) updates on each
method as it progresses. This root cause failure analysis shall include control room activities
to establish a timeline, including manual calculations associated with over and short material
balance efforts, meter PLM imbalance calculations, emergency response procedures and
execution of these procedures by personnel as may be necessary for timeline development,
and associated personnel response to the Failure. Provide the Central Region Director with
the scheduled date, time, and location of personnel interviews and document reviews to be
conducted as part of this RCFA to allow a PHMSA representative to attend either in-person
or via teleconference. The root cause analysis must document all contributing factors and
the decision-making process. Submit a final report of the root cause analysis results to the
Central Region Director, including any lessons learned and whether the findings are
applicable to other locations within the Respondent's Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to
Wood River 20” mainline.
7. Spill Mitigation Study. Respondent must review the topography and water run-off
patterns associated with the Pocahontas Station to mitigate crude-oil migration offsite in the
event of another leak at that location. Investigate the use of surveillance monitoring and/or
leak detectors (hazardous vapor detectors) at this facility. Also, consider topography
modification, surveillance monitoring and/or leak detectors (hazardous vapor detectors) at
other unmanned facilities along the Capwood Pipeline and Patoka to Wood River 20”
mainline to help immediately identify potential leaks.
8. Emergency Response Plan and Training Review. Respondent must review and assess
the effectiveness of its emergency response procedures, plan, response, associated
performance in regards to the Failure, and associated training. Include in the assessment a
detailed review of the on-scene response and support activities (including timeline),
coordination with all parties (including regulatory requests and proceeding with work), site
security (including all phases of the response), procedures for improvements, lessons learned,
and communication with emergency responders, third party contractors, public officials, and
internal resources. Assess the effectiveness of communication with all other modes of
transportation that could have been impacted by this type of spill, such as municipal water
impacts, roads, railroads, electric power, and water intake considerations. This should
include a review of Respondent’s Federal Response Plan (FRP), an understanding of the
worst-case discharge in the area for the pipeline and the other pipelines or facilities in the
area that may need communication and coordination activities. The review will include



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 8
existing training under the Incident Command structure and emergency procedures. Also
included will be a review and assessment of the effectiveness of other Plains emergency
training or response elements such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Plains must
amend its FRP or emergency response operating procedures and associated training, if
necessary, to reflect the results of this detailed review. This review must be conducted by an
independent third-party consultant who specializes in the emergency response and
management aspects of hazardous liquids. A final report shall be the result of this review
and it shall detail in the report findings, recommendations, potential process enhancements,
lessons learned and other applicable information to improve the emergency response of
Plains and associated contractors. The documentation associated with this detailed
Emergency Response Plan and Training Review must be provided to the Central Region
Director no later than 90 days after receipt of this Order.
9. Data Management Software Study. Respondent shall review and evaluate Plains’
existing data management system software tools. Determine if improvements or
enhancements could be made to allow integrity data to be quickly accessed by various
stakeholders in the event of a failure. Report on these potential findings to the Central
Region Director within 120 days of receipt of this Order.
10. Order Revisions. Upon approval by the Central Region Director, the remedial work plan
becomes incorporated into this Order and shall be revised as necessary to incorporate the
results of actions undertaken pursuant to this Order and whenever necessary to incorporate
new information obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities. Submit
any such plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Central Region Director may
approve plan elements incrementally.
11. Implementation of Approved Work Plan. Implement the work plan as approved by the
Central Region Director, including any revisions to the plan.
12. Quarterly Reports. Submit quarterly reports to the Central Region Director that:
(1) include all available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by this
Order; and (2) describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being
undertaken. The first quarterly report for the period from July 15, 2015 through October
15, 2015 shall be due by November 15, 2015.
The Central Region Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the
terms of this Order upon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an
extension.
With respect to each submission that under this Order requires the approval of the Central
Region Director, the Director may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the
submission on specified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies;
(d) disapprove, in whole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the
submission; or (e) any combination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon
conditions, or modification by the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required
by the submission as approved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or



CPF No. 3-2015-5007H
Page 9
any portion of the submission, Respondent shall correct all deficiencies within the time specified
by the Director, and resubmit it for approval. If a resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in
part, the Director may again require Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with
the foregoing procedure, and the Director may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this
Order.
Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for
confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you
must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information
qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
In your correspondence on this matter, please refer to "CPF No. 3-2015-5007H” and for each
document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The
actions required by this Corrective Action Order are in addition to and do not waive any
requirements that apply to Respondent's pipeline system under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199,
under any other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under
any other provision of Federal or State law.
Respondent may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety. Decisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to
the Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 60120.
The terms and conditions of this Corrective Action Order are effective upon service in
accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
_________________________________ ________________
Jeffrey D. Wiese Date Issued
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
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