{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320175008H","title":"TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2017-11-28","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320175008h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320175008h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320175008h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320175008H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2017-11-28 and is reported as closed as of 2019-01-29. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320175008H_Closure Letter_01292019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320175008H/320175008H_Closure%20Letter_01292019.pdf\n\n320175008H_Closure Letter_01292019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320175008H/320175008H_Closure%20Letter_01292019_text.pdf\n\n320175008H_Corrective Action Order_11282017.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320175008H/320175008H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_11282017.pdf\n\n320175008H_Corrective Action Order_11282017_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320175008H/320175008H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_11282017_text.pdf\n\n320175008H_Closure Letter_01292019_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJanuary 29, 2019\nMr. Russell K. Girling\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nTransCanada Corporation\n450 1st Street, S.W.\nCalgary, Alberta T2P 5H1\nCPF 3-2017-5008H\nDear Mr. Girling:\nOn November 28, 2017, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA) issued to TransCanada Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc. a Corrective Action Order in\nthe above-referenced case. This Order included a requirement to take corrective actions on\nyour pipeline. Based on our review of the documentation you provided, it has been determined\nthat you have complied with the terms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n320175008H_Corrective Action Order_11282017_text.pdf\n\nNovember 28, 2017\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (403) 920-2200\nMr. Russell K. Girling\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nTransCanada Corporation\n450 1st Street, S.W.\nCalgary, Alberta T2P 5H1\nCPF No. 3-2017-5008H\nDear Mr. Girling:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued in the above-referenced case to your\nsubsidiary, TransCanada Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc. It finds that continued operation of the\ncompany’s Keystone 30-inch Phase 1 crude-oil pipeline between the Ludden and Ferney pump\nstations near Amherst, South Dakota, is or would be hazardous to life, property, and the\nenvironment without immediate corrective actions. The CAO requires TransCanada to take certain\ncorrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment from a hazardous condition\nresulting from the pipeline leak initially reported to the National Response Center on November\n16, 2017. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile. Your receipt of this Corrective\nAction Order constitutes service of that document under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and\nconditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.\nWe look forward to the successful resolution of the concerns arising out of this accident to ensure\nthe safe operation of this TransCanada facility. Please direct any questions on this matter to Allan\nBeshore, Region Director, Central Region, OPS, at (816) 329-3811.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Corrective Action Order and Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233\n\n\n\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Allan Beshore, Region Director, OPS\nMr. Lee Romack, Manager US Regulatory Compliance, TransCanada Corporation, 700\nLouisiana Street, Houston, TX 77002\nMs. Sonya Kirby, Vice President, Pipeline Safety & Compliance, TransCanada\nCorporation, 700 Louisiana Street, Houston, TX 77002\n\n\n\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nTransCanada Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc., )\nRespondent. )\n)\n)\n)\n)\n__________________________________________)\nCPF No. 3-2017-5008H\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to\nrequire TransCanada Oil Pipeline Operations, Inc. (TC or Respondent), to take necessary\ncorrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards\nassociated with a release from its 30-inch crude oil transmission pipeline near Amherst, South\nDakota (Failure). The Failure occurred on the approximately 46.8-mile pipeline segment referred\nto as “the Keystone 30-inch Phase 1 Line” that runs between the Ludden Pump Station and Ferney\nPump Station (Affected Segment). The Affected Segment is part of TC’s existing Keystone\nPipeline, which is a 2,687-mile hazardous liquid pipeline system between Hardisty, Alberta,\nCanada and Patoka, Illinois, and Port Arthur, Texas.1 This Order finds that continued operation\nof the Affected Segment without corrective action is or would be hazardous to life, property, or\nthe environment and requires Respondent to take immediate action to ensure its safe operation.\nOn November 16, 2017, TC notified the National Response Center (NRC) of a crude-oil release\nfrom its 30-inch pipeline near Amherst, South Dakota. TC’s Keystone Pipeline Supervisory\nControl and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system detected a drop in pipeline pressure and an\nincrease in flow rate on the line at 5:33 am CST. According to documents under review by\nPHMSA, the TC Control Center (Control Center) initiated shut down and isolation of the\npipeline at 5:36 AM CST following the SCADA release indication. The initial release estimate\nwas 5,000 barrels (210,000 gallons). Further review has resulted in an unconfirmed lower spill\nestimate. On November 26, 2017, TC excavated the failed section of pipe and metallurgists\nidentified a rupture originating at the 12:00 o’clock position.\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation immediately following\nnotice of the incident. The preliminary findings of the agency's ongoing investigation are as\nfollows:\n1 http://www.transcanada.com/oil-pipelines html (last accessed November 27, 2017).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2017-5008\nPage 3\nPreliminary Findings:\n TC initially reported the incident to the NRC at 9:15 am CST (local time) on November\n16, 2017 (NRC Report No. 1197446), indicating the quantity released as 5,000 barrels\n(210,000 gallons). An updated report was provided to the NRC at 11:25 am CST on\nNovember 18, 2017 (NRC Report No. 1197610), indicating no change.\n On November 16, 2017, at 5:33 am CST (according to pressure data reviewed by\nPHMSA), Respondent’s Control Center identified a pressure and flow deviation. TC\ninitiated shut-down of the entire pipeline at 5:36 am CST. The release location is in a\nrural agricultural area located between 115th Street and 116th Street in Marshall County,\nSouth Dakota, approximately three miles southeast of Amherst (Failure Site). The Failure\nSite is located at Mile Post (MP) 234.2, approximately 17 miles downstream of the\nLudden pump station. There are approximately 23.8 miles between the Ludden pump\nstation upstream of the Failure Site and the nearest block valve downstream of the Failure\nSite.\n On November 26, 2017, TC and PHMSA identified the source of the release. The rupture\nhas characteristics of mechanical damage from original construction. Preliminary\ninformation indicates the Failure may have been caused by mechanical damage to the\npipeline and coating associated with a weight installed on the pipeline in 2008. Weights\nare placed on the pipeline in areas where water could potentially result in buoyancy\nconcerns.\n TC, after consultation with PHMSA, has removed the portion of pipe containing the\nfailure location and will ship it to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB)\nmetallurgical lab in Virginia for testing.\n The Keystone Pipeline moves crude oil from Hardisty, Alberta, Canada to Patoka,\nIllinois, and to Port Arthur, Texas. This 30-inch Phase 1 portion of the system\nconsists of a 1,082-mile-long pipeline, 23 pump stations, a terminal facility in\nPatoka, Illinois, and related facilities that start at the Canadian Border in North\nDakota and traverse the midwestern states of South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas and\nMissouri, terminating in Patoka, Illinois. It was constructed from June 2008 until\nMarch 2010.\n The specific pipeline section that failed was installed in 2008 as part of Spread 2A.\nThe pipe is 30 inches in diameter and constructed of API 5L X-70 line pipe\nmanufactured by Berg Steel Pipe Corporation. The pipe has a double-submerged arc\nwelded (DSAW) seam and is coated with a fusion bond epoxy coating.\n PHMSA issued a special permit to TC for construction and operation of the Keystone\nPipeline on April 30, 2007, allowing the pipeline to be operated at a stress level of 80\npercent of the steel pipe’s specified minimum yield strength (SMYS), as opposed to the\nnormal operating pressure for hazardous liquid pipelines of 72 percent of SMYS under\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2017-5008\nPage 4\n49 CFR 195.106 (Special Permit). The Special Permit contained 51 conditions and was\ndesigned to provide for a level of safety equal to, or greater than, the regulations in effect\nat the time by requiring TC to more closely inspect and monitor the pipeline over its\noperational life than similar pipelines installed without a special permit. The Special\nPermit remains in effect for the life of the Keystone Pipeline unless suspended, modified\nor terminated by PHMSA.\n PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CPF No. 3-2016-5003H) to TC on April 9,\n2016, due to a leak in a cracked tie-in weld. This Order was closed on March 30, 2017,\nafter TC had completed all the required corrective actions.\n Keystone Pipeline traverses several High Consequence Areas (HCA), as defined under\n49 C.F.R. § 195.450, and navigable rivers. The nearest HCA “could-affect” pipeline\nsegment is approximately 6.5 miles upstream of the Failure Site.\n TC was operating a cleaning tool (pig) and SmartBall® in the Keystone Pipeline at the\ntime of the release. Both tools passed the Failure Site prior to the rupture without\nidentifying any oil leakage from the pipeline at this location. There is no indication the\ntools contributed to the release.\n Removal of crude oil from the spill area is underway. Various state agencies and\nnumerous contractors working on behalf of the operator, as well as other operating\npersonnel, are performing clean-up, remediation, and monitoring activities.\n The PHMSA failure investigation is on-going and information could change. This\norder may be amended based on further findings during the investigation.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder requiring corrective action, which may include the suspended or restricted use of a\npipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as\nappropriate. The basis for making the determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous and\nrequiring corrective action is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R.§\n190.233, a copy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property or the\nenvironment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as\npracticable after the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation\nof the Affected Segment without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property\nand the environment. Furthermore, after considering the age of the pipe, the circumstances\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2017-5008\nPage 5\nsurrounding the Failure, the hazardous nature of the product being transported, the pressure\nrequired for transporting the material, the other recent failure of the Keystone Pipeline in April\n2016, the unusual characteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in the Keystone Pipeline\nand the associated Special Permit issued to ensure its safety, the uncertainties as to the cause\nof the Failure and the ongoing investigation to determine its cause, I find that a failure to issue\nthis Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would result in likely serious\nharm to life, property, and the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing, to be held as soon as\npracticable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety in writing, with a copy\nto the Director, Central Region, PHMSA (Director). If a hearing is requested, it will be held\ntelephonically or in-person in Kansas City, Missouri.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior\nto the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order TC to immediately take the following corrective\nactions with respect to the Affected Segment:\n1. Shutdown of the Affected Segment. The 30” Keystone Pipeline from Ludden Pump\nStation (MP 216.7) to Ferney Pump Station (MP 263.5), defined above as the Affected\nSegment, is being returned to service. The Deputy Associate Administrator has provided\nwritten approval of a Return-to-Service Plan under this Order.\n2. Return-to-Service Plan. The Return-to-Service Plan shall be comprised of a Repair Plan\nand a Restart Plan. Respondent has submitted the Return-to-Service Plan to the Central\nRegion Director for approval. The Repair Plan documents the procedures and scope of\nwork for repairing the Keystone Pipeline. The Restart Plan includes provisions for\nincreased patrolling of the Affected Segment during restart and for 72 hours following\nrestart. The Deputy Associate Administrator, on behalf of the Director, has authorized\nTC to return the Affected Segment to service, whereby the pressure on the Affected\nSegment shall be limited to a maximum discharge pressure set-point at the Ludden pump\nstation of 1046 psig. Additionally, Line Pressure Control settings have been temporarily\nreduced to a Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) of 1152 psig from the US/Canadian\nborder to the Freeman (South Dakota) Pump Station. These pressure restrictions shall\nremain in effect until removed in accordance with Paragraph 5 below.\n\n\n\n3. 4. 5. 6. 7. CPF No. 3-2017-5008\nPage 6\nTesting of Failed Pipeline Section. Respondent is delivering the failed section of pipe to\nthe NTSB laboratory in Virginia for metallurgical analysis and testing as soon as\npossible. Chain-of-custody shall be documented when handling and transporting the\nfailed pipe section and other evidence from the Failure Site. TC shall provide PHMSA\nwith the opportunity to have a representative be present for any metallurgical testing\nperformed, regardless of location.\nRemedial Work Plan. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, TC must submit\na Remedial Work Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval. The plan must provide for\nthe verification of the integrity of the Affected Segment and must address all factors\nknown or suspected in the Failure, including, but not be limited to, the integration of the\nfollowing information, conducted and documented in accordance with sound engineering\nprinciples, as follows:\nA. A review of records for the entire construction Spread 2A, in-line inspection\nreports, and any other data pertinent to the analysis of the failed pipe;\nB. A proposal to analyze available data on other weight locations, for similar\ncharacteristics as the Failure location;\nC. The performance of internal inspections with technologies appropriate to identify\nmechanical damage and/or crack indications with similar characteristics to those\nof the Failure; and\nD. Utilizing all information gained through history review, operational experience,\nthe failure investigation, and root cause analysis, integrate all available data and\nimplement a RWP designed to prevent reoccurrence.\nRemoval of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification\nof the pressure restrictions described above upon a written request from TC\ndemonstrating that restoring the pipeline to its pre-Failure operating pressure is justified,\nbased on a reliable engineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe and\nconsidering all known defects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the Keystone\nPipeline.\nRoot Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of the metallurgical\nanalysis from NTSB, complete a root cause failure analysis (RCFA) and submit a final\nreport of this RCFA to the Director. The RCFA must be supplemented/facilitated by an\nindependent third party acceptable to the Director and must document the decision-\nmaking process used in the analysis and all factors contributing to the Failure. The final\nreport must include findings and any lessons learned and whether the findings and any\nlessons learned are applicable to other locations on the Keystone Pipeline.\nOrder Revisions. Upon approval by the Director, the RWP shall automatically be\nincorporated into this Order and shall be revised as necessary to incorporate the results of\nactions undertaken pursuant to this Order and, whenever necessary, to incorporate new\ninformation obtained during the failure investigation and remedial activities. TC must\nsubmit any such plan revisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may\napprove plan elements incrementally.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2017-5008\nPage 7\n8. Implementation of Approved Work Plan. TC must implement the RWP as approved by\nthe Director, including any revisions to the plan.\n9. Quarterly Reports. TC must submit quarterly reports to the Director that:\na. Include all available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by\nthis Order; and\nb. Describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken\nunder this Order. The first quarterly report for the period from November 16,\n2017, through March 31, 2018 shall be due by April 15, 2018.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of this Order\nupon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nWith respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the submission on\nspecified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove, in whole\nor in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission; or (e) any\ncombination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or modification by\nthe Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required by the submission as approved\nor modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of the submission,\nRespondent shall correct all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director, and resubmit it\nfor approval. If a resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in part, the Director may again\nrequire Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with the foregoing procedure, and the\nDirector may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this Order.\nBe advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential\ntreatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to \"CPF No. 3-2017-5008H” and for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible. The actions\nrequired by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that apply to the\nKeystone Pipeline under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, the Special Permit, under any other\norder issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any other provision\nof Federal or State law.\nTC may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\nDecisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2017-5008\nPage 8\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nNovember 28, 2017\n_________________________________ ________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety","truncated":false,"body_characters":21890}