{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320185003M","title":"DAKOTA GASIFICATION COMPANY — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2018-05-29","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3), 195.440(d), 195.440(e), 195.440(f), 195.452(b)(1), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(f)(4), 195.452(f)(7).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320185003m.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320185003m.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320185003m","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320185003M","body":"Notice of Amendment involving DAKOTA GASIFICATION COMPANY. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(3),  195.440(d),  195.440(e),  195.440(f),  195.452(b)(1),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(3),  195.452(f)(4),  195.452(f)(7). The case was opened on 2018-05-29 and is reported as closed as of 2018-10-16. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320185003M_Closure Letter_10162018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Closure%20Letter_10162018.pdf\n\n320185003M_Closure Letter_10162018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Closure%20Letter_10162018_text.pdf\n\n320185003M_Notice of Amendment_05292018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05292018.pdf\n\n320185003M_Notice of Amendment_05292018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05292018_text.pdf\n\n320185003M_Operator Response to Notice_10052018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_10052018.pdf\n\n320185003M_Notice of Amendment_05292018_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nMay 29, 2018\nMr. David Sauer\nSr. Vice President & COO\nDakota Gasification Company\n1717 East Interstate Avenue\nBismarck ND 58503-0564\nCPF 3-2018-5003M\nDear Mr. Sauer:\nOn January 30–February 3, 2017, February 6-10, 2017, February 13-17, 2017, March 27-31,\n2017 and May 8-12, 2017, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected\nDakota Gasification Company’s (DGC) carbon dioxide pipeline procedures for operations,\nmaintenance, public awareness, operator qualification, integrity management, corrosion and\ncontrol room near Beulah, North Dakota.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified apparent inadequacies found within\nDakota Gasification Company’s plans or procedures, as described below:\n\n\n\n1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall\nbe reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted.\n(b) . . . .(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by\nparagraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to provide\nsafety during maintenance and normal operations:\n(1) . . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with\neach of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\nDGC’s procedural manual failed to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and\nrepairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of subpart F\nand subpart H of Part 195. 49 CFR §195.575(e) requires that “[i]f a pipeline is in close\nproximity to electrical transmission tower footings, ground cables, or counterpoise, or\nin other areas where it is reasonable to foresee fault currents or an unusual risk of\nlightning, you must protect the pipeline against damage from fault currents or lightning\nand take protective measures at insulating devices.” DGC did not have a procedure to\naddress the mitigation of fault currents. DGC must add such a procedure to its\ncorrosion control procedures.\n2. §195.402(a) & (c) See above\nDGC’s procedural manual failed to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and\nrepairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of subpart F\nand subpart H of Part 195. 49 CFR §195.577(a) requires operators to have a program\nto identify, test for, and minimize the detrimental effects of such currents for pipelines\nexposed to stray currents. 49 CFR §195.577(b) requires operators to “design and\ninstall each impressed current or galvanic anode system to minimize any adverse\neffects on existing adjacent metallic structures.” DGC’s procedure ‘74-004 Cathodic\nProtection Surveys’ is missing procedures for identification and mitigation of\ninterference currents. DGC must amend its procedures to address this deficiency.\n2\n\n\n\n3. §195.402(a) & (c) See above\nDGC’s procedural manual failed to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and\nrepairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of subpart F\nand subpart H of Part 195. 49 CFR §195.573(a)(2) requires operators to “[i]dentify\nnot more than 2 years after cathodic protection is installed, the circumstances in which\na close-interval survey or comparable technology is practicable and necessary to\naccomplish the objectives of paragraph 10.1.1.3 of NACE SP 0169 (incorporated by\nreference, see § 195.3).” DGC’s procedures did not address the circumstances to\ndetermine when close interval surveys (CIS) is practicable and necessary. On August\n23, 2017, DGC developed and sent to PHMSA decision criteria to determine when a\nCIS will be conducted. PHMSA found this procedure adequate. Therefore, no further\namendment is required in this item.\n4. §195.440 Public awareness\n(a) . . . .\n(d) The operator's program must specifically include provisions to educate the\npublic, appropriate government organizations, and persons engaged in\nexcavation related activities on:\n(1) Use of a one-call notification system prior to excavation and other\ndamage prevention activities;\n(2) Possible hazards associated with unintended releases from a hazardous\nliquid or carbon dioxide pipeline facility;\n(3) Physical indications that such a release may have occurred;\n(4) Steps that should be taken for public safety in the event of a hazardous\nliquid or carbon dioxide pipeline release; and\n(5) Procedures to report such an event.\n(e) The program must include activities to advise affected municipalities, school\ndistricts, businesses, and residents of pipeline facility locations.\n(f) The program and the media used must be as comprehensive as necessary to\nreach all areas in which the operator transports hazardous liquid or carbon\ndioxide.\nPublic Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators, API RECOMMENDED\nPRACTICE 1162, FIRST EDITION, DECEMBER 2003\n2.2 OVERVIEW FOR MEETING PUBLIC AWARENESS OBJECTIVES\nIn general, Public Awareness Programs should communicate relevant\ninformation to the following stakeholder audiences (as defined in Section 3):\n3\n\n\n\n5. 3 Stakeholder Audiences\nOne of the initial tasks in developing a Public Awareness Program is to identify\nthe audience(s) that should receive the program’s messages. This section defines\nthe intended audiences for the operator’s Public Awareness Program and\nprovides examples (not all inclusive) of each audience. Further explanation and\nexamples are included in Appendix B. This information should help the operator\nclarify whom it is trying to reach with its program. The following audiences are\nconsidered stakeholders of the pipeline operator’s Public Awareness Program.\nThe four intended Stakeholder Audiences include:\n Affected public\n Emergency officials\n Local public officials\n Excavators.\nThe operator should consider tailoring its communication coverage area to its\nparticular pipeline location and release consequences. The operator would be\nexpected to consider areas of consequence as defined in federal regulations.\nWhere specific circumstances suggest a wider coverage area for a certain pipeline\nlocation, the operator should expand its communication coverage area as\nappropriate. The Stakeholder Audience definitions listed in the table below are\nused in the remaining sections of this RP, as applicable.\nDGC’s public awareness plan did not include enough details to adequately define\nbuffer zones for each audience along the pipeline. DGC must amend its PA plan to\nadequately define buffer zones. On January 5, 2018, DGC amended its PA plan with\nbuffer zones in accordance with its 2017 air dispersion model. PHMSA reviewed this\ninformation and determined it satisfactory. No further amendments are required\nregarding this item.\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline\nintegrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:\n(1) Develop a written integrity management program that addresses the risks on\neach segment of pipeline in the first column of the following table not later than\nthe date in the second column:\nPipeline Date\nCategory 1 March 31, 2002.\nCategory 2 February 18, 2003.\nCategory 3 1 year after the date the pipeline begins operation.\n4\n\n\n\n6. . . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) . . . .\n(4) Criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the\nassessment methods and information analysis (see paragraph (h) of this section) .\n. .\nDGC’s integrity management program (IMP) did not describe the elements in enough\ndetail to provide criteria for remedial action to address integrity issues raised by the\nassessment methods and information analysis. DGC’s procedure 028 did not contain\nsufficient detail to address this code section. DGC must amend its procedure to\ninclude more details.\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) . . . .\n(7) Methods to measure the program's effectiveness (see paragraph (k) of this\nsection) . . .\n(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An operator's\nprogram must include methods to measure whether the program is effective in\nassessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment and in protecting\nthe high consequence areas. See Appendix C of this part for guidance on methods\nthat can be used to evaluate a program's effectiveness.\nDGC’s IMP failed to include methods to measure the program's effectiveness.\nSpecifically, DGC’s IMP procedures, Section IX A, did not clearly define the use of\nperformance metrics in evaluating program performance. Additionally, the procedures\nfailed to consider bench-marking performance metrics using data from outside the\n5\n\n\n\n7. company. Therefore, DCG’s IMP procedures were inadequate to measure whether the\nprogram is effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment\nand in protecting the high consequence areas. DGC must amend its procedures to\naddress these issues.\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) . . . .\n(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the\nentire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this\nsection) . . .\n(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of\neach pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all\navailable information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the\nconsequences of a failure. This information includes:\n(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage\ndue to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities,\nand development or planned development along the pipeline segment;\n(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;\n(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and\npatrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and\ncathodic protection surveys; and\n(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such\nas location of the water intake.\n(j)(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as\nneeded to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of\nevaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in\nparagraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the\nbaseline and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g)\nof this section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative\nactions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).\n6\n\n\n\n8. 9. DGC’s IMP failed to include a procedure to analyze all available information about the\nintegrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure. Specifically, DGC\ndid not have a procedure for assessing the risk factors of its aboveground facilities in\nHCAs, namely, the Tioga Pump Station and any other similar facilities. DGC must\namend its procedures to address these issues.\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high\nconsequence area . . .\nDGC’s procedures did not include a process for identifying which pipeline segments\ncould affect a high consequence area. DGC must amend its IMP plan to define, justify\nand document unusually sensitive areas (USAs) and other types of HCAs.\n§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity\nmanagement program begins with the initial framework. An operator must\ncontinually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions\ndrawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and\nsurveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high\nconsequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following\nelements in its written integrity management program:\n(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high\nconsequence area . . .\nDGC’s air dispersion modeling did not address overland downhill flow of heavy CO2\nvapors. Without this effect in the modeling it was not possible to determine if could\naffect HCAs were properly identified. On October 27, 2017, DGC amended its IMP\nplan with an air dispersion model that PHMSA determined to provide technical\njustification for the dispersion distances on all terrains. No further amendment is\nrequired in relation to this item.\n7\n\n\n\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed\nas part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nCompliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies\nfor confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document\nyou must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted\ninformation qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days\nof receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged\nin this Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If\nyour plans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to\namend your plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are\nnot contesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office\nwithin [number of days] days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by\nwritten request for good cause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed\nin your amended procedures, this enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that [Company name] maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision\nof plans, procedures) and submit the total to [Region Director's name], Director, [Region],\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this\nmatter, please refer to CPF 3-2018-5003M and, for each document you submit, please\nprovide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n8\n\n320185003M_Closure Letter_10162018_text.pdf\n\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nOctober 16, 2018\nMr. David Sauer\nSr. Vice President & COO\nDakota Gasification Company\n1717 East Interstate Avenue\nBismarck ND 58503-0564\nCPF 3-2018-5003M\nDear Sauer:\nOn January 30–February 3, 2017, February 6-10, 2017, February 13-17, 2017, March 27-31,\n2017 and May 8-12, 2017, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected\nDakota Gasification Company’s (DGC) carbon dioxide pipeline procedures for operations,\nmaintenance, public awareness, operator qualification, integrity management, corrosion and\ncontrol room near Beulah, North Dakota. As a result of the inspection, DGC was issued a\nNotice of Amendment on May 29, 2018, which proposed amendment of your procedures.\nDGC submitted its amended procedures on October 5, 2018. My staff reviewed the amended\nprocedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment have\nbeen corrected.\nThis letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank\nyou for your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","truncated":false,"body_characters":20271}