# DAKOTA GASIFICATION COMPANY — Notice of Amendment

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 320185003M
- **title:** DAKOTA GASIFICATION COMPANY — Notice of Amendment
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2018-05-29
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3), 195.440(d), 195.440(e), 195.440(f), 195.452(b)(1), 195.452(f)(1), 195.452(f)(3), 195.452(f)(4), 195.452(f)(7).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320185003M
**body:**

Notice of Amendment involving DAKOTA GASIFICATION COMPANY. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.402(c)(3),  195.440(d),  195.440(e),  195.440(f),  195.452(b)(1),  195.452(f)(1),  195.452(f)(3),  195.452(f)(4),  195.452(f)(7). The case was opened on 2018-05-29 and is reported as closed as of 2018-10-16. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

320185003M_Closure Letter_10162018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Closure%20Letter_10162018.pdf

320185003M_Closure Letter_10162018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Closure%20Letter_10162018_text.pdf

320185003M_Notice of Amendment_05292018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05292018.pdf

320185003M_Notice of Amendment_05292018_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_05292018_text.pdf

320185003M_Operator Response to Notice_10052018.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320185003M/320185003M_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_10052018.pdf

320185003M_Notice of Amendment_05292018_text.pdf

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT
CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
May 29, 2018
Mr. David Sauer
Sr. Vice President & COO
Dakota Gasification Company
1717 East Interstate Avenue
Bismarck ND 58503-0564
CPF 3-2018-5003M
Dear Mr. Sauer:
On January 30–February 3, 2017, February 6-10, 2017, February 13-17, 2017, March 27-31,
2017 and May 8-12, 2017, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected
Dakota Gasification Company’s (DGC) carbon dioxide pipeline procedures for operations,
maintenance, public awareness, operator qualification, integrity management, corrosion and
control room near Beulah, North Dakota.
On the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified apparent inadequacies found within
Dakota Gasification Company’s plans or procedures, as described below:



1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.
(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a
manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance
activities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall
be reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar
year, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is
effective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline
system commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where
operations and maintenance activities are conducted.
(b) . . . .(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by
paragraph (a) of this section must include procedures for the following to provide
safety during maintenance and normal operations:
(1) . . . .
(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with
each of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.
DGC’s procedural manual failed to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and
repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of subpart F
and subpart H of Part 195. 49 CFR §195.575(e) requires that “[i]f a pipeline is in close
proximity to electrical transmission tower footings, ground cables, or counterpoise, or
in other areas where it is reasonable to foresee fault currents or an unusual risk of
lightning, you must protect the pipeline against damage from fault currents or lightning
and take protective measures at insulating devices.” DGC did not have a procedure to
address the mitigation of fault currents. DGC must add such a procedure to its
corrosion control procedures.
2. §195.402(a) & (c) See above
DGC’s procedural manual failed to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and
repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of subpart F
and subpart H of Part 195. 49 CFR §195.577(a) requires operators to have a program
to identify, test for, and minimize the detrimental effects of such currents for pipelines
exposed to stray currents. 49 CFR §195.577(b) requires operators to “design and
install each impressed current or galvanic anode system to minimize any adverse
effects on existing adjacent metallic structures.” DGC’s procedure ‘74-004 Cathodic
Protection Surveys’ is missing procedures for identification and mitigation of
interference currents. DGC must amend its procedures to address this deficiency.
2



3. §195.402(a) & (c) See above
DGC’s procedural manual failed to include procedures for operating, maintaining, and
repairing the pipeline system in accordance with each of the requirements of subpart F
and subpart H of Part 195. 49 CFR §195.573(a)(2) requires operators to “[i]dentify
not more than 2 years after cathodic protection is installed, the circumstances in which
a close-interval survey or comparable technology is practicable and necessary to
accomplish the objectives of paragraph 10.1.1.3 of NACE SP 0169 (incorporated by
reference, see § 195.3).” DGC’s procedures did not address the circumstances to
determine when close interval surveys (CIS) is practicable and necessary. On August
23, 2017, DGC developed and sent to PHMSA decision criteria to determine when a
CIS will be conducted. PHMSA found this procedure adequate. Therefore, no further
amendment is required in this item.
4. §195.440 Public awareness
(a) . . . .
(d) The operator's program must specifically include provisions to educate the
public, appropriate government organizations, and persons engaged in
excavation related activities on:
(1) Use of a one-call notification system prior to excavation and other
damage prevention activities;
(2) Possible hazards associated with unintended releases from a hazardous
liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline facility;
(3) Physical indications that such a release may have occurred;
(4) Steps that should be taken for public safety in the event of a hazardous
liquid or carbon dioxide pipeline release; and
(5) Procedures to report such an event.
(e) The program must include activities to advise affected municipalities, school
districts, businesses, and residents of pipeline facility locations.
(f) The program and the media used must be as comprehensive as necessary to
reach all areas in which the operator transports hazardous liquid or carbon
dioxide.
Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators, API RECOMMENDED
PRACTICE 1162, FIRST EDITION, DECEMBER 2003
2.2 OVERVIEW FOR MEETING PUBLIC AWARENESS OBJECTIVES
In general, Public Awareness Programs should communicate relevant
information to the following stakeholder audiences (as defined in Section 3):
3



5. 3 Stakeholder Audiences
One of the initial tasks in developing a Public Awareness Program is to identify
the audience(s) that should receive the program’s messages. This section defines
the intended audiences for the operator’s Public Awareness Program and
provides examples (not all inclusive) of each audience. Further explanation and
examples are included in Appendix B. This information should help the operator
clarify whom it is trying to reach with its program. The following audiences are
considered stakeholders of the pipeline operator’s Public Awareness Program.
The four intended Stakeholder Audiences include:
 Affected public
 Emergency officials
 Local public officials
 Excavators.
The operator should consider tailoring its communication coverage area to its
particular pipeline location and release consequences. The operator would be
expected to consider areas of consequence as defined in federal regulations.
Where specific circumstances suggest a wider coverage area for a certain pipeline
location, the operator should expand its communication coverage area as
appropriate. The Stakeholder Audience definitions listed in the table below are
used in the remaining sections of this RP, as applicable.
DGC’s public awareness plan did not include enough details to adequately define
buffer zones for each audience along the pipeline. DGC must amend its PA plan to
adequately define buffer zones. On January 5, 2018, DGC amended its PA plan with
buffer zones in accordance with its 2017 air dispersion model. PHMSA reviewed this
information and determined it satisfactory. No further amendments are required
regarding this item.
§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . . .
(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline
integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:
(1) Develop a written integrity management program that addresses the risks on
each segment of pipeline in the first column of the following table not later than
the date in the second column:
Pipeline Date
Category 1 March 31, 2002.
Category 2 February 18, 2003.
Category 3 1 year after the date the pipeline begins operation.
4



6. . . . .
(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity
management program begins with the initial framework. An operator must
continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(1) . . . .
(4) Criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the
assessment methods and information analysis (see paragraph (h) of this section) .
. .
DGC’s integrity management program (IMP) did not describe the elements in enough
detail to provide criteria for remedial action to address integrity issues raised by the
assessment methods and information analysis. DGC’s procedure 028 did not contain
sufficient detail to address this code section. DGC must amend its procedure to
include more details.
§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . . .
(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity
management program begins with the initial framework. An operator must
continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(1) . . . .
(7) Methods to measure the program's effectiveness (see paragraph (k) of this
section) . . .
(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An operator's
program must include methods to measure whether the program is effective in
assessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment and in protecting
the high consequence areas. See Appendix C of this part for guidance on methods
that can be used to evaluate a program's effectiveness.
DGC’s IMP failed to include methods to measure the program's effectiveness.
Specifically, DGC’s IMP procedures, Section IX A, did not clearly define the use of
performance metrics in evaluating program performance. Additionally, the procedures
failed to consider bench-marking performance metrics using data from outside the
5



7. company. Therefore, DCG’s IMP procedures were inadequate to measure whether the
program is effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment
and in protecting the high consequence areas. DGC must amend its procedures to
address these issues.
§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . . .
(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity
management program begins with the initial framework. An operator must
continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(1) . . . .
(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the
entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this
section) . . .
(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of
each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all
available information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the
consequences of a failure. This information includes:
(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage
due to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities,
and development or planned development along the pipeline segment;
(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;
(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and
patrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and
cathodic protection surveys; and
(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such
as location of the water intake.
(j)(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as
needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of
evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in
paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the
baseline and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g)
of this section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative
actions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).
6



8. 9. DGC’s IMP failed to include a procedure to analyze all available information about the
integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure. Specifically, DGC
did not have a procedure for assessing the risk factors of its aboveground facilities in
HCAs, namely, the Tioga Pump Station and any other similar facilities. DGC must
amend its procedures to address these issues.
§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . . .
(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity
management program begins with the initial framework. An operator must
continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high
consequence area . . .
DGC’s procedures did not include a process for identifying which pipeline segments
could affect a high consequence area. DGC must amend its IMP plan to define, justify
and document unusually sensitive areas (USAs) and other types of HCAs.
§195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . . .
(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity
management program begins with the initial framework. An operator must
continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions
drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and
surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high
consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following
elements in its written integrity management program:
(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high
consequence area . . .
DGC’s air dispersion modeling did not address overland downhill flow of heavy CO2
vapors. Without this effect in the modeling it was not possible to determine if could
affect HCAs were properly identified. On October 27, 2017, DGC amended its IMP
plan with an air dispersion model that PHMSA determined to provide technical
justification for the dispersion distances on all terrains. No further amendment is
required in relation to this item.
7



Response to this Notice
This Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed
as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in
Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be
advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being
made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies
for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document
you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for
confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted
information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).
Following the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised
procedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days
of receipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this
Notice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged
in this Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If
your plans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to
amend your plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are
not contesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office
within [number of days] days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by
written request for good cause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed
in your amended procedures, this enforcement action will be closed.
It is requested (not mandated) that [Company name] maintain documentation of the safety
improvement costs associated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision
of plans, procedures) and submit the total to [Region Director's name], Director, [Region],
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. In correspondence concerning this
matter, please refer to CPF 3-2018-5003M and, for each document you submit, please
provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.
Sincerely,
Allan C. Beshore
Director, Central Region, OPS
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Enclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings
8

320185003M_Closure Letter_10162018_text.pdf

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
October 16, 2018
Mr. David Sauer
Sr. Vice President & COO
Dakota Gasification Company
1717 East Interstate Avenue
Bismarck ND 58503-0564
CPF 3-2018-5003M
Dear Sauer:
On January 30–February 3, 2017, February 6-10, 2017, February 13-17, 2017, March 27-31,
2017 and May 8-12, 2017, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code, inspected
Dakota Gasification Company’s (DGC) carbon dioxide pipeline procedures for operations,
maintenance, public awareness, operator qualification, integrity management, corrosion and
control room near Beulah, North Dakota. As a result of the inspection, DGC was issued a
Notice of Amendment on May 29, 2018, which proposed amendment of your procedures.
DGC submitted its amended procedures on October 5, 2018. My staff reviewed the amended
procedures, and it appears that the inadequacies outlined in this Notice of Amendment have
been corrected.
This letter is to inform you no further action is necessary and this case is now closed. Thank
you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Allan C. Beshore
Director, Central Region, OPS
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
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