{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320195020","title":"OASIS PETROLEUM NORTH AMERICA — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2019-06-17","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 194.107(c)(1)(ix), 195.402(a), 195.402(d)(1), 195.403(a)(1), 195.403(a)(5), 195.420(b), 195.446(h)(4), 195.446(j)(1), 195.505(b), 195.563(a), 195.591.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320195020.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320195020.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320195020","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320195020","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving OASIS PETROLEUM NORTH AMERICA. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 194.107(c)(1)(ix),  195.402(a),  195.402(d)(1),  195.403(a)(1),  195.403(a)(5),  195.420(b),  195.446(h)(4),  195.446(j)(1),  195.505(b),  195.563(a),  195.591. The case was opened on 2019-06-17 and is reported as closed as of 2021-02-26. Proposed civil penalty: $207,800. Assessed civil penalty: $177,700. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320195020_Closure Letter_02262021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195020/320195020_Closure%20Letter_02262021.pdf\n\n320195020_Closure Letter_02262021_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195020/320195020_Closure%20Letter_02262021_text.pdf\n\n320195020_Final Order_08192020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195020/320195020_Final%20Order_08192020.pdf\n\n320195020_Final Order_08192020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195020/320195020_Final%20Order_08192020_text.pdf\n\n320195020_NOPV PCP PCO_06172019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195020/320195020_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06172019.pdf\n\n320195020_NOPV PCP PCO_06172019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195020/320195020_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_06172019_text.pdf\n\n320195020_Operator Response to Notice_09112019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195020/320195020_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_09112019.pdf\n\n320195020_NOPV PCP PCO_06172019_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nCERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED\nJune 17, 2019\nJason Swaren\nVice President, Operations\nOasis Midstream Partners\n1001 Fannin St. Suite 1500\nHouston, TX 77002\nCPF 3-2019-5020\nDear Mr. Swaren:\nOn January 8 - 12, January 29 – February 2, February 12 – 16 and April 16 – 20, 2018,\nrepresentatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),\nOffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.),\ninspected your Oasis Petroleum North America, formerly Oasis Midstream Partners, (Oasis)\npipeline near Johnsons Corner (JC) and City of Williston (COW) units in Watford City and\nWilliston, ND.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items\ninspected and the probable violations are:\n\n\n\n1. §194.107 General response plan requirements\n(a)….\n(c) Each response plan must include:\n(1) A core plan consisting of-\n(ix) Drill program-an operator will satisfy the requirement for a drill program\nby following the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP)\nguidelines. An operator choosing not to follow PREP guidelines must have a drill\nprogram that is equivalent to PREP. The operator must describe the drill\nprogram in the response plan and OPS will determine if the program is\nequivalent to PREP.\nOasis failed to follow the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP)\nguidelines. Specifically, Oasis did not perform all required PREP drills within a 3-year\nperiod as required by the PREP guidelines or a drill program that is equivalent to PREP.\nJohnson’s Corner Unit had five missing PREP drill activities. Oasis personnel indicated\nthat they had not performed all the required PREP drills shown in the table below.\nJohnson's Corner - Start-Up on 10/10/2016.\nType Required in 3\nYears.\nOct. 2016 2017 2018\nQI 12 Missing 1 Mar. 2017,\nMissing 3\nTabletop 3 Mar. 2017\nUnannounced 3 Missing 1\nEquipment 3 Jan. 2017\nMar. 2017\nTriennial 1\n2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system\ncommence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\n2\n\n\n\n(d) Abnormal operation. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section must\ninclude procedures for the following to provide safety when operating design limits\nhave been exceeded:\n(1) Responding to, investigating, and correcting the cause of:\n(i) Unintended closure of valves or shutdowns;\n(ii) Increase or decrease in pressure or flow rate outside normal operating limits;\n(iii) Loss of communications;\n(iv) Operation of any safety device;\n(v) Any other malfunction of a component, deviation from normal operation, or\npersonnel error which could cause a hazard to persons or property.\nOasis failed to follow for each pipeline system a manual of written procedures for\nconducting normal operations and maintenance activities and handling abnormal\noperations and emergencies. Specifically, Oasis procedure P-195.402(d) states, “[t]he\ncontrol center supervisor should gather all information concerning the abnormal operation,\nincluding the cause, effects, response, corrections, follow-up, monitoring, and any\nresulting procedure reviews, and maintain these records in the control center files.”\nDuring the inspection, Oasis could not produce records that indicated operator's personnel\nresponded to, investigated or gathered information concerning their indications of\nabnormal operations, as required by the written procedures. Based on the inspectors\nreview of records, there were 19 abnormal operations in 2017 and 13 in 2018 that did not\nreceive a documented response or investigation by the control center supervisor.\n3. §195.403 Emergency Response Training.\n(a) Each operator shall establish and conduct a continuing training program to\ninstruct emergency response personnel to:\n(1) Carry out the emergency procedures established under 195.402 that relate to\ntheir assignments;\n(5) Learn the potential causes, types, sizes, and consequences of fire and the\nappropriate use of portable fire extinguishers and other on-site fire control\nequipment, involving, where feasible, a simulated pipeline emergency condition.\nOasis failed to establish and conduct a continuing training program to instruct emergency\nresponse personnel to carry out the emergency procedures established under 195.402 that\n3\n\n\n\nrelate to their assignments. Specifically, Oasis records indicated that 39 individuals had\ntraining from 2016 to 2018, but the training did not comply with § 195.403(a)(1) and\n(a)(5).\nParagraph 195.402(e)(1), as provided by § 195.403(a)(1), requires that an operator’s\nmanual of written procedures for handling emergencies must include procedures for\n“[r]eceiving, identifying, and classifying notices of events which need immediate response\nby the operator or notice to fire, police, or other appropriate public officials and\ncommunicating this information to appropriate operator personnel for corrective action.”\nAdditionally, Oasis’ training program failed to instruct, as provided by § 195.403(a)(5),\nemergency response personnel to learn the potential causes, types, sizes, and consequences\nof fire and the appropriate use of portable fire extinguishers and other on-site fire control\nequipment, involving, where feasible, a simulated pipeline emergency condition.\nIn reviewing Oasis’ McKenzie County Emergency Response Program (ERP), the PHMSA\ninspector noted the training did not: 1) Address the receiving, identifying, and classifying\nnotices of events which need immediate response by the operator. 2) Address the potential\ncauses, types, sizes and consequences of fire and the appropriate use of portable fire\nextinguishers.\n4. §195.420 Valve maintenance.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 71∕2 months, but at least twice\neach calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning\nproperly.\nOasis failed to inspect each mainline valve to determine that it functioned properly at\nintervals not exceeding 7-1∕2 months, but at least twice each calendar year. The Johnson's\nCorner line went into service on 10/10/2016 and the first valve inspection was completed\non 3/3/2018. Oasis stated to PHMSA that no valve inspections occurred during that\nperiod. There were 2 inspection cycles missed for 4 valves for a total of 8 valve\ninspections that were not performed.\n5. §195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and review\nthe training program content to identify potential improvements at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's program must\n4\n\n\n\nprovide for training each controller to carry out the roles and responsibilities defined\nby the operator. In addition, the training program must include the following\nelements:\n(4) Training that will provide a controller a working knowledge of the pipeline\nsystem, especially during the development of abnormal operating conditions;\nOasis failed to establish a controller training program that provides its controllers a\nworking knowledge of the pipeline system, especially during the development of abnormal\noperating conditions. An essential part of the working knowledge of the pipeline system\nincludes knowledge of the safety related data points. Oasis had not developed a list of\nsafety related data points. Five controllers attended the operator’s control room\nmanagement training. During the inspection, PHMSA interviewed a controller who stated\nthat he had not seen a list of safety related points and was unaware of which points were\nsafety related beyond MOP and high pressure.\n6. §195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review during\ninspection:\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this section;\nOasis failed to maintain records as required by §195.446(j)(1) to demonstrate compliance\nwith §195.446(c)(2). During the inspection, Oasis could not produce records for the point-\nto-point verifications required by §195.446(c)(2). An email from the Oasis Pipeline\nControl Center Supervisor states that they had performed the verifications but had no\ndocumentation. A total of 14 points did not have verification documentation.\n7. §195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program\nshall include provisions to:\n(a) . . . .\n(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are\nqualified;\nThe operator did not follow its written qualification program. Oasis’ Operator\nQualification (OQ) plan required written (knowledge) and performance evaluations for all\ncovered tasks as listed in Appendix C “Qualification Requirements Column – Knowledge\nand Performance” . Although written evaluations were completed before pipeline\n5\n\n\n\noperation, there were no performance evaluations conducted until after the Johnson’s\nCorner (JC) pipeline began operations on October 10, 2016. A submittal was received\nfrom Oasis detailing tasks performed by nine unqualified personnel. Based on\ndocumentation the PHMSA inspector reviewed, the JC pipeline was operated from\nOctober 10, 2016 through May 1, 2017 by four unqualified North Dakota controllers. On\nApril 4, 2017, the first Houston controller received adequate operator qualification\ntraining. That person began controlling the pipeline on May 2, 2017. Additionally, this\nsubmittal showed that five other OQ covered tasks (patrolling, launching / receiving pigs,\noperating valves, and line locating) were performed on the pipeline by six unqualified\nfield personnel in North Dakota.\n8. §195.563 Which pipelines must have cathodic protection?\n(a) Each buried or submerged pipeline that is constructed, relocated, replaced, or\notherwise changed after the applicable date in §195.401(c) must have cathodic\nprotection. The cathodic protection must be in operation not later than 1 year after\nthe pipeline is constructed, relocated, replaced, or otherwise changed, as applicable.\nOasis failed to have its cathodic protection system in operation no later than 1 year after its\npipeline was constructed. The JC pipeline was hydrostatically tested on August 29, 2016,\nwhich means the pipeline had already been constructed by that date. Cathodic protection\non the pipeline was complete and in operation on October 4, 2017. This exceeded the 1\nyear requirement by 36 days.\n9. §195.591 In-Line inspection of pipelines.\nWhen conducting in-line inspection of pipelines required by this part, each operator\nmust comply with the requirements and recommendations of API Std 1163, Inline\nInspection Systems Qualification Standard; ANSI/ASNT ILI-PQ, Inline Inspection\nPersonnel Qualification and Certification; and NACE SP0102-2010, Inline Inspection\nof Pipelines (incorporated by reference, see §195.3). An in-line inspection may also be\nconducted using tethered or remote control tools provided they generally comply\nwith those sections of NACE SP0102-2010 that are applicable.\nOasis did not comply with the requirements and recommendations of NACE SP0102-2010\nwhen conducting in-line inspection of pipelines required by Part 195. Specifically, Oasis\ndid not correlate ILI results after the Rosen Combo MFL tool run that took place in\nNovember of 2017 as required by Section 8.1.1.4. NACE SP0102-2010. Section 8.1.1.4\nstates, “[c]orrelations should be made between field assessment information and ILI data.\nAll accuracy errors associated with field measurement and ILI data must be taken into\naccount in integrity assessment and planning.” As part of the Oasis’ response to\nPHMSA’s inspection, Oasis hired a contractor named TEAM to provide ultrasonic testing\n(UT) readings which took place on 6/20/2018 for the purpose of validating the tool run.\n6\n\n\n\nAdditionally, Oasis decided to complete 2 digs which took place on 9/8/2018 and 9/9/2018\nto further validate the tool run. Oasis was unable to provide records showing any\ncorrelations made between the field assessment information and ILI data prior to the\ninspection. Oasis has submitted updated procedures to correct this going forward.\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to\nexceed $213,268 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,132,679\nfor a related series of violations. For violations occurring on or after November 2, 2015 and\nbefore November 27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per violation per\nday, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,090,022. For violations occurring prior to\nNovember 2, 2015, the maximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per day,\nwith a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations. The\nCompliance Officer has reviewed the circumstances and supporting documentation involved\nin the above probable violation(s) and has recommended that you be preliminarily assessed a\ncivil penalty of $207,800 as follows:\nItem number\n1\nPENALTY\n$ 20,300\n4\n$ 21,400\n5\n$46,600\n6\n$ 20,000\n7\n$ 99,500\nWarning Items\nWith respect to items 2, 8 and 9, we have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocuments involved in this case and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement\naction or penalty assessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to promptly correct\nthese items. Failure to do so may result in additional enforcement action.\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to items 3 and 5 pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Oasis Midstream\nPartners. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a part\nof this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline\nOperators in Compliance Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response\noptions. All material you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly\navailable. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential\n7\n\n\n\ntreatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide\na second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment\nredacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, or request\na hearing under 49 CFR § 190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this\nNotice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and\nauthorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this\nNotice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order. If you are responding to this\nNotice, we propose that you submit your correspondence to my office within 30 days from\nreceipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good cause.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2019-5020 and, for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nAllan C. Beshore\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Compliance Proceedings\n8\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Oasis Midstream Partners (Oasis) a\nCompliance Order incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the\ncompliance of Oasis with the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. 2. 3. 4. In regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to establishing and\nconducting a continuing training program, Oasis must establish a program and\ntrain its personnel that includes the following elements: 1) Address the\nreceiving, identifying, and classifying notices of events which need immediate\nresponse by the operator. 2) Address the potential causes, types, sizes and\nconsequences of fire and the appropriate use of portable fire extinguishers.\nOasis must provide PHMSA with the revised program and documentation of\ntraining provide to its staff.\nIn regard to Item Number 5 of the Notice pertaining to establishing a controller\ntraining program that provides its controllers a working knowledge of the\npipeline system especially during abnormal operating conditions. Oasis must\namend its program to include a list of safety related data points and include this\ninformation in its controller training program. Oasis must must provided this\nrevised program and documentation of training provided to its controllers.\nOasis must provide the documents listed above withing 90 days after receipt of\na Final Order.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that Oasis maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit\nthe total to Allan C. Beshore, Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration. It is requested that these costs be\nreported in two categories: 1) total cost associated with preparation/revision of\nplans, procedures, studies and analyses, and 2) total cost associated with\nreplacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\n9\n\n320195020_Final Order_08192020_text.pdf\n\nAugust 19, 2020\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: jswaren@oasispetroleum.com\nMr. Jason Swaren\nVice President – Operations\nOasis Midstream Partners, LP\n1001 Fannin Street, Suite 1500\nHouston, Texas 77002\nRe: CPF No. 3-2019-5020\nDear Mr. Swaren:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $177,700, and specifies actions that need to be\ntaken by Oasis Midstream Partners LP, to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The\npenalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and\nthe terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this\nenforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by electronic mail is effective\nupon the date of transmission as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Allan Beshore, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. David Copeland, Senior Regulatory Specialist, Oasis Midstream Partners, LP,\ndcopeland@oasispetroleum.com\nMr. Thomas B. Nusz, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Oasis Petroleum, Inc.,\ntnusz@oasispetroleum.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n__________________________________________\nIn the Matter of\nOasis Midstream Partners, LP,\na general partner of Oasis Petroleum, Inc.,\nRespondent.\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n__________________________________________)\nCPF No. 3-2019-5020\nFINAL ORDER\nOn multiple occasions between January 8, 2019, and April 20, 2019, pursuant to 49 U.S.C.\n§ 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of\nthe facilities and records of Oasis Midstream Partners, LP’s (Oasis or Respondent) Johnson\nCorner (JC) and City of Williston (COW) pipelines in Watford City and Williston, North\nDakota, respectively. The JC pipeline consists of 19 miles of 10.75” steel crude-oil pipeline\ntransporting crude oil between Oasis’s Wild Basin Crude Handling Facility to two separate\ninterconnects at Johnson’s Corner, North Dakota, for further transportation to other pipelines and\ndepots. The COW pipeline is an approximately 1.4-mile, steel X52, 6” gathering pipeline\ntransporting crude oil from Oasis’ COW drilling space unit (DSU) to a central tank battery where\nthe product is trucked out for delivery.1 Oasis is a master limited partnership formed by Oasis\nPetroleum., Inc.2\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated June 17, 2019, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and\nProposed Compliance Order (Notice), which also included warning items pursuant to 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.205. In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice proposed finding that Oasis had\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 194.107, and committed eight other probable violations of 49 C.F.R. Part\n195 and proposed assessing a civil penalty of $207,800 for the alleged violations. The Notice\nalso proposed ordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nThe warning items required no further action but warned the operator to correct the probable\nviolations or face possible future enforcement action.\n1 See Pipeline Safety Violation Report, dated June 17, 2019 (Violation Report) (on file with PHMSA), at 1.\n2 See https://www.oasismidstream.com/about/ (last accessed August 7, 2020). The Operator ID (OPID) on file with\nPHMSA identifies the operator as “Oasis Petroleum North America”, but there is no reference to any such entity on\nOasis’ website. For purposes of this Final Order, Oasis Midstream Partners, LP, and Oasis Petroleum North\nAmerica are the same.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5020\nPage 2\nAfter requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Oasis responded to the Notice by\nletter dated September 11, 2019 (Response), and again on September 30, 2019 (Supplemental\nResponse). The company contested some of the allegations, offered additional information in\nresponse to the Notice, and requested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced or eliminated.\nRespondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to one.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Parts 194 and 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 194.107(c)(1)(ix), which states:\n§ 194.107 General response plan requirements.\n(a) ….\n(c) Each response plan must include:\n(1) A core plan consisting of— . . .\n(ix) Drill program—an operator will satisfy the requirement for a drill\nprogram by following the National Preparedness for Response Exercise\nProgram (PREP) guidelines. An operator choosing not to follow PREP\nguidelines must have a drill program that is equivalent to PREP. The\noperator must describe the drill program in the response plan and OPS will\ndetermine if the program is equivalent to PREP.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 194.107(c)(1)(ix) by failing to follow\nthe PREP guidelines. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Oasis did not perform all required\nPREP drills within a three-year period, as required by the PREP guidelines, or a drill program\nthat is equivalent to PREP. The JC pipeline had five missing PREP drill activities between 2016\nand 2017.\nOn the one hand, Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation, acknowledging “that it\ndid not meet all of its PREP Drill requirements at the start of Johnson’s corner (JC) pipeline\nfacility.” One the other hand, it asserted that the allegation in the Notice that it failed to conduct\nall required PREP drills in 2016 and 2017 was “inaccurate.”3 However, this statement is\nunsupported by the record and must be weighed against certain unchallenged allegations in the\nNotice. Specifically, the Notice identified a document titled “Johnson’s Corner Start-up on\n10/10/2016,” which identified five missing PREP drills for the JC pipeline between 2016 and\n2017. Further, the Notice alleged that an Oasis employee stated to the PHMSA inspector that not\nall required PREP drills had been completed for the JC pipeline during that same time period.\nBased on the totality of the evidence, I find that PHMSA has met its burden of proving this\nallegation of violation. Accordingly, based upon a review of all of the evidence, I find that\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 194.107(c)(1)(ix) by failing to follow the PREP guidelines for\nthe JC pipeline on five occasions between 2016-2017.\n3 Response, at 2 (on file with PHMSA).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5020\nPage 3\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.403(a), which states, in\nrelevant part:\n§ 195.403 Emergency response training.\n(a) Each operator shall establish and conduct a continuing training\nprogram to instruct emergency response personnel to:\n(1) Carry out the emergency procedures established under 195.402 that\nrelate to their assignments; . . .\n(5) Learn the potential causes, types, sizes, and consequences of fire\nand the appropriate use of portable fire extinguishers and other on-site fire\ncontrol equipment, involving, where feasible, a simulated pipeline\nemergency condition.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.403(a) by failing to establish and\nconduct a continuing training program to instruct emergency response personnel to carry out the\nemergency procedures established under § 195.402 that relate to their assignments. Specifically,\nthe Notice alleged that Oasis records indicated 39 individuals had undergone emergency\nresponse training from 2016 to 2018, but that the training failed to comply with§ 195.403(a)(l)\nand (a)(5). Under § 195.402(e)(l), an operator's manual of written procedures for handling\nemergencies must include procedures for \"[r]eceiving, identifying, and classifying notices of\nevents which need immediate response by the operator or notice to fire, police, or other\nappropriate public officials and communicating this information to appropriate operator\npersonnel for corrective action.\"\nThe Notice alleged that Oasis’ training program failed to address the receiving, identifying, and\nclassifying of event notices that need immediate response by the operator. Additionally, Oasis'\ntraining program allegedly failed to instruct, as provided by § 195.403(a)(5), emergency\nresponse personnel on the potential causes, types, sizes, and consequences of fires and the\nappropriate use of portable fire extinguishers and other on-site fire-control equipment, involving,\nwhere feasible, a simulated pipeline emergency condition.\nIn its Response, Oasis provided information related to the training of its personnel and certain\nimprovements it had made to its training program in support of its request that PHMSA\nwithdraw this item or reduce it to a warning item or a notice of amendment.4\nOasis maintained that the steps it had taken in response to the Notice warrant a reduction of this\nitem from a probable violation to something less. The record, however, does not provide a basis\nfor doing so. Significantly, Oasis acknowledged in its Response that “it did not meet all of its\noperator personnel training requirements at the start of the JC pipeline facility.”5 Oasis further\nstated that it “acknowledged deficiencies identified during the 2018 inspection in real time,\ndemonstrating its collaborative, open approach with PHMSA.”\nOasis’s actions in addressing these training deficiencies are welcomed by PHMSA, but such\n4 Response, at 4-5.\n5 Id., at 4.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5020\nPage 4\nafter-the-fact conduct does not provide a basis to absolve Oasis of its acknowledged violations,\nnor does it warrant reducing the violation to something less. The violation was not merely a\nfailure to have adequate training procedures, which could serve as the basis for a notice of\namendment, but rather, a failure to conduct code compliance training for 39 individuals from\n2016 to 2018. There is nothing in the record to rebut this allegation.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.403(a) by failing to establish and conduct a continuing training program to instruct\nemergency response personnel to carry out the emergency procedures established under\n§ 195.402 that relate to their assignments.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b), which states:\n§ 195.420 Valve maintenance.\n(a) ….\n(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months, but at\nleast twice each calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that\nit is functioning properly.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b) by failing to inspect each\nmainline valve to determine that it is functioning properly, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months\nbut at least twice each calendar year. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the JC pipeline went\ninto service on October 10, 2016, but the first valve inspection was not completed until March 3,\n2018. According to the Notice, Oasis personnel stated to PHMSA inspectors that no valve\ninspections had occurred during that period. Thus, there were two inspection cycles missed for\nfour valves, for a total of eight valve inspections that were not performed.\nIn its Response, Oasis stated that “[w]ithout conceding the underlying violation,” it\nacknowledged that it “did not meet frequency requirements for valve inspections at the start of\nthe JC pipeline facility” and that it had “acknowledged deficiencies identified during the subject\ninspection in real time, demonstrating its collaborative, open approach with PHMSA.”6 The\ncompany therefore suggested that the agency should reduce the proposed civil penalty, an\nargument that is discussed more fully in the “Assessment of Penalty” section below.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.420(b) by failing to inspect each mainline valve to determine that it is functioning\nproperly, at intervals not exceeding 7½ months but at least twice each calendar year.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(h)(4), which states:\n§ 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) ….\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training\nprogram and review the training program content to identify potential\nimprovements at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed\n6 Id., at 5-6.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5020\nPage 5\n15 months. An operator's program must provide for training each controller\nto carry out the roles and responsibilities defined by the operator. In\naddition, the training program must include the following elements:\n(1) . . .\n(4) Training that will provide a controller a working knowledge of the\npipeline system, especially during the development of abnormal operating\nconditions;\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(h)(4) by failing to establish a\ncontroller training program that provides its controllers with a working knowledge of the\noperator’s pipeline system, especially during the development of abnormal operating conditions.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that an essential part of the working knowledge of the pipeline\nsystem includes knowledge of its safety-related data points, and that Oasis had not developed a\nlist of such points.7 Five controllers attended the operator's control room management training\nand during its inspection, PHMSA allegedly interviewed one controller who stated that he had\nnot seen a list of safety-related points for Oasis’ system and was unaware of which points were\nsafety-related beyond “Maximum Operating Pressure” (MOP) and high pressure.\nIn its Response, Oasis stated that it did not “contest the alleged violation subject to the correction\nof relevant facts.”8 In particular, Oasis contended that the company had provided information to\nPHMSA demonstrating that safety-related points had actually been identified to the OPS\ninspectors prior to the 2018 inspection. Oasis requested that PHMSA consider the relevant facts\nand either withdraw or convert the alleged violation to a warning item or notice of amendment.\nThe record, however, does not support a “correction” of the alleged facts since none of the facts\nput forward by Respondent actually relate to the training received by its controllers, nor do they\nwarrant a reduction of this item to a warning or notice of amendment. The most relevant facts\nunderlying the alleged violation stand uncontested and are sufficient on their own to uphold the\nviolation. First, the Notice alleged that one of Oasis’s own controllers stated during an interview\nwith a PHMSA inspector that he was not aware of which SCADA points were safety-related and\nhad not seen a list of such points. That fact alone, without credible evidence rebutting the\nallegation, shows that Oasis failed to properly train all of its controllers consistent with the\nrequirements of the regulation. Although Oasis stated in its Response that it provided PHMSA\nwith a list of safety-related data points during the inspection, that fact does not rebut the\nallegation that Oasis failed to properly train its employees on these safety-related data points, an\n7 To conduct an adequate control room management training program, an operator must provide its controllers with\n“a working knowledge” of the company’s pipeline system. This is spelled out in more detail under paragraph (c) of\n§ 195.466, which requires that an operator must provide its controllers with the information, tools, processes and\nprocedures necessary to carry out their responsibilities. This specifically includes the ability to conduct a “point-to-\npoint verification between [Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA)] displays and related field\nequipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that affect pipeline safety are made to\nfield equipment or SCADA displays.” For more information about safety-related SCADA points, see Control Room\nManagement Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (updated 1/16/2018), FAQ C.01, at\nhttps://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/technical-resources/pipeline/ control-room-\nmanagement/60636/faqs-control-room-management-20180726.pdf,\n8 Response, at 6-7.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5020\nPage 6\nallegation that is supported by the statement referenced above by an Oasis controller. Second, as\nOasis admits in its Response, it did not amend its procedures to include a detailed list of safety-\nrelated data points specific to its unique system until after the PHMSA inspection took place.9\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.446(h)(4) by failing to establish a controller training program that provides its controllers\nwith a working knowledge of the company’s pipeline system, especially during the development\nof abnormal operating conditions.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(j)(1), which states:\n§ 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) ….\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review\nduring inspection:\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this\nsection;\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(j)(1) by failing to maintain\nrecords as required by § 195.446(j)(1) to demonstrate compliance with the control room\nmanagement regulations. Specifically, the Notice alleged that during the inspection, Oasis could\nnot produce records for the point-to-point verifications required by § 195.446(c)(2). A total of\n14 points did not have verification documentation.\nIn its Response, Oasis contested the allegation of violation and stated as follows: “Subject to\ncorrection of relevant facts, Oasis contests the alleged violation without requesting a hearing.”10\nSpecifically, Oasis stated in its Response that it “provided PHMSA records of point-to-point\nverifications and lists of identified safety-related points as well as revisions to associated\nprocedures as part of the 2018 inspection process on May 7, 2018, June 04, 2018, September 13,\n2019, and on October 1, 2018, … [and that] point-to-point verifications are not required to show\ncompliance with § 195.466(c)(2).”11 In addition, Oasis submitted a Supplemental Response for\nItem 6 that purports to address the allegation in the Notice that Oasis was unable to provide\nrecords evidencing that point-to-point verification was performed for the 14 points alleged to be\nlacking relevant records.12\nOasis’s argument that point-to-point verifications are not required to show compliance with\n9 Id.\n10 Id., at 7. The Response went on to state that Oasis was “providing information and explanations it believes should\nbe considered by the Administration for the purpose of changing, reducing, or eliminating the PCP for the alleged\nviolation.” Some of this information challenged the allegation of violation and is therefore discussed here. Other\ninformation sought to reduce or eliminate the proposed penalty and is therefore discussed in the “Assessment of\nPenalty” section below.\n11 Id., at 8.\n12 Supplemental Response, at 1, 4.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5020\nPage 7\n§ l95.446(c)(2) is incorrect. Section 195.446(c)(2) clearly states that operators, via their\ncontrollers, must “[c]onduct a point-to-point verification between SCAD A displays and related\nfield equipment when field equipment is added ….” This is a requirement for the initial\nconnection of these devices and an operator is required to maintain for review during a PHMSA\ninspection all records demonstrating compliance with the verification requirement. Oasis failed\nto do so in this case. Further, the records provided by Oasis in its Supplemental Response show\nthat the 14 points were verified in 2017. The Oasis pipeline went into operation in 2016 and the\nrecor","truncated":true,"body_characters":60032}