{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320195023H","title":"TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC — Corrective Action Order","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2019-11-05","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED corrective action order.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320195023h.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320195023h.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320195023h","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320195023H","body":"Corrective Action Order involving TC OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS INC. The dataset does not identify a cited regulation for this case. The case was opened on 2019-11-05 and is reported as closed as of 2022-02-03. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320195023H_Closure Letter_02032022_(19-168016S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195023H/320195023H_Closure%20Letter_02032022_(19-168016S).pdf\n\n320195023H_Closure Letter_02032022_(19-168016S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195023H/320195023H_Closure%20Letter_02032022_(19-168016S)_text.pdf\n\n320195023H_Corrective Action Order_11052019.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195023H/320195023H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_11052019.pdf\n\n320195023H_Corrective Action Order_11052019_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320195023H/320195023H_Corrective%20Action%20Order_11052019_text.pdf\n\n320195023H_Corrective Action Order_11052019_text.pdf\n\nNovember 5, 2019\nVIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND FAX TO: (403) 920-2200\nMr. Russell K. Girling\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nTC Energy Corporation\n450 1st Street, S.W.\nCalgary, Alberta T2P 5H1\nCPF No. 3-2019-5023H\nDear Mr. Girling:\nEnclosed is a Corrective Action Order (CAO) issued in the above-referenced case. It finds that\ncontinued operation of the company’s Keystone 30-inch Phase 1 crude-oil pipeline between the\nEdinburg and Niagara pump stations near Niagara, North Dakota, is or would be hazardous to\nlife, property, and the environment without immediate corrective actions. The CAO requires TC\nEnergy to take certain corrective actions to protect the public, property, and the environment\nfrom a hazardous condition resulting from the pipeline leak initially reported to the National\nResponse Center on October 30, 2019. Service is being made by certified mail and facsimile.\nYour receipt of this Corrective Action Order constitutes service of that document under 49\nC.F.R. § 190.5. The terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon receipt.\nWe look forward to the successful resolution of the concerns arising out of this accident to\nensure the safe operation of this TransCanada facility. Please direct any questions on this matter\nto Allan Beshore, Region Director, Central Region, OPS, at (816) 329-3811.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure: Corrective Action Order and Copy of 49 C.F.R. § 190.233\ncc: Ms. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Field Operations, OPS\nMr. Allan Beshore, Director, Central Region, OPS\nMr. Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, PHMSA\n\n\n\nMs. Sonya Kirby, Vice President, Pipeline Safety & Compliance, TC Energy, 450 1st\nStreet, S.W. Calgary, Alberta T2P 5H1\nMr. Erick Hughes, Manager US Regulatory Compliance, TC Energy, 700 Louisiana\nStreet, Houston, Texas 77002\nMr. John Barrett, Regulatory Compliance Specialist, TC Energy, 700 Louisiana Street,\nHouston, Texas 77002\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nTC Energy Corporation,\n)\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent.\n)\n)\n____________________________________)\nCPF No. 3-2019-5023H\nCORRECTIVE ACTION ORDER\nPurpose and Background:\nThis Corrective Action Order (Order) is being issued under authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60112 to\nrequire TC Energy Corporation (TC or Respondent), to take necessary corrective actions to\nprotect the public, property, and the environment from potential hazards associated with a release\nfrom its 30-inch crude oil transmission pipeline near Edinburg, North Dakota (Failure). The\nFailure occurred on the approximately 41.9-mile pipeline segment referred to as “the Keystone\n30-inch Phase 1 Line” that runs between the Edinburg Pump Station and the Niagara Pump\nStation near Niagara, North Dakota (Affected Segment). The Affected Segment is part of TC’s\nexisting Keystone Pipeline, which is a 2,687-mile hazardous liquid pipeline system between\nHardisty, Alberta, Canada and Patoka, Illinois, and Port Arthur, Texas.1 This Order finds that\ncontinued operation of the Affected Segment without corrective action is or would be hazardous\nto life, property, or the environment and requires Respondent to take immediate action to ensure\nits safe operation.\nOn October 30, 2019, TC notified the National Response Center (NRC) of a crude-oil release\nfrom its 30-inch pipeline near Edinburg, North Dakota. At approximately 9:52 p.m. CDT on\nOctober 29, 2019, the operator’s control room observed the Edinburg Pump Station tripped and\nshut down. At approximately 9:53 p.m. the control room received two Leak Detection Triggers\nand at 9:55 p.m. the pump station was closed. A technician was dispatched to the station but due\nto wind and darkness, the technician could not identify any issues at the pump station, so the\nindividual began driving the right-of-way (ROW). The technician returned to the pump station\nand conducted another survey when the individual identified crude oil on the ground. Once\ndaylight conditions started, TC found the release site approximately 300 feet downstream (south)\nof the Edinburg Pump Station. The initial release estimate was 1,001 barrels (42,042 gallons),\nwith a worst-case discharge calculation of 9,120 barrels (383,040 gallons).\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n1 TC Energy website, available at https://www.tcenergy.com/operations/oil-and-liquids/ (last accessed November 4,\n2019).\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5023H\nPage 3\n(PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), initiated an investigation immediately following\nnotice of the incident.\nPreliminary Findings:\n TC initially reported the incident to the NRC at 11:20 pm CDT (local time) on October\n29, 2019 (NRC Report No. 1262553), indicating the quantity released as 1,001\nbarrels (42,042 gallons).\n There were no fires, injuries, fatalities or evacuations associated with this accident.\n On October 29, 2019, at approximately 9:52 p.m. CDT the operator’s control room\nobserved the Edinburg Pump Station tripped and shut down. At approximately 9:53\np.m. the control room received two Leak Detection Triggers and at 9:55 p.m. the pump\nstation was closed. A technician was dispatched to the station but due to wind and\ndarkness, the technician was unable to identify any issues at the pump station, so the\nindividual began driving the ROW. The technician returned to the station and did\nanother survey, when the technician identified the product on the ground. Once\ndaylight conditions started, TC found the release site approximately 300 feet\ndownstream (south) of the Edinburg Pump Station. The release location is in an open\nfield located in Walsh County, North Dakota, approximately three miles west of the\ntown of Edinburg, North Dakota (Failure Site). The Failure Site is located at Mile Post\n(MP) 34.3, approximately 300 feet downstream of the Edinburg Pump Station. There\nare approximately 15 miles between the Edinburg Pump Station upstream of the Failure\nSite and the nearest block valve downstream of the Failure Site.\n TC plans to remove the pipe from the Failure Site and ship it to an independent third-\nparty metallurgical laboratory approved by PHMSA for testing. TC will document the\nchain-of-custody of the pipe and any additional evidence that is removed from the\nFailure Site and transported to the metallurgical laboratory.\n The Keystone Pipeline moves crude oil from Hardisty, Alberta, Canada to Patoka,\nIllinois, and to Port Arthur, Texas. This 30-inch Phase 1 portion of the system\nconsists of a 1,082-mile-long pipeline, 23 pump stations, a terminal facility in\nPatoka, Illinois, and related facilities that start at the Canadian Border in North\nDakota and traverse the midwestern states of South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas and\nMissouri, terminating in Patoka, Illinois. It was constructed from June 2008 until\nMarch 2010.\n The specific pipeline section that failed was installed in 2008 as part of Spread 1A.\nHenkels & McCoy, Inc. was the contractor on this spread. The pipe is 30 inches in\ndiameter and constructed of API 5L X-70 line pipe manufactured by Berg Steel Pipe\nCorporation. The pipe has a double-submerged arc welded (DSAW) longitudinal\nseam and is coated with a fusion bond epoxy coating.\n PHMSA issued a special permit to TC for construction and operation of the Keystone\nPipeline on April 30, 2007, allowing the pipeline to be operated at a stress level of 80\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5023H\nPage 4\npercent of the steel pipe’s specified minimum yield strength (SMYS), as opposed to the\nnormal operating pressure for hazardous liquid pipelines of 72 percent of SMYS under\n49 CFR 195.106 (Special Permit). The Special Permit contained 51 conditions and was\ndesigned to provide for a level of safety equal to, or greater than, the regulations in\neffect at the time by requiring TC to more closely inspect and monitor the pipeline over\nits operational life than similar pipelines installed without a special permit. The Special\nPermit remains in effect for the life of the Keystone Pipeline unless suspended,\nmodified or terminated by PHMSA.\n PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CPF No. 3-2016-5003H) to TC on April 9,\n2016, due to a leak in a cracked tie-in weld. This Order was closed on March 30, 2017,\nafter TC had completed all the required corrective actions.\n PHMSA issued a Corrective Action Order (CPF No. 3-2017-5008H) to TC on\nNovember 28, 2017, due to a fracture that initiated at an area of previous mechanical\ndamage. This Order was closed on January 29, 2019, after TC completed all of the\nrequired corrective actions.\n Keystone Pipeline traverses several High Consequence Areas (HCA), as defined under\n49 C.F.R. § 195.450, and navigable rivers. There were no HCAs or unusually sensitive\nareas, as defined under § 195.6, at the release site.\n Removal of crude oil from the spill area in underway.\n The PHMSA failure investigation is on-going and information could change. This\norder may be amended based on further findings during the investigation.\nDetermination of Necessity for Corrective Action Order and Right to Hearing:\nSection 60112 of Title 49, United States Code, provides for the issuance of a Corrective Action\nOrder requiring corrective action, which may include the suspended or restricted use of a\npipeline facility, physical inspection, testing, repair, replacement, or other action, as appropriate.\nThe basis for making the determination that a pipeline facility is hazardous and requiring\ncorrective action is set forth both in the above-referenced statute and 49 C.F.R.§ 190.233, a\ncopy of which is enclosed.\nSection 60112 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the issuance of a\nCorrective Action Order without prior opportunity for notice and hearing, upon a finding that\nfailure to issue the Order expeditiously will likely result in serious harm to life, property or the\nenvironment. In such cases, an opportunity for a hearing will be provided as soon as practicable\nafter the issuance of the Order.\nAfter evaluating the foregoing preliminary findings of fact, I find that the continued operation of\nthe Affected Segment without corrective measures is or would be hazardous to life, property and\nthe environment. Furthermore, after considering the age of the pipe, the circumstances\nsurrounding the Failure, the hazardous nature of the product being transported, the pressure\nrequired for transporting the material, the other recent failures of the Keystone Pipeline in April\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5023H\nPage 5\n2016 and November 2017, the unusual characteristics of the pipe and other equipment used in\nthe Keystone Pipeline and the associated Special Permit issued to ensure its safety, the\nuncertainties as to the cause of the Failure and the ongoing investigation to determine its cause, I\nfind that a failure to issue this Order expeditiously to require immediate corrective action would\nresult in likely serious harm to life, property, and the environment.\nAccordingly, this Corrective Action Order mandating immediate corrective action is issued\nwithout prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. The terms and conditions of this Order are\neffective upon receipt.\nWithin 10 days of receipt of this Order, Respondent may request a hearing pursuant to 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.233, to be held as soon as practicable, by notifying the Associate Administrator for\nPipeline Safety in writing, with a copy to the Director, Central Region, PHMSA (Director). If a\nhearing is requested, it will be held telephonically or in-person in Kansas City, Missouri.\nAfter receiving and analyzing additional data in the course of this investigation, PHMSA may\nidentify other corrective measures that need to be taken. Respondent will be notified of any\nadditional measures required and amendment of this Order will be considered. To the extent\nconsistent with safety, Respondent will be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior\nto the imposition of any additional corrective measures.\nRequired Corrective Actions:\nPursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60112, I hereby order TC to immediately take the following corrective\nactions with respect to the Affected Segment:\n1. Shutdown of the Affected Segment. The 30” Keystone Pipeline from the Edinburg\nPump Station (MP 34.3) to the Niagara Pump Station (MP 76.2), defined above as the\nAffected Segment, is currently out of service and must remain shut down until its restart\nin accordance with this Order.\n2. Restart and Return-to-Service Plan. The Respondent must develop a restart and return-\nto-service plan and submit the plan to the Director prior restarting the Affected Segment.\nThe plan must specify any appropriate pressure restriction to ensure safety of the\nAffected Segment.\n3. Testing of Failed Pipeline Section. Respondent must deliver the failed section of pipe to\nan independent third-party laboratory approved by the Director for metallurgical analysis\nand testing as soon as possible. Chain-of-custody must be documented by Respondent\nwhen handling and transporting the failed pipe section and other evidence from the\nFailure Site. TC must provide PHMSA with the opportunity to have a representative be\npresent for the cut out and transfer of the failed pipeline section for transportation to the\nmetallurgical laboratory, as well as any metallurgical testing performed, regardless of\nlocation.\n4. Remedial Work Plan. Within 120 days following receipt of this Order, TC must submit\na Remedial Work Plan (RWP) to the Director for approval. The RWP must provide for\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5023H\nPage 6\nthe verification of the integrity of the Affected Segment and must address all factors\nknown or suspected in the Failure, including, but not be limited to, the following:\na. A review of records for the entire construction of Spread 1A, in-line inspection\nreports, and any other data pertinent to the analysis of the failed pipe;\nb. All information gained through a history review of the pipeline, operational\nexperience, the failure investigation, the root cause analysis, and the two previous\nfailures that occurred in 2016 and 2017; and\nc. An integration, conducted and documented in accordance with sound engineering\nprinciples, of the information gathered and analyzed in items 4(a) and 4(b), and\nimplemented into an RWP designed to prevent reoccurrence:\n5. Removal of Pressure Restriction. The Director may allow the removal or modification\nof any approved pressure restriction that is part of the restart and return-to-service plan.\nTC must demonstrate that the removal or modification of the pressure restriction, or\nrestoring the pipeline to its pre-Failure operating pressure, is justified based on a reliable\nengineering analysis showing that the pressure increase is safe considering all known\ndefects, anomalies, and operating parameters of the Keystone Pipeline.\n6. Root Cause Failure Analysis. Within 90 days following receipt of the metallurgical\nanalysis from the metallurgical laboratory, TC must complete a root cause failure\nanalysis (RCFA) that is facilitated and validated by an independent third party vendor\nacceptable to the Director. The RCFA must document the decision-making process used\nin the analysis and all factors contributing to the Failure. The final report must include\nfindings and any lessons learned and whether the findings and any lessons learned are\napplicable to other locations on the Keystone Pipeline. TC must submit a final RCFA\nreport to the Director.\n7. Order Revisions. Upon approval by the Director, the RWP, including any subsequent\nrevisions approved by the Director, is automatically incorporated into this Order. The\nRWP must be revised as necessary to incorporate the results of actions undertaken\npursuant to this Order and, whenever necessary, to incorporate new information obtained\nduring the failure investigation and remedial activities. TC must submit any such plan\nrevisions to the Director for prior approval. The Director may approve plan elements\nincrementally.\n8. Implementation of Approved Work Plan. TC must implement the RWP as approved by\nthe Director, including any revisions to the plan, according to the timelines set forth in\nthe RWP.\n9. Quarterly Reports. TC must submit quarterly reports to the Director that:\na. Include all available data and results of the testing and evaluations required by\nthis Order; and\nb. Describe the progress of the repairs or other remedial actions being undertaken\nunder this Order. The first quarterly report shall cover the period from October\n29, 2019 through December 31, 2019, and shall be submitted to the Director by\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2019-5023H\nPage 7\nJanuary 15, 2020. Subsequent quarterly reports shall cover a 3-month period and\nbe submitted on 15th day of April, July, October, and January.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time for compliance with any of the terms of this Order\nupon a written request timely submitted demonstrating good cause for an extension.\nWith respect to each submission under this Order that requires the approval of the Director, the\nDirector may: (a) approve, in whole or part, the submission; (b) approve the submission on\nspecified conditions; (c) modify the submission to cure any deficiencies; (d) disapprove, in\nwhole or in part, the submission, directing that Respondent modify the submission; or (e) any\ncombination of the above. In the event of approval, approval upon conditions, or modification\nby the Director, Respondent shall proceed to take all action required by the submission as\napproved or modified by the Director. If the Director disapproves all or any portion of the\nsubmission, Respondent shall correct all deficiencies within the time specified by the Director,\nand resubmit it for approval. If a resubmitted item is disapproved in whole or in part, the\nDirector may again require Respondent to correct the deficiencies in accordance with the\nforegoing procedure, and the Director may otherwise proceed to enforce the terms of this Order.\nBe advised that all material submitted in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If the Respondent believes that any portion of its responsive material\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), along with the complete original\ndocument, the Respondent must provide a second copy of the document with the portions the\nRespondent believes qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why the\nredacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).\nIf the company responds on this matter, please refer to \"CPF No. 3-2019-5023H” and for each\ndocument the company submits, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nThe actions required by this Order are in addition to and do not waive any requirements that\napply to the Keystone Pipeline under 49 C.F.R. Parts 190 through 199, the Special Permit, under\nany other order issued to Respondent under authority of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 601, or under any\nother provision of Federal or State law.\nTC may appeal any decision of the Director to the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.\nDecisions of the Associate Administrator shall be final.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the assessment of civil penalties and in referral to\nthe Attorney General for appropriate relief in United States District Court pursuant to\n49 U.S.C. § 60120.\nThe terms and conditions of this Order are effective upon service in accordance with 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nNovember 5, 2019\n_________________________________ ________________\nAlan K. Mayberry Date Issued\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\n\n320195023H_Closure Letter_02032022_(19-168016S)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: francois poirier@tcenergy.com , lee romack@tcenergy.com\nJessica Kirstine@tcenergy.com , Wendy West@tcenergy.com , Mark Yeomans@tcenergy.com ,\nMichael Prins@tcenergy.com , Dan Cerkoney@tcenergy.com\nFebruary 3, 2022\nMr. Francois Poirier\nPresident and Chief Executive Officer\nTC Energy Corporation\n450 1st Street, S.W.\nCalgary, Alberta T2P 5H1\nRE: CPF 3-2019-5023H\nDear Mr. Poirier:\nOn November 5, 2019, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a\nCorrective Action Order to TC Energy Corporation (TC Energy) in regard to the release of crude oil from\nTC Energy’s 30-inch Keystone pipeline near the Edinburg pump station, in Walsh County, North Dakota,\nreported to the National Response Center (NRC) on October 29, 2019. By letter dated January 14, 2022,\nfrom Mr. Lee Romack, Director – Regulatory Compliance, TC Energy requested closure of the Corrective\nAction Order (CAO or Order).\nThe CAO required corrective actions to the Keystone pipeline between the Edinburg and Niagara pump\nstations in North Dakota. TC Energy was required to use an independent third-party to perform a\nmetallurgical examination and analysis of the failed section of pipe. The Order also included a provision\nto develop and implement a Remedial Work Plan to verify the integrity of the Edinburg to Niagara pipe\nsegment. A root cause failure analysis report was required by the CAO to determine all factors that\ncontributed to the failure and identification of lessons learned.\nThe root cause failure analysis indicated the joint of pipe at the release site was manufactured with an\natypical seam weld geometry severe enough to initiate a fatigue crack. Per the Remedial Work Plan, TC\nEnergy launched an in-line inspection program with a new technology platform to detect similar cracks.1\nPHMSA’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) Central Region monitored TC Energy’s progress completing\nthe actions required by the CAO. Previously, the Director – OPS Central Region, allowed removal of the\npressure restriction based on an engineering analysis showing that the pipeline segment was safe to\n1 GAO‐21‐588, Pipeline Safety: Information on Keystone Accidents and DOT Oversight, U.S. Government\nAccountability Office, July 2021, www.gao.gov/assets/gao‐21‐588.pdf\n\n\n\noperate at pre-failure pressures considering all known anomalies and operating parameters of the\nKeystone pipeline.\nPer Amendment 195-102, effective July 1, 2020, at 84 FR 52260; 49 CFR §195.452(g) requires that “any\nin-service ruptures or leaks - including identified causes” be integrated with other information when\nperiodically evaluating the integrity of pipeline segments. Therefore, TC Energy’s integrity management\nprogram must include integration of information gathered during the implementation of corrective actions\nrequired by this Order and incorporate the identified causal factors that contributed to the in-service crude\noil release.\nPHMSA also reminds TC Energy of the requirements enacted by Congress and described in Section 114\nof the “Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020” (PIPES Act of\n2020), which requires all pipeline operators to address the elimination of hazardous leaks. Please refer to\nPHMSA Advisory Bulletin ADB-2021-01, for more information on this self-executing provision.\nPHMSA will be conducting inspections of these modified plans in 2022.\nBased on a review of documentation provided by TC Energy, it has been determined that you have\ncomplied with the terms of this Order. Accordingly, this Corrective Action Order is now closed. It is our\nexpectation that TC Energy will implement strategies to eliminate hazardous leaks on the Keystone\npipeline. As noted previously, PHMSA will be inspecting pipeline facilities across the country to ensure\nalignment with statutory requirements for eliminating hazardous leaks. Thank you for your cooperation\nin this matter.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, OPS Central Region\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Lee Romack, Director – Regulatory Compliance, TC Energy, lee romack@tcenergy.com\nJessica Kristine, VP, Liquid System Operations & Engineering, Jessica Kirstine@tcenergy.com\nWendy West, VP, Safety & Operational Excellence, Wendy West@tcenergy.com -\nMark Yeomans, VP, Engineering & Research Programs, Mark Yeomans@tcenergy.com\nMichael Prins, Director, Liquids Engineering, Michael Prins@tcenergy.com\nDan Cerkoney, Sr. Manager, Regulatory Compliance & Governance, Dan Cerkoney@tcenergy.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":25426}