{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320205009","title":"ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2020-11-19","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.116(e), 195.401(b)(1), 195.402(a), 195.402(e)(9), 195.412(a), 195.428(a), 195.432(b), 195.573(e), 195.581, 195.581(a), 195.581(c), 195.583.","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320205009.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320205009.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320205009","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320205009","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.116(e),  195.401(b)(1),  195.402(a),  195.402(e)(9),  195.412(a),  195.428(a),  195.432(b),  195.573(e),  195.581,  195.581(a),  195.581(c),  195.583. The case was opened on 2020-11-19 and is reported as closed as of 2025-03-05. Proposed civil penalty: $122,100. Assessed civil penalty: $98,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320205009_Closure Letter_03052025_(17-158844S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Closure%20Letter_03052025_(17-158844S).pdf\n\n320205009_Closure Letter_03052025_(17-158844S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Closure%20Letter_03052025_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\n320205009_Closure Letter_12222021_(17-158844S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Closure%20Letter_12222021_(17-158844S).pdf\n\n320205009_Closure Letter_12222021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Closure%20Letter_12222021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\n320205009_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_12212021_(17-158844S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_12212021_(17-158844S).pdf\n\n320205009_Decision on Petition for Reconsideration_12212021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Decision%20on%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_12212021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\n320205009_Final Order_08092021_(17-158844S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Final%20Order_08092021_(17-158844S).pdf\n\n320205009_Final Order_08092021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Final%20Order_08092021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\n320205009_NOPV PCP PCO_11192020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11192020.pdf\n\n320205009_NOPV PCP PCO_11192020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_11192020_text.pdf\n\n320205009_Operator Petition for Reconsideration_08302021_(17-158844S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Operator%20Petition%20for%20Reconsideration_08302021_(17-158844S).pdf\n\n320205009_Operator Response to Notice_01192021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_01192021.pdf\n\n320205009_Region Requests Compliance Reopen Case_12022022_(17-158844S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Region%20Requests%20Compliance%20Reopen%20Case_12022022_(17-158844S).pdf\n\n320205009_Region Requests Compliance Reopen Case_12022022_(17-158844S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205009/320205009_Region%20Requests%20Compliance%20Reopen%20Case_12022022_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\n320205009_Closure Letter_03052025_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: kevin.ruffatto@enbridge.com; stacy.soine@enbridge.com;\njeffrey.cremin@enbridge.com\nMarch 5, 2025\nMr. Kevin Ruffatto\nVice President, U.S. Operations\nEnbridge Energy, L.P.\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, TX 77056\nRE: CPF 3-2020-5009-NOPV\nDear Mr. Ruffatto:\nOn August 9, 2021, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),\npursuant to 49 CFR § 190.213, issued to Enbridge Energy, LP (Enbridge) a Final Order that made\nfindings of violations, assessed a reduced civil penalty of $98,900, and specified actions to be taken\nby Enbridge to comply with the pipeline safety regulations in the above-referenced case. On\nAugust 30, 2021, Enbridge filed a Petition for Reconsideration, pursuant to 49 CFR § 190.243. On\nDecember 21, 2021, PHMSA issued, pursuant to 49 CFR 190.243(d), its Decision on the Petition\nfor Reconsideration granting Respondent’s Petition, in part, by withdrawing the disputed statement\nfrom the Final Order. The Final Order included a Compliance Order and a Civil Penalty assessment\nrequirement that were not adjusted on reconsideration.\nPreviously, a closure letter was inadvertently sent to Enbridge in this case. By letter dated December\n2, 2022, Enbridge was notified that this enforcement action was still open pending completion of Item\n10 of the Compliance Order. Based on PHMSA’s review of the additional documentation provided,\nand Enbridge’s payment of the civil penalty on August 31, 2021, it has been determined that Enbridge\nhas complied with all terms of the Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed, and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Stacy Soine, Advisor Regulatory Compliance (stacy.soine@enbridge.com)\nJeff Cremin, Manager US Pipeline Compliance (jeffrey.cremin@enbridge.com)\n\n320205009_NOPV PCP PCO_11192020_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION\nPROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY\nand\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: david.stafford@enbridge.com\nmichael.koby@enbridge.com and\nNovember 19, 2020\nMr. Michael Koby\nVice President US Operations\nEnbridge Energy, LP\n5400 Westheimer Ct.\nHouston, Texas 77056\nCPF 3-2020-5009\nDear Mr. Koby:\nOn January 16, 2018 through July 20, 2018, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), pursuant to\nChapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) inspected Enbridge Energy LP’s (Enbridge)\nLakehead and Flanagan system assets and records in North Dakota, Wisconsin, Michigan,\nIllinois, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana and New York.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items\ninspected and the probable violations are:\n\n\n\n1. §195.116 Valves.\n(a) . . .\n(e) Each valve other than a check valve must be equipped with a means for\nclearly indicating the position of the valve (open, closed, etc.).\nEnbridge failed to maintain a means for clearly indicating the position of the valves. Nine of\nEnbridge’s valves noted below were identified during PHMSA’s field inspections as not\nhaving a clear means of indicating the valve position. Enbridge’s design standard EES124,\ncopied in relevant part below, states that the valve stem position indicator shall have a stem\nprotector of heavy, transparent, UV-resistant plastic. The identified protectors were not\ntransparent due smoke coloring or grease preventing clear indication of the valve stem\nposition.\n4.11.2\nThe Vendor shall provide a rising stem position indicator with a stem protector of heavy,\ntransparent, UV-resistant plastic. A 3 mm (0.125 in.) vent hole shall be drilled in the\ntransparent plastic cover on a 45° angle to prevent condensation and water ingress.\nUnit Valve Comments\nBay City Bay City Bay City Bay City Bay City Bay City Bay City Bay City Bay City 532.74-6V 536.42-6-V 576.92-6-V 607.62 638.45-6-V 576.82-6-V 6-UD-V-21 SK-6-SV-3 6-TBV-2 Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nValve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nAll valves listed above are located on Line 78 between the Illinois border and the Stockbridge,\nMichigan pump and tank station with the earliest installation date being 2014. This line\nsection is new 36” pipe, which is larger than the old line 6B, so all the valves are 2014 or\nnewer.\n2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall\nbe reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\n2\n\n\n\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted.\nEnbridge failed to review its operations and maintenance manual at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once calendar year. During PHMSA’s records inspection, the inspector\nfound that Enbridge did not review the following procedures in 2017. Specifically, Enbridge\ndid not review Book 3 08-03-02 through 08-03-21 in calendar year 2017 and was unable to\nprovide documentation of such review that contained was signed and dated as required by\nEnbridge’s procedures\n3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall\nbe reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted.\n(b) . . . .\n(e) Emergencies. The manual required by paragraph (a) of this section must\ninclude procedures for the following to provide safety when an emergency\ncondition occurs;\n(1) . . . .\n(9) Providing for a post accident review of employee activities to determine\nwhether the procedures were effective in each emergency and taking corrective\naction where deficiencies are found.\nEnbridge failed to conduct a post-accident review of employee activities for one pipeline\naccident, which resulted in a release of hazardous liquid, that occurred on February 29,2016\non the Lakehead system, that was reported to PHMSA on DOT Form 7000-1 [see §195.54].\nDuring PHMSA’s inspection, Enbridge presented its Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP) as the\napplicable emergency procedures for §195.402(e)(9).\nIn replies to OPS Central Region on April 20, 2018 and December 5, 2018, Enbridge asserted\nthat “emergency” is not defined in 49 CFR Part 195. However, § 195.402(e)(2) requires an\noperator to have procedures for responding to “each type emergency, including fire or\nexplosion occurring near or directly involving a pipeline facility, accidental release of\nhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide from a pipeline facility, operational failure causing a\nhazardous condition, and natural disaster affecting pipeline facilities.” Section 195.402(e)(2)\n3\n\n\n\nunambiguously delineates multiple types of emergencies are including, but not limited to, an\n“accidental release of hazardous liquid.” Therefore, Enbridge failed to conduct a post-\naccident review of employee activities for the one reportable pipeline accident which involved\na release of hazardous liquid on Enbridge’s Lakehead system, in order to determine whether\nthe emergency procedures were effective and corrective actions were taken where deficiencies\nwere found.\n4. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the\ncase of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7½\nmonths, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure\nlimiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control\nequipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical\ncondition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of\noperation for the service in which it is used.\nEnbridge failed to inspect and test each overpressure safety device, at intervals not exceeding\n15 months, but at least each calendar year, to determine that it is functioning properly, is in\ngood mechanical condition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity. Specifically, the\nfive (5) pressure safety devices listed below were not inspected and tested within the required\ntime period as identified during PHMSA’s records inspection.\nPressure Safety\nValve\nIn Service Date First Inspection Date Comments\nFN-203-PSV-11 November 2015 June 2017 Missed 2016 inspection\nFN-203-PSV-21 November 2015 June 2017 Missed 2016 inspection\nFN-203-PSV-31 November 2015 June 2017 Missed 2016 inspection\nTransmitter\nSK-207-PT-1BD 1-7-16 4-22-17 SK-208-PT-1BS 1-7-16 4-22-17 Regulatory interval of 15\nmonth was exceeded by 15\ndays\nRegulatory interval of 15\nmonth was exceeded by 15\ndays\n4\n\n\n\n5. §195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the\ncase of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7½\nmonths, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure\nlimiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control\nequipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical\ncondition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of\noperation for the service in which it is used.\nEnbridge did not, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or\nin the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids (HVLs), at intervals not to exceed\n7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, test and inspect each pressure limiting\ndevice, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to\ndetermine that it had adequate capacity from the standpoint of capacity for the service in\nwhich it was used. Specifically, PHMSA’s records inspection found that a total of 39 devices\n(i.e. HVL pressure relief valve full flow (PRVFF) and non-HVL PRVFF) in the Lakehead\nsystem did not have a calculated capacity review to determine them to be adequate from the\nstandpoint of capacity for the service in which it was used from 2016 through 2017 as listed in\nthe table below. A total of 98 capacity checks for adequacy were not performed in accordance\nwith the regulation and Enbridge’s procedure, “Pressure Control Valve Capacity and\nReliability Assessment.” The following table details how these figures were calculated.\nSystem Type Number Number of\nyears\n(2016-2017)\nRequire # of Tests\nor Capacity\nchecks per year\nLakehead HVL PRVFF 10 2 2 40\nTotal\nLakehead Non-HVL PRVFF 29 1 2 58\nLakehead Total 98\n6. §195.412 Inspection of rights-of-way and crossings under navigable waters.\n(a) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 3 weeks, but at least 26 times\neach calendar year, inspect the surface conditions on or adjacent to each pipeline\nright-of-way. Methods of inspection include walking, driving, flying or other\nappropriate means of traversing the right-of-way.\n5\n\n\n\nEnbridge failed to conduct an effective inspection of the surface conditions on or adjacent to\neach pipeline right-of-way. Specifically, Enbridge used aerial patrol inspection methods, but\nat the time of the inspection, the locations noted below were found with vegetation\novergrowth such that surface of the right-of-way was not visible by aerial patrol.1 The\nfollowing three locations on Enbridges’ pipeline right-of-way had excess growth and tree\ncanopy blocking aerial visibility of the surface conditions:\nUnit MP Description Comments\nFort Atkinson\n(Wisconsin)\n360.903 At MP 360.903 there was an\nissue with ROW Clearance\nDense cover restricting\naerial view of ground on\nROW\nLine 5\n(Michigan)\nLine 5\n(Michigan)\n1429.289 ROW needs clearing 1436.91 West side of this exposure needs\nROW clearing\nAerial view of ground\nrestricted by foliage.\nDense cover for 100 feet\neach side of this exposure.\n7. §195.432 Inspection of in-service breakout tanks.\n(a) . . .\n(b) Each operator must inspect the physical integrity of in-service atmospheric\nand low-pressure steel above-ground breakout tanks according to API Std 653\n(except section 6.4.3, Alternative Internal Inspection Interval) (incorporated by\nreference, see §195.3). However, if structural conditions prevent access to the\ntank bottom, its integrity may be assessed according to a plan included in the\noperations and maintenance manual under §195.402(c)(3). The risk- based\ninternal inspection procedures in API Std 653, section 6.4.3 cannot be used to\ndetermine the internal inspection interval.\nSection 6 of API Standard 653 3rd Edition, December 2001\n6.3.1 Routine In-Service Inspections\n6.3.1.1 The external condition of the tank shall be monitored by close visual inspection\nfrom the ground on a routine basis. This inspection may be done by owner/operator\npersonnel, and can be done by other than authorized inspectors as defined in 3.6.\nPersonnel performing this inspection should be knowledgeable of the storage facility\noperations, the tank, and the characteristics of the product stored.\n1 Photographs illustrating the overgrowth on Enbridge’s rights-of-way are found in Exhibit D to the Pipeline\nSafety Violation Report.\n6\n\n\n\n6.3.1.2 The interval of such inspections shall be consistent with conditions at the\nparticular site, but shall not exceed one month.\n6.3.1.3 This routine in-service inspection shall include a visual inspection of the tank’s\nexterior surfaces. Evidence of leaks; shell distortions; signs of settlement; corrosion;\nand condition of the foundation, paint coatings, insulation systems, and appurtenances\nshould be documented for follow-up action by an authorized inspector.\nEnbridge violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.432(b) by failing to adequately inspect the physical\nintegrity of in-service atmospheric and low-pressure steel above-ground breakout tanks\naccording to API Std. 653 (except section 6.4.3, Alternative Internal Inspection Interval).\nSpecifically, Enbridge’s annual inspection records documented deficiencies on three above\nground breakout tanks in Superior, Wisconsin that should have been documented and\naddressed in the company’s monthly pursuant to Enbridge Procedure 09-02-02.\nEnbridge Procedure 09-02-02, dated 05-01-2014, outlines the steps that the company must\ntake to comply with API Standard 653 and 49 C.F.R. § 195.432. Routine monthly inspections\nmust identify the following issues on breakout tanks:\n Leaks on shell, flanges and mixers\n Shell distortions, settlement or heaving, active corrosion, oil or water in tank or on roof\n Foundation condition, paint coatings, floating roof, insulation and appurtenances\nDuring its annual inspection, Enbridge identified issues with three breakout tanks, as\ndescribed in the table below, that should have been addressed in the company’s monthly\ninspections but were not. Enbridge informed PHMSA that further training maybe needed to\ncorrect this matter.\n7\n\n\n\nSuperior Unit\nInspection\nItem\nTank 10 July 2016 Tank 1 August 2016 Tank 12 July 2016\nAnnual Note: Peeling paint on pontoon\ndeck, corrosion on roof leg\nsleeves, ground shunts not in\ncontact with shell, vac\nbreaker leak, bent stair\ntreads.\nRing wall cracks and\nspalls, roof corrosion,\nbent stairs on roof,\nground shunts not in\ncontact with shell,\ncorroded platform stair.\nWater pooling at clean\nout area on E & N sides,\ncavity under roof drain\nvalve, shell paint peeling,\ndamaged stair grating.\nMonthly\nRequired API\n653:\nLeaks\nShell\nDistortions\nSettlement\nCorrosion Missing Missing Foundation Missing Coatings Missing\nInsulation\nMissing\nMissing\nAppurtenances Missing Missing Monthly\nRequired 09-\n02-02\nProcedure:\nMissing\nAbove items\ninclude roof\n8. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) . . .\n(e) Corrective action. You must correct any identified deficiency in corrosion\ncontrol as required by § 195.401(b). However, if the deficiency involves a pipeline\nin an integrity management program under § 195.452, you must correct the\ndeficiency as required by § 195.452(h)\n§195.401 General requirements.\n(a) . . .\n(b) An operator must make repairs on its pipeline system according to the\nfollowing requirements:\n(1) Non Integrity management repairs. Whenever an operator discovers any\ncondition that could adversely affect the safe operation of its pipeline system, it\n8\n\n\n\nmust correct the condition within a reasonable time. However, if the condition is\nof such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard to persons or property, the\noperator may not operate the affected part of the system until it has corrected the\nunsafe condition.\nEnbridge did not correct identified deficiencies in corrosion control within a reasonable time\nas required by § 195.401(b). PHMSA’s records inspection identified that Enbridge did not\ncorrect identified cathodic protection deficiencies to bring structure potentials up to the level\nof \"target potentials\" as defined by the operator within a reasonable time. According to\nEnbridge’s procedures Book 3: Performing CP Surveys - Annual – Sub # 08-03-20,\ndiscovered deficiencies should be corrected prior to the next scheduled inspection.\nDeficiencies were found at the following five locations that were not corrected prior to the\nnext inspection:\nUnit MilePost Description Bay City 678.6230 Target On\nVoltage\n-1.206 2015 On\nReading\n-.769 2016 On\nReading\n-1.18\nC679 Howell\nFacilities CP Valve\n6-SDV-1\n-1.084\nBay City 1628.635 Line 5 Mainline CP -1.443 -1.406 -1.427\nBay City 1734.301 Line 5 Mainline CP -1.047 -.968 -.958\nEscanaba 1571.481 LINE 5 - Mainline\n-1.533 -.924 CP – (Valve\n1571.48-5-V)\nGriffith 341.69 -1.332 -1.236 -1.277\n9. §195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what\ncoating material may I use?\n(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to\nthe atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section.\n(b) Coating material must be suitable for the prevention of atmospheric\ncorrosion.\n(c) Except portions of pipelines in offshore splash zones or soil-to-air interfaces,\nyou need not protect against atmospheric corrosion any pipeline for which you\ndemonstrate by test, investigation, or experience appropriate to the environment\nof the pipeline that corrosion will-\n(1) Only be a light surface oxide; or\n(2) Not affect the safe operation of the pipeline before the next scheduled\ninspection.\n9\n\n\n\nEnbridge failed to provide suitable coating on its pipeline to protect against atmospheric\ncorrosion, as required by 49 C.F.R. § 195.581. Enbridge did not maintain a suitable coating at\nthe following 8 exposed pipe locations identified during PHMSA’s field inspection as shown\nin the field inspection photographs in Exhibit E of the Pipeline Safety Violation Report.\nUnit Pipeline Location Description 1\nMN 1 MP1082\nMN 3 MP820\nMN 2 MP886.953\nMN 3 MP973.7\nMN 2 MP1013\nSuperior 1 MP 1090.22\nEscanaba 5 MP 1456.48\nGriffith 62 MP 66.98\n10. §195.583 What must I do to monitor atmospheric corrosion control?\n(a) You must inspect each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the\natmosphere for evidence of atmospheric corrosion, as follows:\nIf the pipeline is\nlocated:\nThen the frequency of inspection is:\nOnshore At least once every 3 calendar years, but with intervals not exceeding\n39 months.\nOffshore At least once each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths.\n(b) During inspections you must give particular attention to pipe at soil-to-air\ninterfaces, under thermal insulation, under disbonded coatings, at pipe supports,\nin splash zones, at deck penetrations, and in spans over water.\n(c) If you find atmospheric corrosion during an inspection, you must provide\nprotection against the corrosion as required by §195.581.\n§195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric corrosion and what\ncoating material may I use?\n(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to\nthe atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this section.\n(c) Except portions of pipelines in offshore splash zones or soil-to-air interfaces,\nyou need not protect against atmospheric corrosion any pipeline for which you\n10\n\n\n\ndemonstrate by test, investigation, or experience appropriate to the environment\nof the pipeline that corrosion will-\n(1) Only be a light surface oxide; or\n(2) Not affect the safe operation of the pipeline before the next scheduled\ninspection.\ninspection photographs in Exhibit F of the Pipeline Safety Violation Report.\nUnit\nPipeline Location Description 1\nMN\n4\nMP1065.7\nMN\n1\nMP915.141\nMN\n2\nMP915.141\nMN\n3\nMP913\nMN\n2, 1,3\nMP 914\nFort Atkinson\n6\nMP 82\nFort Atkinson\n6\nMP 98\nProposed Civil Penalty\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to\nexceed $209,002 per violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,090,022\nfor a related series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting\ndocumentation involved in the above probable violation(s) and has recommended that you be\npreliminarily assessed a civil penalty of $122,100 as follows:\nItem number\nPENALTY\n1\n$25,200\n2\n$18,900\n$20,300\n00 ur\n$37,000\n$20,700\n11\n\n\n\nProposed Compliance Order\nWith respect to items 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10 pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60118, the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration proposes to issue a Compliance Order to Enbridge\nEnergy, LP. Please refer to the Proposed Compliance Order, which is enclosed and made a\npart of this Notice.\nResponse to this Notice\nEnclosed as part of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline\nOperators in Enforcement Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response\noptions. All material you submit in response to this enforcement action may be made publicly\navailable. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for confidential\ntreatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you must provide\na second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment\nredacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, or request\na hearing under 49 CFR § 190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of receipt of this\nNotice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this Notice and\nauthorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in this\nNotice without further notice to you and to issue a Final Order. If you are responding to this\nNotice, we propose that you submit your correspondence to my office within 30 days from\nreceipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good cause.\nIn your correspondence on this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2020-5009 and, for each\ndocument you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever possible.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosures: Proposed Compliance Order\nResponse Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\nCC: Mr. Dave Stafford, Manager, US Pipeline Compliance, 119 N. 25th Street East,\nSuperior, WI 54880 (david.stafford@enbridge.com)\n12\n\n\n\nPROPOSED COMPLIANCE ORDER\nPursuant to 49 United States Code § 60118, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration (PHMSA) proposes to issue to Enbridge Energy, LP (Enbridge) a Compliance\nOrder incorporating the following remedial requirements to ensure the compliance of Enbridge\nwith the pipeline safety regulations:\n1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. In regard to Item Number 1 of the Notice pertaining to maintaining a means for clearly\nindicating the position of the valves, Enbridge must provide a means of clearly\nindicating the positon of the nine valves and document this effort.\nIn regard to Item Number 3 of the Notice pertaining to providing for a post-accident\nreview of employee activities, Enbridge must conduct and document a post-accident\nreview of employee activities on the pipeline accident that occurred on February 29,\n2016. on the Lakehead system, that were reported to PHMSA on DOT Form 7000-1, to\ndetermine whether the procedures were effective in each emergency and taking\ncorrective action where deficiencies are found. This review and documentation must\ninclude all of the elements in §195.402(e).\nIn regard to Item Number 6 of the Notice pertaining to clearing rights-of-way (ROW) to\nallow for inspection, Enbridge must clear the three ROW areas to allow aerial patrol\nand document this effort, or must patrol the ROW by another method and document the\neffort.\nIn regard to Item Number 7 of the Notice pertaining to inspection of breakout tanks,\nEnbridge must train its employees on procedures for properly conducting monthly\nbreakout tank inspections. Documentation of this training must also be made.\nIn regard to Item 9 of the Notice pertaining to suitable atmospheric coating on the\npipeline, Enbridge must remediate the coating at the 8 locations identified and\ndocument the action taken.\nIn regard to Item 10 of the Notice pertaining to maintaining coating at soil-to-air\ninterfaces, Enbridge must remediate the coating at the 7 locations identified and\ndocument the action taken.\nEnbridge must complete the compliance items 1 thought 6 above within 180 days of\nreceiving the Final Order and provide documentation to Greg Ochs, Director, Central\nRegion, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that Enbridge maintain documentation of the safety\nimprovement costs associated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the\ntotal to Greg Ochs, Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration. It is requested that these costs be reported in two categories: 1)\n13\n\n\n\ntotal cost associated with preparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and\nanalyses, and 2) total cost associated with replacements, additions and other changes to\npipeline infrastructure.\n14\n\n320205009_Closure Letter_12222021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: michael.koby@enbridge.com and\ndavid.stafford@enbridge.com\nDecember 22, 2021\nMichael Koby\nVice President, US Operations\nEnbridge Energy, LP\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, Texas 77056\nCPF 3-2020-5009-NOPV\nDear Mr. Koby:\nOn August 9, 2021 the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to Enbridge Energy, LP a Final Order that made findings of violations, assessed a\nreduced civil penalty of $98,900, and specified actions to be taken by Enbridge Energy, LP in\norder to comply with the pipeline safety regulationsin the above-referenced case. On August\n30, 2021, Enbridge Energy, LP filed its Petition for Reconsideration. On December 21, 2021,\nPHMSA issued its Decision on the Petition for Reconsideration granting Respondent’s\nPetition, in part, by withdrawing the disputed statement from the Final Order. The Final Order\nincluded a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty assessment requirement.\nBased on our review of the documentation you provided, and your Payment of Penalty on\nAugust 31, 2021, it has been determined that Enbridge Energy, LP has complied with the terms\nof the Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Mr. Dave Stafford, Manager, US Pipeline Compliance (david.stafford@enbridge.com)\n\n320205009_Final Order_08092021_(17-158844S)_text.pdf\n\nAugust 9, 2021\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: michael.koby@enbridge.com\nMichael Koby\nVice President, U.S. Operations\nEnbridge Energy, LP\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, Texas 77056\nRe: CPF No. 3-2020-5009\nDear Mr. Koby:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It withdraws one of\nthe allegations of violation, makes other findings of violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of\n$98,900, and specifies actions that need to be taken by Enbridge Energy, LP to comply with the\npipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When\nthe civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance order completed, as determined\nby the Director, Central Region, this enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final\nOrder by electronic mail is effective upon the date of transmission as provided under 49 C.F.R.\n§ 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Gregory Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. David Stafford, Manager, U.S. Pipeline Compliance, Enbridge Energy, LP,\ndavid.stafford@enbridge.com\nCONFIMRATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\nIn the Matter of )\nEnbridge Energy, LP, )\n)\n)\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nCPF No. 3-2020-5009\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom January 16, 2018 through July 20, 2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of\nthe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety\n(OPS), conducted an on-site pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of Enbridge\nEnergy, LP (Enbridge or Respondent) for the Lakehead and Flanagan systems in North Dakota,\nWisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana, and New York. Enbridge Energy, LP\nis a subsidiary of Enbridge, Inc., and operates over 4,000 miles of pipeline across those states.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated November 19, 2020, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and\nProposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice\nproposed finding that Enbridge had committed ten violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195 and proposed\nassessing a civil penalty of $122,100 for the alleged violations. The Notice also proposed\nordering Respondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations.\nAfter requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Enbridge responded to the Notice\nby letter dated January 19, 2021 (Response). Enbridge contested several of the allegations,\noffered additional information in response to the Notice, and requested that the proposed civil\npenalty be reduced. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has waived its right to\none.\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.116(e), which states:\n§ 195.116 Valves.\nEach valve installed in a pipeline system must comply with the\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2020-5009\nPage 2\nfollowing:\n(a) . . .\n(e) Each valve other than a check valve must be equipped with a means\nfor clearly indicating the position of the valve (open, closed, etc.).\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.116(e) by failing to maintain a\nmeans for clearly indicating the position of the valves. Specifically, the Notice alleged that nine\nof Enbridge’s valves noted below were identified by PHMSA’s field inspections as not having\nclear means of indicating the valve position. The identified protectors were not transparent due\nto smoke coloring or grease preventing clear indication of the valve stem position.\nUnit Valve Comments\nBay City 532.74-6V Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City 536.42-6-V Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City 576.92-6-V Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City 607.62 Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City 638.45-6-V Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City 576.82-6-V Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City 6-UD-V-21 Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City SK-6-SV-3 Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nBay City 6-TBV-2 Valve stem cover smoke colored, can’t see valve stem.\nIn its Response, Enbridge contested the allegation. First, Enbridge stated that the valve at 6-UD-\nV-21 is “located indoors and appears to have been inadvertently included.” Second, with regard\nto the remaining valves, Enbridge stated that “the position of the valve stems for each referenced\nvalve can be seen, clearly indicating whether it is in the open or closed position” and could be\n“determined by observing the visible light passing through the cover on either side of the\nthreaded valve stems.” Third, Enbridge argued the “valve protectors remain transparent” and\nprovided photographs in support. Fourth, Enbridge stated that the standard cited above is a\n“design standard, not an operating and maintenance standard, which calls for the installation of\ntransparent valve stem protectors” while design standards do not. Finally, Enbridge stated that it\nis “axiomatic” that discoloration will occur, that it is “acceptable,” and that it “does not prevent\noperator personnel from seeing the valve stem and determining the position of each valve stem.”\nAfter considering the additional information and explanations provided by Enbridge, I agree that\nthe valve at 6-UD-V-21 did not exhibit smoky discoloration and was equipped with a means for\nclearly indicating the position of the valve. Therefore, this alleged instance of violation should\nbe withdrawn. However, with regard to the remaining valves, I disagree with Respondent. The\nevidence shows the remaining eight valves did have discoloration that inhibited the ability to\ndetermine the valve position. Respondent’s contention that § 195.116(e) did not require valve\nstem protectors to remain clear after installation is not a position I find supported by the text of\nthe regulation, which states that each valve installed in a pipeline system “must be equipped with\na means for clearly indicating the position of the valve.” Accordingly, even a properly installed\nvalve would cease to be in compliance if it no longer has means for clearly indicating the valve\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2020-5009\nPage 3\nposition.1 While it may be “axiomatic” that some discoloration will occur, excess discoloration\nthat prevents a clear indication of valve position does not comply with the regulation. In the\nDirector’s written evaluation of the response material pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), the Director\nnoted that the photos provided by Enbridge were taken “right next to the valve stem” and that in\npractice the stem may be located on an elevated platform away from Enbridge personnel. As a\nresult, the photographs fail to show that there is a means for clearly indicating the position of the\nvalve. The Director also noted that PHMSA representatives observed Enbridge personnel\nremoving valve stem covers during the day to observe the valve position because the smoky\ndiscoloration inhibited their view.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence and the legal issues presented, I find that\n","truncated":true,"body_characters":75846}