{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320205010W","title":"ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2020-11-20","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 195.401(b)(1), 195.402(a), 195.402(c)(3), 195.404(a)(3), 195.404(c)(3), 195.410(a)(1), 195.410(c), 195.428(a), 195.452(h)(2), 195.505(b), 195.505(c), 195.573(c), 195.589(a)(3).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320205010w.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320205010w.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320205010w","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320205010W","body":"Warning Letter involving ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.401(b)(1),  195.402(a),  195.402(c)(3),  195.404(a)(3),  195.404(c)(3),  195.410(a)(1),  195.410(c),  195.428(a),  195.452(h)(2),  195.505(b),  195.505(c),  195.573(c),  195.589(a)(3). The case was opened on 2020-11-20 and is reported as closed as of 2020-11-20. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320205010W_Warning Letter_11202020.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205010W/320205010W_Warning%20Letter_11202020.pdf\n\n320205010W_Warning Letter_11202020_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320205010W/320205010W_Warning%20Letter_11202020_text.pdf\n\n320205010W_Warning Letter_11202020_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: david.stafford@enbridge.com\nNovember 20, 2020\nMr. Michael Koby\nVice President US Operations\nEnbridge Energy, LP\n5400 Westheimer Ct.\nHouston, Texas 77056\nmichael.koby@enbridge.com and\nCPF 3-2020-5010W\nDear Mr. Koby:\nFrom January 16 through July 20, 2018, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code\n(U.S.C.) inspected Enbridge Energy LP’s Lakehead hazardous liquid pipeline system assets\nlocated in North Dakota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois and Ohio.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probable violation of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items\ninspected and the probable violations are:\n\n\n\n1. §195.401 General requirements.\n(a) . . .\n(b) An operator must make repairs on its pipeline system according to the\nfollowing requirements:\n(1) Non Integrity management repairs. Whenever an operator discovers any\ncondition that could adversely affect the safe operation of its pipeline system,\nit must correct the condition within a reasonable time. However, if the\ncondition is of such a nature that it presents an immediate hazard to persons\nor property, the operator may not operate the affected part of the system until\nit has corrected the unsafe condition.\nEnbridge failed to demonstrate how the tank repair issues at the Superior Terminal, which\ncould adversely affect the safe operation of the pipeline system, were corrected in a reasonable\ntime according to in accordance with §195.401(b)(1). With regard to Tank 12 at Enbridge’s\nSuperior Terminal, Enbridge did not correct the standing water issue as noted during the\ncompany’s 2014, 2016, and 2017 annual inspections. Enbridge indicate that construction\nwork results in many areas of ground disturbance, but that a budget submission has been made\nfor its 2019 planning cycle to repair this issue. With regard to Tank 18 at the Superior\nTerminal, a 2015 external inspection resulted in a recommendation of removal of soil in\ncontact with the tank bottom and regrade for water drainage as noted in report section 4.1. In\nresponse, Enbridge indicated that it would be conducting a survey of the tank pads using\ndrone technology in early 2019, and any tank pad corrective actions for Tank 18 that were\nidentified via the survey would be completed soon after.\n2. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall\nbe reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted.\n(c) Maintenance and normal operations. The manual required by paragraph (a)\nof this section must include procedures for the following to provide safety during\nmaintenance and normal operations:\n(1) . . .\n(3) Operating, maintaining, and repairing the pipeline system in accordance with\neach of the requirements of this subpart and subpart H of this part.\n\n\n\nEnbridge failed to follow its procedural manual for operating and maintaining the relief valves\non its pipeline. Specifically, Enbridge did not follow its procedure 03-07-03, which requires\nadjusting pressure safety valves (PSV) if the device is outside 2% of the design setpoint.\nBased upon the inspection of records in Enbridge’s Maximo database, a PSV (FN-203-PSV-\n21) was tested on 6-23-17 and found to relieve at 611 psig rather than the design tag setpoint\nof 654 psig. This reading is approximately 6.6% below the design setpoint. The Enbridge\ntechnician indicated he was told not to adjust the PSV setpoint but no explanation was\ndocumented, therefore, Enbridge failed to follow its procedure.\n3. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall\nbe reviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, and appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is\neffective. This manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline\nsystem commence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where\noperations and maintenance activities are conducted\n§195.404 Maps and Records.\n(c) Each operator shall maintain the following records for the periods specified;\n(1) . . .\n(3) A record of each inspection and test required by this subpart shall be\nmaintained for at least 2 years or until the next inspection or test is performed,\nwhichever is longer.\n§195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall, at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year, or in the\ncase of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at intervals not to exceed 7½\nmonths, but at least twice each calendar year, inspect and test each pressure\nlimiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control\nequipment to determine that it is functioning properly, is in good mechanical\ncondition, and is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of\noperation for the service in which it is used.\nEnbridge failed to follow its procedures and failed to maintain records of the inspection and\ntest performed on its overpressure protection devices. Enbridge’s records of inspection in\n2016 and 2017 listed below were deficient as they did not note pressure settings and\nexplanations of actions taken or findings of the devices. Specifically, Enbridge did not record\nas found and as left pressures when performing inspection and testing of overpressure\nprotection devices as demonstrated in a review of a sample set of records from all units from\n\n\n\n2014 to 2017 and as required by Step 10 of Enbridge’s PSV procedure 03-07-03, effective\ndate October 1, 2015.\nPSV # Test Date Deficiency Noted\nFN-201-PSV-18 6-22-17 Enbridge recorded the as found pressure but\nnot the as left as no changes were made.\nEnbridge did not record as left pressure nor\nsetpoint relief pressure.\nFN-201-PSV-62 6-20-17 FN-201-PSV-62 7-29-16 The record shows a relief pressure of 303\npsi and an as left of 219 psi with no\nexplanation for the large discrepancy\nbetween as found and as left.\n4. §195.404 Maps and records.\n(a) Each operator shall maintain current maps and records of its pipeline systems\nthat include at least the following information:\n(1) . . . .\n(3) A record of each inspection and test required by this subpart shall be\nmaintained for at least 2 years or until the next inspection or test is performed,\nwhichever is longer.\n§195.430 Firefighting equipment.\nEach operator shall maintain adequate firefighting equipment at each pump\nstation and breakout tank area. The equipment must be-\n(a) In proper operating condition at all times;\nEnbridge failed to maintain annual inspection records of its fire extinguishers. The following\ntable lists the missing annual fire extinguisher inspection records from a sample set of about\n210 extinguisher records out of a total of 1,800 at the Lakehead system. This is based on a\nreview of the Maximo record for the 210 samples and Enbridge’s response to a data request\nmade the week of May 7, 2018, confirming these records are missing. Due to the missing\nrecords, it is uncertain whether Enbridge performed the annual inspections of its firefighting\nequipment as required by its procedure.\nFire Extinguisher No. 2014 Annual Inspection Records Missing\n(Based on data response from the week of May 7-11, 2018)\n2015 2016 2017\nGC 850 Fire 2 X\nGO 850 fire 7 X X\nGT 850 fire 5256 X\nIN 850 Fire 14 X X\n\n\n\nIR 850 fire 3 X\nIR 850 fire 5 X\nIR 850 fire 6 X\nMA 850 fire 4 X X\nMV 850 fire 07 X\nMV 850 fire 09 X\nNA 850 fire 2 X X\n5. §195.410 Line markers.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator shall place\nand maintain line markers over each buried pipeline in accordance with the\nfollowing:\n(1) Markers must be located at each public road crossing, at each railroad\ncrossing, and in sufficient number along the remainder of each buried line so that\nits location is accurately known.\n(c) Each operator shall provide line marking at locations where the line is above\nground in areas that are accessible to the public.\nEnbridge failed to maintain line markers at mile post (MP) 26.535 / Toledo Unit along its Line\n79. Line 79 is a buried line that traverses directly under populated residential area near MP\n26.535. The line markers placed at the public road crossing are not visible to the populated\narea since the public road along with the markers lie at a lower ground. Additionally, the\npipeline markers do not appear to be placed near the populated area and along the remainder\nof the buried line in order to ensure that its location is accurately known to the public.\n6. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?\n(1) . . .\n(2) Discovery of condition. Discovery of a condition occurs when an operator has\nadequate information about the condition to determine that the condition presents a\npotential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. An operator must promptly, but no later\nthan 180 days after an integrity assessment, obtain sufficient information about a\ncondition to make that determination, unless the operator can demonstrate that the 180-\nday period is impracticable.\nEnbridge did not promptly, but no later than 180 days after an integrity assessment, obtain\nsufficient information about the condition to make a determination that the condition presents\na potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. Specifically, for Enbridge’s Minnesota Unit\nLine 3, which is located in a high consequence area, in-line inspection tools run between 2014\nand 2017 discovered 11 anomalies on the line. Of the 11, two were over the 180 discovery\ndate. One was at 182 days and the other at 194 days. The digs were classed as 180 day digs.\n\n\n\nEnbridge indicated that it was developing software to better flag an overage issue pertaining to\ndiscovery with an anticipated implementation of October 2018.\n7. §195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The\nprogram shall include provisions to:\n(a) . . .\n(b) Ensure through evaluation that individuals performing covered tasks are\nqualified;\n(c) Allow individuals that are not qualified pursuant to this subpart to perform a\ncovered task if directed and observed by an individual that is qualified;\nEnbridge did not follow its written operator qualification program. Specifically, three\nindividuals performed covered task 88 “In-Service Valve Repair” on September 20, 2017,\nunder observation of one qualified individual which was beyond the span-of-control of 1:2 as\nstated in the Enbridge employee covered task list version 7-28-17. This was discovered as a\nresult of a review of Maximo inspection records and operator data responses.\n8. §195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\nDevice\nRectifier\nReverse current switch\n(a) . . .\n(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper\nperformance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the second\ncolumn.\nCheck frequency\nAt least six times each calendar year, but\nwith intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months\nDiode\nInterference bond whose failure would\njeopardize structural protection\nOther interference bond\nAt least once each calendar year, but with\nintervals not exceeding 15 months.\nEnbridge failed to monitor interference bonds for proper performance at least six times per\nyear, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months on critical bonds. Enbridge failed to test\nthe following bond at the required intervals in the Griffith unit:\n Critical Bond -N Side of 2000: Enbridge was unable to provide any data or record\ndemonstrating that it performed a reading between December 2016 and June 17, 2017.\nA critical bond at this location is required to be read six times each year, with intervals\nnot to exceed 2 ½months.\n\n\n\n9. §195.589 What corrosion control information do I have to maintain?\n(a) You must maintain current records or maps to show the location of—\n(1) . . . .\n(3) Neighboring structures bonded to cathodic protection systems.\nEnbridge failed to maintain records or maps to show the accurate location of corrosion control\nbonds. Enbridge had the bonds on Line 62 (Hartford Terminal / Griffith Unit) noted in its\nrecords, but these bonds could not be located during OPS’ field inspection. Since the Line 62\nbonds with TEPPCO and BP were not marked, cathodic protection readings were not taken.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$209,002 per violation per day the violation persists up to a maximum of $2,090,022 for a\nrelated series of violations. We have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents\ninvolved in this case, and have decided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty\nassessment proceedings at this time. We advise you to correct the item(s) identified in this\nletter. Failure to do so will result in Enbridge Energy, LP being subject to additional\nenforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer\nto CPF 3-2020-5010W. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this\nenforcement action is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion\nof your responsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along\nwith the complete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with\nthe portions you believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why\nyou believe the redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C.\n552(b).\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nCopy: Dave Stafford, Manager, US Pipeline Compliance, 119 N. 25th Street East,\nSuperior, WI 54880 david.stafford@enbridge.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":15587}