{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32021017WL","title":"TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC — Warning Letter","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2021-04-09","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED warning letter citing 192.631(e)(4), 192.631(g)(2), 192.631(h), 192.631(j)(1).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32021017wl.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32021017wl.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32021017wl","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32021017WL","body":"Warning Letter involving TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 192.631(e)(4),  192.631(g)(2),  192.631(h),  192.631(j)(1). The case was opened on 2021-04-09 and is reported as closed as of 2021-04-09. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32021017WL_Warning Letter_04092021_(20-173061).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021017WL/32021017WL_Warning%20Letter_04092021_(20-173061).pdf\n\n32021017WL_Warning Letter_04092021_(20-173061)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021017WL/32021017WL_Warning%20Letter_04092021_(20-173061)_text.pdf\n\n32021017WL_Warning Letter_04092021_(20-173061)_text.pdf\n\nWARNING LETTER\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: stan.horton@bwpipelines.com, dick.keyser@bwpipelines.com\nApril 9, 2021\nStanley C. Horton\nPresident, CEO\nTexas Gas Transmission, LLC\n9 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2800\nHouston, TX 77066\nCPF 3-2021-017-WL\nDear Mr. Horton:\nFrom June 15 through June 19, 2020, a representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United States Code (U.S.C.)\ninspected your subsidiary, Texas Gas Transmission, LLC’s (Texas Gas), Control Room\nManagement Program procedures and records in Owensboro, KY. Texas Gas Tranmsission is\nthe primary for the CRM Safety Program Relationship which supports the following OPID’s:\n31278 Texas Gas Pipeline Company, 39210 Boardwalk Storage Services , 39470 Louisiana\nEnergy and Power Authority. The inspection was conducted remotely.\nAs a result of the inspection, it is alleged that you have committed probably violations of the\nPipeline Safety Regulations, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The items inspected\nand the probable violations are:\n\n\n\n1. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review\nduring inspection:\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this\nsection; and\nTexas Gas Point to Point (P2P) verification records were insufficient to demonstrate compliance\nwith the regulation because they did not provide details to demonstrate thoroughness of the\npoint-to-point verification. Section 192.631(c)(2) requires operators to “[c]onduct a point-to-\npoint verification between SCADA displays and related field equipment when field equipment is\nadded or moved and when other changes that affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment\nor SCADA displays.” Texas Gas presented for inspection electronic point to point records for\nGreenville Point to Point Verification (2012), Columbia Point To Point Verification (2012),\nGS024327-CB-NGPL-ControlWave-24328 GS024347-CB-Transco-ControlWave-24348 and\nTG009910/TG 9910 Lepa VLV 18 Stat.\nThe record presented for GS024327-CB-NGPL-ControlWave-24328 (2017-2019) provided a\ncover sheet with technical and mapping information for the RTU. It also provided notes related\nto the site from May 19, 2017 to February 26, 2019. These notes relate to different work or\nprojects related to the facility and associated equipment. The excel document contains 5 tabs:\nInfo, Analogs, Status, Analog-Verify and Status-Verify. The information on the tabs list the\nsignal description, Modbus register and SCADA Tag Name, but not with a consistent layout\nbetween the tabs. There is a column that is labeled “checked out with field” where only an X is\nplaced in the cell. There is no indication of what the Control Room HMI displayed and the\nrelated field end device. There are also columns related to Limits for alarming which provided\nno documentation for the validation check, nor actual field outcome except for one entry for\nChromatograph Stream 1’s GPM, which was not checked out. Similar results were found for\nrecord GS024347-CB-Transco-ControlWave-24348. The record related to TG009910 point to\npoint for an “added remote valve 18”, is a completely different excel file form. The tab labeled\nGeneral has a date at the top of the form as 7/21/2017 and it indicates the verification date was\n4/17/19.\nA summary of the items reviewed provide the following: In the Analogue Verify and Status\nVerify there were columns to document the field value or status and the SCADA value or status,\nthese were either blank or had an X. Additionally, the column with the tag description was\ncolored green. When asked what, this meant, the answer was that they assumed it had been\nchecked. There were columns for alarm limits that were blank and dates for the checkout were\neither not provided or provided in an undiscernible manner. The procedure was reviewed with\nthe team to try to relate completing the form with the procedure and the responses were vague.\nThe P2P procedure, when done in a thorough manner, should include information to verify a\nmatch between the field device and the HMI SCADA values or status, the individuals involved\nin the test, the limits established for the points and that they presented as alarms as designed\n2\n\n\n\n(correct value, message, priority, priority color, safety related, audible alert, etc.) and any\ncomments related to that point. There should also be verification that the point responded\nconsistently on each screen where it has been designed to present. The records of P2P were not\nthorough to provide such documentation.\n2. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) …\n(4) Review the alarm management plan required by this paragraph at least once\neach calendar year, but at intervals not exceeding 15 months, to determine the\neffectiveness of the plan;\nTexas Gas reviews of the alarm management plan for 2017, 2018 and 2019 were insufficient to\ndemonstrate adequate implementation of the operator’s process and to demonstrate compliance\nwith the regulation in determining the effectiveness of the plan.\nTexas Gas presented for inspection form WI 06610 BWP Alarm Management Plan Review for\n2017, 2018 and 2019. The document provided 4 statements of review, with no back up\ndocumentation as to what was reviewed. Each document was signed and dated which also\nincluded a brief comment. The review provided no discernable content nor criteria to determine\nany level of effectiveness of the plan. Simply stating the plan is effective is not adequate.\nDifferent documents were provided for 2018 and 2019 than 2017, but similar in nature.\n3. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(g) Operating experience. Each operator must assure that lessons learned from its\noperating experience are incorporated, as appropriate, into its control room\nmanagement procedures by performing each of the following:\n(1) . . . .\n(2) Include lessons learned from the operator's experience in the training program\nrequired by this section.\nTexas Gas failed to document lessons learned training and review when they were delivered to\ncontrollers. Texas Gas did develop lessons learned, after a variety of events, and indicated they\ndelivered them to the controllers for discussion and review. However, they were not able to\nprovide records in any format to validate the lesson was delivered, reviewed and acknowledged\nby the controller. Lessons learned is required to be part of the training content and therefore,\nwhen delivered to a controller the lesson needs to be recorded.\n3\n\n\n\nBoardwalk provided a response and indicated that going forward, they will assign Lessons\nLearned to Controllers through its online Learning Management System (“LMS”) so that a\ntraining roster can be created to provide better documentation.\nThe result of insufficient review and documentation stems from the procedure for the annual\nalarm review lacking substance in criteria, content, conclusions. There are no metrics for\ndetermination of effectiveness. Simply stating a plan, with no reference for that determination is\nnot adequate nor acceptable.\n4. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(h) Training. Each operator must establish a controller training program and\nreview the training program content to identify potential improvements at least\nonce each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. An operator's\nprogram must provide for training each controller to carry out the roles and\nresponsibilities defined by the operator. In addition, the training program must\ninclude the following elements:\nTexas Gas ’s annual review of the training program were insufficient to demonstrate adequate\nimplementation of the operator’s process and to demonstrate compliance with the regulation in\nreviewing the training program content to identify potential improvements.\nTexas Gas presented for inspection form WI 06616 BWP Training Program Review for the\nyears 2017, 2018 and 2019. The form for 2017 was different in style, but very similar in content.\nThe 2017 form consisted of 3 statements dates, signature and 5 comments related to changes that\nhave been made to the training content. The 2018 and 2019 documents provided responses of\nYes or No to 5 questions with no comments in 2018 and a simple statement in 2019. There is no\nback up documentation to substantiate any of the responses or comments.\nAn example of the lack of back up documentation for a question rendering a response of Yes or\nNo is “Was the overall effectiveness of the Training Program reviewed?”; answer yes. “Were\nany changes necessary to improve Controller performance?”; answer no. The follow up question\nbegs: what was reviewed, who reviewed it why was this relative to training, how is effectiveness\nmeasured, were controllers surveyed, was all content reviewed or just a sample. Without the\ndetails, there is no relevance to the review exercise. A good review process lays out a process\nthat asks questions about content and performance, provides objective responses and findings\nthat are relevant to those outcomes. Texas Gas failed to provide sufficient evidence of review to\ndemonstrate adequate implementation of the operator’s process for annual training content\nreview.\n4\n\n\n\n5. § 192.631 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\ninspection:\n(j) Compliance and deviations. An operator must maintain for review during\n(1) Records that demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this section; and\nTexas Gas failed to provide records for 2018 and 2019 that sufficiently demonstrated that they\ntested and verified their internal communication plan to provide adequate means for manual\noperation of the pipeline safely, at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15\nmonths. Section §192.631(c)(3) requires operators to “test and verify an internal communication\nplan to provide adequate means for manual operation of the pipeline safely, at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months. Under §192.631(j)(1), Boardwalk is\nrequired to keep these records for review during inspection.\nOver the course of the inspection, three different sets of records were provided as evidence of\ncompliance with the 2018 and 2019 internal communication plan tests and verification\nrequirement. The first set of records provided were blank logs with dates of purported tests, but\nwith no actual test information or signatures to verify that tests had been performed as required.\nThe second set of records were emails that provided notification of the upcoming internal\ncommunication manual test to operator personnel for the dates provided in the first set of\nrecords. The third set of records were emails and operator log entries of actual SCADA outage\nevents that were managed in the control room, but with no associated verbiage in the log that\nindicated personnel had been dispatched to the field to call in periodic readings to the\ncontroller. There was also no log recording the field data in this third set of records. Under Texas\nGas ’s Control Room Management (CRM) plan, actual events can be considered a test in place of\na drill or exercise. Section 4.5 of the CRM plan references another Texas Gas procedure titled\n“Risk of Failures and the Problem Resolution Items 3 and 4 of the Gas Control Business\nContinuation Plan (GCBCP), October 17, 2019” as the guiding document for the manual\noperation of the pipeline in the event of loss of SCADA or communications. Per this\nprocedure, \"Gas Control will record this information in the Emergency Ledger Sheets (Exhibit F),\nanalyze it, and provide direction to Operations.\" (emphasis added).\nSection 4.5, “Internal Communication Plan”, of the CRM plan provides in relevant part as follows:\n\"The test shall ensure the equipment is working properly as designed and\nthat employees are familiar with how communications may be conducted.\nFunctions that must be verified during testing include, but are not limited to, (1)\ncommunication between and among operational and maintenance personnel using\nvoice, fax, messaging, radio, etc., and (2) communication of pipeline operational\ndata such as dial-in polling of field equipment, manually reading gauges and field\ninstrumentation, etc.\"\nTexas Gas equates the Internal Communication Plan to a \"local control plan\", which is referenced\nin Texas Gas procedure GCBCP, and provides in relevant part as follows:\n5\n\n\n\n\"Should the local control plan be put in effect, Operations will monitor critical\nlocations (Exhibit B) on the pipeline. Critical information identified in the Gas\nControl Local Control Plan will be accumulated and communicated by Operations\nto Gas Control via the most efficient mode of communication available at least\nevery 2 hours. Should the satellite phone be the most efficient mode of\ncommunication available, Operations will gather and be prepared to communicate\nto Gas Control the specified data contained in the Emergency Ledger Sheets\n(Exhibit F).\"\nThe evidence of actual events as the test and verification required by §192.631(c)(3), provided in\nthe third set of records submitted by Texas Gas , did not include the Exhibit F Emergency Ledger\nSheets. When asked why there were not Emergency Ledger Sheets provided, Texas Gas stated\nthat it did not execute the Local Control Plan during the actual events test, and Texas Gas\nprocedures require use of the Exhibit F form only when the Local Control Plan is executed.\nThe 2018 and 2019 actual event records provided for verification of a test of the internal\ncommunications manual operation plan test do not qualify as an acceptable test because Section\n4.5, “Internal Communication Plan”, of the CRM plan establishes functions that must be verified\nduring testing as: (1) communication between and among operational and maintenance personnel\nusing voice, fax, messaging, radio, etc.; and (2) communication of pipeline operational data such\nas dial-in polling of field equipment, manually reading gauges and field instrumentation,\netc. Because Texas Gas did not execute the Local Control Plan they did not fulfill the functional\nrequirement defined in number 2. Therefore, no test can be counted through the actual\nevents. Additionally, no other records could be provided for any tests in 2018 or 2019 that verified\nthe functional requirements of a valid test.\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, you are subject to a civil penalty not to exceed\n$218,647 per violation per day the violation persists, up to a maximum of $2,186,465 for a\nrelated series of violations. For violation occurring on or after November 27, 2018 and before\nJuly 31, 2019, the maximum penalty may not exceed $213,268 per violation per day, with a\nmaximum penalty not to exceed $2,132,679. For violation occurring on or after November 2,\n2015 and before November 27, 2018, the maximum penalty may not exceed $209,002 per\nviolation per day, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,090,022. For violations occurring\nprior to November 2, 2015, the maximum penalty may not exceed $200,000 per violation per\nday, with a maximum penalty not to exceed $2,000,000 for a related series of violations.\nWe have reviewed the circumstances and supporting documents involved in this case, and have\ndecided not to conduct additional enforcement action or penalty assessment proceedings at this\ntime. We advise you to correct the item(s) identified in this letter. Failure to do so will result in\nTexas Gas Transmission being subject to additional enforcement action.\nNo reply to this letter is required. If you choose to reply, in your correspondence please refer to\nCPF 3-2021-017-WL. Be advised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement\naction is subject to being made publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your\n6\n\n\n\nresponsive material qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the\ncomplete original document you must provide a second copy of the document with the portions\nyou believe qualify for confidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe\nthe redacted information qualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Richard Keyser, Sr. VP Operations dick.keyser@bwpipelines.com\n7","truncated":false,"body_characters":17324}