{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 32021052NOPV","title":"NST EXPRESS LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2021-06-15","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.262(c), 195.406(a)(3), 195.406(b), 195.420(b), 195.428(a), 195.446(c)(2), 195.446(e)(3), 195.452(b)(2), 195.452(g)(3), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(l)(1)(ii), 195.573(c).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32021052nopv.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32021052nopv.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-32021052nopv","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32021052NOPV","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving NST EXPRESS LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.262(c),  195.406(a)(3),  195.406(b),  195.420(b),  195.428(a),  195.446(c)(2),  195.446(e)(3),  195.452(b)(2),  195.452(g)(3),  195.452(i)(3),  195.452(l)(1)(ii),  195.573(c). The case was opened on 2021-06-15 and is reported as closed as of 2023-03-31. Proposed civil penalty: $687,100. Assessed civil penalty: $560,700. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n32021052NOPV_Closure Letter_03312022_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Closure%20Letter_03312022_(21-211419).pdf\n\n32021052NOPV_Closure Letter_03312022_(21-211419)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Closure%20Letter_03312022_(21-211419)_text.pdf\n\n32021052NOPV_Final Order_09192022_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Final%20Order_09192022_(21-211419).pdf\n\n32021052NOPV_Final Order_09192022_(21-211419)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Final%20Order_09192022_(21-211419)_text.pdf\n\n32021052NOPV_Operator Response to Notice_08102021_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_08102021_(21-211419).pdf\n\n32021052NOPV_PCP PCO_06152021_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_PCP%20PCO_06152021_(21-211419).pdf\n\n32021052NOPV_PCP PCO_06152021_(21-211419)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_PCP%20PCO_06152021_(21-211419)_text.pdf\n\n32021052NOPV_Closure Letter_03312022_(21-211419)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: mhummel@northstarmidstream.com,\ntchadwick@northstarmidstream.com, pbautista@northstarmidstream.com\nMarch 31, 2023\nMcMillan Hummel\nChief Executive Officer\nNorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC\n10077 Grogans Mill Road Suite 530\nThe Woodlands, Texas 77380\nRE: CPF No. 3-2021-052-NOPV\nDear Mr. Hummel:\nOn September 19, 2022, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)\nissued to NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC’s subsidiary, NorthStar Midstream’s (NST), a Final\nOrder in the above-referenced case. This Order included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty\nassessment. Based on our review of the documentation provided and confirmation of payment of\nthe civil penalty on September 26, 2022, it has been determined that NST has complied with the\nterms of this Order.\nAccordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the\nmatters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Tara Chadwick – tchadwick@northstarmidstream.com\nPablo Bautista – pbautista@northstarmidstream.com\n\n32021052NOPV_Final Order_09192022_(21-211419)_text.pdf\n\nSeptember 19, 2022\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: mhummel@northstarmidstream.com\nMr. McMillan Hummel\nChief Executive Officer\nNorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC\n10077 Grogans Mill Road, Suite 530\nThe Woodlands, Texas 77380\nRe: CPF No. 3-2021-052-NOPV\nDear Mr. Hummel:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $560,700, and specifies actions that need to be\ntaken by NST Express, LLC to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty\npayment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the\nterms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this\nenforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the\ndate of transmission and acknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Jon Hamel, Senior Vice President, Engineering, NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC,\njhamel@northstarmidstream.com\nMr. Benjamin Rhem, Outside Counsel for NST Express, Jackson Walker L.L.P.,\nbrhem@jw.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nNST Express, LLC, ) CPF No. 3-2021-052-NOPV\na subsidiary of )\nNorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC, )\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nOn various dates between January 2018 and September 2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a\nrepresentative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office\nof Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted a pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of\nNST Express, LLC’s (NST or Respondent) crude oil pipeline system between East Fairview and\nAlexander, North Dakota. NST Express, LLC is a subsidiary of NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC.\nNST operates 23.6 miles of 12.75-inch O.D. pipeline from its Alexander Station to its East\nFairview Station. The system includes two automated river protection valves, one mainline\nvalve, an interconnect location, and two bi-directional pig traps.1\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated June 15, 2021, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and\nProposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice\nproposed finding that NST committed eight violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, proposed assessing\na civil penalty of $687,100 for the alleged violations, and proposed ordering Respondent to take\ncertain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also included an additional four\nwarning items pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, which warned the operator to correct the\nprobable violations or face possible future enforcement action\nNST requested, and on June 25, 2021, PHMSA granted an extension to respond to the Notice.\nNST responded to the Notice by letter dated August 10, 2021 (Response). The Central Region\nissued its Region Recommendation on December 23, 2021. On January 10, 2022, NST\nsubmitted a reply to the Region Recommendation (Reply). NST contested several of the\nallegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and requested that the\nproposed civil penalty be reduced. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has\nwaived its right to one.\n1 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (June 15, 2021) (on file with PHMSA), at 1.\n\n\n\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.262(c), which states:\n§ 195.262 Pumping equipment.\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Each safety device must be tested under conditions approximating\nactual operations and found to function properly before the pumping station\nmay be used.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.262(c) by failing to test and\ndetermine that pumping station safety devices were functioning properly prior to operation.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that seven safety devices for pumping stations located at East\nFairview (three devices) and Alexander Station (four devices) were not functioning properly\nbefore November 16, 2016, the date when the commodity was introduced to the pipeline.\nThe Notice further alleged, based on a review of NST’s records dated October 3, 2018, and the\nassociated work orders #ST120222 (East Fairview Station) and #ST120221 (Alexander Station),\nthat the fire, Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S), and Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) detectors did not sound\nany alarms or shutdowns. The Notice alleged that as of October 16, 2018, the condition had not\nbeen corrected at the local facility or at the Remote Operations Center.\nIn its Response, NST stated that all testing of the East Fairview and Alexander Station pumping\nstation safety devices was completed prior to being placed into service in March 2017.2 NST\nstated that it concluded commissioning activities, including final check out, prior to placing the\npumps into service. NST stated that it included the records of the testing, conducted on February\n4, 2017, and satisfactory results in Attachment A to its Response. In addition, NST admitted that\nthe fire, H2S, and LEL detectors “did not trigger the proper shutdowns” during routine testing on\nOctober 3, 2018, at the East Fairview Station.\n3 However, NST asserted it commenced corrective\nactions and resolved the issue on October 23, 2018.\nIn its Reply, NST raised a new argument asserting that the § 195.262(c) testing requirement does\nnot apply to the fire, H2S and LEL detectors because they are not “safety devices” that “prevent\noverpressuring.\n”4 NST argued that “[t]he devices referred to in the NOPV do not sense\npressure or in any way act to prevent or address fluctuations in pressure.”5 Rather, NST asserted\nthe testing requirements for those devices are found in § 195.446(c)(2) (and mentioned\nappropriately in Item 6). On these grounds, NST requested withdrawal of this item and the\nassociated proposed civil penalty.\n2 Response, at 2.\n3 Id.\n4 Reply, at 1-2.\n5 Id., at 1.\n\n\n\nAccording to the records provided by NST, the fire, H2S, and LEL detectors were tested prior to\nthe commissioning of the East Fairview and Alexander Station pumping stations. NST provided\nrecords indicating that all seven detectors identified in the Notice were tested in February 2017\nbefore commissioning both pump stations in March 2017.\nAccordingly, after considering the issues presented, I find that NST did not violate § 195.262(c)\nbecause NST submitted sufficient records to demonstrate it tested the fire, H2S and LEL devices\nat the East Fairview and Alexander Station pumping stations prior to commissioning. Based on\nthe foregoing, I hereby order that Item 1 be withdrawn.\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3), which states:\n§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.\n(a) Except for surge pressures and other variations from normal\noperations, no operator may operate a pipeline at a pressure that exceeds\nany of the following:\n(1) . . . .\n(3) Eighty percent of the test pressure for any part of the pipeline which\nhas been pressure tested under subpart E of this part.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3) by failing to follow\nmaximum operating pressure (MOP) guidelines by operating segments of its pipeline at a\npressure that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure. Specifically, the Notice alleged five\ninstances of violation at the East Fairview Station between 2017 and 2018. The Notice further\nalleged that NST provided no records to substantiate that these events occurred due to surge\npressures or other variations from normal operations.\nIn its Response, NST stated that each event that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure\nidentified in the Notice “was directly caused by surge pressures or other variations from normal\noperations.”6 NST asserted that the PIT-126 April 2017, PIT-126 January 2018, and PIT-030\nJanuary 2018 events were caused by the equalization of station piping. For the PIT-126 August\n2017 and PIT-126 February 2018 events, NST stated that the cause of the increased pressures\nwas thermal expansion which triggered the temperature safety valves (TSV), as intended. NST\nfurther noted that each instance of elevated pressure was below 110 percent of each pipeline’s\nMOP and lasted for short periods of time. Accordingly, NST requested withdrawal of this item\nand the associated proposed civil penalty.\nAccording to the records provided by NST, three of the five instances of violation were caused\nby “surge pressures and other variations from normal operations.” NST’s records show that the\n1) PIT-126 April 2017, 2) PIT-126 January 2018, and 3) PIT-030 January 2018 elevated pressure\nevents were caused by the equalization of station piping, which I agree constitute a variation\nfrom normal operation per § 195.406(a). Accordingly, I withdraw three of the five instances of\nviolation.\n6 Response, at 3.\n\n\n\nIn its Reply, NST asserted that the thermal expansion events at PIT-126 in August 2017 and PIT-\n126 constitute variations from normal operation and thus do not result in violations of\n§ 195.406(a)(3).\n7 NST cited a prior enforcement order, PHMSA’s Operations & Maintenance\nEnforcement Guidance, Part 195 Subpart F, and a January 10, 2000 PHMSA memorandum to\nsupport its argument that thermal expansion constitutes a variation from normal operation.8\nAfter reviewing the evidence and arguments, I find the PIT-126 August 2017 and February 2018\nelevated pressure events caused by thermal expansion do not constitute surge pressures or\nvariations from normal operations per § 195.406(a), rather, those events constitute abnormal\noperating conditions.\n9 As NST admitted, in both instances, a TSV was triggered to reduce the\npressure following a thermal expansion event. The regulations make clear that once a safety\ndevice is triggered, an operator has experienced abnormal operation. Section 195.402(d)\nprovides examples of what events constitute abnormal operation and requires operators to create\nprocedures for such events. Section 195.402(d)(1) states that an operator must have and\nimplement procedures for abnormal operations that respond to, investigate, or correct the cause\nof the “operation of any safety device.” A TSV is a safety device that is triggered when a\npipeline’s pressure exceeds normal operating limits as a result of thermal expansion. The\ntriggering of this safety device, therefore, indicates that an abnormal operating condition has\noccurred. Because the triggering of the TSV constituted abnormal operation, I find two instances\nof violation at PIT-126 in August 2017 and February 2018 for the elevated pressure events.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence and the legal issues, I find that Respondent\nviolated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3) by failing to follow MOP guidelines by operating segments of\nits pipeline at a pressure that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure (pressure tested under\nsubpart E of Part 195) for two elevated pressure events at PIT-126 in August 2017 and February\n2018.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b), which states:\n§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or\nother variations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the\noperating pressure limit established under paragraph (a) of this section.\nEach operator must provide adequate controls and protective equipment to\ncontrol the pressure within this limit.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) by failing to provide\nadequate controls and protective equipment to limit pressures during surges or other variations\n7 Reply, at 2.\n8 These sources, however, do not support a finding that thermal expansion events triggering a TSV would constitute\na variation from normal operation.\n9 Section 195.402(d)(2) states an operator must have abnormal operation procedures for “[c]hecking variations from\nnormal operation after abnormal operation has ended . . . ” This regulation distinguishes abnormal operation from\n“other variations from normal operations.”\n\n\n\nfrom normal operations. Specifically, the Notice alleged that NST failed to limit the operating\npressure of the pipeline system from exceeding 110 percent of MOP established under\n§ 195.406(a) on eight separate occasions between 2017 and 2018.\nIn its Response, NST stated it initially provided inaccurate data to PHMSA and provided the\ncorrect data which shows that that the actual discharge pressure for PIT-019 in June, July, and\nAugust 2018 was below 110 percent of its MOP. NST stated the correct data also shows that\nPIT-217 in March 2017 did not exceed 110 percent of its MOP. Accordingly, NST requested\nwithdrawal of these four instances of violation and a reduction of the civil penalty. NST did not\ncontest the remaining four instances of violation at PIT-030. I find that NST submitted sufficient\ndocumentation indicating that four of the eight instances identified in the Notice did not exceed\n110 percent of MOP in violation of § 195.406(b).\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.406(b) by failing to limit the operating pressure of the pipeline system from exceeding 110\npercent of MOP established under § 195.406(a) for four elevated pressure events at PIT-030 in\nMarch, November, and December 2017, and in March 2018.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:\n§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator\nshall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, or in the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at\nintervals not to exceed 7 1⁄2 months, but at least twice each calendar year,\ninspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure\nregulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is\nfunctioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from\nthe standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in\nwhich it is used.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect and test\na total of 21 overpressure protection devices at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least\nonce each calendar year. Also, the Notice alleged that NST failed to inspect and test each\npressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control\nequipment to determine that it functioned properly, is in good mechanical condition, is adequate\nfrom the standpoint of capacity and reliable for operation of the service for 29 devices.\n10\nIn its Response, NST contested this allegation of violation stating the pump stations were not\nplaced into service until March 2017 and all devices identified in the Notice were tested within\n15 months of March 2017. In its Reply, NST stated that the East Fairview Station was also not\nplaced into service until March 2017.\nFor all 30 devices listed in the Notice, NST failed to provide records which indicate inspections\n10 Although some devices were listed in both tables, the Notice alleged one instance of violation for each device\nnumber. Therefore, the Notice alleged 30 instances of violation despite including 50 rows of device numbers.\n\n\n\nwere conducted in 2017. Although NST noted that the April 23, 2018 inspections occurred\nwithin 15 months of the start of operation in March 2017, it nonetheless failed to conduct an\ninspection in 2017, as required by § 195.428(a). Therefore, I find no reduction in the instances\nof violation is warranted.\nAccordingly, after considering the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.428(a) by failing to inspect and test 21 overpressure protection devices in calendar year\n2017 and by failing to inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure\nregulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it functioned properly, is\nin good mechanical condition, is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliable for\noperation of the service for 29 devices.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(c)(2), which states:\n§ 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its\ncontrollers with the information, tools, processes and procedures necessary\nfor the controllers to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has\ndefined by performing each of the following:\n(1) . . . .\n(2) Conduct a point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and\nrelated field equipment when field equipment is added or moved and when\nother changes that affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or\nSCADA displays;\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(c)(2) by failing to conduct\npoint-to-point verification between SCADA displays and related field equipment when field\nequipment is added or moved and when other changes that affect pipeline safety are made to\nfield equipment or SCADA displays. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the point-to-point\nrecord dated January 31, 2018, did not include confirmation that each point that can impact\nsafety was verified to the relevant SCADA displays. The Notice identified three instances of\nviolation for fire, LEL, and H2S detectors.\nThe Notice further alleged that the field values and SCADA values recorded have considerable\nvariability without sufficient reconciliation in the records or comments including missing\ncalibration ranges. The Notice alleged that NST did not explain the variabilities or identify\ncorrective actions.\nIn its Response, NST stated it “conduct[ed User Acceptance Testing (UAT)] . . . and point-to-\npoint verifications through which all critical safety points were properly reviewed, prior to\nstartup.”11 NST admitted, however, that its point-to-point records “do not show that fire, [LEL],\nor H2S detectors were verified.” NST stated that “these values were verified in the UAT for the\nstation [programable logic controller (PLC)].”12 NST also stated it has a live point-to-point\n11 Response, at 10.\n12 Id.\n\n\n\ndocument updated on a regular basis, which it provided as evidence in Attachment C. NST\nfurther stated it “is working to modify its point-to-point testing to include a demonstration that\nfire, [LEL], and H2S detection is properly read in the SCADA.”13\nNST also stated that it corrected the variability in the field values and SCADA values during the\ncheckout. However, NST admitted that “documentation improvements are needed and will be\npursued,”14 with respect to field values and SCADA values records.\nIn its Reply, NST stated that it no longer contests the findings in this Item.15\nWhile NST provided additional information regarding the fire, LEL, and H2S detectors, NST\nadmits its records do not reflect point-to-point verifications between the three detectors and its\nSCADA display. Section 195.446(c)(2) specifically requires that field equipment be accurately\nreflected on SCADA displays in the control room. NST admitted that the fire, LEL, and H2S\ndetectors were not properly displayed on SCADA,\n16 and NST stated it is no longer contesting\nthis Item in its Reply. NST’s remaining arguments are addressed below in the Assessment of\nPenalty section.\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.446(c)(2) by failing to conduct point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and\nrelated field equipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that\naffect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(e)(3), which states:\n§ 195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . . .\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must\nhave a written alarm management plan to provide for effective controller\nresponse to alarms. An operator’s plan must include provisions to:\n(1) . . . .\n(3) Verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm\ndescriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed\nand at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15\nmonths;\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(e)(3) by failing to provide\nrecords that verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions when\nassociated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at least once each calendar year, but at\n13 Id.\n14 Id., at 11.\n15 Reply, at 1.\n16 Response, at 10 (“At this time, NorthStar is working to modify its point-to-point testing to include a\ndemonstration that fire, gas, and H2S detection is properly read in the SCADA.”).\n\n\n\nintervals not to exceed 15 months. A total of three instances were identified, one for each type of\nalarm (fire, LEL, and H2S). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Form 11-12 confirmed that a\nreview was conducted within the required time, but it did not include the required information.\nThe Notice identified that Form 11-12 was inadequate for calendar years 2017 and 2018.17\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that the records did not include the correct alarm set-point values\nor correct alarm descriptions at the time of the review, nor did the records demonstrate how the\ncorrect alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions were confirmed, as required by\n§ 195.446(e)(3). In addition, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to produce\ndocumentation that safety alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions were verified when field\ninstruments were calibrated or changed.\nIn its Response, NST contested this allegation of violation and stated it provided supporting\ndocumentation to Form 11-12 (Attachment D) that contains the required information, including\nthe alarms, set-point values, and descriptions. In its Reply, NST asserted it provided further\ninformation which “shows the alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions.”18 Therefore, NST\nrequested that the civil penalty be withdrawn.\nThe information provided in Attachment D does not satisfy § 195.446(e)(3) because it fails to\nshow that NST verified its safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions each\ncalendar year. While NST alleged it provided the alarms, set-point values, and descriptions in\nAttachment D, it did so only for 2017, and the information it did provide was inadequate. The\nprovided information lacked important contextual information, such as the date, how and where\nNST records this information, nor did it demonstrate what the alarm set-points are, what they\nwere changed to (if applicable) and what the alarms were calibrated at, or to. Therefore, the\ninformation provided, both for 2017 and 2018, fails to show that NST verified its safety-related\nalarm set-point values and alarm descriptions each calendar year.19\nAccordingly, after considering the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.446(e)(3) by failing to provide records that verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point\nvalues and alarm descriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at\nleast once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months.\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(2), which states:\n§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline\nintegrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:\n(1) . . . .\n17 See Ex. G-4, NST PHMSA Data Request – Alarm Set Point.\n18 Reply, at 3.\n19 Importantly, the 2018 information is necessary to evaluate the rationalization process that occurred (mentioned in\nForm 11-12 (dated February 20, 2018)). The rationalization process frequently results in changes in alarm set-point\nvalues, alarm priorities, and alarm descriptions. Without details on the rationalization process, PHMSA cannot\ndetermine what, if anything, was changed during that process and the subsequent impact on verification.\n\n\n\n(2) Include in the program an identification of each pipeline or pipeline\nsegment in the first column of the following table not later than the date in\nthe second column:\nPipeline Date\nCategory 1 December 31, 2001.\nCategory 2 November 18, 2002.\nCategory 3 Date the pipeline begins operation.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(2) by failing to identify\neach pipeline segment that could affect a high consequence area (HCA) prior to beginning\npipeline operations. Specifically, the Notice alleged NST provided a report dated June 29, 2018,\nthat determined which pipeline segments could affect an HCA, but the pipeline was\ncommissioned two years earlier on November 16, 2016. In addition, the Notice alleged PHMSA\ninspectors identified the Alexander Junction pump station as being in a could-affect HCA, but it\nwas not identified as such in the June 2018 report.\nIn its Response, NST contested the violation asserting that it did identify each pipeline segment\nthat could affect an HCA prior to beginning pipeline operations, but did not provide this\ninformation to PHMSA. According to NST, it completed its initial HCA analysis on February\n29, 2016 (2016 Initial HCA Map) prior to commissioning in November 2016.\n20 NST stated that\nthe initial HCA analysis included a preliminary HCA determination. Thereafter, NST stated it\ncompleted its liquid HCA analysis report on June 29, 2018 (2018 Final HCA Analysis). In\naddition, NST asserted that the Alexander Junction pump station was identified as being in an\nHCA in the 2018 Final HCA analysis.\nAfter reviewing the evidence, I find the 2016 Initial HCA Map fails to satisfy § 195.452(b)(2) for\nseveral reasons. First, it reflected the proposed route of the pipeline which did not extend as far\neast as the actual pipeline. It also appears to conclude that the entire proposed route is in a\ncould-affect HCA with no supporting analysis or details. The 2016 Initial HCA Map also failed\nto indicate how many miles of pipeline were analyzed and failed to conclude how many of those\nmiles were in could-affect segments. In addition, the 2016 Initial HCA Map contains only one\npage showing a proposed route on a map which is repeated five times for various purposes in\nthat document. There is no text explaining the method of analysis, assumptions, or data inputs.\nWhen compared to the 2018 Final HCA Analysis, which is a detailed 15-page report, the 2016\nInitial HCA Map is clearly inadequate.\nWith respect to the Alexander Junction pump station, both the 2016 Initial HCA Map and the\n2018 Final HCA Analysis failed to indicate that the pump station is in a could-affect HCA. The\n2016 Initial HCA Map included a proposed pipeline route which did not extend to the Alexander\nJunction pump station. The 2018 Final HCA Analysis categorized the pump station as a segment\nwith no impact on an HCA, however, PHMSA determined the pump station is in a could-affect\n20 Response, attach. F.\n\n\n\narea and NST agreed with that determination.\n21 Therefore, NST failed to identify the Alexander\nJunction pump station as a pipeline segment that could affect an HCA prior to beginning pipeline\noperations.\nAccordingly, after considering the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.452(b)(2) by failing to identify each pipeline segment that could affect an HCA prior to\nbeginning pipeline operations.\nItem 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), which states:\n§ 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper\nperformance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the\nsecond column.\nDevice Check frequency\nRectifier At least six times each calendar year, but\nwith intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months.\nReverse current switch\nDiode\nInterference bond whose failure\nwould jeopardize structural\nprotection\nOther interference bond At least once each calendar year, but with\nintervals not exceeding 15 months.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) by failing to electrically\ncheck rectifiers for proper performance at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals\nnot to exceed two and a half months. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the cathodic protection\nsystem was energized on June 23, 2017, and NST could not provide records of inspections for\nany of the three rectifiers on the system.\nRespondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, after considering the\nevidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) by to failing to electrically\ncheck rectifiers for proper performance at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals\nnot to exceed two and a half months.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\n21 Ex. H-1, The Compliance Group NSTX HCA Report (June 29, 2018), at 10 fig. 2.\n\n\n\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.22\nIn determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I\nmust consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue\ndoing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety\nregulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA.\nIn addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction\nbecause of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice\nproposed a total civil penalty of $687,100 for the violations cited above.\nItem 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $85,300 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.262(c), for failing to test and determine that pumping station safety devices were\nfunctioning properly prior to operation. NST requested that PHMSA withdraw the penalty. For\nthe reasons stated above, I withdraw the violation and proposed penalty assessment for this item.\nBased on the foregoing, I withdraw the proposed penalty for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.262(c).\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $70,100 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.406(a)(3), for failing to follow MOP guidelines by operating segments of its pipeline at a\npressure that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure (pressure tested under subpart E of Part\n195) on five occasions. As noted above, NST provided records, argued the five events fall under\nthe exception in § 195.406(a), and requested that PHMSA withdraw the penalty. However, as\nexplained in detail above, two of the five elevated pressure events were caused by thermal\nexpansion and constitute abnormal operation. Those events, therefore, do not fall under the\nexception in § 195.406(a). The remaining three elevated pressure events were caused by the\nequalization of station piping, which constitute variations from normal operation per\n§ 195.406(a). Accordingly, I reduce the instances of violation from five to two.\nBased on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $52,500 for violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3).\nItem 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $87,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.406(b), for failing to limit the operating pressure of its pipeline system from exceeding 110\npercent of MOP established under § 195.406(a) on eight separate occasions between 2017 and\n2018.\nAs noted above, NST contested this violation and requested the penalty be reduced. NST\nprovided evidence indicating that four of the eight alleged instances of violation did not exceed\n110 percent of MOP. NST admitted that four instances of violation identified at PIT-030 did\n22 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223.\n\n\n\nexceed 110 percent of MOP, in violation of § 195.406(a). Therefore, I reduce the instances of\nviolation from eight to four.\nNST also requested a reduction in the civil penalty for the corrective actions taken with regard to\nPIT-030. Specifically, NST stated that it is working to ensure this pipeline segment is in\ncompliance with the operating pressure regulations by only allowing transfers from Alexander to\nEast Fairview to be conducted by gravity flow. In addition, NST stated it will limit the pipeline\npressure to 285 psig during transfers from Alexander to East Fairview by not using the pumps at\nAlexander. While PHMSA encourages prompt corrective action, because PHMSA learned of the\nviolation before corrective action was taken, I find no reduction in the civil penalty is warranted.\nBased on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $64,200 for violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b).\nItem 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $190,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 195.428(a), for failing to inspect and test a total of 21 overpressure protection devices at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year and by failing to inspect\nand test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure\ncontrol equipment to determine that it functioned properly, is in good mechanical condition, is\nadequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliable for operation of the service for 29 devices.\nIn its Response, NST asserted that all of the devices listed in the tables above were tested within\n15 months of the March 2017 startup. As explained above, for all 30 devices listed in the Notice,\nNST failed to provide records which indicate inspections were conducted in 2017, as required by\n§ 195.428(a). Accordingly, I find no reduction in the civil penalty is warranted.\nBased on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $190,500 for violation of 49\nC.F.R. § 195.428(a).\nItem 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $58,400 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.446(c)(2), for failing to conduct point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and\nrelated field equipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that\naffect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays. NST requested\nwithdrawal of the civil penalty for several reasons. NST later stated it no longer contests this\nItem.\nNST asserted it has a regularly updated document with point-to-point values. NST stated it “is\nworking to modify its point-to-point testing to include a demonstration that fire, [LEL], and H2S\ndetection is properly read in the SCADA.”23 As noted above, NST failed to conduct point-to-\npoint verification between SCADA displays and the fire, LEL, and H2S detectors. Although\nNST conducted some testing, I find that this does not warrant reduction in the civil penalty\nbecause the testing did not confirm that the fire, LEL, and H2S detectors were properly read on\nthe SCADA displays.\nNST also stated that it corrected the variability in the field values and SCADA values during the\n23 Response, at 10.\n\n\n\ncheckout. NST admitted that “documentation improvements are needed and will be pursued,”24\nwith respect to field values and SCADA values records. Although NST stated it took corrective\naction, I find that actions to address the variability in the field values and SCADA values, while\ncommendable, do not warrant reduction in the civil penalty because NST’s documentation does\nnot show that point-to-point verifications were conducted in accordance with § 195.446(c)(2).\nBased on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $58,400 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.446(c)(2).\nItem 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $54,900 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.446(e)(3), for failing to provide records that verify the correct safety-related alarm set-\npoint values and alarm descr","truncated":true,"body_characters":52800}