# NST EXPRESS LLC — Notice of Probable Violation

- **operation:** document
- **citation:** CPF 32021052NOPV
- **title:** NST EXPRESS LLC — Notice of Probable Violation
- **source type:** enforcement
- **agency:** Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- **status:** historical
- **official:** true
- **published on:** 2021-06-15
- **effective on:** Not available
- **summary:** CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.262(c), 195.406(a)(3), 195.406(b), 195.420(b), 195.428(a), 195.446(c)(2), 195.446(e)(3), 195.452(b)(2), 195.452(g)(3), 195.452(i)(3), 195.452(l)(1)(ii), 195.573(c).
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- **source url:** https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/32021052NOPV
**body:**

Notice of Probable Violation involving NST EXPRESS LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.262(c),  195.406(a)(3),  195.406(b),  195.420(b),  195.428(a),  195.446(c)(2),  195.446(e)(3),  195.452(b)(2),  195.452(g)(3),  195.452(i)(3),  195.452(l)(1)(ii),  195.573(c). The case was opened on 2021-06-15 and is reported as closed as of 2023-03-31. Proposed civil penalty: $687,100. Assessed civil penalty: $560,700. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.

Official case documents:

32021052NOPV_Closure Letter_03312022_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Closure%20Letter_03312022_(21-211419).pdf

32021052NOPV_Closure Letter_03312022_(21-211419)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Closure%20Letter_03312022_(21-211419)_text.pdf

32021052NOPV_Final Order_09192022_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Final%20Order_09192022_(21-211419).pdf

32021052NOPV_Final Order_09192022_(21-211419)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Final%20Order_09192022_(21-211419)_text.pdf

32021052NOPV_Operator Response to Notice_08102021_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_08102021_(21-211419).pdf

32021052NOPV_PCP PCO_06152021_(21-211419).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_PCP%20PCO_06152021_(21-211419).pdf

32021052NOPV_PCP PCO_06152021_(21-211419)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32021052NOPV/32021052NOPV_PCP%20PCO_06152021_(21-211419)_text.pdf

32021052NOPV_Closure Letter_03312022_(21-211419)_text.pdf

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: mhummel@northstarmidstream.com,
tchadwick@northstarmidstream.com, pbautista@northstarmidstream.com
March 31, 2023
McMillan Hummel
Chief Executive Officer
NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC
10077 Grogans Mill Road Suite 530
The Woodlands, Texas 77380
RE: CPF No. 3-2021-052-NOPV
Dear Mr. Hummel:
On September 19, 2022, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
issued to NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC’s subsidiary, NorthStar Midstream’s (NST), a Final
Order in the above-referenced case. This Order included a Compliance Order and Civil Penalty
assessment. Based on our review of the documentation provided and confirmation of payment of
the civil penalty on September 26, 2022, it has been determined that NST has complied with the
terms of this Order.
Accordingly, this case is now closed and no further action is contemplated with respect to the
matters involved in this case. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Gregory A. Ochs
Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
cc: Tara Chadwick – tchadwick@northstarmidstream.com
Pablo Bautista – pbautista@northstarmidstream.com

32021052NOPV_Final Order_09192022_(21-211419)_text.pdf

September 19, 2022
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: mhummel@northstarmidstream.com
Mr. McMillan Hummel
Chief Executive Officer
NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC
10077 Grogans Mill Road, Suite 530
The Woodlands, Texas 77380
Re: CPF No. 3-2021-052-NOPV
Dear Mr. Hummel:
Enclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of
violation, assesses a reduced civil penalty of $560,700, and specifies actions that need to be
taken by NST Express, LLC to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty
payment terms are set forth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the
terms of the compliance order completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this
enforcement action will be closed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the
date of transmission and acknowledgement of receipt as provided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Alan K. Mayberry
Associate Administrator
for Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA
Mr. Jon Hamel, Senior Vice President, Engineering, NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC,
jhamel@northstarmidstream.com
Mr. Benjamin Rhem, Outside Counsel for NST Express, Jackson Walker L.L.P.,
brhem@jw.com
CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590
____________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
NST Express, LLC, ) CPF No. 3-2021-052-NOPV
a subsidiary of )
NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC, )
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________)
FINAL ORDER
On various dates between January 2018 and September 2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, a
representative of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office
of Pipeline Safety (OPS), conducted a pipeline safety inspection of the facilities and records of
NST Express, LLC’s (NST or Respondent) crude oil pipeline system between East Fairview and
Alexander, North Dakota. NST Express, LLC is a subsidiary of NorthStar Holdco Energy, LLC.
NST operates 23.6 miles of 12.75-inch O.D. pipeline from its Alexander Station to its East
Fairview Station. The system includes two automated river protection valves, one mainline
valve, an interconnect location, and two bi-directional pig traps.1
As a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,
by letter dated June 15, 2021, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and
Proposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice
proposed finding that NST committed eight violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, proposed assessing
a civil penalty of $687,100 for the alleged violations, and proposed ordering Respondent to take
certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice also included an additional four
warning items pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, which warned the operator to correct the
probable violations or face possible future enforcement action
NST requested, and on June 25, 2021, PHMSA granted an extension to respond to the Notice.
NST responded to the Notice by letter dated August 10, 2021 (Response). The Central Region
issued its Region Recommendation on December 23, 2021. On January 10, 2022, NST
submitted a reply to the Region Recommendation (Reply). NST contested several of the
allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and requested that the
proposed civil penalty be reduced. Respondent did not request a hearing and therefore has
waived its right to one.
1 Pipeline Safety Violation Report (Violation Report), (June 15, 2021) (on file with PHMSA), at 1.



FINDINGS OF VIOLATION
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:
Item 1: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.262(c), which states:
§ 195.262 Pumping equipment.
(a) . . . .
(c) Each safety device must be tested under conditions approximating
actual operations and found to function properly before the pumping station
may be used.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.262(c) by failing to test and
determine that pumping station safety devices were functioning properly prior to operation.
Specifically, the Notice alleged that seven safety devices for pumping stations located at East
Fairview (three devices) and Alexander Station (four devices) were not functioning properly
before November 16, 2016, the date when the commodity was introduced to the pipeline.
The Notice further alleged, based on a review of NST’s records dated October 3, 2018, and the
associated work orders #ST120222 (East Fairview Station) and #ST120221 (Alexander Station),
that the fire, Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S), and Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) detectors did not sound
any alarms or shutdowns. The Notice alleged that as of October 16, 2018, the condition had not
been corrected at the local facility or at the Remote Operations Center.
In its Response, NST stated that all testing of the East Fairview and Alexander Station pumping
station safety devices was completed prior to being placed into service in March 2017.2 NST
stated that it concluded commissioning activities, including final check out, prior to placing the
pumps into service. NST stated that it included the records of the testing, conducted on February
4, 2017, and satisfactory results in Attachment A to its Response. In addition, NST admitted that
the fire, H2S, and LEL detectors “did not trigger the proper shutdowns” during routine testing on
October 3, 2018, at the East Fairview Station.
3 However, NST asserted it commenced corrective
actions and resolved the issue on October 23, 2018.
In its Reply, NST raised a new argument asserting that the § 195.262(c) testing requirement does
not apply to the fire, H2S and LEL detectors because they are not “safety devices” that “prevent
overpressuring.
”4 NST argued that “[t]he devices referred to in the NOPV do not sense
pressure or in any way act to prevent or address fluctuations in pressure.”5 Rather, NST asserted
the testing requirements for those devices are found in § 195.446(c)(2) (and mentioned
appropriately in Item 6). On these grounds, NST requested withdrawal of this item and the
associated proposed civil penalty.
2 Response, at 2.
3 Id.
4 Reply, at 1-2.
5 Id., at 1.



According to the records provided by NST, the fire, H2S, and LEL detectors were tested prior to
the commissioning of the East Fairview and Alexander Station pumping stations. NST provided
records indicating that all seven detectors identified in the Notice were tested in February 2017
before commissioning both pump stations in March 2017.
Accordingly, after considering the issues presented, I find that NST did not violate § 195.262(c)
because NST submitted sufficient records to demonstrate it tested the fire, H2S and LEL devices
at the East Fairview and Alexander Station pumping stations prior to commissioning. Based on
the foregoing, I hereby order that Item 1 be withdrawn.
Item 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3), which states:
§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(a) Except for surge pressures and other variations from normal
operations, no operator may operate a pipeline at a pressure that exceeds
any of the following:
(1) . . . .
(3) Eighty percent of the test pressure for any part of the pipeline which
has been pressure tested under subpart E of this part.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3) by failing to follow
maximum operating pressure (MOP) guidelines by operating segments of its pipeline at a
pressure that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure. Specifically, the Notice alleged five
instances of violation at the East Fairview Station between 2017 and 2018. The Notice further
alleged that NST provided no records to substantiate that these events occurred due to surge
pressures or other variations from normal operations.
In its Response, NST stated that each event that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure
identified in the Notice “was directly caused by surge pressures or other variations from normal
operations.”6 NST asserted that the PIT-126 April 2017, PIT-126 January 2018, and PIT-030
January 2018 events were caused by the equalization of station piping. For the PIT-126 August
2017 and PIT-126 February 2018 events, NST stated that the cause of the increased pressures
was thermal expansion which triggered the temperature safety valves (TSV), as intended. NST
further noted that each instance of elevated pressure was below 110 percent of each pipeline’s
MOP and lasted for short periods of time. Accordingly, NST requested withdrawal of this item
and the associated proposed civil penalty.
According to the records provided by NST, three of the five instances of violation were caused
by “surge pressures and other variations from normal operations.” NST’s records show that the
1) PIT-126 April 2017, 2) PIT-126 January 2018, and 3) PIT-030 January 2018 elevated pressure
events were caused by the equalization of station piping, which I agree constitute a variation
from normal operation per § 195.406(a). Accordingly, I withdraw three of the five instances of
violation.
6 Response, at 3.



In its Reply, NST asserted that the thermal expansion events at PIT-126 in August 2017 and PIT-
126 constitute variations from normal operation and thus do not result in violations of
§ 195.406(a)(3).
7 NST cited a prior enforcement order, PHMSA’s Operations & Maintenance
Enforcement Guidance, Part 195 Subpart F, and a January 10, 2000 PHMSA memorandum to
support its argument that thermal expansion constitutes a variation from normal operation.8
After reviewing the evidence and arguments, I find the PIT-126 August 2017 and February 2018
elevated pressure events caused by thermal expansion do not constitute surge pressures or
variations from normal operations per § 195.406(a), rather, those events constitute abnormal
operating conditions.
9 As NST admitted, in both instances, a TSV was triggered to reduce the
pressure following a thermal expansion event. The regulations make clear that once a safety
device is triggered, an operator has experienced abnormal operation. Section 195.402(d)
provides examples of what events constitute abnormal operation and requires operators to create
procedures for such events. Section 195.402(d)(1) states that an operator must have and
implement procedures for abnormal operations that respond to, investigate, or correct the cause
of the “operation of any safety device.” A TSV is a safety device that is triggered when a
pipeline’s pressure exceeds normal operating limits as a result of thermal expansion. The
triggering of this safety device, therefore, indicates that an abnormal operating condition has
occurred. Because the triggering of the TSV constituted abnormal operation, I find two instances
of violation at PIT-126 in August 2017 and February 2018 for the elevated pressure events.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence and the legal issues, I find that Respondent
violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3) by failing to follow MOP guidelines by operating segments of
its pipeline at a pressure that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure (pressure tested under
subpart E of Part 195) for two elevated pressure events at PIT-126 in August 2017 and February
2018.
Item 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b), which states:
§ 195.406 Maximum operating pressure.
(a) . . . .
(b) No operator may permit the pressure in a pipeline during surges or
other variations from normal operations to exceed 110 percent of the
operating pressure limit established under paragraph (a) of this section.
Each operator must provide adequate controls and protective equipment to
control the pressure within this limit.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b) by failing to provide
adequate controls and protective equipment to limit pressures during surges or other variations
7 Reply, at 2.
8 These sources, however, do not support a finding that thermal expansion events triggering a TSV would constitute
a variation from normal operation.
9 Section 195.402(d)(2) states an operator must have abnormal operation procedures for “[c]hecking variations from
normal operation after abnormal operation has ended . . . ” This regulation distinguishes abnormal operation from
“other variations from normal operations.”



from normal operations. Specifically, the Notice alleged that NST failed to limit the operating
pressure of the pipeline system from exceeding 110 percent of MOP established under
§ 195.406(a) on eight separate occasions between 2017 and 2018.
In its Response, NST stated it initially provided inaccurate data to PHMSA and provided the
correct data which shows that that the actual discharge pressure for PIT-019 in June, July, and
August 2018 was below 110 percent of its MOP. NST stated the correct data also shows that
PIT-217 in March 2017 did not exceed 110 percent of its MOP. Accordingly, NST requested
withdrawal of these four instances of violation and a reduction of the civil penalty. NST did not
contest the remaining four instances of violation at PIT-030. I find that NST submitted sufficient
documentation indicating that four of the eight instances identified in the Notice did not exceed
110 percent of MOP in violation of § 195.406(b).
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.406(b) by failing to limit the operating pressure of the pipeline system from exceeding 110
percent of MOP established under § 195.406(a) for four elevated pressure events at PIT-030 in
March, November, and December 2017, and in March 2018.
Item 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:
§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator
shall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar
year, or in the case of pipelines used to carry highly volatile liquids, at
intervals not to exceed 7 1⁄2 months, but at least twice each calendar year,
inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure
regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is
functioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from
the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in
which it is used.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect and test
a total of 21 overpressure protection devices at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least
once each calendar year. Also, the Notice alleged that NST failed to inspect and test each
pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure control
equipment to determine that it functioned properly, is in good mechanical condition, is adequate
from the standpoint of capacity and reliable for operation of the service for 29 devices.
10
In its Response, NST contested this allegation of violation stating the pump stations were not
placed into service until March 2017 and all devices identified in the Notice were tested within
15 months of March 2017. In its Reply, NST stated that the East Fairview Station was also not
placed into service until March 2017.
For all 30 devices listed in the Notice, NST failed to provide records which indicate inspections
10 Although some devices were listed in both tables, the Notice alleged one instance of violation for each device
number. Therefore, the Notice alleged 30 instances of violation despite including 50 rows of device numbers.



were conducted in 2017. Although NST noted that the April 23, 2018 inspections occurred
within 15 months of the start of operation in March 2017, it nonetheless failed to conduct an
inspection in 2017, as required by § 195.428(a). Therefore, I find no reduction in the instances
of violation is warranted.
Accordingly, after considering the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.428(a) by failing to inspect and test 21 overpressure protection devices in calendar year
2017 and by failing to inspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure
regulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it functioned properly, is
in good mechanical condition, is adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliable for
operation of the service for 29 devices.
Item 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(c)(2), which states:
§ 195.446 Control room management.
(a) . . . .
(c) Provide adequate information. Each operator must provide its
controllers with the information, tools, processes and procedures necessary
for the controllers to carry out the roles and responsibilities the operator has
defined by performing each of the following:
(1) . . . .
(2) Conduct a point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and
related field equipment when field equipment is added or moved and when
other changes that affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or
SCADA displays;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(c)(2) by failing to conduct
point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and related field equipment when field
equipment is added or moved and when other changes that affect pipeline safety are made to
field equipment or SCADA displays. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the point-to-point
record dated January 31, 2018, did not include confirmation that each point that can impact
safety was verified to the relevant SCADA displays. The Notice identified three instances of
violation for fire, LEL, and H2S detectors.
The Notice further alleged that the field values and SCADA values recorded have considerable
variability without sufficient reconciliation in the records or comments including missing
calibration ranges. The Notice alleged that NST did not explain the variabilities or identify
corrective actions.
In its Response, NST stated it “conduct[ed User Acceptance Testing (UAT)] . . . and point-to-
point verifications through which all critical safety points were properly reviewed, prior to
startup.”11 NST admitted, however, that its point-to-point records “do not show that fire, [LEL],
or H2S detectors were verified.” NST stated that “these values were verified in the UAT for the
station [programable logic controller (PLC)].”12 NST also stated it has a live point-to-point
11 Response, at 10.
12 Id.



document updated on a regular basis, which it provided as evidence in Attachment C. NST
further stated it “is working to modify its point-to-point testing to include a demonstration that
fire, [LEL], and H2S detection is properly read in the SCADA.”13
NST also stated that it corrected the variability in the field values and SCADA values during the
checkout. However, NST admitted that “documentation improvements are needed and will be
pursued,”14 with respect to field values and SCADA values records.
In its Reply, NST stated that it no longer contests the findings in this Item.15
While NST provided additional information regarding the fire, LEL, and H2S detectors, NST
admits its records do not reflect point-to-point verifications between the three detectors and its
SCADA display. Section 195.446(c)(2) specifically requires that field equipment be accurately
reflected on SCADA displays in the control room. NST admitted that the fire, LEL, and H2S
detectors were not properly displayed on SCADA,
16 and NST stated it is no longer contesting
this Item in its Reply. NST’s remaining arguments are addressed below in the Assessment of
Penalty section.
Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.446(c)(2) by failing to conduct point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and
related field equipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that
affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays.
Item 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(e)(3), which states:
§ 195.446 Control room management.
(a) . . . .
(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must
have a written alarm management plan to provide for effective controller
response to alarms. An operator’s plan must include provisions to:
(1) . . . .
(3) Verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm
descriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed
and at least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15
months;
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.446(e)(3) by failing to provide
records that verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions when
associated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at least once each calendar year, but at
13 Id.
14 Id., at 11.
15 Reply, at 1.
16 Response, at 10 (“At this time, NorthStar is working to modify its point-to-point testing to include a
demonstration that fire, gas, and H2S detection is properly read in the SCADA.”).



intervals not to exceed 15 months. A total of three instances were identified, one for each type of
alarm (fire, LEL, and H2S). Specifically, the Notice alleged that Form 11-12 confirmed that a
review was conducted within the required time, but it did not include the required information.
The Notice identified that Form 11-12 was inadequate for calendar years 2017 and 2018.17
Specifically, the Notice alleged that the records did not include the correct alarm set-point values
or correct alarm descriptions at the time of the review, nor did the records demonstrate how the
correct alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions were confirmed, as required by
§ 195.446(e)(3). In addition, the Notice alleged that Respondent failed to produce
documentation that safety alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions were verified when field
instruments were calibrated or changed.
In its Response, NST contested this allegation of violation and stated it provided supporting
documentation to Form 11-12 (Attachment D) that contains the required information, including
the alarms, set-point values, and descriptions. In its Reply, NST asserted it provided further
information which “shows the alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions.”18 Therefore, NST
requested that the civil penalty be withdrawn.
The information provided in Attachment D does not satisfy § 195.446(e)(3) because it fails to
show that NST verified its safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions each
calendar year. While NST alleged it provided the alarms, set-point values, and descriptions in
Attachment D, it did so only for 2017, and the information it did provide was inadequate. The
provided information lacked important contextual information, such as the date, how and where
NST records this information, nor did it demonstrate what the alarm set-points are, what they
were changed to (if applicable) and what the alarms were calibrated at, or to. Therefore, the
information provided, both for 2017 and 2018, fails to show that NST verified its safety-related
alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions each calendar year.19
Accordingly, after considering the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.446(e)(3) by failing to provide records that verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point
values and alarm descriptions when associated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at
least once each calendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months.
Item 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(2), which states:
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.
(a) . . . .
(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline
integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:
(1) . . . .
17 See Ex. G-4, NST PHMSA Data Request – Alarm Set Point.
18 Reply, at 3.
19 Importantly, the 2018 information is necessary to evaluate the rationalization process that occurred (mentioned in
Form 11-12 (dated February 20, 2018)). The rationalization process frequently results in changes in alarm set-point
values, alarm priorities, and alarm descriptions. Without details on the rationalization process, PHMSA cannot
determine what, if anything, was changed during that process and the subsequent impact on verification.



(2) Include in the program an identification of each pipeline or pipeline
segment in the first column of the following table not later than the date in
the second column:
Pipeline Date
Category 1 December 31, 2001.
Category 2 November 18, 2002.
Category 3 Date the pipeline begins operation.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.452(b)(2) by failing to identify
each pipeline segment that could affect a high consequence area (HCA) prior to beginning
pipeline operations. Specifically, the Notice alleged NST provided a report dated June 29, 2018,
that determined which pipeline segments could affect an HCA, but the pipeline was
commissioned two years earlier on November 16, 2016. In addition, the Notice alleged PHMSA
inspectors identified the Alexander Junction pump station as being in a could-affect HCA, but it
was not identified as such in the June 2018 report.
In its Response, NST contested the violation asserting that it did identify each pipeline segment
that could affect an HCA prior to beginning pipeline operations, but did not provide this
information to PHMSA. According to NST, it completed its initial HCA analysis on February
29, 2016 (2016 Initial HCA Map) prior to commissioning in November 2016.
20 NST stated that
the initial HCA analysis included a preliminary HCA determination. Thereafter, NST stated it
completed its liquid HCA analysis report on June 29, 2018 (2018 Final HCA Analysis). In
addition, NST asserted that the Alexander Junction pump station was identified as being in an
HCA in the 2018 Final HCA analysis.
After reviewing the evidence, I find the 2016 Initial HCA Map fails to satisfy § 195.452(b)(2) for
several reasons. First, it reflected the proposed route of the pipeline which did not extend as far
east as the actual pipeline. It also appears to conclude that the entire proposed route is in a
could-affect HCA with no supporting analysis or details. The 2016 Initial HCA Map also failed
to indicate how many miles of pipeline were analyzed and failed to conclude how many of those
miles were in could-affect segments. In addition, the 2016 Initial HCA Map contains only one
page showing a proposed route on a map which is repeated five times for various purposes in
that document. There is no text explaining the method of analysis, assumptions, or data inputs.
When compared to the 2018 Final HCA Analysis, which is a detailed 15-page report, the 2016
Initial HCA Map is clearly inadequate.
With respect to the Alexander Junction pump station, both the 2016 Initial HCA Map and the
2018 Final HCA Analysis failed to indicate that the pump station is in a could-affect HCA. The
2016 Initial HCA Map included a proposed pipeline route which did not extend to the Alexander
Junction pump station. The 2018 Final HCA Analysis categorized the pump station as a segment
with no impact on an HCA, however, PHMSA determined the pump station is in a could-affect
20 Response, attach. F.



area and NST agreed with that determination.
21 Therefore, NST failed to identify the Alexander
Junction pump station as a pipeline segment that could affect an HCA prior to beginning pipeline
operations.
Accordingly, after considering the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.452(b)(2) by failing to identify each pipeline segment that could affect an HCA prior to
beginning pipeline operations.
Item 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), which states:
§ 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?
(a) . . . .
(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper
performance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the
second column.
Device Check frequency
Rectifier At least six times each calendar year, but
with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months.
Reverse current switch
Diode
Interference bond whose failure
would jeopardize structural
protection
Other interference bond At least once each calendar year, but with
intervals not exceeding 15 months.
The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) by failing to electrically
check rectifiers for proper performance at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals
not to exceed two and a half months. Specifically, the Notice alleged that the cathodic protection
system was energized on June 23, 2017, and NST could not provide records of inspections for
any of the three rectifiers on the system.
Respondent did not contest this allegation of violation. Accordingly, after considering the
evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) by to failing to electrically
check rectifiers for proper performance at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals
not to exceed two and a half months.
These findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement
action taken against Respondent.
21 Ex. H-1, The Compliance Group NSTX HCA Report (June 29, 2018), at 10 fig. 2.



ASSESSMENT OF PENALTY
Under 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed
$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any
related series of violations.22
In determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I
must consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,
including adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history
of Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue
doing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety
regulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA.
In addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction
because of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice
proposed a total civil penalty of $687,100 for the violations cited above.
Item 1: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $85,300 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.262(c), for failing to test and determine that pumping station safety devices were
functioning properly prior to operation. NST requested that PHMSA withdraw the penalty. For
the reasons stated above, I withdraw the violation and proposed penalty assessment for this item.
Based on the foregoing, I withdraw the proposed penalty for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.262(c).
Item 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $70,100 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.406(a)(3), for failing to follow MOP guidelines by operating segments of its pipeline at a
pressure that exceeded 80 percent of the test pressure (pressure tested under subpart E of Part
195) on five occasions. As noted above, NST provided records, argued the five events fall under
the exception in § 195.406(a), and requested that PHMSA withdraw the penalty. However, as
explained in detail above, two of the five elevated pressure events were caused by thermal
expansion and constitute abnormal operation. Those events, therefore, do not fall under the
exception in § 195.406(a). The remaining three elevated pressure events were caused by the
equalization of station piping, which constitute variations from normal operation per
§ 195.406(a). Accordingly, I reduce the instances of violation from five to two.
Based on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $52,500 for violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.406(a)(3).
Item 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $87,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.406(b), for failing to limit the operating pressure of its pipeline system from exceeding 110
percent of MOP established under § 195.406(a) on eight separate occasions between 2017 and
2018.
As noted above, NST contested this violation and requested the penalty be reduced. NST
provided evidence indicating that four of the eight alleged instances of violation did not exceed
110 percent of MOP. NST admitted that four instances of violation identified at PIT-030 did
22 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223.



exceed 110 percent of MOP, in violation of § 195.406(a). Therefore, I reduce the instances of
violation from eight to four.
NST also requested a reduction in the civil penalty for the corrective actions taken with regard to
PIT-030. Specifically, NST stated that it is working to ensure this pipeline segment is in
compliance with the operating pressure regulations by only allowing transfers from Alexander to
East Fairview to be conducted by gravity flow. In addition, NST stated it will limit the pipeline
pressure to 285 psig during transfers from Alexander to East Fairview by not using the pumps at
Alexander. While PHMSA encourages prompt corrective action, because PHMSA learned of the
violation before corrective action was taken, I find no reduction in the civil penalty is warranted.
Based on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $64,200 for violation of
49 C.F.R. § 195.406(b).
Item 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $190,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.428(a), for failing to inspect and test a total of 21 overpressure protection devices at
intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year and by failing to inspect
and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure regulator, or other item of pressure
control equipment to determine that it functioned properly, is in good mechanical condition, is
adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliable for operation of the service for 29 devices.
In its Response, NST asserted that all of the devices listed in the tables above were tested within
15 months of the March 2017 startup. As explained above, for all 30 devices listed in the Notice,
NST failed to provide records which indicate inspections were conducted in 2017, as required by
§ 195.428(a). Accordingly, I find no reduction in the civil penalty is warranted.
Based on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $190,500 for violation of 49
C.F.R. § 195.428(a).
Item 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $58,400 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.446(c)(2), for failing to conduct point-to-point verification between SCADA displays and
related field equipment when field equipment is added or moved and when other changes that
affect pipeline safety are made to field equipment or SCADA displays. NST requested
withdrawal of the civil penalty for several reasons. NST later stated it no longer contests this
Item.
NST asserted it has a regularly updated document with point-to-point values. NST stated it “is
working to modify its point-to-point testing to include a demonstration that fire, [LEL], and H2S
detection is properly read in the SCADA.”23 As noted above, NST failed to conduct point-to-
point verification between SCADA displays and the fire, LEL, and H2S detectors. Although
NST conducted some testing, I find that this does not warrant reduction in the civil penalty
because the testing did not confirm that the fire, LEL, and H2S detectors were properly read on
the SCADA displays.
NST also stated that it corrected the variability in the field values and SCADA values during the
23 Response, at 10.



checkout. NST admitted that “documentation improvements are needed and will be pursued,”24
with respect to field values and SCADA values records. Although NST stated it took corrective
action, I find that actions to address the variability in the field values and SCADA values, while
commendable, do not warrant reduction in the civil penalty because NST’s documentation does
not show that point-to-point verifications were conducted in accordance with § 195.446(c)(2).
Based on the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $58,400 for violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.446(c)(2).
Item 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $54,900 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.
§ 195.446(e)(3), for failing to provide records that verify the correct safety-related alarm set-
point values and alarm descr
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