{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320215002","title":"CCPS TRANSPORTATION, LLC — Notice of Probable Violation","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2021-02-10","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of probable violation citing 195.264(a), 195.264(b)(1)(i), 195.401(b)(1), 195.402(a), 195.420(b), 195.428(a), 195.430(a), 195.505(b), 195.52(a), 195.567(c), 195.573(a)(1), 195.573(c), 195.573(e), 195.581(a).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320215002.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320215002.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320215002","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320215002","body":"Notice of Probable Violation involving CCPS TRANSPORTATION, LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.264(a),  195.264(b)(1)(i),  195.401(b)(1),  195.402(a),  195.420(b),  195.428(a),  195.430(a),  195.505(b),  195.52(a),  195.567(c),  195.573(a)(1),  195.573(c),  195.573(e),  195.581(a). The case was opened on 2021-02-10 and is reported as closed as of 2022-06-22. Proposed civil penalty: $354,100. Assessed civil penalty: $282,900. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320215002_Closure Letter_06222022_(18-157171S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Closure%20Letter_06222022_(18-157171S).pdf\n\n320215002_Closure Letter_06222022_(18-157171S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Closure%20Letter_06222022_(18-157171S)_text.pdf\n\n320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Final%20Order_10122021_(18-157171S).pdf\n\n320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Final%20Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf\n\n320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_02102021.pdf\n\n320215002_NOPV PCP PCO_02102021_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_NOPV%20PCP%20PCO_02102021_text.pdf\n\n320215002_Operator Response to Notice_03112021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215002/320215002_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_03112021.pdf\n\n320215002_Final Order_10122021_(18-157171S)_text.pdf\n\nOctober 12, 2021\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: michael.koby@enbridge.com\nMr. Michael Koby\nVice President, U.S. Operations\nEnbridge Inc.\n5400 Westheimer Court\nHouston, Texas 77056\nRe: CPF No. 3-2021-5002\nDear Mr. Koby:\nEnclosed please find the Final Order issued in the above-referenced case. It makes findings of\nviolation, assesses a civil penalty of $282,900, and specifies actions that need to be taken by\nEnbridge Inc., to comply with the pipeline safety regulations. The penalty payment terms are set\nforth in the Final Order. When the civil penalty has been paid and the terms of the compliance\norder completed, as determined by the Director, Central Region, this enforcement action will be\nclosed. Service of the Final Order by e-mail is effective upon the date of transmission as\nprovided under 49 C.F.R. § 190.5.\nThank you for your cooperation in this matter.\nSincerely,\nAlan K. Mayberry\nAssociate Administrator\nfor Pipeline Safety\nEnclosure\ncc: Mr. Gregory A. Ochs, Director, Central Region, Office of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA\nMr. Dave Stafford, Manager, U.S. Pipeline Compliance, Enbridge Inc.,\ndavid.stafford@enbridge.com\nCONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED\n\n\n\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION\nPIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION\nOFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20590\n____________________________________\n)\nIn the Matter of )\n)\nEnbridge Inc., ) CPF No. 3-2021-5002\n)\nRespondent. )\n____________________________________)\nFINAL ORDER\nFrom March 5 to 9, April 2 to 6, May 7 to 11, May 21 to 25, June 11 to 15, and June 25 to 29,\n2018, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60117, representatives of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), inspected the records and\nfacilities of several subsidiaries of Enbridge Inc., (Enbridge or Respondent) namely, CCPS\nTransportation, LLC; Enbridge Storage (Cushing), LLC; Enbridge Storage (Patoka), LLC; and\nIllinois Extension Pipeline Company in Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, and Illinois. These\nfacilities include two tank farms with a total of 89 tanks and approximately 1,338 miles of crude\noil pipelines.\nAs a result of the inspection, the Director, Central Region, OPS (Director), issued to Respondent,\nby letter dated February 10, 2021, a Notice of Probable Violation, Proposed Civil Penalty, and\nProposed Compliance Order (Notice). In accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 190.207, the Notice\nproposed finding that Respondent had committed nine violations of 49 C.F.R. Part 195, proposed\nassessing a civil penalty of $354,100 for the alleged violations, and proposed ordering\nRespondent to take certain measures to correct the alleged violations. The Notice included an\nadditional five warning items pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 190.205, which required no further action,\nbut warned the operator to correct the probable violations or face possible future enforcement\naction.\nEnbridge responded to the Notice by letter dated March 11, 2021 (Response). Enbridge\ncontested some of the allegations, offered additional information in response to the Notice, and\nrequested that the proposed civil penalty be reduced. Enbridge did not request a hearing and\ntherefore has waived its right to one.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 2\nFINDINGS OF VIOLATION\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. Part 195, as follows:\nItem 2: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264, which states:\n§ 195.264 Impoundment, protection against entry, normal/emergency\nventing or pressure/vacuum relief for aboveground breakout tanks.\n(a) A means must be provided for containing hazardous liquids in the\nevent of spillage or failure of an above-ground breakout tank.\n(b) After October 2, 2000, compliance with paragraph (a) of this\nsection requires the following for the aboveground breakout tanks specified:\n(1) For tanks built to API Spec 12F, API Std 620, and others (such as\nAPI Std 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), the installation of\nimpoundment must be in accordance with the following sections of NFPA-\n30 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3);\n(i) Impoundment around a breakout tank must be installed in\naccordance with section 22.11.2;…\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264 by failing to provide a means\nfor containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout\ntanks built to American Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and\nothers (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), by installing impoundments\naround certain breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at Enbridge’s Cushing Tank Farm\nfacility. Specifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to install impoundments (i.e.,\nintermediate dikes) in accordance with section 22.11.2 of NFPA-30, a standard promulgated by\nthe National Fire Protection Association and incorporated by reference in 49 C.F.R. § 195.3.\nEnbridge did not contest this allegation of violation, the proposed civil penalty, or the proposed\ncompliance order associated with this Item. In its Response, Enbridge indicated that it had\nbegun work to remediate impoundment at the location and planned to complete work within six\nmonths of the Final Order. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that\nRespondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.264 by failing to provide a means for containing hazardous\nliquids in the event of spillage or failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to American\nPetroleum Institute (API) Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and others (such as API Standard\n650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)) at the Cushing Tank Farm.\nItem 3: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies….\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 3\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to follow its written procedure “09-03-02\nRemoving Water / Snow from Tank Roofs.” Step 5 of the procedure for Removing Water\nrequires operator personnel to “[m]onitor water from bottom drain valve for visible product for at\nleast 10 min checking drain valve every 30 min until draining is complete.” During the 2018\nPHMSA field inspection, however, Enbridge representatives stated that the Cushing Tank Farm\nfacility keeps all tank roof drains open at all times, including at night and on weekends. This\npractice is inconsistent with Enbridge’s procedure for Removing Water, specifically the\nmonitoring required under Step 5. Additionally, the practice of leaving the tank roof drains open\nat all times, including at night, conflicts with a specific warning in the procedure that states: “Do\nnot leave tank roof drains and firewall drains open…at night.”\nOn May 31, 2018, in response to OPS’ inquiries about Enbridge’s practice of draining tank roofs\nat the Cushing Tank Farm facility, Cushing staff stated that the practice of leaving the tank roof\ndrains open had been in place prior to Enbridge acquiring the facility. Cushing staff also stated\nthat the procedure would only apply to instances where the roof drain valve was closed.\nHowever, there is no indication in the procedure that it was limited to instances where the roof\ndrain valve was closed.\nIn its Response, Enbridge acknowledged that the Cushing Tank Farm failed to comply with the\nprocedure but asserted that the descriptive language in the Notice was incorrect because the\nCushing Tank Farm operation is now in alignment with other locations and no longer leaves tank\nroof drains open, and at no time are both the roof drains and dike drains open at the same time.\nFor this reason, Enbridge requested that this Item be reduced to a warning item with no civil\npenalty.\nHaving considered the Response, I find the record confirms that Enbridge failed to follow the\nprocedure. Although Enbridge has since discontinued its practice of leaving tank roof drains\nopen at the Cushing Tank Farm, this was the practice at the location at the time of PHMSA’s\ninspection in 2018. Therefore, there is no basis to withdraw this item or otherwise reduce it to a\nwarning. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting\nnormal operations and maintenance activities.\nItem 4: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 4\nSpecifically, Enbridge failed to follow its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves,”\nwhen testing pressure safety valves (PSVs). Procedure 03-07-03 sets forth a 14-step process for\ninspecting and testing PSVs that PHMSA inspectors witnessed Enbridge’s technicians not\nproperly following.\nEnbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with\nthis Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting\nnormal operations and maintenance activities.\nItem 5: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a), which states:\n§ 195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and\nemergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline\nsystem a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations\nand maintenance activities and handling abnormal operations and\nemergencies . . . .\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance activities.\nSpecifically, Enbridge failed to follow its procedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves”\nwhen checking pressure relief set points. Step 10 of the procedure for inspecting and testing\npressure relief/safety valves sets forth measures for checking pressure relief set points for the\nvalves, which includes recording the current pressure-relief setting as “Task” on the work order\nand then creating a follow-up work order to document the adjustments being made. However,\nEnbridge did not complete these specific measures under Step 10 of the procedure by failing to\ndocument the current “as found” relief pressures in the follow-up work orders.\nEnbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with\nthis Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a) by failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting\nnormal operations and maintenance activities.\nItem 6: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b), which states:\n§ 195.420 Valve maintenance.\n(a) . . . .\n(b) Each operator shall, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at\nleast twice each calendar year, inspect each mainline valve to determine that\nit is functioning properly.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.420(b) by failing to inspect each\nmainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months.\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge’s valve maintenance records demonstrated that\nseven valves had not been inspected at least twice each calendar year.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 5\nIn its Response, Enbridge acknowledged that the required inspection interval was not met for\nfive of the seven valves listed in the Notice. Enbridge stated “[v]alves meeting the definition of\nmainline valves and requiring semi-annual inspection are shaded orange on Exhibit NOPV-6,\nattached to this response. However, as shown in the exhibit, the two highlighted valves (TP-63-\nBV-1 and TP-63-CSV-12) are not shaded orange, and the required inspection frequency is three\nyears.” For these reasons, Enbridge requested that PHMSA amend the descriptive language for\nthis Item and reduce the civil penalty accordingly.\nBased on the additional information provided in the Response, and the Regional Director’s\nwritten evaluation of the response material submitted pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), I agree that\nthere were five, rather than seven missing mainline valve inspections, to be completed at\nintervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year, as required by\n§ 195.420(b).\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.420(b) by failing to inspect five mainline valves at least twice each calendar year, at\nintervals not exceeding 7 ½ months. I withdraw the allegation that there were an additional two\nmissed valve inspections.\nItem 7: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:\n§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator\nshall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, or in the case of pipeline used to carry highly volatile liquids, at\nintervals not to exceed 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year,\ninspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure\nregulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is\nfunctioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from\nthe standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in\nwhich it is used.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect each\nnon-highly volatile liquid (HVL) overpressure safety device at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year. Specifically, Enbridge failed to conduct 12\ninspections of overpressure safety devices on its system in 2016 and 2017.\nEnbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with\nthis Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to inspect each non-HVL overpressure safety device at\nintervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.\nItem 8: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a), which states:\n§ 195.428 Overpressure safety devices and overfill protection systems.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 6\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator\nshall, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar\nyear, or in the case of pipeline used to carry highly volatile liquids, at\nintervals not to exceed 7 ½ months, but at least twice each calendar year,\ninspect and test each pressure limiting device, relief valve, pressure\nregulator, or other item of pressure control equipment to determine that it is\nfunctioning properly, is in good mechanical condition, and is adequate from\nthe standpoint of capacity and reliability of operation for the service in\nwhich it is used.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to determine, over\na period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control devices on its non-HVL pipeline were\nadequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of operations for the service in which\nthey were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year.1\nSpecifically, the Notice alleged that Enbridge had missed a total of 159 inspections and tests of\nits overpressure safety devices to determine if they were adequate from the standpoint of\ncapacity, and Enbridge was not able to produce any records demonstrating that it had completed\nsuch determinations.\nEnbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with\nthis Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a) by failing to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-\ncontrol devices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and\nreliability of operations for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15\nmonths, but at least once each calendar year.\nItem 12: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), which states:\n§ 195.573 What must I do to monitor external corrosion control?\n(a) . . . .\n(c) Rectifiers and other devices. You must electrically check for proper\nperformance each device in the first column at the frequency stated in the\nsecond column.\nRectifier\nReverse current switch\nDiode\nDevice Check frequency\nAt least six times each calendar\nyear, but with intervals not\nexceeding 2 ½ months.\nInterference bond whose failure would\njeopardize structural protection\n1 These 53 devices were different from the ones cited in Item 7. Unlike the devices cited in Item 7 where\nRespondent primarily missed a single inspection in either 2016 or 2017, the 53 devices cited in Item 8 all had missed\ncapacity determinations and they were missing for consecutive years from 2016 to 2018.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 7\nOther interference bond\nAt least once each calendar year,\nbut with intervals not exceeding\n15 months.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c) by failing to electrically\ncheck for proper performance of rectifiers and critical bonds at least six times each calendar year,\nbut with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months. The Notice alleged that as identified during the\nPHMSA inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion control records, 11 checks were not completed on\nfour rectifiers and 13 checks were not completed on three critical bonds.\nIn its Response, Enbridge accepted the violation in part, and contested the violation in part, while\nnoting that there were mitigating factors. Additionally, Enbridge questioned the amount of the\nproposed civil penalty in relation to penalties to other operators for the same alleged violation.\nArguments in the Response for this Item were separately addressed for “Rectifiers” and “Critical\nBonds.”\nRectifiers\nEnbridge contested a portion of Item 12, which alleged that it failed to electrically check for\nproper performance of rectifiers at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not\nexceeding 2 ½ months. The Notice alleged that 11 checks were not completed on four rectifiers.\nEnbridge agreed that three of the 11 checks were not completed as alleged in the Notice, and\ncontested eight of the missing rectifier inspections by noting in its Response:\nThe subject rectifiers all have remote monitoring units installed on them for\nrecording automated measurements. When the remote monitoring unit is\nnot functioning properly, a technician is sent to the rectifier to repair the\nunit and obtain any voltage and amperage measurements required by the\nCFR. That data is then manually entered into the cathodic protection\ndatabase called PCS. In this case, when the remote monitoring units were\nnot operating properly a technician did visit the location and recorded the\nmeasurements in the logbook located at the rectifier. However, those\nmeasurements were not recorded in PCS.\nHaving considered the information submitted, I find the information does not demonstrate that\nRespondent was in compliance with § 195.573(c) at the time the violations were alleged to have\noccurred. During PHMSA’s inspection in 2018, records collected indicated gaps between\nrequired checks on each of the four rectifiers. In particular, Exhibit M of the Violation Report\ncontains the Enbridge Energy Rectifier Inspection Report showing the following gaps that do not\ncomply with the 2 ½-month interval in § 195.573(c): (1) L63 MP 71.62 from December 15, 2016\nto May 9, 2017; (2) Patoka MP 120 from December 30, 2016 to July 13, 2017; (3) Patoka MP\n5347 from January 1, 2017 to June 28, 2017; and (4) Patoka MP 5354 from June 21, 2016 to\nApril 19, 2017.\nDespite this evidence of noncompliance, Respondent contended that checks were performed at\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 8\nrequisite intervals during those gaps. For several reasons, I find Respondent has not rebutted the\nevidence of noncompliance. First, Respondent’s contention conflicts with its own records. The\nEnbridge Energy Rectifier Inspection Report demonstrates that no readings were taken during\nthese gaps. PHMSA’s inspection occurred over a year after the checks were missed and at that\ntime Respondent’s records still reflected that no check had been performed. There is no\nevidence in the record that checks took place during the gaps besides Respondent’s own\nassertion. Respondent provided a table of measurements purported to be from a logbook but\nprovided no copy of the logbook and no contemporaneous records of the checks. The table\nprovided was not contemporarily signed, dated, and does not otherwise provide any proof that\nthe measurements were recorded at the time these checks were performed. Moreover,\nRespondent provided this information more than three years after PHMSA brought the\nnoncompliance to Respondent’s attention during the inspection.\nFinally, as Respondent explained in its Response, its process of performing checks when a\nremote monitoring unit is not functioning properly, as it was in the case of all four rectifiers,\ninvolves a technician repairing the unit, taking readings, and entering the data into the cathodic\nprotection database. Despite Respondent’s assertion that checks were performed at intervals of\n2 ½ months, the evidence demonstrates Respondent never entered any data into the cathodic\nprotection database at that time or even by the time PHMSA conducted an inspection a year\nlater. Therefore, Respondent did not follow its process for performing checks.\nFor these reasons, the information Enbridge provided in their Response is not sufficient to show\nthat they performed the required checks under § 195.573.\nCritical Bonds\nThe Notice alleged that Enbridge failed to electrically check for the proper performance of\ncritical interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding\n2 ½ months. As identified during PHMSA’s inspection of Enbridge’s corrosion control records,\n13 checks were allegedly not completed on three critical bonds. Enbridge contested all 13\nmissing critical bond inspections by noting in its Response:\nBond current measurements at MP 423.5056, MP 423.5056A and\n423.5056B were incorrectly identified as “Critical” bonds in the PCS\ndatabase where Enbridge records cathodic protection data. These three\nlocations should have been identified as “Informational” bonds as they are\nnot interference bonds between Enbridge and Magellan, but are bonds tied\ninto a common bus bar with Magellan. These three locations are current\nmeasurements between the three Magellan structures and read for\ninformational purposes only.\nBased on a review of the Response, and the Regional Director’s written evaluation of the\nresponse material submitted pursuant to § 190.209(b)(7), I find that these bonds were not critical\nbonds under § 195.573(c). Therefore, I withdraw from this item the 13 alleged instances of\nviolation for a failure to check the proper performance of critical interference bonds.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 9\nAccordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.573(c) in 11 instances by failing to electrically check for proper performance of four\nrectifiers at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 2 ½ months.\nFurther, I withdraw the 13 alleged instances of violation for a failure to check critical\ninterference bonds.\nItem 14: The Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a), which states:\n§ 195.581 Which pipelines must I protect against atmospheric\ncorrosion and what coating material may I use?\n(a) You must clean and coat each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is\nexposed to the atmosphere, except pipelines under paragraph (c) of this\nsection.\nThe Notice alleged that Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to provide\nprotection against atmospheric corrosion by cleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of\npipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere. Specifically, during the field inspection of\nEnbridge’s Concordia Station, the Notice alleged that PHMSA observed that the coating had dis-\nbonded and/or flaked at the pipe-to-soil transitions on both unit sump drain lines.\nEnbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with\nthis Item. Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I find that Respondent violated\n49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a) by failing to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by\ncleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere.\nThese findings of violation will be considered prior offenses in any subsequent enforcement\naction taken against Respondent.\nASSESSMENT OF PENALTY\nUnder 49 U.S.C. § 60122, Respondent is subject to an administrative civil penalty not to exceed\n$200,000 per violation for each day of the violation, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 for any\nrelated series of violations.2\nIn determining the amount of a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 C.F.R. § 190.225, I\nmust consider the following criteria: the nature, circumstances, and gravity of the violation,\nincluding adverse impact on the environment; the degree of Respondent’s culpability; the history\nof Respondent’s prior offenses; any effect that the penalty may have on its ability to continue\ndoing business; the good faith of Respondent in attempting to comply with the pipeline safety\nregulations; and self-disclosure or actions to correct a violation prior to discovery by PHMSA.\nIn addition, I may consider the economic benefit gained from the violation without any reduction\nbecause of subsequent damages, and such other matters as justice may require. The Notice\nproposed a total civil penalty of $354,100 for the violations cited above.\n2 These amounts are adjusted annually for inflation. See 49 C.F.R. § 190.223.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 10\nItem 2: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $29,700 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.264, for failing to provide a means for containing hazardous liquids in the event of spillage\nor failure of above-ground breakout tanks built to API Specification 12F, API Standard 620 and\nothers (such as API Standard 650 (or its predecessor Standard 12C)), by installing impoundments\naround certain breakout tanks built after October 2, 2000, at Respondent’s Cushing Tank Farm.\nEnbridge did not contest the violation or the proposed civil penalty. Based upon the foregoing, I\nassess Respondent a civil penalty of $29,700 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.264.\nItem 3: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities. Enbridge requested the alleged violation be reduced to a\nwarning, but for the reasons stated above, I rejected this request. Respondent did not otherwise\nprovide information to mitigate the civil penalty. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent\na civil penalty of $19,000 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).\nItem 4: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,600 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities, by failing to properly follow the 14-step process in its\nprocedure “03-07-03 Pressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Enbridge did not contest this allegation of\nviolation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I\nassess Respondent a civil penalty of $19,600 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).\nItem 5: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $16,500 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.402(a), for failing to follow its own manual of written procedures for conducting normal\noperations and maintenance activities, for failing to complete Step 10 of its procedure “03-07-03\nPressure Relief / Safety Valves.” Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the\nproposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent\na civil penalty of $16,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.402(a).\nItem 6: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $21,000 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.420(b), for failing to inspect each mainline valve at least twice each calendar year, at\nintervals not exceeding 7 ½ months. As discussed in more detail above, Respondent provided\nadditional information in its Response indicating that there were five, rather than seven missing\nmainline inspections, to be completed at intervals not exceeding 7 ½ months, but at least twice\neach calendar year, therefore reducing the instances of violation from seven to five. Based upon\nthe foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty of $20,300 for violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.420(b).\nItem 7: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $22,800 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n§ 195.428(a), for failing to inspect each non-HVL overpressure safety device at least once each\ncalendar year at intervals not exceeding 15 months. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of\nviolation or the proposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I\nassess Respondent a civil penalty of $22,800 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a).\nItem 8: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $36,200 for Respondent’s violation of 49 C.F.R.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 11\n§ 195.428(a), for failing to determine, over a period of three years, whether 53 pressure-control\ndevices on its non-HVL pipeline were adequate from the standpoint of capacity and reliability of\noperation for the service in which they were used, at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at\nleast once each calendar year. Enbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the\nproposed civil penalty associated with this Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent\na civil penalty of $36,200 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.428(a).\nItem 12: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $170,0003 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c), for failing to electrically check for proper performance of rectifiers and\ncritical interference bonds at least six times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding\n2 ½ months. For the reasons stated above, the penalty assessment is reduced based on the\nwithdrawal of 13 instances, resulting in a reduction of instances of violation from 23 to 10.\nRespondent also noted in its Response that “the proposed penalty amount for violating this\nstandard is not in line with penalties issued to other operators for alleged violations of the same\nstandard, which also warrants a reduction in the penalty.” PHMSA calculates the penalty\namount for the individual circumstances based on multiple factors. With regard to the nature of\nthe violation, Item 12 was an activities violation for a failure to complete proper performance\nchecks. With regard to circumstances, the violation was discovered by PHMSA. With regard to\ngravity, there were 10 instances of the violation, and the violation occurred within a high\nconsequence area (HCA) or “could affect” HCA. With regard to culpability, Enbridge failed to\ncomply with an applicable requirement. Lastly, there were no aggravating or mitigating factors\nconsidered for Item 12. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a reduced civil penalty\nof $99,500 for violation of 49 C.F.R. § 195.573(c).\nItem 14: The Notice proposed a civil penalty of $19,300 for Respondent’s violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a), for failing to provide protection against atmospheric corrosion by\ncleaning and coating each pipeline or portion of pipeline that is exposed to the atmosphere.\nEnbridge did not contest this allegation of violation or the proposed civil penalty associated with\nthis Item. Based upon the foregoing, I assess Respondent a civil penalty of $19,300 for violation\nof 49 C.F.R. § 195.581(a).\nIn summary, having reviewed the record and considered the assessment criteria for each of the\nItems cited above, I assess Respondent a total civil penalty of $282,900.\nPayment of the civil penalty must be made within 20 days of service. Federal regulations\n(49 C.F.R. § 89.21(b)(3)) require such payment to be made by wire transfer through the Federal\nReserve Communications System (Fedwire), to the account of the U.S. Treasury. Detailed\ninstructions are contained in the enclosure. Questions concerning wire transfers should be\ndirected to: Financial Operations Division (AMK-325), Federal Aviation Administration, Mike\nMonroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 S MacArthur Blvd, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 79169.\nThe Financial Operations Division telephone number is (405) 954-8845.\n3 While the Notice alleged a total of 24 instances of violation, the proposed civil penalty for Item 12 was calculated\nbased on only 23 instances of violation. The 13 instances of violation for an alleged failure to check the proper\nperformance of critical interference bonds has been subtracted from the 23 alleged instances of violation, resulting in\n10 remaining instances of violation for Item 12.\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 12\nFailure to pay the $282,900 civil penalty will result in accrual of interest at the current annual\nrate in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3717, 31 C.F.R. § 901.9 and 49 C.F.R. § 89.23. Pursuant to\nthose same authorities, a late penalty charge of six percent (6%) per annum will be charged if\npayment is not made within 110 days of service. Furthermore, failure to pay the civil penalty\nmay result in referral of the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action in a district\ncourt of the United States.\nCOMPLIANCE ORDER\nThe Notice proposed a compliance order with respect to Item 2 in the Notice for a violation of\n49 C.F.R. § 195.264. Under 49 U.S.C. § 60118(a), each person who engages in the\ntransportation of hazardous liquids or who owns or operates a pipeline facility is required to\ncomply with the applicable safety standards established under chapter 601. Pursuant to the\nauthority of 49 U.S.C. § 60118(b) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.217, Respondent is ordered to take the\nfollowing actions to ensure compliance with the pipeline safety regulations applicable to its\noperations:\n1. With respect to the violation of § 195.264 (Item 2), Respondent must install\nintermediate berms in accordance with NFPA-30 for the containment areas in the\nCushing Tank Farm facility identified in Item 2 of the Notice.\n2. Respondent must correct these inadequacies and supply evidence of drawings and\nphotos to the Director, Central Region, OPS, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety\nAdministration, within six months of issuance of the Final Order.\nThe Director may grant an extension of time to comply with any of the required items upon a\nwritten request timely submitted by the Respondent and demonstrating good cause for an\nextension.\nPHMSA requests that Respondent maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs\nassociated with fulfilling this Compliance Order and submit the total to the Director. It is\nrequested that these costs be reported in two categories: (1) total cost associated with\npreparation/revision of plans, procedures, studies and analyses; and (2) total cost associated with\nreplacements, additions and other changes to pipeline infrastructure.\nFailure to comply with this Order may result in the administrative assessment of civil penalties\nnot to exceed $200,000, as adjusted for inflation (see 49 C.F.R. § 190.223), for each violation for\neach day the violation continues or in referral to the Attorney General for appropriate relief in a\ndistrict court of the United States.\nWARNING ITEMS\nWith respect to Items 1, 9, 10, 11 and 13, the Notice alleged probable violations of Part 195, but\nidentified them as warning items pursuant to § 190.205. The warnings were for:\n\n\n\nCPF No. 3-2021-5002\nPage 13\n49 C.F.R. § 195.52(a) (Item 1) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to give notice at\nthe earliest practicable moment, but no later than one hour after confirmed\ndiscovery, to the National Response Center following the release of\napproximately 10 barrels of crude oil and the shutdown of Enbridge’s Line 63,\nwhich Enbridge reported 2 hours and 10 minutes after confirmed discovery;\n49 C.F.R. § 195.430(a) (Item 9) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to perform an\nannual inspection of firefighting equipment at the Patoka facility in 2016, as\nspecified by its procedures, to ensure the equipment was in proper operating\ncondition at all times;\n49 C.F.R. § 195.505(b) (Item 10) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to follow its\nown written qualification program for ensuring through evaluation that\nindividuals performing covered tasks were qualified when two individuals\nperformed a covered task without being qualified;\n49 C.F.R. § 195.567(c) (Item 11) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to maintain\nseven test lead wires in a condition that would enable the operator to obtain\nelectrical measurements to determine whether cathodic protection on the pipeline\ncomplied with § 195.571;\n49 C.F.R. §§ 195.573(e) (Item 13) ─ Respondent’s alleged failure to correct\ndeficiencies in corrosion control at ","truncated":true,"body_characters":74032}