{"operation":"document","citation":"CPF 320215004M","title":"NST EXPRESS LLC — Notice of Amendment","source_type":"enforcement","agency":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","status":"historical","official":true,"published_on":"2021-02-09","effective_on":null,"summary":"CLOSED notice of amendment citing 195.402(a), 195.446(a), 195.446(b)(1), 195.446(e)(1), 195.446(e)(3), 195.452(a)(3), 195.452(b)(4)(i), 195.452(j)(5), 195.452(l)(1)(ii), 195.505(a), 195.505(g).","machine_formats":{"json":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320215004m.json","markdown":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320215004m.md"},"app_url":"https://regulus.evalyn.ai/document/phmsa-enforcement-320215004m","source_url":"https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-data/case/320215004M","body":"Notice of Amendment involving NST EXPRESS LLC. PHMSA's enforcement data identifies the cited regulations as 195.402(a),  195.446(a),  195.446(b)(1),  195.446(e)(1),  195.446(e)(3),  195.452(a)(3),  195.452(b)(4)(i),  195.452(j)(5),  195.452(l)(1)(ii),  195.505(a),  195.505(g). The case was opened on 2021-02-09 and is reported as closed as of 2022-12-02. Open the official case record for notices, responses, orders, and the latest status.\n\nOfficial case documents:\n\n320215004M_Closure Letter_12022022_(17-156729S).pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215004M/320215004M_Closure%20Letter_12022022_(17-156729S).pdf\n\n320215004M_Closure Letter_12022022_(17-156729S)_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215004M/320215004M_Closure%20Letter_12022022_(17-156729S)_text.pdf\n\n320215004M_Notice of Amendment_02092021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215004M/320215004M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_02092021.pdf\n\n320215004M_Notice of Amendment_02092021_text.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215004M/320215004M_Notice%20of%20Amendment_02092021_text.pdf\n\n320215004M_Operator Response to Notice_03022021.pdf: https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/320215004M/320215004M_Operator%20Response%20to%20Notice_03022021.pdf\n\n320215004M_Notice of Amendment_02092021_text.pdf\n\nNOTICE OF AMENDMENT\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: mhummel@northstarmidstream.com ,\ntsullivan@northstarmidstream.com, pbautista@northstarmidstream.com\nFebruary 9, 2021\nMcMillian Hummel\nPresident / CEO\nNST Express LLC\n10077 Grogans Mill Road, Suite 530\nThe Woodlands, TX 77380\nCPF 3-2021-5004M\nDear Mr. Hummel:\nFrom January 29, 2018 through September 21, 2018, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United\nStates Code, inspected NST Express LLC’s (NST) programs, procedures, plans and records for\nthe Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Manual, Operator Qualification (OQ) program, Control\nRoom Management (CRM) Manual, and the Integrity Management Plan (IMP) in The\nWoodlands, TX.\nOn the basis of the inspection, PHMSA has identified the apparent inadequacies found within\nNST’s plans or procedures, as described below:\n1. §195.402 Procedural manual for operations, maintenance, and emergencies.\n(a) General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline system a\n\n\n\nmanual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance\nactivities and handling abnormal operations and emergencies. This manual shall be\nreviewed at intervals not exceeding 15 months, but at least once each calendar year,\nand appropriate changes made as necessary to insure that the manual is effective.\nThis manual shall be prepared before initial operations of a pipeline system\ncommence, and appropriate parts shall be kept at locations where operations and\nmaintenance activities are conducted.\nNST’s O&M Manual (dated February 15, 2018) is inadequate because it contains incorrect\nreferences and does not address different types of overpressure protective devices. First, the\nTable of Contents (Itemized) located at the beginning of the O&M Manual does not correlate\nwith the specifics noted in Section 18 Forms Table of Contents. Section 18 of the O&M Manual\nhas a separate Forms Table of Contents. Specifically, Form 18.8(a) Rectifier Inspection Form,\nForm 18.8(b) Rectifier Maintenance Form, and Form 18.8(c) Critical Bond Inspection Form are\ndenoted for rectifier O&M activities in Section 18 of the O&M Manual. However, only one of\nthese three forms are listed in the Table of Contents (Itemized) located at the beginning of the\nO&M Manual. Additionally, the one form that is referenced in the Table of Contents (Itemized)\nis referenced incorrectly, specifically Form 18.8 is listed at the beginning of the O&M Manual as\nRectifier Maintenance Report, which is Form 18.8(b).\nFurther, Section 10.6 Rectifier Inspections in the O&M Manual contains a reference to Form\n18.8 called Rectifier Inspection Form but this form is 18.8(a). The three forms that are included\nin the Forms Section 18 of the O&M (Form 18.8(a) Rectifier Inspection Form, Form 18.8(b)\nRectifier Maintenance Form, and Form 18.8(c) Critical Bond Inspection Form) do not have\ncorresponding reference in Section 10.6 regarding when and how the forms should be used. All\nthree of the forms require clarification on maintenance requirements (when to use and what is\nrequired to be populated for the step by step instruction).\nSecond, the O&M Manual is inadequate because it references forms that are not included in\nSection 5.4 Pressure Limiting Device Inspections. Section 5.4 references the use of Form 18.4,\nwhich is included in the O&M Section 18 Forms Table of Contents as the Safety Device\nInspection. However, Form 18.4 does not exist in the actual forms provided in Section 18.\nInstead, Section 18 includes Form 18.4(a) Pressure Limiting Device Inspection, Form 18.4(b)\nPressure Switch Calibration, and Form 18.4(c) Pressure and Temperature Transmitter\nCalibration. Again, all three of these forms require clarification on maintenance requirements\n(when to use and what is required to be populated for the step by step instruction).\nFurther, Section 5.4 Pressure Limiting Device Inspection in the O&M Manual is inadequate\nbecause it does not address different types of overpressure protective devices. NST uses pressure\ntransmitters, pressure switches, and pressure limiting devices such as thermal reliefs. NST’s\nAlexander and East Fairview stations incorporate pressure transmitters and pressure switches in\ntheir control narratives. However, NST’s Form 18.4(a) does not allow for the pressure\ntransmitters range to be recorded nor does it allow for pressure switch and pressure transmitter\n“as found” and “as left” pressure values to be recorded. Forms 18.4(b) and 18.4(c) would allow\nthis data to be recorded, but as noted above, these forms are not referenced with specifics about\nwhen these individual forms should be utilized.\n2\n\n\n\nAdditionally, the O&M Manual contains incorrect references to the section on Abnormal\nOperating Conditions (AOCs). Throughout the O&M Manual other sections refer to Section 2.6\nAbandoning Pipeline Facilities (for example, 4.2 Inspection Frequency). However, these\nreferences to 2.6 should be amended to Section 2.7 Abnormal Operating Conditions.\nFurther, NST’s O&M Manual references control room, SCADA and controller in the definitions\nSection 1.8, but nothing further is found for these terms in the O&M Manual. The O&M\nreferences control center rather than control room in Section 2.4 Communications. The O&M\nManual also references the term contract operator in several sections, including Section 2\nregarding abnormal operations procedures. The operator confirmed verbally during the\ninspection that the contract operator for the control room was ROC (Remote Operations Center).\nThe operator also confirmed verbally during the inspection that the control room management\nprocedures utilized for NST’s pipeline facilities (assets) was the 2018 ROC CRM Manual.\nHowever, the O&M Manual did not address how integration of procedures between the O&M\nManual and applicable control room management plan (as identified by NST during the\ninspection) would be accomplished.\nFurther, NST’s O&M procedures are inadequate because points that can impacts safety relevant\nto control room management are not identified. NST’s O&M procedures do include safety\ndevices, alarming, and associated responses related to alarms. Without identifying points that can\nimpact safety, the points specific to NST regulated pipeline facilities utilized by the control room\nrequired to have a point-to-point verification conducted between SCADA displays and related\nfield equipment when field equipment is added or moved are unknown [195.446(c)(2)]. NST\nmust amend its O&M Manual to adequately identify points that can impact safety (safety related\npoints) so that procedures are clear as to when point to point verifications will be conducted\nbetween SCADA displays and related field equipment.\nTherefore, NST must amend its O&M Manual to address the incorrect references described\nabove, provide the specifics for when various forms should be utilized for O&M tasks, and\nprovide missing step by step instructions for the various maintenance tasks when using the\nincluded forms. NST must also amend its O&M Manual to consistently address those functions\nrelevant to coordination with NST and the control room that operates NST regulated pipeline\nfacilities, provide required emergency response coordination, identify points related to safety\nrelevant to control room operations, and address how procedures are integrated between §§\n195.402 and 195.446.\n3\n\n\n\n2. §195.446 Control room management.\n(a) General. This section applies to each operator of a pipeline facility with a\ncontroller working in a control room who monitors and controls all or part of a\npipeline facility through a SCADA system. Each operator must have and follow\nwritten control room management procedures that implement the requirements of\nthis section. The procedures required by this section must be integrated, as\nappropriate, with the operator's written procedures required by § 195.402. An\noperator must develop the procedures no later than August 1, 2011, and must\nimplement the procedures according to the following schedule. The procedures\nrequired by paragraphs (b), (c)(5), (d)(2) and (d)(3), (f) and (g) of this section must\nbe implemented no later than October 1, 2011. The procedures required by\nparagraphs (c)(1) through (4), (d)(1), (d)(4), and (e) must be implemented no later\nthan August 1, 2012. The training procedures required by paragraph (h) must be\nimplemented no later than August 1, 2012, except that any training required by\nanother paragraph of this section must be implemented no later than the deadline\nfor that paragraph.\n(b) Roles and responsibilities. Each operator must define the roles and\nresponsibilities of a controller during normal, abnormal, and emergency operating\nconditions. To provide for a controller's prompt and appropriate response to\noperating conditions, an operator must define each of the following: (1) (1) A\ncontroller's authority and responsibility to make decisions and take actions during\nnormal operations;\nNST provided a control room management manual (2018 ROC CRM Manual1) as the procedures\nrelevant to operation of NST’s regulated pipeline facilities. These control room management\nprocedures are inadequate because the roles and responsibilities of the controllers identified in\nthe CRM procedures are not specific to NST. Specifically, Section 3 Responsibilities in the\n2018 ROC CRM Manual is generic and does not provide roles and responsibilities of a controller\nfor normal, abnormal and emergency operating conditions specific to NST.\nNST must provide amendments to the control room management procedures relevant to\noperation of NST’s regulated pipeline facilities to ensure the roles and responsibilities of\napplicable controllers are specifically defined for NST’s regulated pipeline facilities for normal,\nabnormal and emergency operating conditions.\n1 Remote Operations Center (ROC) is a control room contract operator that operates portions of NST’s assets.\n4\n\n\n\n3. §195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . .\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) Review SCADA safety-related alarm operations using a process that ensures\nalarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations;\nNST provided a control room management manual (2018 ROC CRM Manual) as the control\nroom procedures relevant to operation of NST’s regulated pipeline facilities during the\ninspection. The CRM manual is inadequate regarding alarm management, contains incorrect\nreferences, conflicts with the NST O&M, and requires amendment.\nSpecifically, the 2018 ROC CRM manual references Section 8.7.6 Reporting Alarm\nProblems/Malfunctions multiple times; however, there is no Section 8.7.6. The correct section is\nSection 8.9.6 Reporting Alarm Problems/Malfunctions. Also, the reference included in the 2018\nROC CRM Manual of 8.3.1 Safety-Related Alarms and Points found in Section 8.9.7 is incorrect\nas this does not exist. The correct Section is Section 8.6 Safety-related Alarms and Points.\nAdditionally, NST’s O&M Defines Alarm in Section 1.8 Definitions as an audible or visual\nmeans of indicating to the controller that equipment or processes are outside operation-defined,\nsafety-related parameters. The O&M Section 2.7.6 Activation of a Safety Device considers any\nalarm that activates during system operations an abnormal operating condition (AOC) and\nfurther indicates this may include but are not limited to, high or low pressure alarms, temperature\nalarms, and flow alarms. Furthermore, this section requires alarm verification to ensure\ncontinued safety and integrity of the pipeline system, as well as to identify and correct the\ncondition that caused the alarm (see the picture of this portion of the manual below):\nNST’s O&M further mentions alarms in Section 13.4 and describes the potential of intrusion\nalarms.\n5\n\n\n\nConversely, Section 8.6 Safety-Related Alarms and Setpoints of the 2018 ROC CRM Manual\nprovides a definition for safety related point, which is a SCADA point necessary to maintain\npipeline integrity or that could lead to the recognition of a condition that could impact the\nintegrity of the pipeline, or a developing abnormal or emergency situation. And then identifies\nthe safety related alarms for these various points. These SCADA Points and Alarms identified in\nthe 2018 ROC CRM Manual are listed in the table in Section 8.6 (Page 8-4) and presented\nbelow:\nFigure 1 Safety Related Points\nFigure 2 Safety Related Alarmsl\nNST’s O&M procedures are inadequate because sections of procedures conflict as presented in\nthe 2018 ROC CRM Manual regarding safety related alarms and points. In addition, the 2018\nROC CRM Manual also does not reference the potential of intrusion alarms as safety-related.\nNST must provide amendments to the Control Room Management procedures that eliminate\nincorrect references, and eliminate the conflict between the O&M Manual provided and the\nControl Room Management procedures. The alarm management portion of the CRM procedures\nprovided by the operator requires amendment to be integrated with the NST O&M manual to\nensure that alarms are accurate and support safe pipeline operations.\n6\n\n\n\n4. §195.446 Control room management.\n(a) . . .\n(e) Alarm management. Each operator using a SCADA system must have a written\nalarm management plan to provide for effective controller response to alarms. An\noperator's plan must include provisions to:\n(1) . . .\n(3) Verify the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions\nwhen associated field instruments are calibrated or changed and at least once each\ncalendar year, but at intervals not to exceed 15 months;\nNST provided a control room management manual (2018 ROC CRM Manual) as the control\nroom procedures relevant to operation of NST’s regulated pipeline facilities during the\ninspection. NST’s CRM Manual (provided during the inspection) is inadequate because it does\nnot have a plan for the verification of the correct safety-related alarm set-point values and\ndescriptors for effective controller response when field instruments are calibrated, changed or\nduring other reviews required under §195.446(e)(3).\nThe 2018 ROC CRM Manual provided by the operator does not ensure NST personnel are\ninvolved in the review of the plan and that NST verifies correct alarm set-point values and\ndescriptors.\nNST must provide amendments to the Control Room Management procedures to include\nverification by NST of correct safety-related alarm set-point values and alarm descriptions\nimplemented by the control room when associated field instruments are calibrated, changed, or\nwhen conducting required reviews.\n5. § 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas\n(a) Which pipelines are covered by this section? This section applies to each\nhazardous liquid pipeline and carbon dioxide pipeline that could affect a high\nconsequence area, including any pipeline located in a high consequence area unless\nthe operator effectively demonstrates by risk assessment that the pipeline could not\naffect the area. (Appendix C of this part provides guidance on determining if a\npipeline could affect a high consequence area.) Covered pipelines are categorized as\nfollows:\n(1) . . .\n(3) Category 3 includes pipelines constructed or converted after May 29, 2001.\nNST’s IMP Section 2.2 Direct Intersection of Pipelines and HCAs does not adequately identify\nall pipelines that could affect an HCA. PHMSA reviewed “Northstar Midstream Services\nCompany, LLC – Liquid HCA Analysis” dated June 29, 2018 (2018 Analysis) and noted that\nAlexander Junction, a regulated pipeline facility and pump station, was determined to be in a\n7\n\n\n\ncould affect HCA at the time of the inspection. However, IMP Section 2.2 states that “Northstar\nhas (as part of this process) determined there are no jurisdictional terminals, pump stations or\nother facilities that directly intersect an HCA.” Section 2.2 further stated that “Northstar will\ncontinually evaluate jurisdictional facilities to determine if they could potentially impact HCAs,”\nyet NST did not update its IMP to include the findings from its 2018 Analysis, specifically as it\nrelates to Alexander Junction. NST must amend its IMP to identify Alexander Junction or any\nother pipeline facility and pump stations that could affect an HCA.\n6. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline integrity?\nEach operator of a pipeline covered by this section must: . . .\n(1) . . .\n(4) Include in the program a framework that—\n(i) Addresses each element of the integrity management program under paragraph\n(f) of this section, including continual integrity assessment and evaluation under\nparagraph (j) of this section; and\nNST’s IMP is inadequate regarding continual integrity assessment and evaluation. Section 1.4\nIntegrity Management Team states that the IMT will continually verify and validate the risk\nassessment results, however, it is not clear how everyone on the IMT will be made aware of data\nrelated to integrity as it changes.\nSection 1.4 also indicates that the SVP of Operations will be the owner of the IMP and will\ndirect employees and manage the IMT accordingly. However, because information that may\nresult in necessary changes to the IMP is not routinely reviewed by the SVP of Operations, it is\nunclear in the IMP how the continual risk assessment and evaluation will be sufficiently\nmanaged.\nIn addition, the IMP plan does not identify who will call the Integrity Management Team (IMT)\nmeetings designed to review data that could impact the risk and continual assessment for the\npipeline.\nNST must amend its IMP to clarify how data changes that could impact risk, continual integrity\nassessment and evaluation will be managed, and identify who will call IMT meetings.\n8\n\n\n\n7. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\nintegrity?\n(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline's\n(1) . . .\n(5) Assessment methods. An operator must assess the integrity of the line pipe by\nany of the following methods. The methods an operator selects to assess low\nfrequency electric resistance welded pipe or lap welded pipe susceptible to\nlongitudinal seam failure must be capable of assessing seam integrity and of\ndetecting corrosion and deformation anomalies.\n(i) In-Line Inspection tool or tools capable of detecting corrosion and deformation\nanomalies, including dents, gouges, and grooves. For pipeline segments that are\nsusceptible to cracks (pipe body and weld seams), an operator must use an in-line\ninspection tool or tools capable of detecting crack anomalies. When performing an\nassessment using an In-Line Inspection tool, an operator must comply with §\n195.591;\n(ii) Pressure test conducted in accordance with subpart E of this part;\n(iii) External corrosion direct assessment in accordance with § 195.588; or\n(iv) Other technology that the operator demonstrates can provide an equivalent\nunderstanding of the condition of the line pipe. An operator choosing this option\nmust notify OPS 90 days before conducting the assessment, by sending a notice to\nthe address or facsimile number specified in paragraph (m) of this section.\nNST’s IMP is inadequate because it contains inconsistent information regarding methods for\nassessing the integrity of line pipe in could affect HCAs. Specifically, Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2\nof NST’s IMP are in conflict. Figure 4.1 – Assessment Method Decision Process does not allow\nfor a piggable pipeline to use hydrotest as an appropriate assessment method. However, during\nthe inspection it was verbally communicated to PHMSA by the operator that a hydrotest could be\nused as a possible reassessment method. In response to inquiry about assessment methods in\nNST’s IMP, NST communicated to PHMSA verbally during the inspection that Figure 4.1 would\nbe removed, leaving Figure 4.2 to be used in the future. NST further indicated verbally that\nFigure 4.2 is used as the decision tree for making the reassessment method determination.\nTherefore, NST must amend its IMP to identify all assessment methods that it can utilized as part\nof the integrity management plan.\n9\n\n\n\n8. §195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.\n(a) . . .\n(l) What records must an operator keep to demonstrate compliance? —\n(1) An operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, records that\ndemonstrate compliance with the requirements of this subpart. At a minimum, an\noperator must maintain the following records for review during an inspection:\n(i) . . .\n(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to\nimplement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program listed in\nparagraph (f) of this section.\nNST’s IMP is inadequate because it does specify those documents that must be maintained for\nthe useful life of the pipeline to support decisions and analyses, including any modifications,\njustifications, deviations and determinations made, variances, and actions taken, to implement\nand evaluate each element of the integrity management program. For example, pursuant to\nNST’s IMP, Emergency Flow Restriction Device (EFRD) Analysis include cost estimates,\ncalculations and evaluations as described in Section 7.7 and 7.8 of the plan; however, these\nanalyses including decisions made were not clearly defined as records that would be documented\nin Section 9.6 Records.\nAdditionally, Section 9.6 Records only contains Table 9.1 Record Retention. Table 9.1 does not\nprovide adequate detail to identify all records to support decisions relevant to the integrity\nprogram as required by §195.425(l)(1)(ii).\nNST must amend its IMP to sufficiently identify all documents that support the decisions and\nanalyses, including justification for why something was not implemented along with other\nelements such as modifications, justifications for why something was done, deviations and\ndeterminations made, variances, and action taken to implement and evaluate each element of the\nintegrity management program.\n9. §195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and follow a written qualification program. The program\nshall include provisions to:\n(a) Identify covered tasks; . . .\nNST’s written Operator Qualification (OQ) program is inadequate because it does not\nappropriately identify covered tasks for its hazardous liquid pipelines. Specifically, Section 15.1\nContractors of the OQ program does not appropriately identify all covered tasks that are\nperformed as a requirement of 49 CFR Part 195. Section 15.1 states that “All personnel\n10\n\n\n\n(Northstar Management, contractor or subcontractor) working on Northstar pipelines must be\nqualified in accordance with 49CFR 192 Subpart N (gas pipelines)/49CFR Subpart G (liquid\npipelines) prior to performing any covered task listed in this plan. However, at the time of the\ninspection, NST did not own or operate any natural gas pipelines subject to the requirements of\n49 CFR Part 192.\nThe covered tasks identified in Section 8 of the OQ program and the associated AOCs had not all\nbeen written correctly to address the requirements for hazardous liquid pipelines under Part 195.\nFor example, in OQ covered task 34, the AOC identifies \"unexpected presence of gas\" but does\nnot reference an unexpected presence of liquid or hazardous vapor in the event of a leak.\nNST’s Form 16.3 Contractor Evaluation, question 7, in its OQ program contains references to\nSubpart N (49 CFR Part 192), but not Subpart G (49 CFR Part 195).\nNST must amend its written OQ program to ensure that its covered task list appropriately\nreferences covered tasks that are performed as a requirement of Part 195, including associated\nAOCs, as well as include a reference to Part 195, Subpart G in Form 16.3.\n10. §195.505 Qualification program.\nEach operator shall have and following a written qualification program. The\nprogram shall include provisions to:\n(a) . . .\n(g) Identify those covered tasks and the intervals at which evaluation of the\nindividual’s qualifications is needed; . . .\nNST’s written OQ program is inadequate as it does not provide sufficient detail regarding its\nqualification process. Specifically, the OQ program does not reference NST as the operator in\nSection 11.1 or clarify if Reliance is a third-party contractor to NST. In Section 11.1\nQualifications Intervals the program states “A Reliance representative will monitor qualifications\nfrequencies and schedule appropriate operator qualification assessments when needed.”\nAdditionally, Section 11 of the written OQ program describes a 3-year interval for qualifications\nand describes qualification for new hires, but does not make a distinction between initial\nqualification process and the re-qualification process for NST personnel performing covered\ntasks.\nNST must amend its written OQ program to identify what it will require for the evaluation\nintervals for the various covered tasks. If less than 3 years is identified for the requalification\ninterval, NST amend its procedures to include a process that describes how this interval of\nrequalification will also be accomplished. The written OQ program must reference NST as the\noperator or clarify if Reliance is a third-party contractor to NST.\n11\n\n\n\nResponse to this Notice\nThis Notice is provided pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 60108(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 190.206. Enclosed as\npart of this Notice is a document entitled Response Options for Pipeline Operators in\nEnforcement Proceedings. Please refer to this document and note the response options. Be\nadvised that all material you submit in response to this enforcement action is subject to being\nmade publicly available. If you believe that any portion of your responsive material qualifies for\nconfidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b), along with the complete original document you\nmust provide a second copy of the document with the portions you believe qualify for\nconfidential treatment redacted and an explanation of why you believe the redacted information\nqualifies for confidential treatment under 5 U.S.C. 552(b).\nFollowing the receipt of this Notice, you have 30 days to submit written comments, revised\nprocedures, or a request for a hearing under §190.211. If you do not respond within 30 days of\nreceipt of this Notice, this constitutes a waiver of your right to contest the allegations in this\nNotice and authorizes the Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety to find facts as alleged in\nthis Notice without further notice to you and to issue an Order Directing Amendment. If your\nplans or procedures are found inadequate as alleged in this Notice, you may be ordered to amend\nyour plans or procedures to correct the inadequacies (49 C.F.R. § 190.206). If you are not\ncontesting this Notice, we propose that you submit your amended procedures to my office within\n30 days of receipt of this Notice. This period may be extended by written request for good\ncause. Once the inadequacies identified herein have been addressed in your amended\nprocedures, this enforcement action will be closed.\nIt is requested (not mandated) that NST maintain documentation of the safety improvement costs\nassociated with fulfilling this Notice of Amendment (preparation/revision of plans, procedures)\nand submit the total to Greg Ochs, Director, Central Region, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\nSafety Administration. In correspondence concerning this matter, please refer to CPF 3-2021-\n5004M and, for each document you submit, please provide a copy in electronic format whenever\npossible.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\nEnclosure: Response Options for Pipeline Operators in Enforcement Proceedings\nCc: Thomas Sullivan, Vice President – Operations, NST Express,\ntsullivan@northstarmidstream.com,\nPablo Bautista, DOT Compliance, NST Express, pbautista@northstarmidstream.com\n12\n\n320215004M_Closure Letter_12022022_(17-156729S)_text.pdf\n\nVIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: mhummel@northstarmidstream.com;\ntsullivan@northstarmidstream.com; pbautista@northstarmidstream.com\nDecember 2, 2022\nMcMillian Hummel\nChief Executive Officer\nNST Express LLC\n10077 Grogans Mill Road, Suite 530\nThe Woodlands, Texas 77380\nRE: CPF 3-2021-5004M\nDear Mr. Hummel:\nFrom January 29, 2018, through September 21, 2018, a representative of the Pipeline and\nHazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), pursuant to Chapter 601 of 49 United\nStates Code, inspected NST Express LLC’s (NST) programs, procedures, plans, and records\nfor the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Manual, Operator Qualification (OQ) program,\nControl Room Management (CRM) Manual and the Integrity Management Plan (IMP) in\nThe Woodlands, Texas.\nRegarding the Control Room Management plan revisions, although the procedures had been\nworked through with NST and ROC in extensive detail, the CRM procedures relevant to the\nassets were changed and the third party control room was purchased by Everline Tech Ops,\nLLC (Everline). In addition, portions (to all) of the NST relevant assets were purchased by\nBayou Midstream (Bayou) in 2022. As a result, we are closing the case with the information\nsubmitted and are reviewing the procedures again with Everline in calendar year 2022 during\ninspection.\nPHMSA is aware that Bayou is in the process of engaging a different third-party control\nroom operator with different procedures than those used by Everline, and that this change\nwill be transpiring in later part of calendar year 2022 or early calendar year 2023.\nAs a result, PHMSA will be working through the CRM procedures for both Everline and\nBayou as a result of the 2022 inspection, and will review the 2023 relevant CRM procedures\nthrough inspection efforts.\nThis letter is to inform you that no further action is necessary, and this case is now closed.\n\n\n\nThank you for your cooperation.\nSincerely,\nGregory A. Ochs\nDirector, Central Region, OPS\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\ncc: Thomas Sullivan, Vice President – Operations, tsullivan@northstarmidstream.com,\nPablo Bautista, DOT Compliance, pbautista@northstarmidstream.com","truncated":false,"body_characters":31800}